JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - This is a revision against an order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ganjam-Boudh, Berhampur in Criminal Revision No. 20/67, upholding the order of the learned Magistrate, passed obviously u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure in G.R. Case No. 779 of 1965, directing return of the seized articles to p.w. 9, after acquitting the accused persons, Petitioners herein, in the said case. 2. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 were charged under Sections 452 and 380, Indian Penal Code and Petitioners Nos. 8 to 10 were charged u/s 411, Indian Penal Code in G.R. Case No. 779/65. The said case ended in acquittal of all the accused persons. While acquitting all the Petitioners the learned Magistrate directed return of the M.Os. I to XII to p.w. 9 or to her husband p.w. 1. These articles were seized from the houses of the Petitioners. A petition, registered as Criminal Revision No. 20 of 1967, was filed before the Sessions Judge, Ganjam-Boudh at Berhampur, for setting aside the aforesaid order u/s 617(1), Code of Criminal Procedure of the learned Magistrate, and for directing the return of the said M. Os. to the Petitioners. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 17-7-1968 dismissed the said petition on merits, thus upholding the aforesaid order passed by the learned Magistrate. This revision petition is against the aforesaid order of the learned Sessions Judge. 3. On an earlier occasion, when this revision petition came up for hearing before me, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this revision was raised by Mr. Dhal the then learned Standing Counsel for the State, on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure had no jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid final order upholding the decision of the learned Magistrate passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure. He submitted then that the grievance of the Petitioner, in effect, was against the final order passed by the Magistrate and not against the ineffective order of the Sessions Judge passed without jurisdiction, and so this revision against the sessions Judges?s order was barred by time and not maintainable, and no relief could be granted to the Petitioners in this revision. Mr. Dhal cited the decisions reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991 or AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, in support of the above preliminary objection. Mr. Mr. Dhal cited the decisions reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991 or AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, in support of the above preliminary objection. Mr. Y.S.N. Murty the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, then contended that the view taken in the decision reported in AIR 1961 Orissa, 1212, was based OD the single Judge decision reported in A.I.R 1959 Allahabad, 963, which was overruled by a subsequent Division Bench Decision of the same Court reported in AIR 1961 Allahabad 5444, and that the views taken in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212 and A.I.R 1965 Orissa 1991, are in conflict with the views taken by a large number of other High Courts, some of which are Full Bench decisions. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Respondent did not refuse the above position. I also found that it had been observed in both the above mentioned decisions and also in the decision reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1985, that there was sharp conflict of Judicial opinions on the question of law, decided in the aforesaid two cases. I therefore felt that this was a fit case which should be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration, and accordingly, by my order dated 29-9-1970, I directed this matter to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders to that effect. But the learned Chief Justice did not consider this to be a fit case for reference to a Division Bench and directed this matter to be placed again before me for disposal by his order dated 20-10 1970 which is as follows: The conflict of authority was noticed by the learned Single Judge in AIR 1965 Orissa, 1991, (See paragraph 4). After giving reasons it was held therein: In the aforesaid state of things it is unnecessary to refer the matter to a Division Bench for reconsideration. I hold that 27 C.L.T. 232 : AIR 1961 Orissa, 1212, has been correctly decided. 2. Thus it is not for the first time that the conflict of authority has been noticed. To get over the consistent authorities of this Court it was naturally contended at the Bar that the case should be referred to the Division Bench. For reasons given in AIR 1965 Orissa, 1991, I do not consider that this is a fit case for reference to a Division Bench. There is no conflict of authority so far 808 this Court is concerned. For reasons given in AIR 1965 Orissa, 1991, I do not consider that this is a fit case for reference to a Division Bench. There is no conflict of authority so far 808 this Court is concerned. The case may therefore be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal according to law. 4. When this matter thus came up again before me, for bearing, Mr. Y.S.N. Murty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, contended that independently of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, be, under the special substantive and independent provisions of Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure itself, was legally competent to entertain and finally, dispose of an merits an application against an order passed by the Magistrate u/s 517(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, and as such this revision against the Sessions Judge?s final order passed on the said petition was maintainable. He urged that this particular question of law, as specially urged by him, was never mooted out or noticed and/or decided in the three decisions of this Court reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, AIR 1965 Orissa 1985 and AIR 1965 Orissa 1991 and as such they could not be treated as authoritative precedents for deciding the aforesaid point. 