ORDER : OZA, J. This petition has been filed against an order passed by the District Magistrate, Indore, refusing permission to the petitioner to build a cinema theatre under the Madhya Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952, (hereinafter called the Act), and also against the order of the State Government on appeal under the provisions of the Act. 2. On 22nd August 1967, the petitioner made an application to the District Magistrate, Indore, for grant of a licence for exhibition of cinema films at 564, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Indore. He had submitted an application earlier also, which was rejected by the District Magistrate by his order dated the 3rd August 1967. In the application it was urged that when his earlier application was rejected no reasons were given for rejection and he was also not given an opportunity of hearing. The petitioner, therefore, submitted in his application that he may be granted a hearing so that if there be any objection he would be able to satisfy the authorities and would also undertake to comply with the conditions that might be imposed. This application was also rejected by the District Magistrate by his order dated the first September 1967. Against that order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the State Government, and by its order dated the 18th November 1968 the State Government rejected the petitioner’s appeal. The petitioner has, therefore, now filed this petition. 3. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner by Shri Bhachawat that the order of the District Magistrate being an appealable order, it must indicate reasons on the basis of which permission was refused to the petitioner. He contended that the petitioner is entitled to use his property and follow any trade or business and this is his fundamental right under the Constitution. According to the learned counsel, the licence for exhibition of films provided for in the Act is a restriction on the fundamental right, although he did not contend that this is not a reasonable restriction. Learned counsel contended that before an order was passed under the Act, the District Magistrate ought to have given a hearing to the petitioner. He further contended that the appellate authority also should have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 4. Shri Dubey, learned Government Advocate for the State, contended that this petition is filed late. Learned counsel contended that before an order was passed under the Act, the District Magistrate ought to have given a hearing to the petitioner. He further contended that the appellate authority also should have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 4. Shri Dubey, learned Government Advocate for the State, contended that this petition is filed late. According to the learned counsel, the application dated the 22nd August 1967 was only a review application against the order of rejection of the petitioner’s earlier application. He contended that the State Government had granted the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel contended that when the petitioner’s application was considered the opinion of the High Court was sought because the place where the petitioner wanted to build the theatre was in the vicinity of the High Court building and as the High Court objected to it, the District Magistrate refused the earlier application and, therefore, the subsequent application did not deserve any consideration. 5. The earlier application made by the petitioner to the District Magistrate was rejected. In fact, in the application made by the petitioner on 22nd August 1967 the petitioner himself stated that his earlier application was rejected without giving him any opportunity of hearing and, therefore, he emphasised that hearing be granted to him. Shri Bhachawat, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that if the District Magistrate had granted a hearing to the petitioner, it would have been possible for him to satisfy the District Magistrate and obtain a licence which would safeguard the peace around the High Court building and, therefore, all the more the absence of an opportunity of hearing is material. As regards delay, learned counsel contended that the appellate order was passed by the Government on 18th November 1968 and was thereafter communicated to the petitioner, and that the petitioner filed this petition, after the Government’s order was received by him, without any undue delay. 6. It cannot be doubted that this petition was filed after the orders of the Government in November 1968, and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petition was filed after undue delay. Before filing this petition, the petitioner had moved the respondents on l8th April 1969 demanding justice to him. 6. It cannot be doubted that this petition was filed after the orders of the Government in November 1968, and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petition was filed after undue delay. Before filing this petition, the petitioner had moved the respondents on l8th April 1969 demanding justice to him. In fact, the learned Government Advocate’s contention was that this petition would be said to be delayed if the earlier application of the petitioner and its rejection were considered to be the starting point. The subsequent application filed by the petitioner before the District Magistrate cannot said to be only a review petition as contended by the learned Government Advocate. The mention of the fact by the petitioner in his second application that when his earlier application was rejected no opportunity of hearing was given to him only goes to show that the petitioner now wanted to be granted an opportunity of hearing. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioner’s subsequent application was merely an application for review. 7. It cannot be doubted that the petitioner was not given an opportunity of hearing by the District Magistrate, and while considering an application of this kind the District Magistrate was expected to give a hearing. It is also clear that the orders passed by District Magistrate are made appealable under the provisions of the Act, and, therefore, the orders should indicate reasons on the basis of which they were passed, It is apparent that in the present case the order of the District Magistrate does not mention any reasons and so that order cannot be justified. 8. The matter came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court under the Bombay Cinemas (Regulations) Act, 1953 in State of Gujarat v. Krishna Cinema AIR 1971 SC 1650 and it was observed that :— “Again the power to grant a licence under the Act is quasi-judicial, and by the use of the expression ‘absolute discretion’ it is not intended to invest the Licensing Authority with arbitrary power so as to destroy the limitations to which it is subject by its inherent nature. The Act does not purport to confer arbitrary authority upon the Licensing Authority or the State Government.” In view of this pronouncement, it cannot be doubted that Authorities under this Act were expected to act judicially. The Act does not purport to confer arbitrary authority upon the Licensing Authority or the State Government.” In view of this pronouncement, it cannot be doubted that Authorities under this Act were expected to act judicially. In Shri Bhagwan v. Ramchand AIR 1965 SC 1767 , it was observed that— “When a legislative enactment confers jurisdiction and power on any Authority or body to deal with the rights of citizens, it often becomes necessary to enquire whether the said authority or body is required to act judicially or quasi judicially in deciding question entrusted to it by the statute. It sometimes also becomes necessary to consider whether such an authority or body is a tribunal or not. It is well-known that even administrative bodies or authorities which are authorized to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner, are required to reach their decisions fairly and objectively; but in reaching their decisions, they would be justified in taking into account considerations of policy. Even so, administrative bodies may, in acting fairly and objectively, follow the principles of natural justice. An obligation to act judicially may in some cases, be inferred from the scheme of the relevant statute and its material provisions. In such a case, it is easy to hold that the authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers; but it is not necessary that the obligation to follow the principles of natural justice must be expressly imposed on such an authority or body. If it appears that the authority or body has given power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, the very nature of the power would inevitably impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice.” In the light of these pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it cannot be doubted that the Licensing Authority under the Act has to apply the principles of natural justice. Consequently the petitioner is entitled to the right of hearing. 9. Although it was contended that a notice for the hearing of the appeal was issued to the petitioner, still so far as the order of the District Magistrate is concerned, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. Even the order of the Government does not disclose reasons why the appeal was rejected. 9. Although it was contended that a notice for the hearing of the appeal was issued to the petitioner, still so far as the order of the District Magistrate is concerned, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. Even the order of the Government does not disclose reasons why the appeal was rejected. Learned counsel for the parties referred at length to the merits of the grant or refusal of the licence in view of the objection of the High Court. But we are not concerned with the merits of the matter as the petitioner was not granted an opportunity of hearing before the order was passed on his application for licence. It is for the District Magistrate to consider reasons on the basis of which the application should or should not be granted. 10. In the light of the discussion above, this petition is allowed, the order dated the 1st September 1967 passed by the District Magistrate and that passed by the State Government on 18th November 1968 are set aside, and it is directed that the respondent No. 1, District Magistrate, Indore, shall first afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and then proceed to decide his application in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to the costs of this application. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100 if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.