JUDGMENT A.K. Kirty, J. - This appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is directed against the order of the court below allowing the application filed by the respondent under Section 20 of the Act. 2. The respondent had taken out two fire policies on 29-11-37 and 11-1 1968. On 14-3-1968 a fire broke out in the shop of the respondent in the evening, in consequence of which the goods contained in the shop were, according to the respondent, completely burnt out. The goods were covered by the two policies noted above. Thereafter, the respondent lodged a claim for Rs. 55,445/- which was repudiated and ultimately, rejected by the appellant company by letter dated 14-5-1969. 3. The two policies were subject to a number of conditions. These conditions constituted the terms of the agreement upon which the policies were taken and issued respectively by the respondent and the appellant. The material part of condition No. 18 runs thus : "If any difference arises as to the amount of any loss or damage such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an Arbitrator, to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference or, if they cannot agree upon a single Arbitrator, to the decision of two disinterested persons as Arbitrators, of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party in case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint an Arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint a sole Arbitrator ........................ And it is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such Arbitrator, Arbitrators ............ of the amount of the loss or damage if disputed shall be first obtained." 4. The respondent by letter dated 21-2-1969 intimated the appellant that since a dispute had arisen between the parties it had nominated Sri Sewa Ram Soori, Advocate, Kanpur as its arbitrator. In its reply dated 25-3-1969 the appellant asserted that no dispute had arisen in terms of the arbitration clause in the Policies and no reference to arbitration could be made. The respondent by letter dated 21-2-1969 intimated the appellant that since a dispute had arisen between the parties it had nominated Sri Sewa Ram Soori, Advocate, Kanpur as its arbitrator. In its reply dated 25-3-1969 the appellant asserted that no dispute had arisen in terms of the arbitration clause in the Policies and no reference to arbitration could be made. All the same, the appellant subject to the reservations mentioned in its aforesaid letter, intimated the respondent that it had nominated Sri Ganga Ram Talwar, Advocate as its arbitrator. The appellant having finally rejected the claim in toto by letter dated 14-5-1969, the respondent filed an application under Section 20 (1) of the Act, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 224 of 1969. This application was contested by the appellant on several grounds. The court below framed four issues and having decided those issues against the appellant allowed the application. 5. The principal point argued on behalf of the appellant is that the application under Section 20 (1) of the Act was misconceived and not legally maintainable at all; hence the entire proceedings and the impugned order are without jurisdiction. It was urged that the respondent having taken proceedings under Chapter II of the Act, the application under Section 20 was not legally maintainable. The remedy of the respondent, if any, was under Section 8 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to support his contentions by referring to "the scheme of the Act" and a number of sections thereof. According to him, Sec. 20 (1) cannot ex facie apply to a case where a party to an arbitration agreement has nominated or appointed his own arbitrator and has called upon the other party to nominate or appoint its own arbitrator. Such act amounts to "proceeding under Chapter II of the Act" and takes the case out of the ambit of Section 20 (1) , because the disputes or differences between the parties become the subject of a pending arbitration. In support of this argument reliance, in particular, was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Mangal Prasad v. Lachhman Prasad, A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 108 : 1963 A.L.J. 693. Reliance was also placed on Venkata Surya Rao v. Venkata Rao, A.I.R. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 286, Messrs Vallabh Pitte v. Narsingdas, A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 157; E.I. Construction Co. In support of this argument reliance, in particular, was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Mangal Prasad v. Lachhman Prasad, A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 108 : 1963 A.L.J. 693. Reliance was also placed on Venkata Surya Rao v. Venkata Rao, A.I.R. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 286, Messrs Vallabh Pitte v. Narsingdas, A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 157; E.I. Construction Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 243, and Union of India v. Krishna Rao, A.I.R. 1970 Madhya Pradesh 49 : 1969 M.P.WR. 613. It is necessary to examine in the first instance the rulings, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, specially the Full Bench decision of this court, because if the instant case is covered by the said decision the appeal would have to be allowed. 6. In Mangal Prasad's, A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 108 the full Bench was called upon to answer the following question :- "Whether an application under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act can be made in a case like the present one where the arbitrator had started to function and had entered upon the reference but at a later stage could not proceed with the same?" By a majority of two to one, the question was answered in the negative. The Full Bench decision is an authority only for the proposition that an application under Section 20 of the Act would not be maintainable in a case where the arbitrator or arbitrators after having started functioning and entered on the reference do not or cannot proceed with the same with the consequence that no award can be made. Admittedly, in the instant case, no arbitrator had started to function, much less entered on the reference. It is, therefore, difficult to hold on the basis of the full Bench decision that the respondent's application under Section 20 of the Act was not legally maintainable. 