JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - Komal Yadav, the petitioner, who was Principal of Janta Higher Secondary School, Ahraula was placed under suspension by a resolution, dated the 28th of July, 1963, of the Committee of Management of that School. The resolution further appointed a committee of inquiry to investigate into certain allegations made against the petitioner by Ishwar Chandra, the Head Clerk committee of Inquiry consisted of the President of the Committee of Management (Jagdamba Prasad Singh), the Manager of the School (Ram Oudh Singh) and three others, the President of the Committee of Management being the Chairman of the Committee of inquiry. Sixteen charges were drawn up against the petitioner which were repudiated by the petitioner. The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging his suspension but it was dismissed in October, 1966. The inquiry against the petitioner, which was stayed during the pendency of the writ petition, was thereafter resumed. On receipt of the inquiry report, the Committee of Management passed a resolution on the 26th February, 1968, proposing dismissal of the petitioner with effect from the date of suspension i.e. 28th of July, 1963. 2. Under Sec. 16-G (3) (a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, no Principal, Head Master, or teacher can be discharged or removed or dismissed from service except with the prior approval in writing of an Inspector. "Inspector" is defined in Section 2 (bb) of the Act to mean the District Inspector of Schools and to include an officer authorised by the State Government to perform all or any of the duties of the Inspector. 3. In view of the aforesaid provision of law, the Committee of Management made a reference to the District Inspector of Schools for approval of the Proposal to dismiss the petitioner. Under Regulation 44 of the Regulations made under the Act, the Committee of Management was required to send a complete report together with all the connected papers to the Inspector for approval of the action proposed by it. The report and the papers were received in the office of the Inspector on the 18th of May, 1968. The reference was disposed of by Noorul Hasan, who was the Associate District Inspector of Schools, on the 26th of October, 1968, after hearing the petitioner and considering the explanation given by him. The report and the papers were received in the office of the Inspector on the 18th of May, 1968. The reference was disposed of by Noorul Hasan, who was the Associate District Inspector of Schools, on the 26th of October, 1968, after hearing the petitioner and considering the explanation given by him. Noorul Hasan reduced the penalty from dismissal to removal and accorded his approval to the removal of the petitioner. The petitioner appealed to the Deputy Director of Education against the orders of Noorul Hasan; the appeal, however, was dismissed after hearing the petitioner and his representative, and the Manager and one Sudhakar Lal, a legal practitioner, who was also a Member of the Committee of Management. 4. This petition is directed against the orders of Noorul Hasan as District Inspector of Schools, and of the Deputy Director of Education as well as against the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 26th of February, 1968 on several grounds. 5. The grounds urged are : (i) Noorul Hasan was not the District Inspector of Schools and was also not authorised by the State Government to perform any of the duties of the Inspector and he was, therefore, not competent to consider and accord approval to the proposal made by the Committee of Management. Even if he was vested with the powers of the District Inspector of Schools, the relevant order was not authenticated in the manner provided by Article 166 (2) of the Constitution. (ii) Noorul Hasan recorded the order of approval more than six weeks after the receipt of the proposal of the Committee of Management, in contravention of Regulation 44 made under the Act, which requires the decision to be communicated within six weeks. (iii) The Deputy Director of Education permitted Sudhakar Lal, a legal practitioner, to represent the case on behalf of the Manager, notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Regulation 93 of the Regulations under the Act that no party shall be represented by a legal practitioner. (iv) Four members of the Inquiry Committee were biased against the petitioner and principles of natural justice were violated in conducting the inquiry. (v) The Committee of Management, which passed the resolution proposing the dismissal of the petitioner, was not properly and legally constituted. (vi) The Deputy Director of Education failed to take into consideration some of the submissions made by the petitioner at the hearing of the appeal. (v) The Committee of Management, which passed the resolution proposing the dismissal of the petitioner, was not properly and legally constituted. (vi) The Deputy Director of Education failed to take into consideration some of the submissions made by the petitioner at the hearing of the appeal. 