Nema v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P. , Lucknow Camp at Pilibhit
1971-09-09
SATISH CHANDRA, T.S.MISRA
body1971
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of consolidation proceedings. 2. It appears that on 18th June, 1957, Smt. Jasoda, respondent No. 3 executed a deed of release in respect of the plots in dispute in favour of the petitioner, Smt. Nema for a cash consideration of Rs. 800/-. It was recited in the document that Smt. Jasoda, the executant had deposited ten times the rent in order to obtain bhumidhari rights. Thereafter, the bhumidhari certificate appears to have been granted in favour of Smt. Jasoda on 18th September, 1964. 3. The consolidation proceedings in the village where the plots in dispute are situate started before the grant of the aforesaid certificate. The parties objections. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the claim of the petitioner to be recorded as a Bhumidhar. On appeal, the Settlement Officer accepted the claim. He directed that the name of Smt. Jasoda, be expunged from the record and, in her place, the name of the petitioner be recorded as a sirdar. Smt. Jasoda filed a revision. The Dy. Director has allowed it. He has held that Smt. Jasoda was only a sirdar on the date of the execution of the deed of release. The release operated as a transfer, which was prohibited under the ZA and LR Act, and that Smt. Jasoda had made no fraudulent representations in the deed of release and so the petitioner, namely, Smt. Nema was not entitled to the benefit of S. 43, Transfer of Property Act. 4. At the time of the admission of the writ petition, reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner upon a single Judge decision of this Court in Smt. Annapurna v. Munshi 1967 AWR 198 ), for the proposition that the benefit of S. 43, Transfer of Property Act, was available to a transfer of Sirdari holding, even though it was made in contravention of S. 153, UP ZA Act. The Bench felt that this decision required a reconsideration, and, so recommended that the writ petition be heard at the final hearing by a Division Bench. That is how the petition has come before this Bench. 5. On facts, the question of the applicability of S. 43, Transfer of Property Act, does not arise in the present case. 6.
The Bench felt that this decision required a reconsideration, and, so recommended that the writ petition be heard at the final hearing by a Division Bench. That is how the petition has come before this Bench. 5. On facts, the question of the applicability of S. 43, Transfer of Property Act, does not arise in the present case. 6. It will be seen that Smt. Jasoda made a representation to the petitioner that on 18th June, 1957, the day when she executed the deed of release, she had already deposited ten times the rent in order to acquire bhumidhari rights in relation to the plots conveyed by the deed of release. This position is not disputed by Smt. Jasoda even in this Court. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Smt. Jasoda, the fact that she had deposited ten times the rent prior to the date of the release-deed has not been controverted, but has been reiterated in paragraph 7. In Ram Swarup v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1970 AWR 891 ), a Division Bench held that in view of Sections 134 and 137 of the UP ZA and LR Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of S. 137(1) by the amending Act No. XXI of 1962, Bhumidhari rights accrued from the date of the grant of the certificate and not with effect from the date of the deposit. It was also held that the amending Act No. XXI of 1962 was not retrospective in its operation. The Bench relied upon an earlier decision in an unreported case. In that case, the ten times rent was deposited on 13th August, 1958 and the Sanad was granted on 4th November, 1958. That is to say, both the events took place prior to the amendment of S. 137. 8. In the present case, the deposit was made prior to 18th June, 1957; but the certificate was granted on 18th September, 1964. The grant of the certificate was, therefore, after the amendment of S. 137. Prior to its amendment, S. 137 stated:- 137(1) If the application has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the declaration mentioned in S. 134, he shall grant a certificate to the effect.
The grant of the certificate was, therefore, after the amendment of S. 137. Prior to its amendment, S. 137 stated:- 137(1) If the application has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the declaration mentioned in S. 134, he shall grant a certificate to the effect. (2) Upon the grant of the certificate, u/sub-S. (1) the Sirdar shall,......after the date thereof-- (a) become and be deemed to be a bhumidhar of the holding or the share in respect of which the certificate has been granted,.... After its amendment, sub-S. (2) read as follows:-- (2) Upon the grant of the certificate u/sub-S. (1) the sirdar shall, from the date on which the amount referred to in sub-S. (1) has been deposited- It will thus be seen that under the unamended section, accrual of Bhumidhari rights took place with effect from the date of the certificate, while after the amendment, the accrual was retrospective, namely with effect from the date of the deposit. 9. under section 137, the accrual of Bhumidhari rights depends upon the event of the grant of the certificate. When the certificate is granted, then the bhumidhari rights accrue. The effect of the 1962 amendment is to make the accrual retrospective. Since the accrual of the right operates from the date of the grant of the certificate, in our opinion, the amendment to S. 137(2) relating to the retrospectively of the accrual of the right, would apply to grants made on or after the date when the amending Act came into operation. So from the date on which the amendment to S. 137(2) came on the statute book, it will affect and operate upon all kinds of certificates granted on or after that date. So construing the amending Act of 1962 is not given any retrospective effect. It operates prospectively upon grants made after the amendment came into force. In view of this, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the view taken in Ram Swarup's case that the amending Act of 1962 was not retrospective in its operation so as to apply to grants of certificates made prior to the coming into force of the amendments. 10. In the present case, the certificate appears to have been granted on 18th Sept., 1964. On that day, S. 137(2) stood amended.
10. In the present case, the certificate appears to have been granted on 18th Sept., 1964. On that day, S. 137(2) stood amended. Under it, the grantee became a bhumidhar from the date on which the requisite amount of rent was deposited. That, as seen above, took place prior to 18th June, 1957. In view of the retrospectivity of the grant of the Bhumidhari Sanad, Smt. Jasoda became a bhumidhar from a date prior to the 18th of June, 1957. A Bhumidhar is competent to transfer. So, on 18th June, 1957, Smt. Jasoda could validly execute a transfer of her share in the holding. Even if the release deed executed by Smt. Jasoda is taken to be a deed of sale, it would not be invalid or an incompetent transaction. It is hence unnecessary to discuss whether that document operated in law merely as a deed of release, or as a deed of sale. 11. It has been found that the execution of that document by Smt. Jasoda was proved. Smt. Jasoda having validly executed a transfer or release of her rights, which on that date were bhumidhari in nature, the petitioner acquired bhumidhari rights in the plots which were the subject-matter of the deed dated 18th June, 1957. 12. As the petitioner is entitled to succeed on the merits, it is unnecessary to examine the alternative claim that she became a bhumidhar by virtue of S. 43, Transfer of Property Act. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders of the authorities below are all set aside. It is directed that the name of the petitioner will be recorded over the plots in dispute as a bhumidhar and the name of Smt. Jasoda will be expunged from the records. Under the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.