Som Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1971 DIGILAW 406 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoband from proceeding with the arbitration pending before him questioning legality of the petitioners' election as members of the Committee of Management of Deoband Cooperative Cane Development Union. A writ of certiorari has also been claimed for quashing the State Government's order dated 4th January, 1971. 2. The facts, in brief, which led to the filing of the present petition, are necessary to be stated. There is a Cooperative Society, registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, known as Deoband Cooperative Cane Development Union Limited, Saharanpur, hereinafter referred to as the Society. The cane growers of the locality are its members and the Society renders services to them and makes arrangement for sale of sugarcane grown by its members to the sugar factories. The Society is a Cane Growers Cooperative Society under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. In October, 1970, election of the Committee of Management of the Society was held in accordance with a circular letter issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, by which all the delegates present at the General Meeting of the Societies elected 12 members to constitute its Committee of Management. The Circular dated 14th October, 1970, issued by the Registrar was, however, held illegal by this Court in writ petition No. 5276 of 1970. Another writ petition No. 5504, of 1970 challenging the election of the Committee of Management of the Society was filed by opposite parties Nos. 7 and 8 and one Raj Kumar Singh. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that the petitioners of that petition had an alternative remedy under the Cooperative Societies Act by way of arbitration proceedings, as provided by Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . Thereupon opposite parties Nos. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that the petitioners of that petition had an alternative remedy under the Cooperative Societies Act by way of arbitration proceedings, as provided by Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . Thereupon opposite parties Nos. 7, 8 and 9, who are the members of the Society challenged the election of the petitioners and respondent No. 6, 10, 11 and 12 to the present petition, mainly on the ground that since the election of the Committee of Management was held in accordance with the circular order of the Registrar Cooperative Societies dated 14th October, 1970 and as the said circular letter has been held illegal by this Court, the entire election was vitiated. The District Magistrate, Saharanpur entertained the dispute raised by the opposite parties Nos. 7, 8 and 9 and appointed Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoband, opposite party No. 5, as Arbitrator to hear and decide the dispute. While the proceedings were pending before the Arbitrator, State Government issued a letter dated 4th January, 1971 addressed to the Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, drawing his attention to the judgment of this Court in writ petition No. 5276 of 1970 declaring the Registrar's circular letter dated 14th October, 1970 illegal. The Government in its order directed that no appeal need be filed against the judgment of the High Court as the State Government had decided to implement the judgment, and act accordingly, it further directed, that in the societies where election had not been held, election should be held in accordance with the judgment of the High Court, but in cases where elections had been held and the same were under challenge, they should be decided according to the judgment of the High Court. The petitioners have challenged the legality of the aforesaid Government order and the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to act as Arbitrator to hear and decide or to continue with the proceedings in arbitration arising out of the said election dispute. 3. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners has firstly challenged the order of the State Government as contained in its letter to the Cane Commissioner dated 4th January, 1971. 3. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners has firstly challenged the order of the State Government as contained in its letter to the Cane Commissioner dated 4th January, 1971. According to learned counsel, the letter contains a direction to the Arbitrator to decide the dispute in a particular way and, as such, it amounts to interference with the arbitration proceedings, without there being any authority in law for the issue of any such direction. I have perused the order of the State Government as contained in its letter dated 5th January, 1971, a copy of which has been filed as annexure `3' to the petition. The letter was issued by the Deputy Secretary of the Cane Development Department addressed to the Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow on the subject of writ petition No. 5276 of 1970. The letter in the first place stated that the Government had decided to accept the judgment of the High Court and, therefore, there was no necessity for filing any appeal against that judgment before the Supreme Court. The letter further stated that election should be held in accordance with the judgment of the High Court in all those District Cane Development Societies where such elections had not been held, and in cases where disputes were pending relating to the election of Committee of Management of the Society, the same should be decided in accordance with the judgment of the High Court but where no dispute had been raised and the elections had not been questioned, the elections so held should be allowed to stand. The Cane Commissioner was directed to inform his other subordinate officers about the orders of the State Government. The letter of the State Government was not addressed to the District Magistrate, Saharanpur or to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoband before whom arbitration proceedings are pending. There is no material on record to show that the Cane Commissioner had issued any direction to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, respondent No. 5, directing him to decide the dispute in question in a particular manner. There is no material on record to show that the Cane Commissioner had issued any direction to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, respondent No. 5, directing him to decide the dispute in question in a particular manner. The order of the State Government as contained in its letter dated 4th January, 1971 is directed to implement the orders of this Court, In my opinion, no objection can be taken to the order of the State Government, which issued directions to its subordinate officers to act according to law declared by this Court and to implement the same. The petitioners' contention that the circular letter was issued without any jurisdiction or that it has predetermined the issues pending before the Arbitrator is wholly misconceived. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has secondly urged that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Deoband, who is acting as Arbitrator to decide the election dispute, has no jurisdiction or authority in law to continue with the proceedings or to decide the same, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Rule 225 of the Rules framed under the Act or to refer the dispute in question to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for arbitration. According to the learned counsel, it was the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies alone, empowered under Section 70 of the Act to entertain an application raising dispute about the constitution of Committee of Management, or to refer such dispute to any other person to act as an Arbitrator for deciding that dispute; the District Magistrate was not the Registrar, nor he was appointed to assist the Registrar as required by Section 3 (2) of the Act, therefore, the the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain an application raising dispute relating to the election of Committee of Management or to refer the same to any other person for deciding the same. 5. Chapter IX of the Act makes provision for the settlement of disputes relating to the Constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society. The chapter contains only two sections : viz., Secs. 70 and 71. 5. Chapter IX of the Act makes provision for the settlement of disputes relating to the Constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society. The chapter contains only two sections : viz., Secs. 70 and 71. Sec. 70 enumerates the disputes which may be raised; it further confers powers on the Registrar to entertain a dispute so raised and to take action in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, Sec. 70 expressly takes away the jurisdiction of a court of law to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any such dispute as enumerated in the section. Sec. 71 enjoins the Registrar to act according to rules in referring the dispute to Arbitrator. It laid down that subject to the provisions of the Rules, the Registrar is to decide the dispute himself or refer the same for decision to an arbitrator appointed by him or refer it on the request of the parties in writing for decision to a Board of Arbitrators. The decision given by the Registrar, the Arbitrator or the Board of Arbitrators becomes an award. The scheme as contained in these two sections makes it clear that for settlement of disputes relating to the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society, the Registrar or the Arbitrator, as indicated in the Act and the Rules, have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the same. A dispute required to be referred to the Registrar for action in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules when raised, the Registrar on receipt of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of Section 70 is required to take further action according to the Rules. The Registrar has no discretion of his own in taking the decision under Section 71, he is bound to act according to the Rules. The powers conferred on the Registrar under Section 71 are circumscribed by the Rules, and he is bound to act according to those Rules. 6. Rules 225 to 251 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules have been framed under the Act for carrying out the purposes of Secs. 70 and 71 of the Act. The powers conferred on the Registrar under Section 71 are circumscribed by the Rules, and he is bound to act according to those Rules. 6. Rules 225 to 251 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules have been framed under the Act for carrying out the purposes of Secs. 70 and 71 of the Act. Rule 229 (2) lays down that where a dispute is raised under the Act relating to the Constitution of the Committee of Management or election or appointment of any office-bearer or a delegate of a cooperative society, and where such dispute relates to a cooperative society other than an apex society, reference shall be made to the District Magistrate of the district to which the society belongs. Rule 230 (e) empowers the District Magistrate to decide the dispute himself or appoint any one of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under him to act as Arbitrator, or as the President of the Board of Arbitrators, as the case may be. The provisions of Secs. 70, 71 and Rule 229 and 230 makes it amply clear that if a dispute relating to the constitution of the Managing Committee of a cooperative society other than an apex society is raised, the Registrar has no choice in the matter. The powers conferred upon him under Section 71 of the Act to decide the dispute or refer it for decision to an Arbitrator or Board of Arbitrator has to be exercised, as directed under the Rules. Rule 229 enjoins upon the Registrar to refer such disputes to the District Magistrate. The Registrar has no option in the matter. He cannot either decide it himself or refer to any other authority or person. The District Magistrate is appointed as one of the authorities to decide the dispute in question and he has further been empowered by Rule 230 (e) to decide the dispute himself or to appoint any one of the Sub-Divisional Magistrates under him to decide the same. In the present case, the dispute relates to the constitution of the Managing Committee of the Cooperative Society other than an apex Society, therefore, the District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and to appoint Sub-Divisional Magistrate, opposite party No. 5, to decide the same. The proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate are thus legal and valid. 7. In the present case, the dispute relates to the constitution of the Managing Committee of the Cooperative Society other than an apex Society, therefore, the District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and to appoint Sub-Divisional Magistrate, opposite party No. 5, to decide the same. The proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate are thus legal and valid. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that District Magistrate had no power to entertain the dispute in the present case as he was not appointed Registrar. The appointment of Registrar is contemplated under Section 3 of the Act. Under Sub-sec. (1) of Section 3, State Government may appoint a person to be the Registrar of Cooperative Societies for the state. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the State Government to appoint other persons to assist the Registrar and to confer on any such persons all or any of the powers of the Registrar by general or special orders. Learned counsel has proceeded to argue that the dispute raised by respondents against the petitioner's election could not be entertained by the District Magistrate as it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar. Consequently, the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate are without jurisdiction. There is no substance in the contention. Even if it is accepted that the District Magistrate had no power to entertain the dispute, he was the authority designated under the rule 229 to have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute or to appoint any Sub-Divisional Officer to decide the same. Admittedly, the District Magistrate Saharanpur, within whose jurisdiction the Society has been functioning had appointed Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoband opposite party No. 5, to act as arbitrator, to hear and decide the dispute relating to petitioner's election; therefore, the proceedings pending before him are not without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel has not been able to point out any provision in the Act to show that the opposite party No. 5 had no authority in law to act as arbitrator or to hear and decide the dispute pending before him. The petitioner's contention that the application raising the dispute relating to the petitioner's election was presented to a wrong person, therefore, all the subsequent proceedings are rendered void any Sub-Divisional Magistrate has no jurisdiction, is devoid of the substance. The petitioner's contention that the application raising the dispute relating to the petitioner's election was presented to a wrong person, therefore, all the subsequent proceedings are rendered void any Sub-Divisional Magistrate has no jurisdiction, is devoid of the substance. Even if the application challenging the petitioner's election was presented to the Registrar, the dispute would have ultimately been referred to the District Magistrate for deciding the same and the District Magistrate could then appoint Sub-Divisional Magistrate, opposite party No. 5 to hear and decide the same. Under these circumstances the mere fact of presentation of the application to the District Magistrate does not render the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, vitiated. 8. There is yet another reason to hold that the District Magistrate was empowered to entertain the dispute questioning the petitioner's election. The State Government in exercise of its powers conferred on it under Sub-sec. (2) of Section 3 of the Act issued a notification dated 24th June, 1969 published in the U.P. Gazette, Part I dated 5th July, 1969 at page 2460 conferring powers of the Registrar on the District Magistrate, which the Registrar could exercise under Section 70 and 71 of the Act. The relevant extract of the notification runs as under- "SAHKARITA VIBHAG : NOTIFICATION NO. 3328/XII-CA-25 (1)-67. DATED JUNE 24, 1969. In exercise of the powers under Sub-sec. (2) of Section 3 of the UTTAR PRADESH COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1965 (U.P. ACT XI of 1966), the Governor is pleased to confer subject to the provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder, the powers of the Registrar under that Act and the rules, to be exercised as follows- (1) ........................................ (2) ........................................ (3) An officer for the time being holding the post of District Magistrate of a District shall exercise the powers of the Registrar under Section 70, 71 and 98 of the Act in respect of the disputes relating to the Constitution of the Committee of Management or election or appointment of any office-bearer or a delegate of a Cooperative Society having headquarters within the district; (4) ........................................ (5) ........................................ (6) The powers relating to reference of the disputes to the Registrar under Section 70 and the decision on such disputes under Section 71 shall be exercised as provided in Rules 229 and 230. (5) ........................................ (6) The powers relating to reference of the disputes to the Registrar under Section 70 and the decision on such disputes under Section 71 shall be exercised as provided in Rules 229 and 230. By the above notification powers of the Registrar exercisable by him under Section 70 and 71 of the Act have been conferred upon the District Magistrate, namely, to entertain a dispute and to decide the same. Under clause (6) of the Notification the same restrictions, which are placed by the Act on the powers of the Registrar, have also been placed on the powers of the District Magistrate and in exercising the powers of the Registrar under Section 70 and 71 of the Act he has to take action in accordance to rule 229 and 230. The notification and the Rules referred to above, leave no room for any doubt that the District Magistrate was authorised to entertain the dispute in question and to refer the same to opposite party No. 5, who was a Sub-Divisional Magistrate working under him. 9. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that the conferment of powers of the Registrar on the District Magistrate by the aforesaid notification was wholly illegal, according to the learned counsel, the State Government could not confer the powers of the Registrar on the District Magistrate unless he was at first appointed as an Officer to assist the Registrar as contemplated by Sub-sec. (2) of Section 3 of the Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the case of Ajaib Singh v. Gur Bachan Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1619, and Hari Chand v. Batla Engineering Company, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 483 In my opinion, these cases do not lend any support to the petitioner's case. 10. In Ajaib Singh's case, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1619 the power to pass an order of detention under Rule 31 (b) of the defence of India Rules was in question. The order of detention in that case was passed by Additional District Magistrate