5. In the decision reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, Narasimham, C.J. agreeing with the view taken in AIR 1959 All. 963, in effect holds that Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure does not confer an independent right of appeal against an order passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure in the absence of an appeal against the principal order actually pending before the appellate Court. The relevant observations from the above mentioned Allahabad decision may be quoted: I am convinced that Section 520 does not empower a Court to assume jurisdiction as a Court of appeal etc. but empowers the Court that has assumed jurisdiction as a Court of appeal etc. to modify, alter or annul an order regarding disposal of property. It assumes jurisdiction as a Court of appeal etc. over the principal order passed by the trial Court and in the course of the exercise of that power it is empowered to modify, alter or annul a consequential order or incidental order passed by the trial Court u/s 517. to modify, alter or annul an order regarding disposal of property. It assumes jurisdiction as a Court of appeal etc. over the principal order passed by the trial Court and in the course of the exercise of that power it is empowered to modify, alter or annul a consequential order or incidental order passed by the trial Court u/s 517. The above Orissa and the Allahabad decisions therefore dealt with the topic mainly on the above perspective of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. In the decision reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1985, Narasimham, C.J. noticed that the decision in AIR 1959 All. 963, on which the above decision in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, was based, was overruled by a subsequent Division Bench decision of the same Court, reported in AIR 1961 All. 5444, and then observed: There is no doubt that there is conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the power u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised in the absence of an appeal actually pending before the appellate Court. But in my opinion this question is academic here. Even if it be held that there was no right of appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, as the matter has come up before me in revision I shall dispose of on merit. In the decision reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991, Misra. J., as he then was, (at present the learned Chief Justice), noticed the above mentioned observations A.I.R 1965 Orissa 1985, and the fact that the decision in AIR 1959 All. 963, was overruled by a subsequent Division Bench of that Court, and then observed that the view taken in AIR 1961 Orissa 121 represents one view over which there is a sharp conflict of authority and this view has been accepted as the correct view in AIR 1963 Punj. 1676. In the aforesaid state of things it is unnecessary to refer the matter to a Division Bench for reconsideration. I hold that 27 C.L.T. 23 : AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, has been correctly decided. He then observed "On the authority of that decision the position of law is not disputed that no appeal lies to the Sessions Judge u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure against (In order u/s 517(1)". I hold that 27 C.L.T. 23 : AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, has been correctly decided. He then observed "On the authority of that decision the position of law is not disputed that no appeal lies to the Sessions Judge u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure against (In order u/s 517(1)". Holding thus on that particular aspect of the question the learned Judge then proceeded to deal with the other question as to whether the Sessions Judge, in exercise of his power of superintendence, could annul the final order passed u/s 517(1)? when no appeal lay to him u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure. In deciding this question reference was made to the provisions of Sections 435 and 438, Code of Criminal Procedure and it was held: It is thus manifest that though the Sessions Judge has got power of superintendence u/s 435, Code of Criminal Procedure he has no power to finally dispose of matters unless they come within the purview of Sections 436 and 437 Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge missed this point and interfered with the final order passed by the a Magistrate u/s 517(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to quash the order of the learned Magistrate (See AIR 1963 Punjab, 167, Paras 7 and 9). Mr. Murty submitted that this is the lone decision of this Court on the second above mentioned point. It was also shown that the opposite party in this case was not represented by a counsel. The Punjab decision in AIR 1963 Punjab, 1676, which was relied on for the decision in AIR 1965 Orissa, 1991, does not at all deal with the question in issue in the present form. In that case the point specifically referred to the Division Bench for decision was- That the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to pass such an order in appeal that in fact no appeal lies against an order u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure as such. The decision on the said point is thus: It thus seems to