JUDGMENT G. S. Lal, J. (for himself and on behalf of K. C. Puri, J.) :- This is a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which has come before the Full bench on a reference by a Division Bench of which one of us was a member. We have already allowed the petition by our order dated 22-5-1971, stating that our reasons would however be given later on. We proceed to give our reasons now. 2. The facts of the case are briefly these. The petitioner Urooj Abbas is an under-trial in a case under Section 379 and 411, I.P.C. He is detained in jail. One of the grounds taken by him in support of the case that his detention in jail is illegal is that on neither of the dates 4-1-1971 and 13-1-1971 fixed in the case for hearing he was called in the Court room before the Magistrate and there was therefore no legal remand of himself to jail custody. The second ground is that the learned Magistrate did not record any order remanding the petitioner to jail custody. The third ground is that no proper warrant remanding him to jail custody was prepared. 3. It is not in controversy that in the case of the petitioner the learned Magistrate had to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 344 (1-A) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The third ground is that no proper warrant remanding him to jail custody was prepared. 3. It is not in controversy that in the case of the petitioner the learned Magistrate had to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 344 (1-A) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That section reads :- "(1-A) If, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody : Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time : Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing." The orders of the trial Magistrate which are to be found on the record on the two dates on which legal remand orders are said not to have been made are to be found in the proceedings sheet in the following words : "4-1-1971. Case called out. The accused is in jail in this case the P.P. has given his report that this is a case of Section 392/397, I.P.C. and so it may be taken up as an enquiry case. Order. Put up up on 13-1-1971 for the disposal of the application of A.P.P. Sd/- Illegible, J.O. 4-1-1971." "13-1-1971. Case called out. The A.P.P. has moved an application requesting that this case may be taken up as enquiry case. Hence the case is adjourned to 21-1-1971 for further orders. Order. Fix 2-1-1971 (sic) for further orders. Sd/- Illegible, J.O. 13-1-1971." 4. It is agreed that the accused was not taken before the Magistrate when the two orders quoted above were passed. The A.P.P. has moved an application requesting that this case may be taken up as enquiry case. Hence the case is adjourned to 21-1-1971 for further orders. Order. Fix 2-1-1971 (sic) for further orders. Sd/- Illegible, J.O. 13-1-1971." 4. It is agreed that the accused was not taken before the Magistrate when the two orders quoted above were passed. It is also apparent that while the reason for adjourning the case was record in writing each of the two dates there was not records on either of these dates on the proceedings sheet or elsewhere an order directing the petitioner to be remanded to jail custody again or giving the reasons for such further remand to jail custody. According to Sri C. H. Naqvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, the production of the accused before the Magistrate before he could be remanded to jail custody was absolutely necessary. Learned counsel's reference to the provisions of Section 167, Criminal P.C. and Art. 22 (2) of the Constitution of India is irrelevant because the stage of compliance with the said provisions of law had passed. A charge-sheet had been submitted against the petitioner and a date had been fixed for the commencement of the trial in the form of recording the statement of the accused and framing of charges. Hearing on both the dates was adjourned because the Assistant Public Prosecutor wanted the proceedings to be taken as an enquiry for commitment to the Court of Session and not as a trial. The Magistrate had to comply with the provisions of Section 344(1-A) in adjourning the case and remanding the petitioner to further jail custody. Learned counsel has contended that the petitioner was entitled to take part in the proceedings in the case and they should have been held in his presence and the passing of an order in his absence adjourning the case on each of the two dates was against law and the principles of natural justice. Here we are no doubt concerned with the simple question whether the remand to jail custody without the production of the petitioner before the Magistrate was legal or illegal and not with the question whether the order adjourning the case should have been passed in the presence of the petitioner. Here we are no doubt concerned with the simple question whether the remand to jail custody without the production of the petitioner before the Magistrate was legal or illegal and not with the question whether the order adjourning the case should have been passed in the presence of the petitioner. Learned counsel has however suggested that the order for adjournment and the remand of the accused to jail custody could not be regaeded as separates Now howsoever desirable it might have been for the petitioner to have been taken before the Magistrate when the case was taken before the Magistrate when the case was taken up by the Magistrate even when the particular proceedings for which the case was fixed did not take place and only the report of the A.P.P. on the first date and his application on the second date were taken notice of for adjourning the case, we find there was no violation of any mandatory provision of law requiring the production of the accused before the Magistrate holding the trial of inquiry. