JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The plaintiffs instituted a suit for a declaration that certain awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer were illegal, null and void and not binding on them. The plaintiffs felt that court-fee was payable under Article 17 (iii) of the 2nd Schedule of the Court-fees Act, and as such, it. was chargeable to the fixed fee of Rs. 200/-. Accordingly they paid court fee of Rs. 200/-. The Inspector of Stamps reported that the plaint was deficiently stamped. According to him, the suit was for the setting aside of the awards, and was chargeable to court-fee under Section 7 (IV-B) (e) of the Act. The Court below accepted the report and directed the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have come to this Court under Sec. 6-A of the Act. 2. In the plaint, the proceedings for acquisition of the plaintiffs' properties were challenged on several grounds. It was prayed :- "(a) . It be declared in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants that the awards Nos. 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, all dated 30th September, 1961, made by the Land Acquisition Officer in so far as they relate to the properties mentioned in Schedule `A' annexed to and part of this plaint being absolutely, illegal null and void is not any way be binding on the plaintiffs." EX-facie, this relief is merely for declaration that the awards are void and not binding. The court below, however, held that clause (e) of Section 7 (IV-B) , Court-Fees Act was attracted. Sec. 7 (IV-B) provides :- " (IV-B) . In suits (a) for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land; (b) to obtain an injunction; (c) to establish an adoption or to obtain a declaration that all alleged adoption is valid; (d) to set aside an adoption or to obtain it declaration that an alleged opinion is invalid, or never, in fact, took place; (e) to set aside an award not being an award mentioned in Sec. 8; according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued is the plaint : Provided that such amount shall not be less than one-fifth of the market value of the property involved in or affected by the relief sought or Rs. 200/- whichever is greater." It is apparent that in clauses (c) and (d) , the Legislature included declarations about the validity as well as the invalidity of an adoption, bit omitted to include a declaration regarding invalidity of an award in clause (e) . Clause (e) covers a relief to set aside an award. In the context of the other provisions of the section, it could well be held that the omission was deliberate, and. that clause (e) was not intended to cover it relief for declaration that an award was illegal. 3. In this Court, it is settled that for purposes or applying the provisions of the Court-Fees Act, a Court is merely to look at the relief as framed. If the plaintiff prays for a declaration, the court cannot compel the plaintiff to superadd a prayer for consequential relief, even though under Section 42, Specific Relief Act, the Court may refuse to grant a mere declaration on the finding that a consequential relief ought to have been prayed for Bisan Sarup v. Musa Lal, AIR 1935 Allahabad 817-F.B., Krishana Chand v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1933 Allahabad 488 and Smt. Bhagwan Dei v. Firm Het Ram Suresh Chandra, AIR 1960 Allahabad 688. 4. It was urged on behalf of the Revenue that the relief involved a concealed prayer for the setting aside of the awards. A Full Bench of this Court in Om Prakash v. Moti Lal, AIR 1962 Allahabad 310, repelled such a submission. It was observed that the same thing can be said in negative or a positive form and that the effect of the use of the words the attachment is not enforceable against is that the houses in suit are not liable to be attached in execution of the decree, but that is not the same thing as praying for the setting aside of the attachment. The prayer, as it is, is only for a declaration. It would have been a prayer for a consequential relief if it had been prayed that the attachment be set aside. It is impossible to read in the relief worded as it was a concealed prayer for setting; aside an attachment. 5. In the present case, the plaintiffs want a declaration that the awards are illegal, void and not binding. They do not further pray that the award$ be set aside or cancelled. It is impossible to read in the relief worded as it was a concealed prayer for setting; aside an attachment. 5. In the present case, the plaintiffs want a declaration that the awards are illegal, void and not binding. They do not further pray that the award$ be set aside or cancelled. In this situation, it cannot be said that the suit is to set aside an award within meaning of clause (e) of Section 7 (IV-B) , Court Fees Act. 6. The Court below relies upon a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Seth Kishanlal Radhakaran Oswal v. The Cooperative Central Bank Ltd, A.I.R. 1941 Nagpur 243. In that came, the prayer was for a declaration that the award made by the Regular Cooperative Societies was ultra vires his powers. A Single judge of that court held that, no doubt, the plaintiffs had asked. for a declaration, but reading the plaint as a whole, it was clear that what they really wanted was that the award should be set aside. It will be seen that this method of construing a plaint is, according to Full Bench decisions of our Court, not permissible. 