me that the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction as an appellate Court u/s 520 to reverse or modify an order passed by a Magistrate u/s 517 since no appeal lies against an order? The decision on the said point is thus: It thus seems to me that the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction as an appellate Court u/s 520 to reverse or modify an order passed by a Magistrate u/s 517 since no appeal lies against an order? under that section as such, and in exercise of his powers of revision the Sessions Judge can only exercise revisional powers conferred on him by Chapter 32 and therefore must, if he thinks an order u/s 157 requires correction, forward the case to the High Court u/s 438 for the orders of this Court. Falshaw, C.J. Looking at the scheme of the Code and also at Part VII, I find it a little difficult to conclude that Section 520 by itself creates a right of appeal from orders passed under Sections 517 to 519. It appears to me that Section 520 merely empowers the Courts exercising the various powers vested in them in the course of such exercise to stay the consequential order passed u/s 517 etc. by the Subordinate Courts and to modify, alter or amend those orders and then to pass such further orders as may be considered just. (Dua, J.). Thus both the above mentioned Orissa and Punjab decisions deal with and decide the point in the perspective of the appellate and the revisional power of the Court of Sessions, and the point specifically posed by Mr. Murty did not at all arise therein for consideration. The decision in AIR 1965 Orissa 1985, left the question undecided. 6. Mr. Murty does not at all invoke the Sessions Judge?s appellate or revisional power to entertain and/or dispose of such a petition. He urges that independent of the appellate and revisional power, and only under the separate and substantive provisions of Section 520 itself, any Court, which has power of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision in respect of the trial Court, can pass any final order, as may be legally just and proper, in respect of any property concerning which an order u/s 517(1) Code of Criminal Procedure has been passed by the trial Court. This specific question was therefore never mooted out, nor noticed and/or decided in the above mentioned Orissa decisions reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, and AIR 1965 Orissa 1991. This specific question was therefore never mooted out, nor noticed and/or decided in the above mentioned Orissa decisions reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, and AIR 1965 Orissa 1991. These decisions, as stated above, proceeded and decided the question regarding the power of the Court u/s 520 Code of Criminal Procedure only on the basis and perspective of its appellate and/or the revisional jurisdiction. The last mentioned decision as seen above was arrived at without the losing party having been reported in the case. 7. Mr. Dhal, the learned Standing Counsel for the State, at the hearing of this revision petition ultimately supported the above mentioned contention of Mr. Murty. He also pointed out that in the case reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991, the only two contentions raised by the counsel for the Petitioners, as mentioned in para 3 of that decision were as follows: 1. The learned sessions Judge has no appellate forum u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure against an order u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure and he has also no power of superintendence. The Sessions Judge can make a reference to the High Court and cannot annul the order of the Magistrate. 2. On merits the learned Sessions Judge did not take into consideration the evidence of the witnesses for the complainant stating that the complainant grew the crop. Mr. Dhal, agreeing with the submissions of Mr. Murty, very fairly conceded that the contention as specifically raised by Mr. Murty was never urged, considered and or decided in the above mentioned three Orissa decisions. 8. Mr. Murty drew my attention to certain portions from the topic on ?Precedent? appearing in Chapter 5 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, by P.J. Fitzgerald (12th Ed.) to support his contention that the above Orissa decisions are not authoritative precedents for the specific point raised by him. A decision passed sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. The rule that a precedent sub silentio is not authoritative goes back atleast to 1961(m) when counsel said: "An hundred precedents sub silentio are not material" and Twisden, J, agreed, "Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment". This rule has ever since been followed (n). The rule that a precedent sub silentio is not authoritative goes back atleast to 1961(m) when counsel said: "An hundred precedents sub silentio are not material" and Twisden, J, agreed, "Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment". This rule has ever since been followed (n). (Page 154(m) and (n) mentioned above are reference to decisions noted at that page). One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. Where judgment is given without the losing party having been represented, there is no assurance that all the relevant considerations have been brought to the notice of the Court, and consequently the decision ought not to be regarded as possessing absolute authority, even if it does not fall within the sub silentio rule. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also held that "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides" 1968 C.L.T. 1057. 