Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1971 DIGILAW 428 (ALL)

Kanhaiya Lal v. Board of Revenue

1971-09-21

S.N.DWIVEDI

body1971
JUDGMENT S.N. Dwivedi, J. - The petitioner is the tenant-in-chief of a plot of Land situate in the city of Jaunpur; the respondents 4 to 8 were his sub-tenants. He instituted a suit under Sec. 175, U.P. Tenancy Act for their ejectment. The suit was decreed on July 2, 1953. Thereafter he applied for the execution of the decree for ejectment. At first it was stayed by the execution court in view of certain orders of the U.P. Government. Subsequently, on July 1, 1965, the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enforced in the city of Jaunpur. And then the petitioner's application for execution was stayed under rule 38 (viii) of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. But on June 30, 1966, the execution court held that as the respondents had acquired the rights of a sirdar under the aforesaid Act, they were immune from ejectment. On that view he dropped the proceedings for execution. The petitioner filed an appeal. It was dismissed. His revision was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue. Hence this petition. He prays that the court may quash the orders of the Board of Revenue and the Tahsildar. 2. Sec. 10 of the Act provides for consequences of the vesting of the zamindari in the State. Clause (i) of Sec. 10 says that all suits and proceedings of the nature to be prescribed pending in any court on the date of vesting and all proceeding upon any decree or order passed in any such suit or proceeding previous to the date of vesting, shall be stayed. Rule 38 provides for the stay of proceedings of various kinds. Clause (iv) provides that suits, applications or proceedings, including appeals, references and revisions relating to or pending under, inter alia, Sec. 175 of the U.P. Tenancy Act shall be stayed. Rule 38 provides for the stay of proceedings of various kinds. Clause (iv) provides that suits, applications or proceedings, including appeals, references and revisions relating to or pending under, inter alia, Sec. 175 of the U.P. Tenancy Act shall be stayed. Clause (viii) of rule 38 provides that all proceedings "upon any decree or order, unless it is a decree or order which became final before the date of vesting, but is not a decree which may be executed by ejectment of the judgment-debtor, passed previous to the date of vesting, in any suit or proceedings of the nature specified in clause (iv) shall remain stayed." Rule 39(1), as it stood on the date the Tahsildar made his order, provided that every suit or proceeding, whether pending in the court of the first instance or in appeal or in revision, stayed under clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (viii) of rule 38, shall, together with appeal or revision, if any, be abated by the court or authority before whom, it may be pending, after notice to parties and giving them an opportunity of being heard. Other clauses of rule 39 are associated with the other clauses of rule 38 except its clause (viii). Rule 39, looked at as a whole, provided either for abatement of certain proceedings or their continuance. As clause (viii) of rule 38 was not mentioned in any part of rule 39 on the date of the passing of the order of the Tahsildar, the Tahsildar could not dispose of the proceeding for execution initiated by the petitioner. He should have kept it stayed. Rule 39 (1) was amended on December 21, 1966. The amendment added clause (viii) of rule 38 in Sub-rule (1) of rule 39. In the result, after December 21, 1966, the Tahsildar should have abated the proceedings for execution of the decree initiated by the petitioner. The Tahsildar took the view that the respondents have become sirdars and accordingly he dropped the proceedings. There he is clearly wrong. The proceedings for execution should not be abated. 3. In the result, after December 21, 1966, the Tahsildar should have abated the proceedings for execution of the decree initiated by the petitioner. The Tahsildar took the view that the respondents have become sirdars and accordingly he dropped the proceedings. There he is clearly wrong. The proceedings for execution should not be abated. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the proceedings should be decided in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 39, sub-rule (3) provides that except as provided in sub-rule (2) every suit or proceeding stayed under clause (iv) of Rule 38 shall, whether pending in appeal, reference or revision, be continued and decided in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Sub-rule (3) will not apply to the case. It is limited to suits and proceedings stayed under clause (iv) of Rule 38. The proceeding for execution in the instant case was not stayed under clause (iv) of Rule 38: it was stayed under clause (viii) of Rule 38. 4. It seems to me that the scheme of Rule 39 is two-fold. Where a suit or proceeding is stayed, it shall be decided on the merits bearing in mind the provisions of the Act read with Rule 40. Where a decree passed before the date of vesting is stayed under clause (viii) of Rule 38, it will be abated under Rule 39 (1) . After abatement the claims of the parties to the execution proceedings will be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This follows from Rule 40. Rule 40 says that nothing in Rule 38 shall be construed as depriving any party to the suit or proceeding from any right which may have accrued to him under the Act. So in spite of the abatement of the execution proceedings it will be open to the petitioner and the respondents to claim any right which may have been conferred on either of them by the Act. Of course, the claim will be subject to the law of limitation, if any, provided for in the Act. 5. In support of his argument counsel for the petitioner has relied on Bhagwan Das v. Ratti Ram Koeri, 1970 ALJ (Revenue) 57. The case no doubt supports the petitioner. But it is wrongly decided. Of course, the claim will be subject to the law of limitation, if any, provided for in the Act. 5. In support of his argument counsel for the petitioner has relied on Bhagwan Das v. Ratti Ram Koeri, 1970 ALJ (Revenue) 57. The case no doubt supports the petitioner. But it is wrongly decided. The Board of Revenue wrongly assumed that the proceeding for execution of a decree falls "within the category of suits, applications and proceedings referred to in sub-clause (iv) of Rule 38". I have already indicated earlier that the proceeding for execution of a decree in a suit under Sec. 175 U.P. Tenancy Act is mentioned separately in clause (viii) of Rule 38. Accordingly clause (iv) of Rule 38 will not apply to such a proceeding. 6. Counsel for the respondents has relied on Dalsinghar v. Mangal, 1970 ALJ (Revenue) 59. That decision will not help him because the application for execution in that case was filed after the date of vesting. 7. In the two judgments of the Board of Revenue the applicant in revision has been described as "revisionist". The word "revisionist" means a person who is in favour of revising opinions. It does not signify a person who makes an application for revision before a court. 8. Having regard to the foregoing discussion the petition is allowed. The orders of the Tahsildar, the Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue are quashed. The petitioner's application for execution of the decree shall stand abated. As the petitioner has succeeded on a point not taken by him before the inferior authorities, there shall be no order as to costs.