JUDGMENT K.B. Srivastava, J. - Owing to a difference of opinion between Oak, C. J. and O. P. Trivedi, J. on the question of the competency of a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Claims Tribunal) to entertain claims arising out of motor accidents which had occurred prior to the date of its constitution, the matter has come to me for opinion. 2. The facts, in brief, are as follows :- The truck of one Ram Singh collided with the scooter of one Amar Nath Misra on September 11, 1966 resulting in the latter's death. The Claims Tribunal was constituted under Sec. 110, Motor Vehicles Act (herein-after referred to as the Act) on March 18, 1967. The legal representatives of the deceased Amar Nath filed an application for compensation to the Claims Tribunal on July 8, 1967. A preliminary objection was raised by the insurer, the New India Assurance Company Ltd. that the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction in respect of a claim relating to a motor accident which had occurred anterior to its constitution. The Claims Tribunal overruled the objection on September 11, 1968. Writ Petition No. 2 of 1969 was then instituted for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Claims Tribunal and a Writ of mandamus commanding it not to entertain the application for compensation. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and issued the two writs. The legal representatives of the deceased Amar Nath then instituted the special appeal. Oak, C. J. took the view that the Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction while O.P. Trivedi, J. agreed with the view of the learned single Judge that it had no jurisdiction over a claim arising out of an accident which had occurred prior to its date of constitution. This is how the matter has come up to me for opinion. 3. Voluminous case law was cited at the Bar. Khatumal v. Abdul Qadir, A.I.R. 1961 MP 295 and Mani Bai v. Raj Kumar Harpal Deo, A.I.R. 1967 Bombay 92 lay down the law that a claims Tribunal will have no jurisdiction over suits for compensation arising out of motor accidents already pending before Civil Courts from before the date of its constitution. These two cases, therefore, are not relevant. Khatumal v. Abdul Qadir, A.I.R. 1961 MP 295 and Mani Bai v. Raj Kumar Harpal Deo, A.I.R. 1967 Bombay 92 lay down the law that a claims Tribunal will have no jurisdiction over suits for compensation arising out of motor accidents already pending before Civil Courts from before the date of its constitution. These two cases, therefore, are not relevant. The view taken in Sushma Mehta v. C.P.T. Services Ltd., A.I.R. 1964 M.P., 133 supports the view of the learned Single Judge and O.P. Trivedi, J. The view taken by the Madras, Delhi, Gurjat, Punjab and Bombay High Court, however, supports the view of the Chief Justice, vide V.C.K. Bus Services v. H.B. Sethna, A.I.R. 1965 Madras 149; Thomas v. Messrs. Hotz Hotels Ltd., A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 3; Joshi Ratansi Gopaji v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, 1968 Accidents Claims Journal 338; Zarin v. Santubhai, A.I.R. 1969 Gujarat 233; Unique Motor and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kartar Singh, A.I.R. 1965 Punjab 102, Abdul Mahomad Aga v. Peter Leo D'mello, A.I.R. 1965 Bombay 21 and Natverla Bhikhalal Sheh v. Thakarda Khodaiji Kalaji, 1967 Accidents Claims Journal 397. 4. Sec. 110 to 110-F were substituted for the former Sec. 110 of the Act by Sec. 80 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (Act 100 of 1956) with effect from February 16, 1967. Under the common law before the date of the amendment, a claim for compensation of the nature in question had to be enforced by a suit in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The period of limitation for the enforcement of such a claim was one year under article 21, Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and is now two years under Article 82, Limitation Act, 1963 which came into force on January 1, 1964. Court fees payable was advalorem while now on an application for compensation before a Claims Tribunal, the fee payable is only Rs. 5/-. This then was the state of the common law before the insertion of Sec. 110 to 110 F. The old remedy by way of suit entailed protracted litigation in the Civil Courts involving one and even two appeals. The legal representatives of a person dying as a result of a motor accident, had a long period of waiting. If a claimant belonged to a poorer sec. The legal representatives of a person dying as a result of a motor accident, had a long period of waiting. If a claimant belonged to a poorer sec. of the community, he could not claim a reasonable amount on account of heavy ad valorem Court fees, unless he chose to enlarge the period of waiting further by resort to a pauper suit. There was obvious frustration to person who stood in urgent need of financial help. The Parliament stepped in to eliminate or mitigate these evils and provide a more speedy and cheap remedy. The new sections provide for the constitution of a Claims Tribunal by taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The Court fees payable is practically nominal. The long period of waiting has been curtailed by a shorter period of limitation, with one right of appeal direct to the High Court and with no right of appeal whatsoever if the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 2000/-. In Heydon's case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a it was resolved by Barons of the Exchaquer that : "For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general....... four things are to be discerned and considered : (1st) what was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the common wealth and, (4th) the true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such constructions as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true interest of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." 