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that though there is no express provision in Section 344 in the Code of Criminal Procedure like those in Sections 167, 170 and 173 for the production of the accused before the Magistrate at the time of remand to jail custody, the same is to be taken to be impliedly there. It is not possible to accept this contention, keeping in view the fact that even for the stage beyond the stages to which Sections 167, 170 and 173 of the Code relate, the Code has made provision in Section 353 for the presence of the accused before the Magistrate but the section confines the necessity of the personal presence of the accused to the time during which the evidence is being recorded. If the intention of the law were that the accused must be produced before the Magistrate irrespective of the nature of the proceeding to be taken in his case, Section 353 would have been worded differently. If the intention of the law were that the accused must be produced before the Magistrate irrespective of the nature of the proceeding to be taken in his case, Section 353 would have been worded differently. In any case, the dispute raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concluded by two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases Raj Narain v. Superintendent Central Jail, New Delhi ( AIR 1971 SC 178 ) = (1971 Cri.L.J. 244) and A. Lakshmanrao v. Judicial Magistrate Parvatipuram, ( AIR 1971 SC 186 ) = (1971 Cri.L.J. 253). In both of them it was held that Court can pass an order of remand under Section 344, Criminal P.C. even in the accused is not present in Court. 5. Coming to the second point, namely, that there was no valid remand in the absence of the Magistrate recording an order remanding the petitioner to jail custody, it will appear from the wording of Section 344(1-A) that the order required to be recorded in writing and with reasons, is about the postponement or adjournment of the enquiry or trial and not about remand about which all that the section requires is that it is to be made by a warrant. The reason is obvious. The accused to whom the enquiry or trial relates will be in custody either because he has not asked for bail or he has been refused bail. Adjournment of the enquiry or trial will not by itself require any change in the matter of the accused being kept in custody. It is a different thing that if many adjournments are made on account of any laches or the like on the part of the prosecution, it may provide a ground to be accused to whom bail had been refused earlier, to ask for bail but there will be no need to record an order in writing stating the reasons for remanding the accused. On a plain reading of sub-section (1-A) of Section 344, all that is need for remanding the accused is a warrant. On a plain reading of sub-section (1-A) of Section 344, all that is need for remanding the accused is a warrant. Sub-section (2) of S. 344 no doubt states that every order made under the section by a Court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the President Judge or the Magistrate but the requirement of the order being in writing would appear to be only a superfluous repetition, for the orders contemplated in sub-section (1) of the section are required under that sub-section itself to be in writing. Even if remanding the accused is related to be an order, it will be in writing because a warrant will have to be prepared. Sub-section (2) will therefore appear to have significance only in so far as every order under sub-section (1) is required to be signed by the presiding Judge or the Magistrate. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on certain precedents. They are the cases Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi, (AIR 953 SC 277) = (1953 Cri.L.J. 1113), ( AIR 1953 SC 277 ) = (1953 Cri.L.J. 1113), a decision of the Supreme Court, and Vasu Deo Ojha v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1958 All 578 ) = (1958 Cri.L.J. 988) and Atiq Ahmad v. State (Criminal Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969, decided on 27-10-1969 (All), but not reported) which are two decisions of this Court. So far as the Supreme Court case is concerned, it does not directly decided the point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case. In that case the warrants of custody which were in form of some slips were not taken into consideration when filed belatedly. Apart from those slips which were said to be warrants, there was no indication on the record of the Court that the accused had been remanded by warrant signed by the Magistrate when he adjourned the case under Section 344(1-A), Criminal P.C. It was for that reason that the custody of the accused was held illegal. It was nowhere laid down that a separate order otherwise than a warrant was required for the purpose of remanding the accused. In Vasu Deo Ojha's case the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singh's case appears to have been interpreted to mean that an order in writing was required for remanding the accused. It was nowhere laid down that a separate order otherwise than a warrant was required for the purpose of remanding the accused. In Vasu Deo Ojha's case the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singh's case appears to have been interpreted to mean that an order in writing was required for remanding the accused. But, with respect, we are unable to agree with that interpretation of the Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider at all the question whether if proper warrants had been issued remanding the accused, a separate order to that effect would still be required to be recorded on the file. In Vasu Deo Ojha's case the Division Bench found the slips on which reliance was place for the State, to be unacceptable as warrants because the endorsements on the slips bore no date nor stated that detenus concerned were remanded to jail custody. Therefore even Vasu Deo Ojha's case cannot be considered as decisively laying down that in addition to a proper warrant an order in writing remanding the accused would be necessary. 