at a time when no District Magistrate was posted in the District. The validity of the order was challenged before the Supreme Court. The order of detention in that case was passed by Additional District Magistrate at a time when no District Magistrate was posted in the District. The validity of the order was challenged before the Supreme Court. Sec. 3 of the Defence of India Act confers power on the Central Government to make Rules, to delegate power to detain any person on the grounds mentioned therein, but the power to pass an order of detention is not to be conferred on any person lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate. The Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder itself laid down that the authority empowered to detain should not be lower in rank that of a District Magistrate. Under Section 40 (2) of the Defence of India Act, State Government was authorised to delegate its power to any officer or authority subordinate to it. The delegation of such power for passing the order of detention was, however, to be in accordance to Section 3 of the Act and, therefore, the State Government could not delegate its powers of detention to any officer below the rank of the District Magistrate. It was under these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that the order of detention passed by an Additional District Magistrate was illegal. The contention raised on behalf of the State that since the Additional District Magistrate was empowered to exercise powers of the District Magistrate under Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was repelled on the ground that since the officer had not been appointed District Magistrate he was an officer below in rank to that of the District Magistrate. 11. In the case of Hari Chand Agarwal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 483 the power of requisition property under the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder was in question. In that case, the Additional District Magistrate Gurdaspur, who had been invested with the powers of the District Magistrate under Section 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had passed an order under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act requisitioning a shop. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Ajaib Singh's, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1619 and held that the powers of requisitioning was of a very drastic nature which interfered with the fundamental rights of property guaranteed under the Constitution. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Ajaib Singh's, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1619 and held that the powers of requisitioning was of a very drastic nature which interfered with the fundamental rights of property guaranteed under the Constitution. The Central Government, therefore, while making the delegation of its powers under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act must be presumed to be fully conscious of that aspect of the matter and it was for that reason that an officer or authority of a status of the District Magistrate in the district was authorised to exercise that power. Having regard to the provisions continued in the Defence of India Act, Their Lordships in the circumstances of that case held that an Additional District Magistrate had no power to pass an order of requisitioning property under the Defence of India Act. In both the cases, the Supreme Court laid stress on the fact that the Legislature had declared that power of detention or the power of requisitioning property should not be conferred by the Central Government or by the State Government on any officer lower in rank than the District Magistrate and, therefore, even if an Additional District Magistrate empowered to exercise the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, who was admittedly lower in rank to District Magistrate was held to have no power to pass an order of detention or requisitioning property under the Defence of India Act. There is no such provision under the U.P. Government Societies Act. On the other hand, we find the Act itself contemplated that the powers of the Registrar can be, conferred on any other officer or authority. The Legislative intent has further been made clear as the District Magistrate and other officers have been designated nominated under the Rules to hear and decide the dispute relating to the election of Committee of Management of a cooperative society. The nature of the dispute and the rights of the petitioners involved in the present dispute are quite different than that before the Supreme Court. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are no authority for holding that the District Magistrate had no power to entertain the dispute in question. 12. The nature of the dispute and the rights of the petitioners involved in the present dispute are quite different than that before the Supreme Court. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are no authority for holding that the District Magistrate had no power to entertain the dispute in question. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners had lastly urged that the Society is a Cane Growers Cooperative Society under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and therefore, any dispute relating to the constitution of Committee of Management could only be referred to the Cane Commissioner for decision under Rule 108 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954. The U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and the Rules framed thereunder make a special provision for the Cooperative Societies of Cane Growers. The U.P. Cooperative Societies Act is a general law which governs all kinds of cooperative societies while the aforesaid U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is a special law confined only to the cane growers cooperative societies, therefore, the Rule 108 shall over-ride the provisions contained in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder. According to the learned counsel, the Registrar or the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain or to refer the dispute in question for arbitration. The Cane Commissioner was the only person authorised under law to entertain such a dispute. The proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate are, therefore, wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 13. Rule 108 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954 was framed under Section 28 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. Under Section 28 of the