5. It is necessary now to under take a survey of sections 110 to 110-F. Under Sec. 110(1), a State Government may constitute a Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. It is necessary now to under take a survey of sections 110 to 110-F. Under Sec. 110(1), a State Government may constitute a Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. A Claims Tribunal will, therefore, have jurisdiction if (1) the claim is for compensation, (2) that claim is in respect of an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles, (3) that accident involved the death of, or bodily injury to, any person. The claim in the instant case is undoubtedly a claim of this type. The procedure for the enforcement of such a claim has been provided for in Sec. 110-A(1) and (2). The Law requires an application to be made before a Claims Tribunal for the enforcement of the claim. The period of limitation for the enforcement of such a claim was 60 days under Sec. 110-A(3) on September 11, 1966 when the accident occurred. It is now six months, as amended by Sec. 58 of Act No. 56 of 1969. Under the proviso to this sub-section, however, the Claims Tribunal is empowered to entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of 60 days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. If the accident gives rise to a claim for compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the person entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both, as provided in Sec. 110-AA of the Act. A claimant can thus bypass the Claims Tribunal only if his claim falls also under the Workmen's Compensation Act and he exercises his option to resort to the procedure provided under that Act. He cannot ignore the Claims Tribunal in any other contingency. Indeed, in a contingency, not covered by Sec. 110-AA, jurisdiction of a Civil Court is expressly ousted. Under Sec. 110-F, where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. Indeed, in a contingency, not covered by Sec. 110-AA, jurisdiction of a Civil Court is expressly ousted. Under Sec. 110-F, where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. The plain meaning of the words used by Parliament is that on and after the date of the constitution of a Claims Tribunal, with the one exception mentioned in Sec. 110-AA, a Claims Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction and no Civil Court can entertain or adjudicate upon any question relating to any claim for compensation, unless a suit for that claim is already pending before it. This is the interpretation at which I have arrived, and it is the plain duty of the Court to advance the remedy provided by Parliament. 6. There can be no dispute with the proposition that although a claimant may have a vested right to institute a suit or other civil proceedings, he has no such right in the choice of a forum. In Hazari Tewari v. Mst. Maktula, A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 30, a Division Bench of this Court observed thus : "It seems to us that a right of action is something different from the choice of the forum. There may be a vested right of action when the cause of action has accrued before the old Act has been altered; but there can be no vested right in the choice of a particular forum. If the legislature has thought fit to deprive the Civil Court of its jurisdiction to entertain suits of a particular nature, a plaintiff cannot compel the civil court to hear his suit merely because his cause of action had accrued before the new Act depriving the Civil Court of its jurisdiction was passed. The choice of forum is a matter of procedure and not a substantive right, and in most cases a new Act would have a retrospective effect so far as the choice of forum is concerned." 7. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 36, at page 426, it has been observed : "Again, legislation increasing the jurisdiction of particular courts by empowering them to determine matters previously remediable in other courts is prima facie applicable to existing, as well as future, causes of action." 8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 36, at page 426, it has been observed : "Again, legislation increasing the jurisdiction of particular courts by empowering them to determine matters previously remediable in other courts is prima facie applicable to existing, as well as future, causes of action." 8. Likewise; no one has a vested right in any period of limitation. It cannot he said that there is any substantive right in any litigant to wait for a particular period of time before filing his claim. Rules of limitation are rules of procedure, and the rules applicable to a claim would be the rules which are in force at the time when the claim is filed, and unless something special in it justifies a contrary inference, would govern all proceedings from the moment of their enactment even though the cause of action may have accrued before the rules come into existence. See Baijnath v. Dulari Hajjam, ILR 50 Alld. 865; Soni Ram v. Kunhaiya Lal, ILR 35 Alld. 227; Mst. Began Sultan v. Sarvi Begam, A.I.R. 1926 Alld. 93 and Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 SC 915. The law affecting forum and limitation being a procedural law, the presumption against retrospective construction has no application to such a law which affects only the procedure and practice of the Courts. Maxwell, in his Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 222 has observed : "No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, but only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the court in which he sues, and if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he can only proceed according to the altered mode. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be." Halsbury's Laws of England, thirds Edition Volume 36, page 426 has this to say :- "The presumption against retrospection does not apply to legislation concerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence; on the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of Parliament." That being so, it is well settled that enactments affecting choice of forum and the period of limitation are procedural laws and will have a retrospective operation, unless the Statute provides otherwise or unless the new law of limitation takes away or completely destroys a vested right of action or defence. 