6. As regards ground No. (i), it was argued that Noorul Hasan was only an Associate Inspector of Schools and not the District Inspector of Schools and had, therefore, no authority to consider and grant approval to the proposal of the Committee of Management. Along with the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Deputy Director of Education, a copy of the order of the Deputy Director of Education has been produced. It indicates that on the 15th of January, 1970, the Government of Uttar Pradesh had passed an order appointing Noorul Hasan as District Inspector of Schools with retrospective effect from 6th of September, 1968 to 15th of November, 1968. One of the endorsements thereon shows that the order was made with reference to the letter of the Director of Education, dated 14th of July, 1969. Under the directions of the Court, the learned Standing Counsel produced for inspection the original letter of the Director of Education and also filed a true copy thereof along with an affidavit. The letter states that on the transfer of Ali Hussain Jafri, the District Inspector of Schools, the duties of the District Inspector of Schools were performed by Noorul Hasan, the Associate Inspector of Schools, who was holding charge of that office from 6th of September, 1968 to 15th of November, 1968 and a request was made to make a formal appointment of Noorul Hasan as the District Inspector of Schools for the period. It is clear that Ali Hussain Jafri, on transfer, relinquished charge in favour of Noorul Hasan and as no substitute was appointed as the District Inspector of Schools, the duties of that office were performed by Noorul Hasan and the position was regularised by it formal order issued later on. In these circumstances, the competence of Noorul Hasan to perform the functions of the District Inspector of Schools cannot be successfully challenged. It may be mentioned that the petitioner has, in the correspondence in connection with the appeal as well as with Noorul Hasan himself, described Noorul Hasan as the District Inspector of Schools. In these circumstances, the competence of Noorul Hasan to perform the functions of the District Inspector of Schools cannot be successfully challenged. It may be mentioned that the petitioner has, in the correspondence in connection with the appeal as well as with Noorul Hasan himself, described Noorul Hasan as the District Inspector of Schools. It may also be mentioned that the petitioner never raised objection before Noorul Hasan regarding his authority to consider the proposal of the Committee of Management. He having submitted to the jurisdiction Noorul Hasan could not object that Noorul Hasan was not competent to pass the order on the proposal of the Committee of Management. Such submission to jurisdiction disentitles the petitioner to a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on a plea of lack of jurisdiction in Noorul Hasan. Vide : Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397. It was urged that the order filed along with the counter-affidavit appointing Noorul Hasan as District Inspector of Schools was not properly authenticated. That order merely reproduced the order of the State Government and is not the original. I am not satisfied that the order of the State Government which, unfortunately, learned Standing Counsel was not able to trace, is defective and did not comply with the provisions of Article 166 (2) of the Constitution. Thus this ground must fail. 7. As regards the second ground, Sec. 16-G (3) provides that the decision of the Inspector on the proposal made by the committee of Management "shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by the Regulations." Regulation 44 reads as follows : "The Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall communicate his/her decision to the management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal in complete form for action mentioned in Sub-sec. (3) (a) of Sec. 16-G of the Act. If incomplete papers are received from the management, the approving officer shall require it to resubmit its proposal in complete form within two weeks and the period of six weeks prescribed in this Regulation shall be reckoned from the date on which complete papers are received by the approving officer. These papers shall either be sent by the registered post or by special messenger." 8. It is undeniable that Noorul Hasan communicated his decision to the Committee of Management more than six weeks of the receipt of the complete papers. These papers shall either be sent by the registered post or by special messenger." 8. It is undeniable that Noorul Hasan communicated his decision to the Committee of Management more than six weeks of the receipt of the complete papers. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the provision of Regulation 44 when read with Sec. 16-G (3), is mandatory and if the decision of the Inspector is not communicated within a period of six weeks, as prescribed, the decision made subsequently is valid. I was referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Banwari Lal Agarwal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 849, Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 113, and Kaushalaya Rani v. Gopal Singh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 260, and was asked to hold that the prescribed period of six weeks within which the Inspector has to communicate his decision is mandatory in nature. As the Supreme Court has ruled in these cases, the Court has in determining whether a provision is mandatory, to decide the legislative intent on consideration of the scheme of the statute and the danger to the public by the contravention of the same. It is important that Sec. 16-G (3) does not state the consequence of the communication of the decision of the Inspector after the prescribed. The dismissal or removal of a teacher can only be ordered with the prior approval of the Inspector and if there is delay in the Inspector according approval, the result would be that the teacher concerned would be dismissed or removed even though there may be good cause for his dismissal or removal and, in that event, the