ORDER:- This is an application by L. Tombi Singh under Cl.(c) of Article 133(1) of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment dated 11th December 1970 of this Court by which the applicants petition under Art.226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the order terminating his services as Chowkidar of village Khangabok was rejected. The prayer for certificate of fitness is opposed by the respondents who are the Superintendent of Police, Manipur, and the Union of India. 2. Shri Somorendra Singh urged for the applicant that the central question that fell for determination in the writ petition being one of general and public importance it is a fit case in which the certificate should be granted. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand contended that certificate can be granted in terms of Cl.(c) of Article 133(1) only if the question of law raised is substantial in the sense that it is of general public importance, that since the only point canvassed during the course of arguments in this Court, when the writ petition came up for hearing, was whether L. Tombi Singh held a civil post in his capacity as Chowkidar, that since the principles governing what constitutes a civil post were settled by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884 , and all that this Court had to do in determining whether a Chowkidar in territory of Manipur holds a civil post, was to apply those principles, certificate of fitness cannot be legally granted. To support that contention he cited AIR 1962 SC 1314 , Chunilal v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. The rule enunciated in this authority is as under: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of Law." 3. According to Cl.(c) of Article 133(1) an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. It was conceded at the bar by the learned Government Advocate that all conditions prescribed by Cl.(c) excepting that it "is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court" are satisfied. Therefore, what falls for determination is whether the present one is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Clause (c) of Art.133(1) has been the subject of interpretation in a large number of authorities of various High Courts in India as also of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held in the case of Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 457 , that in the case of Cl.(c) both of Art.133(1) and Art.134(1) "the only condition is the discretion of the High Court but the discretion is a judicial one and must be judicially exercised along the well-established lines which govern these matters." In the case of Chunilal, AIR 1962 SC 1314 (supra) the Supreme Court very clearly laid down the rule that if the question in dispute is settled by the Highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles, the question would not be a substantial question of law. The criteria for determining whether a particular office or employment is a "civil post" were elaborately outlined by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case of Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884 and it is on the basis of the principles set out therein that I reached the con-dusk that L Tombi Singh did not hold a civil post from which he was said to have been dismissed or removed. Consequently, in the face of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sir Chunilal, I find it difficult to subscribe the contention of Shri Somorendra Singh that the present is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held in the case of Mange v. Additional Director. Consolidation of Holdings, AIR 1968 Punj and Har 216 (FB), that a case cannot be certified by the High Court as fit one for appeal when the point raised is already settled by the Supreme Court. I agree with Shri Somorendra Singh that the point involved in the present case, viz., whether chowkidars in the territory of Manipur hold civil posts raises a question of general and public importance, but since the principles governing the determination of the question whether a particular office or employment is a civil post within the meaning of Art.311 of the Constitution are settled at the highest, the rule laid down in the case of Sir Chunilal constitutes a formidable hurdle in the way of granting the certificate. Hence, the application for leave must fail on that ground alone. 4. There is another serious obstacle in the way of granting the certificate prayed for. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, in reply to the allegations made in the writ petition by L. Tombi Singh, it was alleged that after L. Tombi Singh was appointed chowkidar pursuant to election held in the village it came to light that he (L. Tombi Singh) was a dismissed constable, and that for that reason his services as chowkidar were terminated. In the affidavit in reply put in by L. Tombi Singh he did not chalange. the correctness of the allegation that he was a dismissed constable. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that L. Tombi Singh had been dismissed from the post of constable. It cannot be gainsaid that a person dismissed from Government service cannot get another employment under the Government. It is equally well-settled that the grant at relief in Appellant writ petition rests at the discretion of the High Court and that even if a legal or constitutional right of the writ petitioner is proved to have been infringed the High Court may refuse to grant the relief sought in the context of the facts and circumstances brought to its notice. In this connection I may appropriately invite reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Writ Petn. No.53 of 1968, Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, decided on 22-11-1968 (reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 ). It was held therein that there appears some confusion about the scope of Art.32, that Article gives the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, that the Article merely keeps open the doors of the Supreme Court, that the guarantee goes no further at least on the terms of Article 32 and that after a petitioner has reached the Supreme Court the extent or manner of interference is for that Court to decide. It was observed further that "it is clear that every case does not merit interference. That (interference) must always depend upon the facts of the case." Another significant observation made by the Supreme Court was that on grounds of public policy it "should not lend its aid to a litigant even under Article 32 of the Constitution in case of an inordinate delay in asking for relief and the question of delay ought normally to be measured by the period fixed for the institution of suits under the Limitation Acts." The Supreme Court held further that there is no merit in the contention "that because there is an invasion of a fundamental right of a citizen he can be allowed to come to this Court, no matter how long after the infraction of his right he applies for relief." With these observations the writ petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court although on merits it was not in dispute that the petitioner had a good case. The basic principles governing the writs filed under Art.226 in the High Court and under Art.32 in the Supreme Court, I believe, are identical. Therefore, the relief claimed by a writ petitioner can appropriately be refused if the facts and circumstances justify adoption of such Appellant course. 5. Now coming to the facts of the case in hand, it is proved that L. Tombi Singh is a dismissed Government employee, and it is not in dispute that a dismissed employee cannot re-enter Government service. Therefore, the relief claimed by a writ petitioner can appropriately be refused if the facts and circumstances justify adoption of such Appellant course. 5. Now coming to the facts of the case in hand, it is proved that L. Tombi Singh is a dismissed Government employee, and it is not in dispute that a dismissed employee cannot re-enter Government service. If therefore the office of chowkidar, as contended, is a civil post, L. Tombi Singh is not entitled to be appointed to it because of his previous dismissal from Government service, and if it is not a civil post then he has no right to come to this Court under Art.226. This Court would be most reluctant to grant a relief which can serve no practical purpose. Even if it may be argued that L. Tombi Singh having once been appointed as chowkidar he could be removed from that office only by compliance with the provisions of Art.311 and that his removal is unconstitutional because of non-compliance with those provisions. I find no compelling merit in that contention inasmuch as the ultimate fate of the claim of Tombi Singh is as clear as a pikestaff, viz., that he cannot retain the office of chowkidar. 6. For the reasons stated the application falls and is dismissed but without costs. Application dismissed.