9. Maxwell, in the same edition at page 218 says that the presumption against retrospective operation has been applied chiefly in cases in which the Statute in question, if it operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the legality of past transactions, or would impair contracts, or would impose new duties or attach new disabilities in respect of past transactions. Halsbury, in the same Edition, at page 427, has remarked that to the extent, however, that the effect of applying of procedural enactment retrospectively would be to deprive a person of a vested right, retrospective effect will not be given to it without plain words. Halsbury, in the same Edition, at page 427, has remarked that to the extent, however, that the effect of applying of procedural enactment retrospectively would be to deprive a person of a vested right, retrospective effect will not be given to it without plain words. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 82, at page 992, it has been observed that : "While the general rule that statutes are construed as prospective only applies to remedial statutes, remedial or procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested or contractual rights but relate only to remedies or modes of procedure are generally held to operate retrospectively and to apply to pending actions or proceedings, unless such operation or application would adversely affect substantive rights." Again, at page 994, the following passage occurs :- "However, a remedial or procedural statute not impairing or affecting contractual obligations or vested rights applies to proceedings begun after its passage, although it relates to acts done previous thereto, and to pending sections, in the absence of language indicating a legislative intent to the contrary." The gist of the law is that the law of limitation is not always a law of procedure, that is to say, a purely adjective law; for amongst its other consequences it has the creation of vested rights or rights by prescription; and if those rights have vested in individuals under one law of limitation, they cannot be divested by the introduction of a new law of limitation, or by an amendment in the law. In such a case, however, the vested right or right of prescription must be either destroyed and it is then alone that a procedural law will not be taken to be retrospective but only prospective. If, on the other hand, the right is not destroyed but kept alive, though only a shorter period of limitation is prescribed, or if a breathing space or period is available between the passing of the enactment and its enforcement, during which period, the vested right of action can be exercised, the new period of limitation will have retrospective effect. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on certain cases. I think it expedient to deal with these cases first. The first case is Bansidhar Lal v. Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, A.I.R. 1960 Patna 306. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on certain cases. I think it expedient to deal with these cases first. The first case is Bansidhar Lal v. Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, A.I.R. 1960 Patna 306. In that case, the right to recover arrears of rent was already barred by time under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Sec. 48, Administration of Evacuee Property Act was, however, amended subsequently and the right to realise the barred debt was expressly confer red. It is, in these circumstances, that it was held that the tenant had already acquired a vested right on the date of the coming into force of the amending Act, to treat the claim against him by the Custodian as barred. It was a case, therefore, in which an extinguished right was revived and the vested right of the tenant to resist the claim was taken away or destroyed altogether. The next case is Sarkar Dutt Roy and Co. v. Shree Bank Ltd., AIR 1960 Calcutta 243. In that case, certain instalments of a decree 110 become barred under Article, 182(7), Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Sec. 45, Banking Companies Act, enlarged the period of enforcement of such decrees. It was held that the right which the debtor had obtained by the decree being barred was a substantive right and the enlargement of the period would not affect this vested right unless the Statute said so by express words or necessary intendment. The amendment was not held to be retrospective as it has the effect of extending the period of limitation for filing an application for execution and also had the effect of reviving and rendering affective a decree which had been barred under the previous law. The third case is Rajah Pittapur v. Venkata Subba Row, I.L.R. 39 Madras 645. In that case the plaintiff attained majority on October, 5, 1906. He filed a suit for arrears of rent and claimed exemption from bar of limitation on the ground that he had three years from the date of attainment of majority to file the suit. The Madras Estate; Land Act received the Governor General's assent on June 28, 1908 and caste into force on July 1, 1908, Sec. 77 of that Act took away the benefit benefit of Sec. 7, Limitation Act. The Madras Estate; Land Act received the Governor General's assent on June 28, 1908 and caste into force on July 1, 1908, Sec. 77 of that Act took away the benefit benefit of Sec. 7, Limitation Act. The result was that though under the old Act, a plaintiff attaining majority could enforce his claim within three years of the attainment of majority, that benefit was taken away and the period was left at three years from the date when the rent had become due. The cause of action was alive on June 28, 1908 when the Act was enacted. The new Act negatived the cause of action by the non-application of Sec. 7, Limitation Act. It thus completely destroyed the vested right. It is true that there was a period of three days between the date of assent and the date of