interest of the institution and of the public would be prejudiced by an undesirable teacher continuing in office. The possibility of the Inspector requiring more time than six weeks in coming to a decision cannot be also ruled out altogether. He has to give adequate opportunity to the teacher concerned to make his representation; he has to give hearing to both the parties, call for additional evidence, if necessary and then come to a decision. In some cases, like the present one, the proceeding before him is bound to take more than six weeks. It may be mentioned that Noorul Hasan has explained in his order why he took time to arrive at a decision. In some cases, like the present one, the proceeding before him is bound to take more than six weeks. It may be mentioned that Noorul Hasan has explained in his order why he took time to arrive at a decision. The record was received on the 18th May, 1968 and a show cause notice was sent on 30th May, 1968 but the petitioner submitted his final explanation only on the 20th July, 1968. Thereafter he had to call for the original records which finally came to him on 17th September, 1968 and after hearing both the parties and after scrutiny of all the records in the light of the explanation given, he recorded his decision on the 26th October, 1968. It would be recalled that there were as many as 16 charges which had to be explained and considered. In Dattatrya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 181, the Supreme Court observed : "It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote, the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions as directory only the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done." 9. In the circumstances, I am unable to hold that the period prescribed in Regulation 44 for communication of the decision is mandatory. As a sound rule of interpretation a statute has to be so construed as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the statute, which unquestionably is to serve the larger interest of the community. 10. In this view, I hold that the communication of the decision by Noorul Hasan beyond the prescribed period of six weeks does not invalidate the approval accorded by him. 11. The third ground relates to violation of Regulation 93 according to which no party before the appellate authority can be represented by a legal practitioner. 10. In this view, I hold that the communication of the decision by Noorul Hasan beyond the prescribed period of six weeks does not invalidate the approval accorded by him. 11. The third ground relates to violation of Regulation 93 according to which no party before the appellate authority can be represented by a legal practitioner. Sudhakar Lal, who admittedly represented the Committee of Management before the Deputy Director of Education, was a legal practitioner and an objection was taken to his appearance in the presentation of the argument at the hearing of the appeal. The Deputy Director of Education has observed that Sudhakar Lal, though a legal practitioner, was a member of the Committee of Management and appeared before him in that capacity and not in the capacity of a legal practitioner. He has rightly rejected the objection of the petitioner as Regulation 93 says that the legal practitioner should not represent a party "as such" that is as legal practitioner. Since Sudhakar Lal appeared as a member of the Committee of Management and not as legal practitioner, Regulation 93 has not been violated. 12. The argument on the fourth ground was that four members of the Inquiry Committee were biased against the petitioner and an adequate opportunity was not given to the petitioner to defend himself at the inquiry. Before the Deputy Director of Education, this ground appears to have been taken by urging that the Manager, who was a member of the Inquiry Committee, had also held a preliminary inquiry and the document necessary for the defence of the petitioner were not made available to him. In this connection, the Deputy Director of Education has observed that the petitioner admitted that all the relevant documents were shown to him and he could not satisfy as to how he was prejudiced. He does not, however, seem to have properly understood the objection to the inclusion of the Manager on the Inquiry Committee as he had held a preliminary inquiry, for, he has merely remarked that the preliminary inquiry was held by the Manager but Jagdamba Prasad was the President of the Inquiry committee. Though several reasons for the Manager entertaining a grudge against the petitioner have been given in the petition, nothing has been alleged against the three other members of the Inquiry Committee who were charged as biased. Though several reasons for the Manager entertaining a grudge against the petitioner have been given in the petition, nothing has been alleged against the three other members of the Inquiry Committee who were charged as biased. The Inquiry Committee consisted of five persons including the President of the Committee of Management who was the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee and the presence of the Manager on the Inquiry Committee as only one of the five could not be regarded as fatal to the inquiry; admittedly, the President was eminently impartial and three others are not proved to be in any way biased. 13. It was urged that the Deputy Director of Education has not recorded in his order the entire arguments for the petitioner in this connection. This objection would be dealt with discussing ground No. (vi). 