JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal, by the unsuccessful plaintiff, is directed against a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Betul, dated 12th October 1966, dismissing his suit for declaration, injunction and refund of consideration. ( 2. ) THE relevant facts may be shortly stated. At a public auction held on 10th July 1962, the plaintiff purchased felled trees of teak and other species lying in coupe No. IX (A and B) Felling Series, Sarni, for a consideration of rs. 8,000. The amount of consideration was payable in 4 equal instalments of rs. 2,000 each. The plaintiff paid the 1st instalment and after execution of a coupe boundary certificate and the usual contract deed, he was placed in possession of the coupe. For a period of 4 months, he made no complaint whatever about any shortage of material. The complaint was not made until he had defaulted in payment of the 2nd instalment. No enquiry on his complaint was called for as the plaintiff had satisfied" himself about the material before executing the coupe boundary certificate. Thereafter, he also made a default in payment of the 3rd instalment. The Divisional Forest Officer served him with a notice calling upon him to pay the defaulted instalments within 15 days, failing which he threatened that action for cancellation of the contract would be taken. That notice had no effect on the plaintiff who, instead, applied for an extension of time alleging that he was misled in bidding at the auction. In rejecting his prayer for extension, the Divisional Forest Officer observed that the quantity of forest produce had not been guaranteed and there was no case for extension. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff did not also pay the 4th instalment which had fallen due. He was, therefore, served with another notice to pay the over due instalments. The notice stated that if he did not remit the 2nd, 3rd and the 4th instalments within 15 days, the Divisional Forest Officer would be compelled to take action for the cancellation of the contract. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Conservator of Forests against the refusal of the Divisional forest Officer to grant an extension but that appeal was rejected. ( 3. ) EVENTUALLY, when the plaintiff did not comply with the notices of demand for payment of the 3 defaulted instalments, the Divisional Forest officer, by his order, Ex. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Conservator of Forests against the refusal of the Divisional forest Officer to grant an extension but that appeal was rejected. ( 3. ) EVENTUALLY, when the plaintiff did not comply with the notices of demand for payment of the 3 defaulted instalments, the Divisional Forest officer, by his order, Ex. D-7, terminated the contract under Rule 29 of the forest Contract Rules, and in his forwarding endorsement directed that the relinquished material would be re-auctioned. ( 4. ) THE decision of the appeal turns on a construction of Rule 29 (2) (e)of the Forest Contract Rules. To understand the proper scope of that Rule, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Rule 29 which read as follows:- "29. (1) A forest contract may be terminated by the officer empowered to execute it on behalf of the Government if the Forest Contractor makes default in the payment of the consideration for his contract or of any instalment thereof, or commits a breach of any of the other conditions of his contract. (2) Such termination shall be notified to the forest contractor by a written notice delivered to him personally or sent to him by registered post, and thereupon all the contractors rights under the contract including all necessary licences, shall cease and all the forest produce remaining within the contract area or at the depots specified under rule 13 shall become the absolute property of Government. On such termination Government shall be entitled- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . (b) to recover as arrears of land revenue any part of the consideration which has fallen due but is still unpaid on the date of the termination of the contract; (e) to recover as arrears of land revenue any part of the consideration which would have subsequently fallen due but for such termination or to resell the contract and to recover in like manner the amount by which the price secured on such resale falls short of that part of the consideration which would have so fallen due. " ( 5. ) THERE was admittedly default on the part of the plaintiff to pay the 2nd, 3rd and 4th instalments. Under the terms of Rule 29. " ( 5. ) THERE was admittedly default on the part of the plaintiff to pay the 2nd, 3rd and 4th instalments. Under the terms of Rule 29. (1), the Divisional forest Officer, who was empowered to execute the contract on behalf of the government, had the right to terminate the contract. Admittedly, the contract was so terminated and such termination was duly notified to the plaintiff under rule 29 (2 ). On such termination, the Government was entitled, under clause (b), either to recover the defaulted instalments due on the date of the termination of the contract as arrears of land revenue or to resell the contract, under 2nd part of clause (e), and recover in like manner the amount by which the price secured on such resale fell short of that part of the consideration which had so fallen due. ( 6. ) THE contention that in a case like this, where the Divisional Forest officer had, while terminating the contract, directed that the relinquished material would be re-auctioned falls only within the 2nd part of clause (e), cannot be accepted. The order of cancellation, Ex. D-7, does not direct resale of the contract, but of the relinquished material only. Under Rule 29 (2), the relinquished material became the absolute property of the Government on the termination of the contract. ( 7. ) THERE is no warrant for the submission that the provision of section 82 of the Forest Act could not be invoked by the Government. That section clearly invests the Government with authority to recover any sum recoverable under a contract relating to timber or forest produce, if not paid when due, as if it were the arrear of land revenue. ( 8. ) UNDER Rule 29 (2), the Government had clearly an option either to proceed under clause (b) and to recover as arrears of land revenue, the part of consideration which had fallen due but was still un-paid on the dare of the termination of the contract, or, to fall back on the 2nd pan of clause (e) and to resell the contract. The course of action to be adopted was left to the discretion of the Government and it cannot be said that having regard to the fact that the period of contract was about to expire, the Government was not within its rights in deciding to proceed under clause (b ). The course of action to be adopted was left to the discretion of the Government and it cannot be said that having regard to the fact that the period of contract was about to expire, the Government was not within its rights in deciding to proceed under clause (b ). ( 9. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the law is otherwise and he relies upon Badriprasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, s1; k. P. Chowdhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, s2 and K. P. Chowdhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, s3 for the contention that the right of the Government is to- realise the deficiency on resale, and not to realise the arrears of money due as arrears of land revenue. The contention is wholly unfounded and cannot be accepted. In Badriprasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case where the cut timber auctioned was destroyed by fire before the contract deed was executed. Their Lordships held that as the sale was of goods in a deliverable state, the property in them passed to the contractor, and further that it was with in the realm of possibility that that the forest produce might be lost on account of fire or any other risk mentioned in Rule 32 of the Forest Contract Rules before the deed of contract was formally signed. According to them, the contract entered into, therefore, involved the possibility of loss of goods by fire, and the contractor was not absolved of his liability thereby. Their Lordships also interpreted Rule 8 of the 1. 1966 M PL J 1 = AIR 1966 SC 58 . 2. 1966 M PL J 1057= air 1967 SC 203 . 3. 1970 J L I Note 42. Forest Contract. Rules, which gave a right to the Government to stop the removal of forest produce under certain circumstances. In that context, they also interpreted the provisions of Rule 83 of the Forest Act which created a lien on forest produce for the money payable to the Government. We fail to see what relevance that decision has to the present controversy. ( 10. ) THE two decisions in K. P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), are clearly distinguishable on facts. There, there was no contract in writing as provided for under Article 299 (1) of the Constitution. We fail to see what relevance that decision has to the present controversy. ( 10. ) THE two decisions in K. P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), are clearly distinguishable on facts. There, there was no contract in writing as provided for under Article 299 (1) of the Constitution. Their Lordships accordingly held that there being no completed contract, the deficiency on resale could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue under Rule 29 (2) (c ). Nor could the liability be enforced upon the basis of an implied contract. Their Lordships, however, remitted the case to the High Court for an enquiry whether the claim of the State for recovery of the deficiency on resale could be supported under any other provision of law. On remand, the High Court held that there was no Rule existing on the date of resale, under which the amount became payable to the Government and, therefore, section 82 of the Forest act had no application. That is not the case here where admittedly there was a completed contract, Ex. D-4, executed between the parties as envisaged by article 299 (1) of the Constitution. The provisions of section 82 of the Forest act as also those of Rule 29 of the Forest Contract Rules, were, therefore, applicable with full force. ( 11. ) RELIANCE is also placed on section 54 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, for the contention that on the plaintiff making default, the