7. In Venkata Surya Rao v. Venkata Rao, A.I.R. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 286, in a regular suit for partition a preliminary decree was passed providing inter alia that if the parties failed to work out their rights according to the terms stated in the decree within four months, the reliefs stated in the decree may be obtained in final decree proceedings. Final decree proceedings were never initiated. The parties divided the family lands but could arrive at no agreement regarding the extent of the total liabilities. Final decree proceedings were never initiated. The parties divided the family lands but could arrive at no agreement regarding the extent of the total liabilities. They agreed to refer the disputes to the arbitration of a named arbitrator who actually entered on the reference, and held some proceedings. The matter subsequently came to a stand-still, the time for making the award expired and no order from Court extending time was obtained. One of the parties then made an application under Section 20 of the Act which was held to be not legally maintainable. The learned judges in holding so took notice of the fact that the suit not having culminated in a final decree for having been withdrawn remained a pending suit and further observed that the parties had actually proceeded under Chapter II and the arbitrator appointed by them had admittedly entered on reference. Reliance, however, was placed by Mr. Choudhry on the following observation made by the learned judges :- "The word `instead of proceeding under Chapter II' further clarify the stage at which the provision (Sec. 20) in available. If that stage is passed and the proceedings are started under Chapter II, the provisions of Section 20 will not be available." But, it may be noted, the said observation was made in the following context immediately proceeding that observation : "The sub-clauses (4) (5) furnish clear indicia of the appropriate stage at which the provisions of Section 20 can be availed of. It is manifest that they to be availed of before an arbitrator has entered on reference." In our opinion, this case does not lend any greater support to the appellant's contention than the full Bench decision of this Court. 8. In the case of M/s. Vallabh Pitte v. Narsingdas, A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 157, no question arose as to maintainability of any application under Sec. 20. No such application had been filed. The question directly arising for consideration was whether an award made in favour of a party must be set aside in a case where the other party denied the agreement itself and the party asserting and relying on the agreement did not obtain any order under Section 20 of the Act. It was answered in the negative. 9. The question directly arising for consideration was whether an award made in favour of a party must be set aside in a case where the other party denied the agreement itself and the party asserting and relying on the agreement did not obtain any order under Section 20 of the Act. It was answered in the negative. 9. In the case of E.I. Construction Co., A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 243 the maintainability of an application under Section 8 of the Act was questioned and it was contended that the appropriate remedy was either under Section 9 or under Sec. 20. This contention was negatived. It was argued that Section 20 does not apply to a case where the reference has already commenced. This was accepted and reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in Mangal Prasad's case, A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 108. 10. In Union of India v. Krishna Rao, A.I.R. 1970 Madhya Pradesh 49 : 1969 M.P.W.R. 613, an application under Section 20 of the Act was filed which was objected to as being premature. The court, acting a subsequent application made by the applicant, appointed an arbitrator contrary to the arbitration agreement inspite of the objection of the opposite party. A revision was filed against the order. In the High Court an argument was advanced to sustain the order on the ground that once an application under Section 20 is entertained other provisions of the Act, including Section 9, are attracted and that, therefore, the order appointing the arbitrator could not be questioned. This argument was repelled and it was held that Section 8 did not apply. The question with which we are concerned did not arise at all. 11. The rulings relied on by Mr. Chowdhury thus are of little help to the appellant. Room for doubt, assuming there by any, is, to our mind, completely dispelled by the observations of the Supreme Court in Tharwardas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468 noted below :- "A reference requires the assent of `both' sides. If one side is not prepared to submit a given matter to arbitration when there is an agreement between them that it should be referred, then recourse must be had to the Court under Section 20 of the Act and the recalcitrant party can then be compelled to submit the matter under Sub-sec. (4). If one side is not prepared to submit a given matter to arbitration when there is an agreement between them that it should be referred, then recourse must be had to the Court under Section 20 of the Act and the recalcitrant party can then be compelled to submit the matter under Sub-sec. (4). In the absence of either, agreement by `both' sides about the terms of reference, or an order of the Court under Section 20 (4) compelling a reference, the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive jurisdiction." In the instant case the application under Section 20, of the Act was made by the respondent in an identical situation. 