9. I may also profitably quote here a paragraph from the same Chapter on "precedent" appearing at page 158 of the same book: The general rule is that a Court is bound by the decisions of an Courts higher than itself. A High Court Judge cannot question a decision of the Court of appeal, nor can the Court of Appeal refuge to follow judgment of the House of Lords. A corollary of the rule is that Courts are bound only by decisions of higher Courts and not by those of lower or equal rank. A High Court Judge is not bound by a previous High Court decision, though he will normally follow it on the principle of judicial comity, in order to avoid conflicts of authority and to secure certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice. If refuses to follow it, he cannot overrule it; both decisions stand and the resulting antinomy must wait for a higher Court to settle. If refuses to follow it, he cannot overrule it; both decisions stand and the resulting antinomy must wait for a higher Court to settle. I would also quote below with respect, the salutary dictum on this particular topic, laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1967 in para 18 at page 1773)8: It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a ;matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded an healthy principles of Judicial decorum and propriety. Having in view the above salutary observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court I wanted that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench, and placed the matter before the Hon?ble the Chief Justice far necessary orders to constitute a larger Bench, as under proviso (a) to Rule 1 of Chapter III of our High Court Rules, a Single Judge of our Court cannot directly refer such a matter to a Division Bench. In my opinion this proviso unreasonably fetters the judicial discretion of a single Judge to take recourse to the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The said proviso accordingly needs to be suitably amended very soon. However, as stated above, the matter Could not go before a larger Bench for reconsideration. 10. In view of the law on precedents as quoted above and in view of the concession of Mr. Dhal and my finding that the specific question raised by Mr. The said proviso accordingly needs to be suitably amended very soon. However, as stated above, the matter Could not go before a larger Bench for reconsideration. 10. In view of the law on precedents as quoted above and in view of the concession of Mr. Dhal and my finding that the specific question raised by Mr. Murty was never mooted out, nor noticed and/or decided in any of the above mentioned Orissa decisions and in view of that fact that in the hearing of case in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991, the opposite party was not represented by a counsel, I am satisfied that the above mentioned decisions of this Court do not stand as authoritative precedents for the particular point in question, arid so I am Tree to deal with and decide the point in issue on its own merit. 11. Mr. Murty, on the merits of his above mentioned contention urges that a reading of Section 520 indicates that the words any Court of appeal the section refer only to the class of Courts which can stay an order passed u/s 517 and can pass any final order in respect of such an order, and those words do not at all refer to the powers of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision of such Courts in, dealing with such an order. He submitted that in this case the Court of Sessions which passed the impugned order is a Court of appeal, and/or revision with reference to and vis-a-vis the trial Court, which is a Court subordinate to the Court of Sessions. So the court of Sessions could entertain and dispose of the said petition by passing any order in respect of the order passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure by its subordinate Court, under the provisions made u/s 520 Code of Criminal Procedure itself. This power is a special and substantive power and is independent of the Court?s appellate or revisional powers. His above contention gets support from the Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1932 Bombay, 5349. This power is a special and substantive power and is independent of the Court?s appellate or revisional powers. His above contention gets support from the Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1932 Bombay, 5349. The relevant portion of which is as follows: It seems to me that what Section 520 means is that any Court, which has powers of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision in respect of the trial Court, that being the Court subordinate thereto referred to in the section, can make any substantive order it thinks fit in respect of property dealt with by the trial Court under Sections 517, 518 or 519. Unless Section 520 is read in that way, it is difficult to see what practical effect it can have because there can be no doubt that u/s 423(1)(d) and Section 439 a Court hearing an appeal or revision application would have ample power to deal with any order passed with regard to property the subject matter of the charge, or otherwise, before it. In arriving at the above view their Lordships of the Bombay High Court referred with approval to the view taken on this topic in Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1929 Rangoon 9710, wherein it is held: We see nothing in the terms of Section 520 of the, Code justifying the view that the words "Court of appeal" in that section mean only a Court to which either of the parties to the Criminal case has appealed or could appeal. Without the section, when a party to a criminal case has appealed, the Court of appeal would have ample power to pass the necessary orders u/s 423 of the Code. Similarly it seems to us that the words "Court of revision" cannot be interpreted in the narrow