6. The third and unreported case Cri. Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969, D/- 27-10-1969, decided by a Division Bench of which one of use was a member is of similar nature. The slip produced before the learned Judge as being the warrant for intermediate custody was held not to be in order and the was no other order on the record of the case about remand of accused Atiq Ahmad. He was therefore held to be in illegal detention in the absence of an order in writing signed by the Magistrate. This case is also no authority for the proposition of law that an order remanding the accused should be passed apart from the warrant. 7. The learned Government Advocate has referred us to the following observations of Desai, J. (as he then was) while speaking for the Court in the Division Bench case, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. The Superintendent, Central Prison, (AIR 1955 All 193) = (1955 Cri.L.J. 623) :- "In the warrant directing the Superintendent of the Central Jail to keep him in custody, the Magistrate has ordered that he should be produced before him in Court on 19-7-1954. It amounts to his authorising the applicant's detention in jail custody. Ram Manohar Lohia v. The Superintendent, Central Prison, (AIR 1955 All 193) = (1955 Cri.L.J. 623) :- "In the warrant directing the Superintendent of the Central Jail to keep him in custody, the Magistrate has ordered that he should be produced before him in Court on 19-7-1954. It amounts to his authorising the applicant's detention in jail custody. Ordinarily Magistrates write in the order sheet of the case, when adjourning it to the next date, that the accused should remain in custody as before, but Sri P. R. Gupta or rather his clerk did not say in the order passed on 6-7-1954 that the applicant should remain in custody upto 19-7-1954. That omission does not matter when the warrant contains the Magistrate's authority for the detention. One authority for detention is enough ....." The case does show that a warrant remanding the accused would be sufficient and no additional order recording the fact of the accused being remanded will be necessary. We notice that in the printed form of warrant for remanding an accused under Section 344, Criminal P.C. there is a note on the reverse side below the columns given therein stating : "The reasons for remanding the accused must be given in the record. No accused may be remanded to custody for a term exceeding 15 days at a time (Section 344, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898). "The note itself refers to Section 344 for what it lays down but that section itself does not, as has been shown above, anywhere require reasons to be given for remanding the accused. The note thus goes beyond the provisions of Section 344 and is immaterial. We are firmly of opinion that remanding of an accused under Section 344(1-A) can be made by a warrant and any separate order in addition on the record of the case is not necessary though it may be desirable in order to keep the record self-contained in the matter of the proceedings taken on each day of hearing. 8. We are firmly of opinion that remanding of an accused under Section 344(1-A) can be made by a warrant and any separate order in addition on the record of the case is not necessary though it may be desirable in order to keep the record self-contained in the matter of the proceedings taken on each day of hearing. 8. Coming to the third ground, namely, that no proper warrant remanding the petitioner to jail custody was prepared, we find that there is a printed form of warrant authorised by the High Court for remanding of an accused under Section 344, Criminal P.C. The form has been referred to in the list of printed forms given in the General Rules (Criminal) 1957 for the subordinate Courts, though it has not been reproduced in the appendices to the rules. The front side of the form contains on one-half of it divided vertically the matter reproduced below in English and the remaining half contains a translation of the same material in Hindi - "WARRANT FOR INTERMEDIATE CUSTODY OF REMAND (Section 344, Criminal P.C., 1898) The Jailor of Whereas of Charged with and has been remanded to take his trial before the Court of You are hereby required to receive the said .... into your custody and produce him before the said Court as required on the reverse. Magistrate Date day of 19 ". 9. The back side of the form is divided into four columns with heading both in English and Hindi in each column and a note at the end. With only the English part of the headings the back side is reproduced below. |---------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------| | "Number of accused. | Date of order. | Date on which | Magistrate's | | | | is to be | Signature. | | | | produced. | | |---------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------| N. B. The reasons for remanding the accused must be given in the record. No accused may be remanded to custody for a term exceeding 15 days at a time (Section 344, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898)" 10. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that mere entering of dates on the reverse of the form and initialling of the entries in the four columns will not amount to issuing a warrant for jail custody. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that mere entering of dates on the reverse of the form and initialling of the entries in the four columns will not amount to issuing a warrant for jail custody. The second is that in any case the slip which was been produced cannot be regarded as a warrant at all. The slip produced is half of the printed warrant form cut into two vertically. The front side of the slip contains the English version reproduced above while the back side consists of the third and the fourth columns cut out of the four columns reproduced above. In fact even a small left side part of the third column is not to be found. There are dates given in both the columns with initials of the Magistrate near the dates in the fourth column. We find that amongst other dates, the date 4-1-1971 is mentioned in the fourth column and then it is mentioned in the third column with the date 13-1-1971 in the next column opposite it. Thereafter the date 13-1-1971 is mentioned in the third column and the date 21-1-1971 is mentioned in the column opposite it. In the front side of the slip the gaps are found filled and the front side is signed by the Magistrate is the date 8-9-1970. It is obvious that the printed form had been mutilated to make use of half of it for the petitioner and, possibly, the other half containing a Hindi version of the front side, for some other accused. 11. The argument of the learned counsel in regard to his first contention mentioned above is that the front side can operate only as an order for one particular date for receiving the accused in jail and the mere filling in of dates on the reverse side of the form will not amount to warrant to receive the accused in jail on subsequent dates which are entered on the reverse. In the instant case particularly where only half the printed form cut out from the whole has been made use of, the alternative argument is that the entering of dates on the reverse conveys no meaning and there is no remand in any manner. In the instant case particularly where only half the printed form cut out from the whole has been made use of, the alternative argument is that the entering of dates on the reverse conveys no meaning and there is no remand in any manner. The plain meaning of the contents of the printed Form, that is to say, the front side of the form along with the reverse side in tabular Form, is that the Jailor is directed once to receive the accused and to produce the accused on each of the dates to be noted on the reverse, implying thereby that he is to be taken back after being produced on each day of production. The question is whether this meets with the intention underlying the expression "and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody" used in Section 344(1-A). The word "remand" means sending back (prisoner) into custody to allow of further enquiry, that is to say, recommitting the prisoner to custody. Section 344(1-A) requires that recommittal to custody or the sending back of the accused to jail would be done by a warrant when the case is adjourned. As such ordinarily a warrant or written authorisation to the Jailor to receive the accused in custody on each day when the accused is remanded under Section 344(1-A) is expected. There can however no doubt be a single form utilised for successive remands if it is so worded as to serve as a recommittal order on successive days, the language of the printed warrant form aforesaid would seems to fall short of doing that because while it is certainly a warrant committing the accused to jail custody for the day on which it is first signed on the front side the position is not clear for later dates on which it is signed only on the reverse. If countersigned on each subsequent day on which the accused is produced in Court and remanded, it will of course be a fresh authorisation to take the accused in custody. But the form, as it is, does not clearly convey the said position. We have no doubt in our minds that on its language the printed form in question needs improvement in order that it may clearly express what Section 344(1-A) requires. But the form, as it is, does not clearly convey the said position. We have no doubt in our minds that on its language the printed form in question needs improvement in order that it may clearly express what Section 344(1-A) requires. In order clearly to serve as a warrant form for being utilized for successive remands, both the front side and the reverse side require some change. A suggestive change will be to substitute the words "and produce him before the said Court as required on the reverse" by the words "today and hereafter on the dates to be noted in column 3 on the reverse and produce him before the said Court on the dates to be noted on column 4 on the reverse." "The reverse side should have one more column as the The third column of which the heading will be "the existing third and fourth columns shall become the fourth and fifth columns." (sic). 