12. The `Scheme' and material provisions of the Act may now be examined. Sec 20 (1) of the Act reads :- "Where any persons have entered into an arbitration agreement before the institution of any suit with respect to the subject matter of the agreement or any part of it, and where a difference has arisen to which the agreement applies. they or any of them, instead of Proceeding under Chapter II, may apply to a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates, that the agreement be filed in Court." The words `instead of proceeding under Chapter II' italicised by us postulate that if the requisite conditions mentioned under Section 20 (1) are fulfilled, two remedies in the alternative become available to the person or persons concerned. The option to elect either of them lies with such person or persons. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 20 envisages a situation or state of affairs where the parties to an arbitration agreement or any of them can legally proceed under Chapter II, and provides for another remedy in the alternative by way of an application to have the agreement filed in Court which ultimately is to make an order of reference under Sub-Sec. (1). It is true that Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 20 does not warrant the pursuit of the remedies provided under Chapter II and under Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 20 simultaneously, once an election has been made, the person or persons concerned cannot, perhaps (in our tentative opinion), fall back on the other alternative remedy which initially was available. It is true that Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 20 does not warrant the pursuit of the remedies provided under Chapter II and under Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 20 simultaneously, once an election has been made, the person or persons concerned cannot, perhaps (in our tentative opinion), fall back on the other alternative remedy which initially was available. This being the position, the learned counsel for the appellant was constrained to argue that in the instant case the respondent had already proceeded under Chapter II by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act and the dispute or difference between the parties had become the subject-matter of a pending arbitration. 13. The act is divided into seven Chapters. Chapter I, of which the title is "Introductory," contains two sections only. "Arbitration agreement" has been defined in Section 2 (a) thus : "arbitration agreement" means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not." Under Section 2 (a) "reference" means a reference to arbitration. The heading of Chapter II is "Arbitration Without Intervention of a Court." Sec. 3 provides that "unless a different intention is expressed in an arbitration agreement it shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule, in so far as they are applicable to the reference." Sec. 4 provides that the parties to an agreement may agree that any reference thereunder shall be to an arbitrator or arbitrators to be appointed by a person designated in the agreement. Sec. 5 provides that unless a contrary intention is expressed in the arbitration agreement, the authority of an appointed arbitrator or umpire shall not be revocable except with the leave of the Court, Sub-sec. (1) of Section 8 specifies the circumstances under which any party to an arbitration agreement may serve the other parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to concur in the appointment or appointments or in supplying the vacancy; Sub-sec. (1) of Section 8 specifies the circumstances under which any party to an arbitration agreement may serve the other parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to concur in the appointment or appointments or in supplying the vacancy; Sub-sec. (2) provides that if the appointment is not made within 15 clear days after the service of the notice mentioned above, the Court say, on the application of the party who gave the notice and after giving the other parties an opportunity of being heard, appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, or umpire, as the case may be, who shall have like power to act in the reference and to make an award as if he or they had been appointed by consent of all parties. It may be noticed that although Sub-sec (2) of Section 8 provides for the making of an application to the Court and also the appointment of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire by the Court, it does not provide for any reference being made by the court to an arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire. In this respect Section 8 (2) of the Act is materially different from Sub-sec. (4) of Section 20 which expressly requires the court to make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, whether in the agreement or otherwise, or, where the parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator, to an arbitrator appointed by the Court. Under Section 8 (2) , therefore, even when the Court has appointed an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, the reference to arbitration is to be made by the parties concerned themselves and not by or under an order made by the Court. Similarly, Secs. 9, 11, and 12 of, the Act do not contain any provision empowering the Court to make it reference to any arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire. Possibly, such a power may be said to be implicit in the words "or pass such other order as it things fit' in the proviso to Section 9 (b) . This question, however, does not arise in the present case and we express no opinion thereon. The Court's power is apparently restricted to the filling in of a vacancy if it has occurred or to replacing, a negligent or recalcitrant arbitrator or umpire by another arbitrator or umpire appointed by it. This question, however, does not arise in the present case and we express no opinion thereon. The Court's power is apparently restricted to the filling in of a vacancy if it has occurred or to replacing, a negligent or recalcitrant arbitrator or