sense suggested. The High Court in dealing with cases in revision has ample power under the provisions of Section 439 to pass orders as to the disposal of property in cases which may come before it in revision,and the provisions of Section 520 are unnecessary to give it this power. The High Court in dealing with cases in revision has ample power under the provisions of Section 439 to pass orders as to the disposal of property in cases which may come before it in revision,and the provisions of Section 520 are unnecessary to give it this power. The two questions which were referred to the Full Bench for decision are: (1) Whether, in the case of an acquittal by the trial Court, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate as a Court of revision has power u/s 520, Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere with the order of the trial Court passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure, regarding" the disposal of the property in respect of which offence was committed; and (2) Whether, in the case of a conviction by a First Class Magistrate the District Magistrate has, in the absence of an appeal to the Sessions Court, power to interfere with an order passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure by the trial Court. Both the above mentioned Fun Bench decisions no where say that Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure confers an independent right of appeal, or revision, as the case may be, against an order passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure; though in the case reported in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, both "these cases have been noticed, along with other cases, as decisions holding that view. These two Fun Bench decisions also were not at all referred to in the decisions reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 1991. In the Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1956 Madras 4211, their Lordships of the Madras High Court referred with approval to the Fun Bench Decisions reported in AIR 1932 Bombay, 5349, and AIR 1929 Rangoon 9710, and the decision of their own Court reported in AIR 1927 Madras 79712, and held as follows: 17. In the Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1956 Madras 4211, their Lordships of the Madras High Court referred with approval to the Fun Bench Decisions reported in AIR 1932 Bombay, 5349, and AIR 1929 Rangoon 9710, and the decision of their own Court reported in AIR 1927 Madras 79712, and held as follows: 17. The powers of a High Court or any other Court as a Court of appeal, or revision in respect of any order of disposal of property passed by a Subordinate Court u/s 517 do not therefore depend for their exercise on the availability or pendency of any appeal or revision in the substantive case or in the appealability or a right of revision against the order complained of; but it is an independent and substantive jurisdiction by which it will be open not only to modify, cancel or alter the order but make such other order for the proper disposal of the property as the justice of the case may require. In this decision their Lordships referred with approval to the view taken by Curgenven, J. in the decision reported in AIR 1927 Madras 79712, which is as follows: It appears to me doubtful whether an application made u/s 520 to a "Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision," is in the nature of an appeal. The phrase I have quoted seems only to designate the Courts which can modify, alter or annul, an order passed under the preceding sections and not to specify the nature of the application which has to be made to them. For analogous powers possessed by superior Courts reference maybe made to Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the cancellation of bond given for good behaviour, and to Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure relating to sanction to prosecute. It seems to me that in all these cases the Court designated has been given special jurisdiction to pass what order it thinks fit, and that it is not necessary to read into the section the provisions regarding appeals. X X X In these circumstances I hold that the application to the Additional District Magistrate was not an appeal and therefore not time barred. The relevant observations in the decision reported in AIR 1954 Madras 77113, cited by Mr. X X X In these circumstances I hold that the application to the Additional District Magistrate was not an appeal and therefore not time barred. The relevant observations in the decision reported in AIR 1954 Madras 77113, cited by Mr. Dhal may with profit be quoted below: Any Court of appeal may direct any order u/s 517 dais not mean that a right of appeal u/s 517 is granted u/s 520. It only means, any Court to which an appeal lies from the Court which convicts and from which an appeal is provided, such a Court u/s 520 has got the power to pass an order revising, altering or annulling the order passed u/s 517. In this case the Sub-Magistrate passed an order u/s 517. From a conviction by the Sub-Magistrate an appeal lies to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate can therefore direct any order passed u/s 517 to be stayed, modified, altered or annulled. The extent of the powers which the Court of appeal has with reference to an order passed u/s 517 is both defined and limited by the words Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure. It could only pass an order either modifying the order u/s 517, altering an order u/s 517 or annulling an order u/s 517 and make any further orders that may be just, which include confirming the order also. Except the powers mentioned above, it has not all the powers given to a Court of appeal u/s 423 of the Code. Not can Section 