JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - The petitioner, Ragliunath Saran Agarwal, was appointed by a letter dated 14th July, 1968, as a lecturer in Sociology in Upadhi Mahavidhyalaya, respondent No. 2 Degree College affiliated to the Agra University. He was selected to the post by the Executive Committee of the institution, which also formed the selection committee for selection of a suitable candidate for appointment to the post. The order of appointment stated, inter ilia, that the appointment was subject to the approval of the University as, under Section 26 (4) of the Agra University Act, 1926, every decision to make a substantive appointment or a temporary or officiating appointment, lasting for six months or more, of a teacher in an affiliated college, has to be submitted to the Vice-Chancellor for approval. The Vice-Chancellor approved the appointment of the petitioner for the then current session of the institution and directed the college to re-advertise the post. Pursuant to the direction of the Vice-Chancellor, the services of the petitioner were terminated and the post was re-advertised. In response to the re-advertisement, a number of applications were received, including those of the petitioner and of one C.L Maheshwari. The Executive Council again selected the petitioner for the appointment. As appears from the resolution passed by the Executive Council, C.L. Maheshwari was the best candidate but they could not select him for the post as it was felt doubtful whether he would continue in the post long as he was prosecuting studies in a post-graduate college and he had not stuck to any institution in the past and also as he had filed a writ petition against the Vice-Chancellor of the Meerut University in the High Court and the petitioner was considered the next best candidate. The relevant papers were then forwarded to the Vice-Chancellor for his approval but at this stage C.L. Maheshwari made a representation to the Vice-Chancellor regarding his non-selection. The Vice-Chancellor again turned down the appointment of the petitioner whereupon the services of the petitioner were terminated. 2. The petitioner, by this writ petition, has impugned the order of the Vice Chancellor disapproving his appointment and the termination of his services in consequence. 3. The Vice-Chancellor again turned down the appointment of the petitioner whereupon the services of the petitioner were terminated. 2. The petitioner, by this writ petition, has impugned the order of the Vice Chancellor disapproving his appointment and the termination of his services in consequence. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Vice-Chancellor could not disapprove the decision of the Executive Council for appointment of the petitioner without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposal to disapprove his selection. It was urged that the principles of natural justice required that the rights of the petitioner to the appointment by virtue of his selection could not be taken away by the Vice-Chancellor disapproving his selection without hearing the petitioner. Though a reference was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the observation of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kripak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150, to the effect that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin he proceeded to support his argument on the basis that the act of disapproval by the Vice-Chancellor was in exercise of an administrative power; however, he argued that even in the exercise of this administrative power, the Vice-Chancellor was bound to hear the petitioner. In support of this argument he relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the same case :- "In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing as a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instruentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision." (p. 154). He also draw my attention to the following further observations of the supreme Court :- "if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative inquiries ................................ He also draw my attention to the following further observations of the supreme Court :- "if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative inquiries ................................ Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative inquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry ................ What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal of body of persons appointed for that purpose whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." (P. 157). 4. As I understand, the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice apply equally to administrative decisions as to quasi-judicial decisions but it is not imperative that every rule of natural justice has to be observed in every case and the rules of natural justice not having been codified, whether a particular rule would apply to a given case must depend on the framework of the law under which an administrative decision is made, the nature of the authority making that decision and on the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner was not entitled to be heard by the Vice-Chancellor before deciding to disapprove the petitioner's appointment. 6. It will be observed that under Section 25 (4) of the Agra University Act, the decision for appointment has to be submitted to the Vice-Chancellor along with all the applications and connected papers. The appointment can be made even before the approval is received from the Vice-Chancellor but the continuance of the appointment is subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The appointment can be made even before the approval is received from the Vice-Chancellor but the continuance of the appointment is subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor to disapprove the appointment is made with the concurrence of the Selection Committee established under Section 25 (1) , which consists of, besides the Vice-Chancellor, the Dean of the Faculty concerned and three other persons possessing expert knowledge of the subject, one to be nominated by the Academic Council, and two by the Chancellor after consultation with the relevant Faculties of at least three Universities of India as provided under Section 25 (2) . This selection committee is indeed a high powered impartial body and is expected to concur with the Vice-Chancellor in disapproving the appointment after examining the applications received and connected papers. The communication conveying the disapproval of the petitioner's appointment states that the petitioners appointment `was not made on merit'. Thus the selection committee, after considering all the applications and the connected papers, came to the conclusion that, on merits the petitioner did not deserve the appointment. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Vice-Chancellor was bound to follow that rule of natural justice which requires a person to be heard before a decision adverse to him is taken; the petitioner cannot, while considering the merits of the candidates, be given an opportunity to prove his merit. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in R.D. and Chemical Co. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1789, which was a case under Section 326 of the Companies Act, 1946. Dealing with the approval of the Central Government in the appointment of a Managing agent, the Supreme Court said :- "Investment of that power carried with it a duty to act judicially: i.e., to hold an enquiry in a manner consistent with rules of relevant matters, to ignore irrelevant matters, and to reach a conclusion without bias, without predilection and without prejudice." (1792). These observations also lead me to the same conclusion which I have reached above. Besides the Supreme Court held in this case that the power was quasi-judicial. 8. These observations also lead me to the same conclusion which I have reached above. Besides the Supreme Court held in this case that the power was quasi-judicial. 8. It was feebly suggested during the course of arguments that the representation of C.L. Maheshwari influenced the decision of the Vice-Chancellor but there is no indication that that representation was placed before the Selection Committee and was taken into consideration by the Selection Committee while giving concurrence to the disapproval. 9. In Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 353, to which also a reference was made the Supreme Court held that before taking action under Section 4 of the Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) (Amendment Act 13 of 1962) regarding any appointment, dismissal, removal or termination of services of a teacher, the Chancellor must hear the teacher concerned according to the principles of natural justice. This decision is of no avail to the petitioner if the background of that provision is examined. In that case Jagdish Pandey was selected for appointment as Principal of a college and his appointment as approved by the University on 24-1-1962. After the approval of the appointment i.e. after Jagdish Pandey was firmly installed in the post of the Principal, a new law was passed, namely, the aforesaid Bihar State Universities (University of Biliar Bhagalpur and Ranchi) (Amendment) Act which contained Section 4, empowering the Chancellor to screen every appointment, dismissal or removal etc. of a teacher in a college with the advice of University Service Commission. Since the appointment of Jagdish Pandey had already become regular in accordance with the law prevailing at the time of appointment and since the new law came into force subsequently the Supreme Court held that under the new law the Chancellor would not take away the vested right without giving an opportunity to the teacher concerned to show cause against any flaw or irregularity in his appointment. The position in the present case is different. The petitioner was appointed subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor and he had no vested right as Sri Jagdish Pandey had in the Bihar case. 10. The position in the present case is different. The petitioner was appointed subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor and he had no vested right as Sri Jagdish Pandey had in the Bihar case. 10. In Mohammad Ali v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 681, a Division Bench of this Court held that where the appointment is subject to the approval of the higher authority or the Government, the appointment, though valid till it is disapproved, is nobulous and cannot be deemed to be perfect and binding. The nebulous nature of appointment of the petitioner does not give the right which Jagdish Pandey was enjoying in the Bihar case by reason of the completion of all the formalities including the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under the law existing at the time of his appointment as Principal. 11. In the view I take, I am unable to hold that the disapproval of the Petitioner's appointment by the Vice-Chancellor suffers from any infirmity of non-compliance with principle of natural justice that every person shall be heard before he is condemned. 12. Since Sec. 25(l) of the Agra University Act provides that on the appointment of a teacher being disapproved by the Vice-Chancellor, his services shall be terminated, no exception can be taken to the termination of the services of the petitioner. It may be recalled that his appointment was clearly stated to be subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. 13. Apart from that, the petitioner was an employee of a private body and did not enjoy the protection available to a Government servant under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In a case like this, if the termination of service is wrongful, the appropriate remedy for him is to sue the University for damages vide U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C.K. Tyagi, A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244, and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, 1971 (II) Supreme Court Cases 192. This is, therefore, not a fit case for interference with the termination of the petitioner's appointment in the exercise of the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. 14. The result is that the petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed but there will be no orders as to costs.