12. The point however arises whether a remand by filling the columns on the reverse of the warrant already signed on the front side on some earlier date can still be taken to be substantive compliance with the requirement of remanding by warrant under Section 344(1-A), Criminal P.C. and if that is so, whether the position in any case becomes different in the case of making use of only half portion of the warrant form and noting on the reverse, irrespective of the headings of the columns, the date on which adjournment is made and the date on which the case is adjoined and then initialling by the Magistrate of the entry consisting of the said two dates on the successive dates of hearing. In AIR 1958 All 578 = (1958 Cri.L.J. 988) the printed Form under consideration does not appear to have been used, vide paragraph 6 of the report of the judgment. That case is therefore of no assistance. In the unreported case (Criminal Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969 decided on 27-10-1969) (All) the Division Bench case referred to earlier, in which one of us was a member, the manner in which remand was purported to have been made was, as appears from the judgment, exactly similar to that in the instant case. In the unreported case (Criminal Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969 decided on 27-10-1969) (All) the Division Bench case referred to earlier, in which one of us was a member, the manner in which remand was purported to have been made was, as appears from the judgment, exactly similar to that in the instant case. In the column bearing the heading "Date on which accused is to be produced" were noted the dates on which the accused had actually been produced (as appearing from the record) and in the column headed "Magistrate's signature" the date on which the case was to come next was mentioned against each entry in the first column. There were also initials of the Magistrate near the date in the second column. Read with the headings the entries on the reverse were meaningless. It was held by the Division Bench that the endorsements did not state that the accused was remanded to jail custody and it was difficult to read those endorsements as orders of remand. Reference was made to the observation of the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singh's case AIR 1953 SC 277 = (1953 Cri.L.J. 1113) (supra), that "those who feel to call upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law." It was accordingly held, in the absence of any other order on the record remanding the accused, that the so-called warrant was not a warrant as required under Section 344, Criminal P.C. and therefore the detention of the accused petitioner was illegal. We may however add that if the warrant form in full had been made use of and the entries in the columns on the reverse had been duly made, then the warrant upon reading both sides of the form would in spite of the defect mentioned earlier, have amounted to sub-stantial compliance with the requirements of Section 344(1-A) since the intention of remand would have been fairly clear. But with the so-called warrant in regard to the petitioner produced before us, that is to say, a half of the warrant form in which the entries on the reverse are so made as to be meaningless even when read with the front side of the Form, we cannot hold that the petitioner was remanded by warrant on 4-1-1971 or 13-1-1971 within the meaning of Section 344(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In consequence, his detention beyond 4-1-1971 was illegal. 13. It has been contended before us by the learned Government Advocate that the crucial date for judging the validity of the detention in habeas corpus proceedings is not the date of in habeas corpus proceedings is not the date of institution of the proceedings but the date of filling of return. Even assuming that the validity of the detention is to be determined on the date of filing of return, yet in the instant case we do not find that on any date till the filing of the return there was any proper warrant remanding the petitioner to jail custody. For improvement of the warrant form as suggested earlier we direct that a copy of the judgment shall be laid by the Registrar before Hon'ble Chief Justice for such action being taken by the Court as it thinks fit for suitable modification in the Form. K. B. SRIVASTAVA, J. :- 14. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by brother G. S. Lal and though I agree with the order proposed I would like to add a few words of my own. 15. The facts will appear from the judgment prepared by my learned brother. 16. The first point canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an illegality has been committed by the Magistrate in remanding the petitioner without having him before him and giving him an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be further remanded. Undoubtedly, the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate either on January 4, 1971 or on January 13, 1971. Again his contention finds support from (1867) 2 Weir 409; Crown v. Shera, (1867 Pun Re (Cr) 72). Undoubtedly, the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate either on January 4, 1971 or on January 13, 1971. Again his contention finds support from (1867) 2 Weir 409; Crown v. Shera, (1867 Pun Re (Cr) 72). In Re Venkataraman, (AIR 1948 Mad 100) = (49 Cri.L.J. 41); and Ram Rishi Anal v. Delhi Administration, Delhi (1967 LT 126); but these cases could no longer be taken to lay down good law, in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in ( AIR 1971 SC 178 ) = (1971 Cri.L.J. 244) and ( AIR 1971 SC 186 ) = (1971 Cri.L.J. 253). Their Lordships have held that as a matter of law personal presence of an accused