428 apply to a petition filed u/s 520. In fact, no appeal is preferred against an order u/s 517. The practice has been to move the District Magistrate in the form of a criminal Miscellaneous petition praying for one of the reliefs mentioned in Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Division Bench case reported in AIR 1961 All. 5444, the above mentioned two Full Bench decisions and quite a large number of other decisions, both for and against on this particular point, were considered. In the Division Bench case reported in AIR 1961 All. 5444, the above mentioned two Full Bench decisions and quite a large number of other decisions, both for and against on this particular point, were considered. On a thorough consideration of the views taken in all those decisions, their Lordships agreed with the views expressed in AIR 1956 Madras, 4211, and ILR 3 Calcutta 37914, and held: We respectfully agree and we are of opinion that the power conferred on the Court of appeal is a separate and independent power conferred on that Court to correct the mistakes of the trial Court in respect of order passed u/s 517, Code of Criminal Procedure and has no relation to the right of the appeal which may exist or even if available may not be exercised. It is not necessary for us to refer to the case of AIR 1936 Gal. 18515, as it was a single Judge decision and reliance was placed on the decision in the case of ILR 3 Cal. 37914, referred to above. Their Lordships disagreed with the views taken in AIR 1959 Allahabad 963, and held: 7. Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers every Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision to which such proceedings ordinarily lie to pass orders. The Court can exercise the powers u/s 520 and amend, alter or annul the orders passed u/s 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and pass such orders as may be just. Thus this Division Bench decision over rules the previous Single Judge decision of the said Court reported in AIR 1959 All. 963, on which, as stated above, the decision in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, is based. Thus this Division Bench decision over rules the previous Single Judge decision of the said Court reported in AIR 1959 All. 963, on which, as stated above, the decision in AIR 1961 Orissa 1212, is based. In the case reported in AIR 1961 M.P. 117, this topic came up before the Division Bench by way of a reference by a learned Single Judge and it was held: (I) Section 520 Code of Criminal Procedure, does not enable the "Superior Court" to entertain an appeal properly so called: (ii) However, it gives supervisory powers under which it can modify or alter an order of the Subordinate Court u/s 517(1) of the Code, and pass its own order as it thinks just; (iii) A Superior Court for the purposes of Section 520 of this Code would be one to which appeals generally lie, and not necessarily the one to which will lie the appeal from that particular judgment, apropos of which the order of the trial Court is passed. (IV) To avoid confusion, the Nagpur ruling should be deemed to have been overruled by the Madhya Pradesh ruling. The 'Nagpur ruling' so overruled refers to the decision in AIR 1947 Nagpur 3318, on which reliance was placed for the view taken in AIR 1963 Punjab, 1676, relied on for the decision in AIR 1965 Orissa, 1991. The aforesaid decision of the Punjab High Court (A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 167)6, again has not been approved in the decision reported in AIR 1963 H.P. 45 wherein by following the view taken in AIR 1961 All 5444, it has been held: The words "any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference of revision" are not necessarily limited to a Court be fate which an appeal, confirmation, reference or revision, in the main case is pending. Section 520 does not find place in the Chapter of Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with appeal and it gives a court of appeal etc., power to modify, alter or annul the order passed u/s 517, 518 arid 519 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 520 does not find place in the Chapter of Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with appeal and it gives a court of appeal etc., power to modify, alter or annul the order passed u/s 517, 518 arid 519 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 423 of Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Appellate Court to make any amendment or any consequential incidental order that may be just and proper and if the intention of the legislature had been that orders passed u/s 517, 518 and 519 of Code of Criminal Procedure could be interfered with only when an appeal had been preferred against the main order of conviction or acquittal, there should have been no necessity to make a separate provision for interference by a court of appeal with such orders. Thus it is seen that the decisions reported in AIR 1929 Ran. 9710, (Full Bench) and AIR 1932 Bombay 5349, (Full Bench) and the decisions in AIR 1956 Madras, 4211, A.I.R 1927 Madras, 79712, AIR 1954 Madras, 44113, AIR 1961 Allahabad 5444, AIR 1961 M.P. 17, and AIR 1963 H.P. 45 19, directly deal with and decide the question in the form as specifically raised by Mr. Murty. The decisions in AIR 1957 Patna 68520, AIR 1936 Calcutta 2121 and AIR 1954 Madras 94012, and ILR 3 Calcutta 37914, within my notice also support the views taken in the above mentioned decisions. (All the above italics are mine) 12. Mr. Dhal, the learned Standing counsel for the State fairly conceded that the point raised by Mr. Murty is directly covered by the above mentioned decisions. He, from his own side, cited some of the above mentioned decisions which were not cited by Mr. Murty, and very fairly conceded the above mentioned contention of Mr. Murty was well founded. 