ORDER B.N. Lokur, J. - The petitioner was a temporary process-server in the Court of the District Judge at Deoria. On a circular letter issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 14th May, 1970, that action may be taken against a Government servant, who had contracted a second marriage during the lifetime of his first wife, even though the aggrieved party has not filed a criminal complaint in Court of law. the District Judge directed the sadar Munsarim to report if there was any such case among the employees, of class 3 and class 4 in his Court. The Sadar Munsarim reported that there appears to be a case of bigamous marriage of the petitioner and that he would report after ascertaining full facts and figures from the petitioner. The further report of the Sadar Munsarim is not on the file but it appears from the counter affidavit that the District Judge ordered the Central Nazir to make a report. The Central Nazir reported that on an inquiry he had come to know that the petitioner had two wives. Acting on this report, the District Judge terminated the services of the petitioner after giving him one month's notice. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court. 2. It may be mentioned at the outset that no inquiry appears to have been made by the Central Nazir with the petitioner himself. His report is characterised by the petitioner in paragraph 13 of the petition as incorrect, and this averment has not been denied in the counter affidavit. I have to accept accordingly that the report of the Central Nazir that the petitioner had two wives is incorrect. At the end of paragraph 13 of the petition appears the following sentence :- "In fact the petitioner has only one wife". This sentence, however, does not appear in the copy of the petition served on the Government Counsel. That being so. the specific averment that the petitioner has only one wife cannot be taken into consideration, However the same inference arises from the controverted statement in paragraph 13 of the petition that the report of the Central Nazir is incorrect on record. I have to proceed on the basis that the petitioner does not have two wives. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the termination of the. I have to proceed on the basis that the petitioner does not have two wives. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the termination of the. services of the petitioner is in truth and law a dismissal or removal from service. He pointed out that the report of the Central Nazir that the petitioner had two wives was the sole reason for the impugned order and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to answer to the charge that he had two wives. There is no doubt that, on account of the policy adopted by the Government as enunciated in the Circular Letter of the Government, the Government servant having a second wife during the lifetime of his first wife shall be considered to be guilty of fault or misconduct. Thus, the petitioner's services have been terminated for a fault or misconduct, which casts a stigma and aspersion upon his character. 4. It is true that the order of the termination of the services of the petitioner is couched in language. which, on the face of it, does not reflect upon the conduct of character of the petitioner. However, it is well-settled law laid down by the Supreme Court that the circumstances preceding or attending upon the order of termination of services ought to be examined in each case, although the motive behind the order is immaterial. In the 'State of Punjab v. Sukh Rai Bahadur, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1089 the Supreme Court has laid down five propositions as follows :- "1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. 3. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequence or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i. e., an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article." 5. The learned counsel for the State contended that the present case would fall either under proposition 1 or under proposition 2 while the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that proposition 2 applies to the facts of the case. It is sufficient, to determine the weight of the rival arguments, to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in `State of Bihar v. Shiv Bhikshuk Mishra, A.I.R. 1971 SC 1011 wherein the propositions set out above were applied to the facts of that case. The Supreme Court said :- "So far as we are aware no such rigid principle has ever been laid down by this Court that one has only to look to the order and if it does not contain any imputation of misconduct or words attaching a stigma to the character or reputation of a Government Officer it must be held to have been made in the ordinary course of administrative routine and the Court is debarred from looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover whether the order had been made by way of punishment. The form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and it might merely be a cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct (see S.R. Tewari v. District Board Agra, 1964-3 SCR 55 : A.I.R. 1964 SC 1680. It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. But the entirety of circumstances preceding oi attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order." It has to be determined in every case whether the circumstances in which an order of termination of services has been made indicates that the services were terminated for misconduct and further whether the misconduct was merely a `motive' or the very `foundation' of the order. The case before me is analogous to the case of Shiv Bhikshuk Misra, who was reverted from a higher post to a lower post on the basis of a report containing complaint against his work. The Supreme Court held :- "The order of reversion was directly and proximately founded on what the Commandant and the Deputy Inspector General said relating to the respondent's conduct generally and in particular with reference to the incident of assault by him on his orderly. We find no reason to disagree with the view of the High Court. It is not disputed that if the order of reversion was void the subsequent order of dismissal, which was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police would be violative of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution." 6. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in Appar Apar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1970-2 Lab 686 : 1971 Lab IC (Notes) 1 (SC). The Supreme Court reproduced the propositions established in Sukhrai Bahadur's case and applying them, set aside the order of reduction in rank of Appar Apar Singh, the appellant before the Supreme Court, with the following words "On the other hand the position is, as pointed out by us earlier, that the reversion of the appellant is based entirely and exclusively on the basis of the adverse finding recorded against him by the Deputy Directors and the report itself forms the foundation for the order of reversion being passed." 7. In the present case also, the services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of the report of Central Nazir that the petitioner had two wives, which is regarded as a fault or act of misconduct. 8. The report of the Central Nazir is the very foundation of the order passed by the District Judge and relying upon the cases of Shiv Bhikshuk, A.I.R. 1971 SC 1011 and Appar Apar Singh (1971) 2 Lab LJ 686 : (1971 Lab IC (Notes) 1 (SC)) the order made against the petitioner without giving the petitioner an opportunity to meet the allegation ought to be set aside, considering the order in the light of the preceding and attending circumstances, as an order of dismissal passed without complying with the requirement of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 9. The learned standing counsel sought to defend the order contending that the motive behind the order cannot be taken into consideration. my attention was drawn to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Champak Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1854 and Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 SC 158. The case before me is more akin to the cases of Shiv Bhikshuk, A.I.R. 1971 SC 1011 and Aopar Apar Singh, (1971) 2 Lab LJ 686 : 1971 Lab IC (Notes) 1 (SC). In these cases before me as I have mentioned above, the services of the petitioners were terminated on the strength of the report of the Central Nazir, which is the very foundation of the order. Such was not the situation in Champak Lal's and Ram Gopal's cases. 10. The result is that the order of the District Judge, Deoria, terminating the services of the petitioner is quashed, and the petition is allowed. No order as to costs.