JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - The only point that was argued by Sri N. Banerji learned Counsel for the appellant in this case was that the suit was barred by limitation. His contention was that it was not a case of non-delivery of goods but was a case of losing or injuring the goods and as such it would be governed by Article 30 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Under that Article the prescribed period of filing the suit was one year from the date when the loss or injury occurred. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that evidently the alleged loss or injury has occurred in April, 1956 and as such the suit filed on 4-12-1959 was of the appellant had been accepted by the trial court but the barred by limitation under this Article. This contention owner appellate court took a different view. According to that court the suit was governed by Article 31 and not Article 30. 2. The brief facts so far as relevant for determining this controversy were that a consignment consisting of a bale of cloth had been booked from Kanpur for Colonelganj station in Gonda district on 13-4-1956. On 16-4-1956 a bale reached Colonelganj which, according to the railway administration, bore the number and mark of the railway receipt under which the plaintiff's consignment had been booked. The plaintiff, however, contended that it was not that consignment which had been booked by him but some different one and he insisted on an open delivery. On opening this bale it was found that instead of cloth it contained gunny bags and its weight was also much less than the weight of the consignment that had been booked. The plaintiff, therefore, did not take delivery and he made a complaint to the railway administration: The railway administration through their replies to the repeated letters sent by the plaintiff on the subject had been representing that the matter was under investigation and a definite reply would be given to the plaintiff regarding this consignment after the investigation had been completed. The last of such letters was dated 24-10-1958. The plaintiff then served a notice under Sec. 77 Railways Act and Sec. 80, C.P.C. on the railway administration demanding delivery of his consignment or its value. In reply to this notice the railway administration repudiated its liability by means of their letter dated 3-8-1959. The last of such letters was dated 24-10-1958. The plaintiff then served a notice under Sec. 77 Railways Act and Sec. 80, C.P.C. on the railway administration demanding delivery of his consignment or its value. In reply to this notice the railway administration repudiated its liability by means of their letter dated 3-8-1959. It was under these circumstances that the plaintiff filed this suit on 4-12-1959. 3. The lower appellate court has further found as a fact that the bale which had reached Colonelganj station on 16-4-1956 and was offered to the plaintiff was not the consignment that had actually been booked but it was some different consignment. This is a finding of fact which has been recorded by the lower appellate court on appraisal of evidence and it cannot be assailed in this second appeal. 4. From the above facts it is clear that it was not a case of losing or injurying the goods so as to be governed by Article 30 but it was a case of non-delivery of goods so as to be governed by Article 31 as held by the lower appellate court. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that even under Article 31 the suit was time barred because when the plaintiff was offered a bale which contained gunny bags by the railway administration on 16-4-1956 he knew that his own bale containing cloth had been lost and as such the limitation for filing a suit shall run from that date. This contention would have some force if the railway administration had straight away told the plaintiff that his own consignment had somehow been lost or exchanged with this one or it had taken a definite stand that since this consignment bore the railway receipt number under which the plaintiff's consignment had been booked, the railway administration was not liable if somehow its contents had been changed by some body in the transit. But none of these things was done by the railway administration. On the other hand they lulled the plaintiff to sleep and induced him not to file his suit promptly by representing that they had been making investigation in the matter and would let him know the final result after the completion of that investigation. Even as late as 24-10-1958 a similar reply was given to the plaintiff vide letter Ex. 12. Even as late as 24-10-1958 a similar reply was given to the plaintiff vide letter Ex. 12. Under these circumstances the plaintiff had reasonable ground to think that his consignment might be traced out and delivered to him and he could till then not lose hope of getting it back. When the plaintiff served a notice on the railway administration in May, 1959 the railway administration for the first time came out with a definite case in their letter dated 3-8-1959 that the consignment that had been offered to the plaintiff and which he had refused to accept was the same consignment that had been booked by him and they were not liable to compensate him for that consignment. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that it was not that very consignment that had been booked. In arriving at that finding reliance was placed on the circumstance that though apparently the bale that was offered to the plaintiff was securely packed and fastened with iron bends, it did not bear the private mark which plaintiff had put on his consignment at the time of booking. It was therefore, concluded that it was not the same consignment. If that was not the same consignment which had been booked, the alleged offer of delivery made on 16-4-1956 is of no consequence. It would mean as if no delivery of the consignment had been made and whenever the plaintiff wrote to the railway administration about this delivery he was told every time that the matter was under investigation and a definite reply would be given after the investigation was complete. Under these circumstances the limitation had not started running under Article 31 at least till the last of such letters dated 24-10-1958 was sent by the railway administration. From that date the suit was within limitation after excluding the period of notice under Sec. 80, C.P.C. In this view of the matter the suit had been rightly decreed by the lower appellate court and this appeal has no force. 6. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent. The stay order dated 20-4-1964 is discharged.