7. Article 17 (iii) of the 2nd Schedule to the Court Fees Act applies to a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed in a suit. not otherwise provided for by this Act. So, if the declaratory decree is provided by the Act elsewhere, Article 17 (iii) will not apply. For the Revenue, the learned Standing Counsel invited our attention to Section 7 (IV-A) of the Act. This provision applies to suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the relief claimed expressly requires an adjudication that the impugned awards were void, and so the suit is for adjudging void those award. It was further urged that the impugned awards were instruments securing money, and so the suit being for adjudging void instruments securing money, fell aquarely within the purview of Sub-sec. (IV-A) . It cannot be doubted that the plaintiffs claim a relief that the awards be declared void and so not binding on them. The question, however, is whether the impugned awards are instruments securing money. 8. (IV-A) . It cannot be doubted that the plaintiffs claim a relief that the awards be declared void and so not binding on them. The question, however, is whether the impugned awards are instruments securing money. 8. The word `instrument' has not been defined by the Court Fees Act. Clause (14) of Section 2 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, however, defines an `instrument' to include any document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. In our opinion, the term `instrument' has been used in the Court Fees Act in a similar sense. An award made under the Land Acquisition Act is a formal legal document in writing, creating or recording a right to money as well as liability on the part of the State to pay the sum of money mentioned in it. 9. The further question, however, is whether the award being an instrument, secures money. In Smt. Bishun Shree v. Smt. Suraj Mukhi, A.I.R. 1966 Allahabad 563, a Full Bench observed :- "The word "securing" is the present participle from verb "to secure". It has got various meanings (Words and Pharses Permanent Edition) Vol. 38 p. 458). "Secures" as used in a contract whereby a vendor agrees to execute a conveyance thereof as soon as the vendee secures the payment of purchase money, means not a payment in money, but the giving by the vendees of something by means whereof payment at some future time can be procared or compelled (Ibid) . Webster defines "secures" to mean "To make certain", "to put beyond hazard", "To secure" is to make safe, to put beyond hazard of losing or of not receiving, as to secure a debt by a mortgage; it also means to get safely in possession, to obtain to acquire certainly, as to secure an inheritance or a price (Ibid 459) ." An award under the Land Acquisition Act computes the compensation payable by the State for acquisition of the property. The State is bound by the award. The award makes safe to the claimant the receiving of the stated amount of money. It clearly secures money. Thus, the impugned award were instruments securing money within meaning of Section 7 (IV-A) , Court Fee, Act. The plaint was chargeable to Court-fee under this provision. 10. The impugned awards were made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The award makes safe to the claimant the receiving of the stated amount of money. It clearly secures money. Thus, the impugned award were instruments securing money within meaning of Section 7 (IV-A) , Court Fee, Act. The plaint was chargeable to Court-fee under this provision. 10. The impugned awards were made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The plaintiffs were not the executants or a consenting party to the awards. Consequently, under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 (IV-A), advoleram court-fee was payable according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter. 11. In other words, the plaintiffs are liable to pay court-fee at one-fifth of the market value of the involved property. It may be mentioned that under Clause (e) of Sub-sec. (IV-B) also, the plaintiffs were liable to pay court-fee at one-fifth of the market value of the property (because admittedly the market value is more than Rs. 200/-). Consequently, the view of the trial court that the plaint was deficiently stamped was correct, and the plaintiffs were liable to make good the deficiency, though the particular provision under which the plaintiffs was chargeable was Section 7 (IV-A), and not Section 7 (IV-B) (e), Court Fees Act. 12. Subject to these observations, the appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.