umpire by another arbitrator or umpire appointed by it. As soon as the Court has done this, its powers in relation to the application which was made either under Section 8 or under Section 9 or Section 11 or Section 12 are seemingly exhausted. Sec. 13 of the Act specifies the powers of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire. Sec. 14 provides that when the arbitrator, or arbitrators or umpire have made their award they shall sign it and shall give notice to the parties of the making and signing of the award. It also provides that the arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire shall at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or if so directed by the Court cause the award or a signed copy of it to be filed in Court. Sec. 15 empowers the Court to modify or correct an award under the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) , (b) and (c). Under Section 16 the Court is empowered to remit the award from time to time or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration in the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c). Sec. 17 provides when and under what circumstances the court is to pronounce judgment according to the award and that upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow. Sec. 18 empowers the Court to pass interim orders under the circumstances mentioned in that section. Sec. 19 gives the court the power to supersede the reference under certain circumstances. These are the material sections in Chapter II of the Act. 14. It will be seen that although the said Chapter is titled "Arbitration without Intervention of a Court" that Chapter itself contains Secs. 8, 9, 10 and 11 empowering the Court to intervene under certain circumstances. But these sections, particularly Section 8, as already mentioned, do not empower the court to make any reference to arbitration which necessarily must be done by the parties themselves. Chapter II against contains Secs. 8, 9, 10 and 11 empowering the Court to intervene under certain circumstances. But these sections, particularly Section 8, as already mentioned, do not empower the court to make any reference to arbitration which necessarily must be done by the parties themselves. Chapter II against contains Secs. 11, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, which evidently do not relate to any matter which strictly can be said to relate only to "arbitration without intervention of a Court." Similarly, Secs. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of that very chapter definitely dispel the contention that this Chapter contains provisions which are exclusively confined to "arbitration without intervention of a Court." To our mind, the title of Chapter II is not in conformity or consonance with several sections contained in that Chapter itself. The title presumably was not and could not be intended to exclude the powers of the Court. In this respect, therefore, the title of Chapter II alone cannot furnish any cogent ground for holding that once a step in aid of arbitration has been taken in the sense that a party entitled to nominate or appoint his arbitrator under the arbitration agreement has made such nomination or appointment, the application of Chapter III, which contains only one Sec. namely, 20, is necessarily excluded. Such a proposition would not also be in consonance with the words "instead of proceeding under Chapter III" occurring in Section 20 (1) itself. 15. For the purpose of this case it does not seem necessary to refer to Chapter IV of which the title is "Arbitration in Suits". The heading of Chapter V is "General." It does not appear to be necessary to, refer to Secs., 26 to 36 occurring in this Chapter. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 37 of this Chapter provides that for the purposes of that section and of the Limitation Act an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other parties thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator, or where the arbitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designated in the agreement, requiring that the difference be submitted to the person so named or designated. The expression "commencement of arbitration' has not been defined otherwise than in Sec 37 (3) above. The expression "commencement of arbitration' has not been defined otherwise than in Sec 37 (3) above. If the expression "commencement of arbitration" can be equated with the expression "reference or commencement of reference" the Submission made by Mr. Chowdhury on behalf of the appellant would appear to be highly tenable, because in that event the Full Bench decision in Mangal Prasad's case, A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 108 will be squarely applicable. But, as will be shown later, it is not possible to hold that commencement of arbitration is the same thing as the reference itself or the commencement of reference. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions contained in-Chapters VI and VII. Reference may, however be made to the First Schedule of the Act. Clause (1) of the First Schedule provides that unless otherwise expressly provided the reference shall be to a sole arbitrator. Clause (2) provides that if the reference is to an even number of arbitrators the arbitrators shall appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments. Clause (3) provides that the arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the Court may allow. Clause (3) mentions the circumstances under which the umpire shall enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators. The aforesaid clauses of the First Schedule, as also the remaining clauses (5) to (8) read with the various Sections of the Act already referred to above, clearly indicate that the actual act of reference or that of entering on the reference is essentially different from the acts of entering into an arbitration agreement, or appoint in or nominating an arbitrator or giving notice to a party or parties to appoint an arbitrator or to concur in appointment, as also from the act of a court appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire. To us it appears that if circumstances have come to exist giving rise to an occasion to a party to an arbitration agreement to decide how he will proceed, that is, seek the assistance of the Court under Section 8 or Section 9 or Section 11 or Section 12 as the case may be on the one hand, or under Section 20 on the other, it is for him to select the course. If he considers it advisable or necessary to obtain an order of reference from the Court referring the dispute or difference to an arbitrator or arbitrators. he has to make an application under Sec. 20. If he does not consider it necessary to get such an order he can proceed under any of the relevant sections of Chapter II. The expression "proceeding under Chapter II" would, in our opinion, mean taking any such step in the court as has been specifically provided under Secs. 