said Act, State Government was empowered to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of that Act. Sub-sec. (2) enumerates the matters which such Rules may provide for. Clause (n) of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 28 confers specific power on the State Government to frame Rules for constitution, operation, management, supervision and audit of cane growers cooperative societies and councils, and further under clause (r) of the said Sub-section, rules could be framed by the State Government for reference of disputes to the Cane Commissioner regarding the business of cane growers cooperative society. Rule 108 was framed by the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred under Sub-sec. (2) clause (n) and (r) referred to above in 1954 which laid down that any dispute touching the business of the cane growers cooperative societies between members or between members or society shall be referred to the Cane Commissioner for decision, who could decide the dispute himself or refer it to arbitration. The U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 was enacted by the Uttar Pradesh Legislature to consolidate and amend the law relating to cooperative societies in Uttar Pradesh. The provisions contained in the Act are exhaustive which govern the registration, constitution, management of all kinds of cooperative societies functioning in the State. The activities of cooperative societies are regulated under the provisions of the Act which makes provision for the raising of disputes and decision of the same in the manner prescribed thereunder. The Act is complete code in itself. The cane growers cooperative societies are also cooperative societies registered under the Act and their activities are also governed by the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative societies, Act 1965. The Legislature was conscious that special provisions were in existence in the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder for the cane growers cooperative societies, for that reason, the Legislature by enacting Section 134 in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 amended the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953. Under Sub-sec. (5) of Section 134, provisions of Section 28 (2) of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act. 1953 have been amended and clause (r) of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 28 had been substituted in a manner so as to take away the power of the State Government to frame rules for referring the disputes arising among the members of the Cane growers societies to the Cane Commissioner. After the amendment the State Government is not empowered to frame a rule under the said Act making provisions for the settlement of disputes between members of the cane growers cooperative societies. The legislative intent is, therefore, clear that the provisions contained in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and the rules framed thereunder were to govern and regulate the affairs of the Cane Growers Societies also. 14. The legislative intent is, therefore, clear that the provisions contained in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and the rules framed thereunder were to govern and regulate the affairs of the Cane Growers Societies also. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged that Subsequent general legislation does not over-ride an earlier special legislation and, therefore, the provisions contained in the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder would prevail and in any case, Rule 108 is still valid and the dispute in question should there fore, have been referred to the Cane Commissioner. It is not necessary to refer to various cases cited by the learned counsel in support of his contention that subsequent general legislation does not over-ride or repeal an earlier special legislation, as in my opinion, the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 contains express provisions to the effect that the provisions contained under the Act would over-ride the provisions contained in any other existing law. Sec. 70, enumerates the disputes, which may be referred to the Arbitrator and which confers power on the Registrar to entertain a dispute between members of a society relating to the constitution of a Cooperative Society expressly declares that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute relating to the constitution, management or the business of a Cooperative Society arises, then such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for action in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The enacting clause of Sub-sec. (1) of Section 70 of the Act clearly expresses the legislative intent that the provisions contained in the Act shall over-ride the provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force. While enacting Section 70 the Legislature was aware that the provisions contained in Section 28 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder were in existence which governed the affairs of cane growers societies. Rule 108 was an existing law at the time when the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act 1965 came into force, therefore, the provisions contained in Section 70 shall over-ride and prevail in respect of settlement of disputes between members of a Cane Growers Cooperative Society and that dispute cannot be referred to the Cane Commissioner. Rule 108 was an existing law at the time when the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act 1965 came into force, therefore, the provisions contained in Section 70 shall over-ride and prevail in respect of settlement of disputes between members of a Cane Growers Cooperative Society and that dispute cannot be referred to the Cane Commissioner. In view of the express provisions contained in Section 70 of the Act the Registrar or the District Magistrate have full jurisdiction to entertain a dispute arising between members of cane growers cooperative society. There is thus no force in the petitioner's contention. 15. I have already discussed all the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but I do not find any force in any of them. The District Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in question and to refer the same to arbitration to the Sub-divisional Magistrate working under him, the proceedings pending before the opposite party No. 5 are legal and valid. The petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 16. In the result, writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. September 7th, 1971.