Government was entitled to rescind the contract and thereby the original contract of sale stood rescinded, but without prejudice to any claim which the Government may have for damages. In support of that contention, reliance is also placed on Firm karam Narain v. Volkart Bros, AIR 1946 Lahore 116 (F. B.) and J. A. Dalmet v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 Mys. 109. We are unable to accept the contention. The provisions of section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act are subject to a contract to the contrary. Here, the contract deed executed between the parties provides, inter alia, by clause 6, that the contract shall be subject to the Forest Contract Rules, which shall be deemed to be part of the contract, in so far as they are applicable thereto. Here, the contract deed executed between the parties provides, inter alia, by clause 6, that the contract shall be subject to the Forest Contract Rules, which shall be deemed to be part of the contract, in so far as they are applicable thereto. That being so, the mutual rights and obligations of the parties have to be worked out with reference to the Forest Contract Rules. Under Rule 29, the Government was entitled upon termination of the contract to recover the arrears of instalments as arrear of land revenue. Apart from the Rule, that was also its statutory right under section 82 of the Forest Act. ( 12. ) BESIDES, the authorities relied upon do not support the appellant. In firm Karam Narain v. Volkart Bros, (supra), Harries C. J. , speaking on behalf of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, stated that the rescission contemplated in section 54 (4) is something less than a complete annulment or destruction of the contract. Their Lordships were concerned with a claim for damages and in regard to that claim they held that the contract must be regarded as existing at least for that purpose. Indeed, sub-section (4) of section 54 reserves to the unpaid seller the right to claim damages inspite of rescission of the contract. We are, however, here not concerned with any claim for damages. The contract has been, no doubt, rescinded by the Government on account of a breach by the plaintiff, but such rescission does not result in total annulment of the contract so as to deprive it of the right to recover the price due thereunder. In J. A. Dalmet v. State of Mysore (supra), the cancellation of the auction was due to the failure of the contractor to deposit 25% of the price. Therefore, his tender was cancelled and the coupe was resold. As a result of resale, the Government suffered a loss. The question was, whether the claim fell within the ambit of section 82 of the Forest Act. The Mysore High Court held that a case of that nature fell under section 54 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act and after the cancellation of the sale, the relationship between the parties was not that of a seller and buyer and consequently, no price was due from the contractor. That case is equally inapplicable to the facts of the present case. That case is equally inapplicable to the facts of the present case. ( 13. ) IT is then urged that the plaintiff was entitled to avoid the contract, having been misled into bidding at the auction by the false representation made by the Divisional Forest Officer at the time of the auction as to the quantity of material offered for sale. We are in complete agreement with the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that there was no such fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the Divisional Forest Officer, and indeed, the quantity of forest produce offered for sale had not been guaranteed to any extent. We may advert to clause 1 of the contract deed which recites that the sale was in respect of the forest produce described in the First Schedule. Clause 2 provides that the quantity of the said forest produce sold under the contract "shall be the quantity which may exist" at the time of executing the deed, or "may come into existence thereafter". The First Schedule gives a description of the forest produce sold. There is a foot-note added to the following effect-"but quantity and quality of material and details of area are not guaranteed. " ( 14. ) THE plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he was misled into bidding by any false description of the thing sold. Under condition No. 3 of the auction Conditions, it was specifically stated that the details of the quantities of forest produce announced at the time of auction was correct to the best of knowledge of the Divisional Forest Officer but were not guaranteed to any extent. By that clause, the plaintiff was, therefore, advised to inspect on the spot, the contract area and the produce he intended to bid for, with a view to satisfy himself about its correctness. That he did so is amply clear from the evidence on record. He, indeed, not only signed the auction conditions in token of acceptance of the terms on which the bid was held, but after acceptance of the bid in his favour, inspected the contract area and executed the necessary coupe boundary certificate. ( 15. ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with costs. Appeal dismissed.