JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - The Appellant was convicted u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(o) and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years under the first count, while no separate sentence was passed under the second by the special Judge, Bhubaneswar. On 16-1-1970, he filed this appeal and moved the Court for his release on bail pending disposal of the appeal. The Court ordered his release on bail of Rs. 2,000/- with two sureties for the like amount. On a subsequent petition of the Appellant which came up for orders on 5.3.1970, the previous order was modified to the effect that the sentence appealed against be suspended pending disposal of the appeal. The Appellant filed another petition on 17.4.1970 praying to clarify the previous order and direct that the, order of the trial Court appealed against convicting And sentencing him be suspended pending disposal of the appeal. This matter was moved in,my chamber and in modification of order No. 3 dated 5.3.1970, the following order was recorded on 17.4.1970: In modification of order No. 3 dated 5.3.1970, the order of conviction appealed against and the sentence imposed therein be suspended pending disposal of the appeal. 2. At the time of passing the latter two orders, learned Counsel for the State does not appear to have raised any objection. In another Cr.A. No. 7 of 1911 the Appellant therein moved a petition for passing an order in terms of aforementioned and the above order was cited as a precedent. The said matter came up before a Division Bench of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and myself and the prayer was rejected as untenable in law. That is bow the two orders passed on 5.3.1970 and 17.4.1970 respectively came to our notice and as some doubts arose about the correctness of those orders, the matter was directed to be put up in the presence of learned Counsel for both sides to consider if the aforementioned orders are in accordance with law or they require modification. 3. The correctness of the aforementioned orders will depend on a proper interpretation of Section 426(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The correctness of the aforementioned orders will depend on a proper interpretation of Section 426(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this provisions pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate Court is empowered firstly, to order suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against, and secondly, the appellate Court may also, if the convicted person is in confinement, order that he be released on bail. Thus, in short, the two powers conferred on the appellate Court are suspension of the sentence or order appealed against and also release of the Appellant on bail, if he is in confinement. It is conceded by Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for Appellant that under this provision the appellate Court has no power to suspend the order of conviction. Therefore, order No. 4 dated 17-4-1910 to the extent it purports to suspend the order of conviction appealed against was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and has to be recalled. 4. The next point is whether in cases where an appellate Court orders release of the Appellant on bail, it is necessary to suspend execution of the sentence. 5. The words "and, also" occurring in Section 426(1) Code of Criminal Procedure clearly indicate that these are two distinct powers independent of each other. In a given case, the Court may order suspension of the sentence without releasing the accused on bail or he may be released on bail without ordering suspension of execution of the sentence. In the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in State Vs. Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati, while dealing with the question of an order of suspension of sentence under Article 161 of the Constitution, their Lordships observed that there is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. This finds support from the following observations of the Privy Council in AIR 1945 94 (Privy Council) . A power to grant bail to convicted persons would, if exercised, interrupt the serving of the sentence the period of bail might even cover the whole of its term. A power to grant bail would not include a power to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence that this is so is shown by the fact that it was necesary to enact the special provision which is contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 426 of the Code. A power to grant bail would not include a power to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence that this is so is shown by the fact that it was necesary to enact the special provision which is contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 426 of the Code. Under Sub-section (3), when the appeal fails, the time during which the accused is released on bail under the section should be excluded in computing the term for which he is sentenced. This consequence occurs in cases where the Appellant is released, on bail and not in cases where the sentence is suspended without release of the Appellant on bail. In the decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Shaikh Karim v. Emperor AIR 1926 Nag. 279, dealing with the effect of suspension of sentence, it was observed: If the appeal finally fails, the convicted person only serves the original period of his sentences less the period of suspension. So, such, and order should only be passed when very special cause is shown. The reasoning for the aforementioned view is not clear from the judgment, but it appears that this view has been taken as Sub-section (3) of Section 426 Code of Criminal Procedure makes no reference about exclusion of the period of suspension of sentence in computing the term for which an accused is sentenced. The correct view seems to be that suspension of execution of the sentence though within the powers of the appellate court is to be ordered only in exceptional circumstances where special cause exists and not invariably whenever the Appellant is released on bail. In the present case, the Appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and has been ordered to be released on bail. There are no special or exceptional circumstances for suspending execution of the sentence. Hence the order dated 5-3-1970 suspending execution of the sentence pending disposal of the appeal and the order, dated 17-4-1970 suspending the order of conviction appealed against are recalled and the two petitions on which the said orders were passed stand rejected. The Appellant as ordered on 16-1-1970 will remain on bail pending disposal of the appeal.