enforcement, but three days were held to be wholly insufficient to give notice to the public that they should exercise their vested rights within this short period. This case is easily distinguishable as it either destroyed or practically destroyed the vested right. In the same line is the case of Chotmal Ganeshram v. M S. Rawchand Tarachand, A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 137. The law laid down was that if the Statute of limitation, if given a retrospcetive effect, destroys a cause of action which was vested in a party or makes it impossible for that party to exercise his vested right of action then the Court would not give retrospective effect to the statute of Limitation. In Govt. of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh, A.I.R. 1962 Rajasthan 43 the law laid down was not different. It was held that it is not always true to say that the law of limitation is only a law of procedure and does not bar the remedy altogether so as to destroy the right. It is a well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy of a litigant to enforce his right in a court of law. It is a well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy of a litigant to enforce his right in a court of law. In case the remedy to enforce a vested right is altogether barred on the date when the new law comes into force without providing any breathing time to a litigant that remedy must be continued to be covered by the old law of limitation. The Legislature has full power to make a law retrospective so as to destroy any remedy altogether but this must be expressly laid down or this result must flow by necessary implication. A Court of law is not justified in drawing such inference merely from the fact that the new enactment deals mainly with procedure. 11. In the instant case, the vested right to recover compensation has not been taken away. What has happened is to change the forum. insofar as the period of limitation is concerned, it has certainly been shortened. What then is the effect of curtailing the period of limitation? The shorter period will not affect such causes of action arising out of motor accidents, which accrued within 60 days (now six months, alter the amendment) of the date of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal, as such claims could be made before it. It will obviously affect only such causes of action as have relation to accidents which occurred earlier than 60 days before the late of the Constitution of the Claims Tribunal. The contention of the learned counsel is that in the latter class of causes of action, a vested right becomes barred as it is destroyed completely and on that account, Secs. 110-A and 110-F of the Act cannot be regarded to have retrospective effect. I am unable to subscribe to this contention, my reasons being two-fold. 12. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (Act 100 of 1956), was published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 2, dated November 12, 1955 at page 624 and the report of the Joint Committee was published in Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 2, dated November 20, 1956, at page 855. 12. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (Act 100 of 1956), was published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 2, dated November 12, 1955 at page 624 and the report of the Joint Committee was published in Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 2, dated November 20, 1956, at page 855. This amending Act was passed by Parliament on December 30, 1956 and came into force with effect from February 16, 1957. It is this amending Act which inserted Secs. 110 to 110-F in place of old Sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939). However, in spite of its enforcement from 16th February, 1957, the amended Secs. were still not applicable. Under Sec. 110(1), a State Government was empowered, by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute one or more Claims Tribunals. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the constitution of the Claims Tribunal was notified by Notification No. 188(1) DST/XXX-B-59, DST-66, dated March 7, 1967 published in the U.P. Gazette Part I, dated March 18, 1967, at page 952. That being so, during the entire period December 30, 1936 (when the Act was passed) and March 7, 1967 (when the Claims Tribunal was constituted), the public had ample notice and there was a prolonged breathing period during which a claimant, as and when his cause of action accrued could resort to the competent Civil Court, within one or two years, as the case might have been. No one prevented such a claimant from utilising the longer period and resorting to the Civil Court. However, he cannot say that he has a right to resort to a particular forum and within a particular period of limitation merely because his cause of action had accrued prior to the constitution of a Claims Tribunal, when he had ample notice that such a Claims Tribunal could be constituted any time at the pleasure of the State Government, and when it was constituted, there will be a different forum and a shorter period of limitation. If he chose to wait till the expiry of one or two years, he did so at his own risk and peril. 13. If he chose to wait till the expiry of one or two years, he did so at his own risk and peril. 13. With regard to the principle of law concerning breathing time, the following observations occur in Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume LIII between pages 905-908 :- "The Legislature may enact statutes of limitation and subject to certain restrictions, may extend or shorten the time already fixed .......... As to existing causes of action, a statute of limitations must afford a reasonable time for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. If the statute operates immediately to cut off the existing remedy, or within so short a time as to give the party no reasonable opportunity to exercise his remedy, then the retrospective application of it is unconstitutional as to such party. The time allowed cannot be pronounced unreasonable unless it is so short as under the circumstances to amount to a practical denial of the right itself. In determining the reasonableness of a limitation, comparison may be made with prior or analogous statutes of limitations; and the public policy as declared by the legislature in creating the limitation is a proper consideration. If the time fixed is unreasonable, it has been held that the statute will not be declared unconstitutional or void for that reason, but the courts will permit the action to be brought within such time as may be found to be reasonable ........ Unless forbidden by constitutional restrictions, the legislature may shorten the period of limitation even as to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. Unless forbidden by constitutional restrictions, the legislature may shorten the period of limitation even as to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. In determining the reasonable of a statute shotening the period of limitation as to existing causes of action, the period of time between the passage of the statute and its effective date may be considered." In re: Athlunmney, (1898) 2 Q.B. 547, at page 553 Wright, J. says : "One exception to the general rule has some times been suggested, namely, that where, as here, the commencement of the operation of an Act is suspended for a time, this is an indication that no further restriction upon retrospective operation is intended ................" In the case of Queen v. N. Leeds and Bradford By Co., (1852) 18 Q.B. 343 Lord Campbell, C. J. made the following observation :- "If the Act had come into operation immediately after the time of its being passed, the hardship would have been so great that we might have inferred an intention on the part of the legislature not to give it a retrospective operation, but when we see that it contains a provision suspending its operation for six weeks, that must be taken as an intimation that the legislature has provided that as the period of time within which proceedings respecting antecedent damages or injuries might be taken before the proper tribunal. A certain time was allowed before the Act was to come into operation, and that removes all difficulty. The case of Towler v. Chatterton is strongly in point." These English cases have been followed in the decisions of some of the High Courts in our country also. See District School Board of Belgaum v. Mohammad Mulla, A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 377 where the interval between passing of the Act and its enforcement was 35 days only and yet it was held that the Act must he deemed to be retrospective and applied to all suits filed after it came into force because the period of 35 days, even though it was short, enabled litigants to exercise their right within that period. See also Khondkar Mohmed Saleh v. Chandra Kumar Mukerji, A.I.R. 1930 Cal 34 and Govt. of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh (supra). I shall now refer to my second reasoning. See also Khondkar Mohmed Saleh v. Chandra Kumar Mukerji, A.I.R. 1930 Cal 34 and Govt. of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh (supra). I shall now refer to my second reasoning. The proviso to sub-Sec (3) of Sec. 110-A says that the Claims Tribunal may entertain an application for compensation after `the expiry of the said period of limitation, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The legislature contemplated cases in which limitation would have expired before the date of the presentation of the claim and, therefore empowered a Claims Tribunal to condone the delay if it was explained to its satisfaction. Two arguments were advanced against this. It was first contended that a Claims Tribunal may refuse to condone the delay. There is really no no substance in this. A Claims Tribunal will be called upon to exercise its judicial discretion in the matter. Such a discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily but in accordance with settled principles of law. If it errs it can be set right by a superior Court. It cannot be disputed that the preference of a claim before a Claims Tribunal after the expiry of 60 days, but within two years, of the date of the accrued of the cause of action, will be a sufficient ground because the Claims Tribunal was not constituted when the cause of action arose and when it was constituted, 60 days had already elapsed. No Claims Tribunal will brush aside such a Claim on account of the bar of limitation. The second argument is that the proviso is wholly ineffective inasmuch as proviso or no proviso, such a facility is open to a litigant under Sec. 5, Limitation Act, read with Sec. 29 of the same Act. In advancing this argument, the learned Counsel has lost sight of the implications of the old and new Sec. 29. The old Sec. 29 of the 1908 Limitation Act provided that the provisions contained in Secs. 4, 9 to 18 Secs. 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by a Special or local law, and the remaining provisions of that Act shall not apply. The old Sec. 29 of the 1908 Limitation Act provided that the provisions contained in Secs. 4, 9 to 18 Secs. 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by a Special or local law, and the remaining provisions of that Act shall not apply. It is obvious, therefore, that Sec. 5 was not applicable to a Special Act and the Motor Vehicles Act is a Special Act making its own provision for period of limitation. In 1957 when Secs. 110 to 110-F were inserted, Sec. 5, Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable. It became applicable only by the force of Sec. 29, Limitation Act, 1963 which came into force on January 1, 1964, practically seven years after the proviso had been inserted to Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110-A. But for that proviso, there could have been no condonation of delay. 14. In view of the discussion above, I am in respectful agreement with the opinion expressed, by Oak, C. J. and I regret, I am unable to see eye to eye with brother O.P. Trivedi. 15. Let this opinion be laid before, Hon'ble the Chief Justice.