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the Act under the circumstances specified in those Sections. The mere act of nominating or appointing an arbitrator by a party entitled to do so under an arbitration agreement and asking the other party to likewise nominate or appoint his arbitrator cannot be held to be an act of "proceeding under Chapter II". Such a right in reality does not flow from any of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act but emanates from the arbitration agreement itself, This being so, the fact that in the instant case the respondent had nominated or appointed his arbitrator and had asked the appellant to reciprocate would not be derogatory to his right to make an application under Sec 20 (1). Such an act is not tantamount to an act of proceeding under Chapter II. 16. Once an arbitrator has or arbitrators have started to function and entered on the reference suo motu or on being called upon to do so by any party under the agreement, the Court under Section 20 would evidently have no control over him or them. There is nothing in Section 20 by virtue of which the Court can remove an arbitrator or arbitrators. There is nothing in Section 20 by virtue of which the Court can remove an arbitrator or arbitrators. Therefore, in a case where the difference or dispute had previously become the subject matter of a pending reference, which had been entered upon by the arbitrator or arbitrators the remedy of the person seeking assistance of the court, if there is a failure or neglect on the part of the arbitrator or arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration, would be under Secs. 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the Act, as the case may be. In such case no question of electing to proceed either under Chapter II or under Section 20 can actually arise. 17. It was next contended that the application under Secs. 20 of the Act was itself barred by limitation. In support of this argument reliance was placed on clause 19 of the terms and conditions of the policy which runs thus : "In no case whatever shall the Company be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration." 18. This question was considered by the court below under issue No.4. The learned Judge relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Usman v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 474 : 1969 A.L.J. 387, held that an application under Section 20 was governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The present application was filed in 1969 when Limitation Act, 1963, was in force. Article 137 of this Act corresponds to Article 1 of the previous Act. No period of limitation having been prescribed else where in the IIIrd Division of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 for an application under Section 20 of the Act, such an application has to be filed within three years from the time when the right to apply accrues. In the instant case evidently the application was well within the time prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, inasmuch as the fire which gave rise to the claim under the two insurance policies had taken place in March, 1968. In the instant case evidently the application was well within the time prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, inasmuch as the fire which gave rise to the claim under the two insurance policies had taken place in March, 1968. It was, however, contended that in view of condition No. 19 the application could not have been entertained, because by virtue of that condition the appellant Company was absolved from all liabilities for any loss or damage after the expiration of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage. it was further contended that within the period of twelve months prescribed under condition No. 19 the claim had not become the subject of any pending action or arbitration. The court below has held that there was a pending arbitration on 19-12-1969 and that the application under Section 20 of the Act was a continuation of the arbitration proceeding which had already commenced. It was, therefore, held that the application was not barred by condition No. 19 of the Policy. We are in full agreement with the decision of the court below, and hold that arbitration commenced on 21-2-1969. 19. For the purposes of Section 37 of the Act and of the Limitation Act, it has inter alia been provided under Sub-sec. (3) of the said section that an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. The Act, as provided in Section 47, applies to all arbitration and to all proceedings thereunder, unless otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force. The Policies do not contain any term or condition specifying when arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced for the purposes of clauses 13, 18 and 19. Clearly, therefore, the application was within limitation even if the question of limitation is considered with reference to condition No. 19. Besides, it appears to us to be highly doubtful as to whether it is open to the parties entering into an arbitration agreement to contract out of the statute of limitation. We need not, however, consider this aspect of the matter further nor need we express any final opinion thereon, because the question does not really arise. 