13. I am in full and respectful agreement with the over whelming judicial decisions mentioned above which deal with and decide the specific question raised by Mr. Murty. Murty, and very fairly conceded the above mentioned contention of Mr. Murty was well founded. 13. I am in full and respectful agreement with the over whelming judicial decisions mentioned above which deal with and decide the specific question raised by Mr. Murty. The views taken in the said decisions and the reasonings for the same appear to be in consonance and conformity with the specific provisions of Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure and enables the superior Courts to meet all possible eventualities and to pass suitable orders for the proper disposal of such property as the justice of the case may require, even in the absence of an appeal or revision etc. pending before them. Apart from other things this view of Section 520 enables, not only the parties to the case, but also other persons who may justly be interested in the proper disposal of the property to approach the superior Courts for a just and proper order to that effect. Any narrow construction would leave them without any effective and speedy remedy against an order u/s 517 Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. Being in fun agreement with the preponderant judicial pronouncements noticed above I hold that any superior Court of the class and category mentioned in Section 520 Code of Criminal Procedure i.e. "any Court of appeal", confirmation, reference or revision, can, under the independent and substantive provision of Section 520 itself, and irrespective of its appellate, revisional and/or other powers under the Code, is competent to stay, modify, alter or annul any order passed u/s 517, by a Court subordinate thereto, and can also make any further orders in that connection as the justice of the case may require. In the present case the Court of Sessions, which passed the impugned order, is a Court of appeal with reference to and vis-a-vis the trial Court, which passed the order u/s 517(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. That being so the Sessions Judge was legally competent to entertain the application filed by the Petitioners against the aforesaid order passed u/s 517, and he acted within his jurisdiction by passing the impugned order in that connection. Accordingly this revision against the impugned, order passed by the Sessions Judge is maintainable and not barred by time. 15. That being so the Sessions Judge was legally competent to entertain the application filed by the Petitioners against the aforesaid order passed u/s 517, and he acted within his jurisdiction by passing the impugned order in that connection. Accordingly this revision against the impugned, order passed by the Sessions Judge is maintainable and not barred by time. 15. Coming to the merits of the case on facts, it is seen that the articles in question were seized from the possession of the Petitioners some of whom stood their trial for charges under Sections 452 and 380 and the rest u/s 411, Indian Penal Code while acquitting all the Petitioners the trial Court passed the following order: The seized articles forming M.O. I, M.O. II, M.O. III, M.O. IV, M.O. V, M.O. VI, M.O. VII, M.O. VIII, M.O. IX, M.O. X, M.O. XI and M.O. XII be returned to Radha Rana or to her husband Simanchala Rana in the circumstances of the case. Police should,take up investigation against Balakrishna Rana and his group. If the accused want to reopen the question of establishing the ownership of these articles i.e. M.O. I. to M.O. XII at the time of enquiry, the Police shall further investigate and make a report to ?the Court accordingly. I The above order has been formed as such by the Sessions Judge. 16. Mr. Murty contends that the Sessions Judge was absolutely wrong in confirming the trial Court?s above quoted order, as, (1) the direction to return- the said articles to p. ws. 1 or 9 is not based on any reasoning and/or consideration of the matter on merits, and as (ii) in accordance with the Court?s order the police are to make further investigation into the case, during which the Petitioners are allowed to establish their ownership to these articles by reopening this question, in which case the police are required also to investigate into this aspect of the matter, and to submit their report to the Court to that effect. Mr. Murty submits that once the articles are returned to p. ws. 9 or 1, the Court?s order to the above effect will be rendered infructuous, ineffective and inoperative. There is substance in the above contention. Mr. Murty submits that once the articles are returned to p. ws. 9 or 1, the Court?s order to the above effect will be rendered infructuous, ineffective and inoperative. There is substance in the above contention. The Court on allowing an opportunity to the Petitioners to subsequently establish their ownership to the said articles, should not have, in the same strain, directed to hand over those articles to one of the p. ws. Once the articles are handed over to a prosecution witness it would be hardly possible for the Petitioners to get them back, even if they establish their ownership to the same. Moreover these articles may be necessary in the trial of the case against other persons, in case police chooses to file a charge sheet against them after further investigation, as desired by the Court. The learned Sessions Judge has not bestowed proper consideration to the above aspects of the matter. I therefore set aside the impugned order. The trial Court is directed to deal afresh with this matter in accordance with Jaw and as the justice of the case may require at present.