person before a Magistrate is not a necessary requirement for the purpose of his remand under Section 344, Criminal P.C. at the instance of the police, though as a rule of caution it is highly desirable that the accused should be personally produced before the Magistrate so that he may, if he so chooses, make a representation against his remand and for his release on bail. Thus though there is no mandate of law compelling production of an accused person before a Magistrate for purposes of remand, ordinarily such production should take place, unless it is prevented by some circumstance which can be regarded as reasonable and proper. A Magistrate cannot act arbitrarily in the matter and has to follow well-recognized precedents and principles in the exercise of his judicial discretion in the matter. In the circumstances, the remanding of the petitioner without his production before the Magistrate cannot be characterised as illegal so as to enable the Court to set him at liberty on that basis. 17. The second point raised by the learned counsel is that it is mandatory on the part of a Magistrate, while remanding a prisoner to jail, to pass a separate or independent order remanding him to jail custody as the mere issue of a warrant of remand will not be sufficient in law. He placed reliance for this proposition on ( AIR 1953 SC 277 ) = (1953 Cri.L.J. 1113); ( AIR 1958 All 578 ) = (1958 Cri.L.J. 988) and Atiq Ahmad v. The State, an unreported decision of a Division of a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member. He placed reliance for this proposition on ( AIR 1953 SC 277 ) = (1953 Cri.L.J. 1113); ( AIR 1958 All 578 ) = (1958 Cri.L.J. 988) and Atiq Ahmad v. The State, an unreported decision of a Division of a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member. In Ram Narayan Singh's case, the Supreme Court had to deal with the validity of detention of an accused in respect of whom no order of the Magistrate remanding him to custody was placed before the Court. Four slips of paper were produced but the Court did not take any notice of these documents because they were not produced at the proper stage. That decision, therefore cannot be taken to be an authority for the proposition that a warrant of remand alone is insufficient. In Ojha's case, an observation was certainly made that a remand, without a specific order of remand, was invalid and illegal. With due respect, however, I am unable to agree to that view. The contention put forward by the learned counsel, to my mind, does not flow from the language used in Section 344 (1-A), Criminal P.C. This section says that if, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. It is only a postponement or adjournment which requires an order in writing and the reasons therefor, and not the act of remanding, which if I may say so, can be evidenced by a mere warrant of remand, signed by the Magistrate. The decision in Atiq Ahmad's case, Cri Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969, D/- 27-10-1969 (All) does not deal with the point now before us as it turned upon the invalidity of the warrant itself. The decision in Atiq Ahmad's case, Cri Misc. Case No. 737 of 1969, D/- 27-10-1969 (All) does not deal with the point now before us as it turned upon the invalidity of the warrant itself. The question whether a separate order of remand is or is not necessary came up for decision In re Kunjan Nadar, (AIR 1955 Tray-Co 74) = (1955 Cri.L.J. 740) where Koshi, C.J. dealing with the matter observed thus : "The reasons to be stated as per the above provision are the reasons for the adjournment of the case and not the reasons for the remand. When a persons charged with commission of a non-bailable offence is produced before the Court unless he is admitted to bail the Court remands him to custody. This is done as a matter of course and is the only way to make him available for trial." I am in respectful agreement with this view. There is, therefore no substance in the second contention also. 18. I, however, think that the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has substance, and must be accepted. The warrant of remand in the instant case is a mutilated document. Either due to inadvertence or carelessness or with a view to utilize one printed form for two prisoners, a practice seems to have developed in the subordinate criminal Courts to separate the printed form in two halves vertically and to utilize one half for one prisoner and the other half for another. The result, as pointed out by my learned brother G. S. L. Srivastava, leads to confusion and uncertainty. The requirements of the printed form, if faithfully observed, will make the position clear as to the number of the accused, the date of the order and the date on which the accused is to be produced. As, it is, however the warrant for intermediate custody in the instant case consists only of the third and fourth columns and the entries in these two columns do not subserve the purpose. I agree, therefore, that the warrant in the instant case is illegal and the petitioner should be set at liberty forthwith. 19. My learned brother G. S. Lal has made some suggestions for modification in the prescribed Form. I agree, therefore, that the warrant in the instant case is illegal and the petitioner should be set at liberty forthwith. 19. My learned brother G. S. Lal has made some suggestions for modification in the prescribed Form. Since I am taking the view that this matter is not really necessary for the disposal of the habeas corpus petition, I would not like to make any comment upon it. Petition allowed.