20. Besides, it appears to us to be highly doubtful as to whether it is open to the parties entering into an arbitration agreement to contract out of the statute of limitation. We need not, however, consider this aspect of the matter further nor need we express any final opinion thereon, because the question does not really arise. 20. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the East Punjab High Court in The Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd., v. The Bharat Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 352,"' In that case also there was a clause in the Policy corresponding to clause No. 19 of the Policy issued by the appellant Company. In that case the fire took place on the night between the 20th and 21st of March, 1948. On 21st January, 1949 the Insurance Company offered a sum of Rs. 22,500/- in full and final settlement of the loss that had occurred. This offer was rejected by the Bank. The judgment does not indicate that the Bank had made any specific claim for the loss suffered by it, nor does it indicate when the Bank called upon the Insurance Company to refer the matter to arbitration. The application under Section 20 of the Act was filed on 18th March, 1949. The Insurance Company relied on clause 19 of the Policy, which is identical with clause 19 of the instant case, and contended that the application had not been filed within time. On behalf of the Bank it was contended that clause 19 itself was invalid. The contention of the Insurance Company was accepted and that of the Bank rejected. On facts, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from the case decided by the East Punjab High Court. Here the fire took place on 14-3-1968 and claim for Rs. 53, 445/- was submitted to the appellant Company within a few clays. Further the respondent by letter dated 21-2-1969 gave notice to the appellant intimating that it had nominated its arbitrator and requiring the appellant to nominate its arbitrator. Under Section 37 of the Act an Arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. Under Section 37 of the Act an Arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. Therefore, in the instant case the arbitration must be deemed to have commenced on 21-2-1969, that is, within one year from the date when the loss occurred. Besides, we may again reiterate that, in our tentative opinion, it is not legally open to any person or persons to contract out of the statute of limitation unless so permitted by the Limitation Act, or the Arbitration Act. We may here also refer to Sub-sec. (4) of Section 37 of the Act which provides as follows : "Where the terms of an agreement to refer future differences to arbitration provide that any claims to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless notice to appoint an arbitrator is given or an arbitrator is appointed or some other step to commence arbitration proceedings in taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a difference arises to which the agreement, applies, the Court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused, may on such terms, if any, as the justice of the case may require, extend the time for such period as it thinks proper." It will thus be seen that provision in the Act itself has been made empowering the Court to give relief to a party against whom a clause like clause 19 is invoked thereby causing under hardship to the party. In our opinion the present case is a fit one in which, in any event, the respondent should be given protection from the rigid application of clause 19, even if that clause otherwise applied. 21. In so far as condition No. 13 is concerned, the Court below under issue No. 2 held that the application under Section 20 was neither misconceived nor untenable by virtue of any thing contained in that condition. The material part of condition No. 13 reads : " ............ 21. In so far as condition No. 13 is concerned, the Court below under issue No. 2 held that the application under Section 20 was neither misconceived nor untenable by virtue of any thing contained in that condition. The material part of condition No. 13 reads : " ............ if claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced within three months after such rejection, or (in case of an arbitration place in pursuance of the 1st condition of this Policy) within three months after the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire shall have made their award, all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited." In our opinion the first part of condition No. 13 is not attracted, because that part relates to "an action or suit". In so far as the second part is concerned, the question of its applicability has not arisen yet. The question is premature because, as we read the material provision of condition No. 13 it appears to us that the question can only arise "when an award shall have been by an arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire." In the instant case the appellant Company repudiated or rejected the respondent's claim by letters dated 11th March, 1959, 25th March, 1959 and 14th May, 1959. The application was filed on 19th December, 1969. According to Mr. Chowdhury, no application having been made within three months form the date of final rejection, namely 11th May, 1969, all the benefits under the Policies stood forfeited. The application, therefore, was not maintainable. This argument has little force and is somewhat misconceived as well. As already pointed out, the first part of clause 13 relevant for the purpose of this case relates to an action or suit. The second part became applicable after an award has been made. Condition No. 13, therefore, did not bar the application under Section 20 of the Act, as has been rightly held by the court below. Here we may again refer to Sub-sec. (4) of Sec 37 which would be equally applicable to condition No. 13 and condition No. 19. 22. For the reasons given above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.