JUDGMENT : Kanhaiyaji, J. 1. This is an application by the Management of Balihari Colliery of Messrs Balihari Colliery Company (Private) Ltd. under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :given by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, in Application No. 144 of 1967 (Annexure 3'). The facts of the case may be briefly stated. The petitioner, a private limited company is conducting the business of coal raising from its mines and, as such, it owns a coal mine situated in police station Putki in the district of Dhanbad known as the Balihari Colliery. Twenty-four workmen, Kangali Gorai and others, were found by the Company's Medical Officer to be very weak and infirm due to their old age. The Management issued notices on the 26th September, 1967, to the individual workmen concerned to appear for medical examination at Company's cost in the dispensary of the Colliery before the Medical Board constituted for the purpose with the Medical Officer Incharge of the Government Hospital. A copy of the notice is Annexure 2' to the writ application. The workmen concerned did not appear for medical examination. The Management terminated their services, and a copy of the ORDER :of termination is Annexure 2' to the writ application. At the relevant time, a dispute between the Management and their workmen regarding the retrenchment of certain workmen was pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur. Therefore, the Management filed an application before the said Tribunal under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The application was transferred to the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad (respondent no. 1) for disposal. 2. The workmen concerned, twenty-four in number, were represented by Sri S.V. Achariar, General Secretary of the Hindusthan Khan Mazdoor Sangh, Hirapur, Dhanbad, and the Management was represented by Sri R.P. Pillai, Secretary, Balihari Colliery. Before the Tribunal, the parties examined their witnesses and filed their documents. The Tribunal held that the workmen were not bound in response to a general letter to appear for medical examination. It further held that supposing they were so bound, there was no evidence at all to prove that a Medical Board was constituted in fact and that none of the workmen concerned appeared before the Medical Board. The Tribunal held that the workmen were not bound in response to a general letter to appear for medical examination. It further held that supposing they were so bound, there was no evidence at all to prove that a Medical Board was constituted in fact and that none of the workmen concerned appeared before the Medical Board. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the Management merely used this ground as a pretext for getting rid of all of the 24 workmen without a justification or just cause. The Tribunal further found that the relevant provision relating to one month's wages was also not complied with. In view of these findings, the Tribunal refused approval to the discharge of the twenty-four workmen concerned. The Management has consequently moved this Court for quashing the said JUDGMENT :. 3. Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that although the Management filed a petition for approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, yet the Tribunal had to decide whether any such application was necessary and the Tribunal ought to have decided this point before going into the merits of the application. The workmen concerned, according to Mr. Roy, were not dismissed or discharged and further they had been noticed not to be dismissed or discharged for any misconduct, but their services were to be terminated simpliciter. He also challenged the findings of the Tribunal as perverse, as they were based on assumptions and generalisations. Reliance was placed by him on a decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. D.R. Singh (A.I.R. 1966 SC 288), wherein it has teen observed that "Where judicial decisions differed on the construction of the words 'workmen concerned in such dispute', it would be idle and unreasonable to suggest that the employer should make up his mind whether Section 33 applies or not, and if he thinks that Section 33 does not apply, he need not make the application, on the other hand, if he thinks that Section 33 applies, he should make an application, but then he cannot be permitted to urge that the application is unnecessary. Such a view is, in our opinion, wholly illogical and unsatisfactory." 4. I have no doubt in my mind that there is a great force in the contention of Mr. Such a view is, in our opinion, wholly illogical and unsatisfactory." 4. I have no doubt in my mind that there is a great force in the contention of Mr. Roy, but the decision on the point raised by him will be of no help to the petitioner, because the workmen concerned have not been made parties to the petition. It may be mentioned that in the writ application Sri S.V. Achariar, General Secretary of the Hindusthan Khan Mazdoor Sangh, Hirapur, Dhanbad, has been made a party representing the twenty-four workmen concerned. Notices of the writ application were issued only to the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal (respondent no. 1) and to Sri S.V. Achariar (respondent no. 2). Sri Achariar in his counter-affidavit filed on the 30th August, 1969, has stated that the persons who were opposite parties before the Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, have not been impleaded as parties and a person who was not a party has been impleaded as a party in the writ application and, as such, the writ application was not maintainable. Mr. J. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for Sri Achariar, submitted before us that his client was not representing the workmen concerned, although he also combated the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Roy contended that, in fact, the twenty-four workmen concerned ware made parties to the writ application through the General Secretary of their Union, and the Union could fully represent the workmen concerned before this Court. In my opinion, it is difficult to accept this submission. It is true that so far as the Industrial Courts and Tribunals are concerned, the power of representation has been given to the Union according to Section 36 of the Act. A dispute between an individual workman and an employer could not be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act unless it is taken up by an Union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen. Section 36 of the Act recognises this position by providing that "a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented" by an officer of a registered Trade Union of which he is a member in any proceeding under the Act. The representation permitted by Section 36 is limited only to the proceedings under the Act. The representation permitted by Section 36 is limited only to the proceedings under the Act. The provisions regarding representation before the labour courts and tribunals cannot be imported to writ-proceeding. The jurisdiction, which is exercised by the High Court in writ matters, is different from the jurisdiction which is exercised by an industrial court or tribunal, and in a writ jurisdiction, an individual must come before the court. 5. For the foregoing reasons, in case the writ application is allowed, it will seriously affect the twenty-four workmen concerned who have not been made parties to the writ application. This serious lacuna in the writ application has not been remedied by the petitioner even after the filing of the counter-affidavit on behalf of Sri Achariar, the General Secretary of the Union. It is needless to say that even if the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner had force, this writ application would fail because no relief could be given to the petitioner in absence of the persons concerned who were likely to be affected by the ORDER :of this Court. The petition, therefore, must fail on this short ground. In the result, this application is dismissed; but, in the circumstances, there will be no ORDER :for costs. S.N.P. Singh, J. I agree. Application dismissed.