14. The objection to the constitution of the Committee of Management, which is the fifth ground, was not, as appears from the order of the Deputy Director of Education, raised before him. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that this was one of the objections which was not considered at all by the Deputy Director of Education. This question also would be discussed in ground No. 6 (vi). 15. In regard to ground No. 6 (vi) the case of the petitioner is that a number of submissions made on behalf of the petitioner were not taken into consideration at all by the Deputy Director of Education and hence he has not determined some questions involved in the case. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Education has observed that at the hearing of the appeal, the petitioner submitted "some grounds apart from other grounds" and these some grounds, ten in number, have been set out and answered. It was argued that the words "apart from other grounds" appearing in the order indicates that some other grounds also were urged and the grievance is that those grounds have not been considered. The order of the Deputy Director of Education deals at the outset with ten grounds and then proceeds to discuss briefly the sixteen charges levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner has enumerated in paragraph 30 of the petition, the submissions made on his behalf which have not been considered by the Deputy Director of Education. The order of the Deputy Director of Education deals at the outset with ten grounds and then proceeds to discuss briefly the sixteen charges levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner has enumerated in paragraph 30 of the petition, the submissions made on his behalf which have not been considered by the Deputy Director of Education. It is significant that in the verification clause, the averments made in paragraph 30 of the writ petition are said to have been made on legal advice and not on personal knowledge. Even though the petitioner was present at the hearing, he has not verified from personal knowledge that the submissions set out in paragraph 30 of the petition were actually made. On the other hand, the Manager, in his counter-affidavit, has worn from personal knowledge in paragraph 49 that on grounds other than those mentioned in the order of the Deputy Director of Education were urged before him. That being so, I am not satisfied that the submissions tabulated in paragraph 30 of the petition were at all made before the Deputy Director of Education. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, pointed out that the petitioner had submitted to the Deputy Director of Education written arguments as well in which those submissions were made. The Manager of the Committee of Management, who too was present at the hearing, has averred in the counter-affidavit that no written argument were submitted at all at the hearing. A copy of the written arguments is an Annexure to the writ petition and is dated 24th of September 1969. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Deputy Director of Education indicates that there was only an oral learning and, though not expressly stated so, the contents of para. 24 of the writ petition which referred to the submission of the written arguments are denied. I am not satisfied that written arguments were presented to the Deputy Director of Education. In any event, there is nothing to show that the Deputy Director of Education accepted the written arguments. There is no provision in the Regulations for presentation of argument in writing. It may be mentioned at this stage that the order of the Deputy Director of Education has recorded a surprise that no submissions were made on behalf of the petitioner on the merits of the 16 charges against him. There is no provision in the Regulations for presentation of argument in writing. It may be mentioned at this stage that the order of the Deputy Director of Education has recorded a surprise that no submissions were made on behalf of the petitioner on the merits of the 16 charges against him. The Deputy Director of Education also has enumerated the arguments advanced by numbering each of the arguments. If any arguments, other than those which have been discussed by him, had been urged, he would not have failed to deal with them. The words "apart from other grounds" appearing in his order probably referred to the memo of appeal which deals with some objections on merits of the case which have been discussed by the Deputy Director of Education. In this situation, I remain unsatisfied that the petitioner had made the submissions recorded in paragraph 30 of the writ petition. 17. It was also urged that the Deputy Director of Education has not understood some of the ten objections mentioned by him in his order in their proper perspective. The petitioner has tried to explain in detail the objections raised by him in paragraph 29 of the petition. The statements in this paragraph also have been made by the petitioner on legal advice and not on personal knowledge. In the counter-affidavit, the Manager has denied on personal knowledge that the submissions as set out in paragraph 29 were actually made. I have thus no hesitation in negativing the contention that submissions as recorded in paragraph 29 of the writ petition were actually made but were misunderstood by the Deputy Director of Education. 18. After carefully considering the arguments advanced by the petitioner, I am unable to hold that there is sufficient reason to quash the order made by the Deputy Director of Education or the District Inspector of Schools. 19. The result it that the petition is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.