JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a Miscellaneous (First) Appeal. The order being passed in this case shall also govern the disposal of the connected Miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 150 of 1970 (Ghanshyam Das Agrawal and others v. The Union of india and others), as both these appeals involve the same question of law. ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to the present appeal may be given in some detail in order to understand the point. There was a firm nirbhaya Ram dadu Ram. In this firm Dadu Ram, Nirbhaya Ram and Nathu Ram (one of the sons of Nirbhaya Ram) had one-fourth share each while one Dhani Ram and Purushottam Das (another son of Nirbhaya Ram) had one-sixteenth and three-sixteenth share respectively. Against this firm there was an income-tax liability of Rs. 39,530. 60. In proceedings for the recovery of this amount the tax recovery officer attached a house belonging to the joint family of Nirbhaya Ram and his sons. A different house was attached in each of the two cases. So far as the present appeal (No. 149 of 1970) is concerned an objection was filed by the appellants Ramakant Gupta and Rajendra Kumar Gupta, claiming that this house had come to their share along with their brother nathu Ram Agrawal (Respondent No. 3) on partition in the family, each of them having one-third share in the house. The objection was that since Nathu Ram alone was a partner in the firm, the two-third share belonging to the appellants Ramakant and Rajendra Kumar was not liable to attachment and sale. This objection was not accepted by the tax recovery officer and he by order dated 6th September 1965 directed that the whole house be attached. Against that order regular Civil Suit No. 7-A of 1965 was filed by the appellants in the Court of the Additional District judge, Raigarh. To that suit the Union of India, the State of Madhya Pradesh and Nathu Ram were made defendants. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiffs asked for an injunction under Order 39, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, restraining the defendants from putting their share of the house to auction. Such an injunction was refused by the Court below by order dated 7th August It 70. Against that order the present appeal has been filed, ( 3. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiffs asked for an injunction under Order 39, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, restraining the defendants from putting their share of the house to auction. Such an injunction was refused by the Court below by order dated 7th August It 70. Against that order the present appeal has been filed, ( 3. ) THE Court below has not gone into the merits of the case and has not decided upon the advisability of passing the order but has held that Order 39, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply to a suit where the plaintiff merely seeks a declaration; and since no property is involved in such a suit no injunction can be granted. Learned Judge of the lower Court has not quoted any authority on the basis of which he has come to that conclusion. ( 4. ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the parties have cited before me authorities on both sides. It appears that the Court below was misled into applying the principle laid down by Hon. Bose J. of the Nagpur High Court in fakira Mahadaji v. Rumsukhibai (1947 NLJ 43=air 1946 Nag 428 ). In that case the plaintiffs suit was for declaration of his right to certain lands. The learned Judge observed : "it will be seen that the suit does not arise out of any previous proceedings. It is an independent suit brought by the plaintiff against Sakhatsingh and Balu for a declaration that the fields in suit belong to the plaintiff and were not liable to sale in execution of sakhatsinghs decree in Civil Suit No. 14 of 1926. The Collector decided to proceed despite the suit and the plaintiff was unable to obtain an order for stay. Accordingly the fields were sold again on the 24th August 1945 and were purchased by certain auction purchasers who were represented. " In that suit an application was made for staying the confirmation of the sale in favour of the purchasers and the learned Judge was considering the propriety of making a stay order. In this connection the learned Judge observed : "as this is an application for stay, I am naturally not concerned with the merits. The short question before me is this. A obtained a decree against B and attached certain property. In this connection the learned Judge observed : "as this is an application for stay, I am naturally not concerned with the merits. The short question before me is this. A obtained a decree against B and attached certain property. C claimed that the property was his and A, without raising any objection in execution, straightway filed a suit for a declaration and did not seek the consequential relief of injunction. Now it is no part of my duty at this interlocutory stage to decide whether a suit for declaration simpliciter without any prayer for the consequential relief of injunction lies, nor do I attempt to do so. " It was in this situation that the learned Judge declined to issue a stay order. After dealing with the principles on which a staty order will be granted only to prevent a permanent injury the learned Judge went on to consider the provisions of Order 39, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed : "it only applies when any property in dispute is in danger. In a case for a declaration simpliciter there is, in my judgment, no property in dispute. Only an incorporeal right is litigated. The fight is not about the property but about the right to property. The property is only indirectly affected by the suit. If the property is in danger the proper course is to seek the appropriate relief and pay court-fees on it. " The judgment of the Court below indicates that it has followed this principle, as practically the same language has been used by it in its order, but it failed to notice that in the present case the declaration sought directly affected the property. The house had been attached and the objection to attachment had been dismissed and it was as a result of the declaration if granted in favour of the plaintiff that the attachment would cease to be effective. Thus in a case where a suit is filed under the provisions of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure code, or a similar provision as in the present case under Schedule II, rule 11 (6)of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the suit does relate to property and it does not merely claim rights to property. The property is directly affected by the result of the suit. Either the property gets released from attachment or becomes liable to sale. The property is directly affected by the result of the suit. Either the property gets released from attachment or becomes liable to sale. ( 5. ) THE distinction is clearly brought out in Madanlal v. Phoolchand and others (Civil Revn. No. 170 of 1961, decided on the 25th October 1961-1962 MPLJ Note 179 ). In that case Hon. Tare, J. has observed : "further in suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, the relief of a permanent injunction was wholly unnecessary. It was enough if temporary injunction was sought and the same was granted by the trial Court. In a declaratory suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, it was the ultimate judgment or the declaration that governed the rights of the parties. If it was held that the property was liable to attachment and sale then there was no question of any injunction. On the other hand, if the declaration was that the property was not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree, a permanent injunction was wholly unnecessary. By the grant of the declaration the decree became un-executable with reference to that particular property. " The position of law is so clear that it is unnecessary to multiply cases on the point. The Court below was obviously wrong in thinking that it had no jurisdiction to grant injunction under Order 39, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In any case, even if Order 39, rule 1 did not apply the Court had jurisdiction under section 151, Civil Procedure Code The Court was, therefore, wrong in refusing to go into the merits of the case. ( 6. ) IN the connected case [miscellaneous (First) Appeal No. 150 of 1970] the relevant point is exactly the same, although the plaintiffs are the other sons of Nirbhaya Ram and the property also is different. It is, however, unnecessary to go into facts of that case which decided on the same principle as laid down above. The impugned order in that case also is, therefore, liable to be set aside. ( 7. ) BOTH these appeals are accordingly allowed, the orders impugned there in are set aside and the cases are sent back for deciding the application for injunction in each case afresh on merits. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs in both these appeals. Appeals allowed.