Kondaiah, J.-When this criminal appeal came up for hearing, a preliminary objection pertaining to the maintainability of the appeal was raised by Sri G. Krishna Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, on the ground that it was barred by limitation and there was no sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay of 12 days in presenting the appeal. 2. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the appeal was presented in time and in any event, the delay, if any, was bona fide and not due to wilful default or neglect and urged for condonation of the same. 3. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer briefly to the material facts: The Judgment in Sessions Case No. 41 of 1968 acquitting all the accused of the charges levelled against them, which is the subject-matter of this appeal, was pronounced by the learned Sessions Judge, Warangal. on 10th April, 1969. A true copy of the judgment was supplied under rule 45 of the Criminal Rules of Practice to the Police Department by the District and Sessions Court on 22nd April, 1969. It was sent to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.C.I.D., Hyderabad on 8th May, 1969. The opinion of the Public Prosecutor, Warrangal was given on 12th June, 1969. Though the papers have been received by the Public Prosecutor, High Court, on 18th July, 1969, the appeal was in fact filed on 21st July, 1969. On an objection raised by the officer, an application, Crl.M.P.No. 1509 of 1969 to condone the delay of 12 days in presenting the appeal was filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act and it was ordered by Sharfuddin Ahmed, J., and my learned brother, A.D.V. Reddy, J., sitting in Bench on 6th November, 1969. When the appeal came up for hearing before another Division Bench of this Court on 21st December, 1970, time was granted to the Public Prosecutor to file an affidavit explaining the delay in filing the appeal, as an objection was taken by the respondents that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay and it was contended that they were entitled to question the same at the hearing of the main appeal as the delay was condoned on 6th November, 1969 without notice to them. Pursuant to that direction, an affidavit was filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police on 31st December, 1970 to the effect that there was no delay in presenting the appeal if the time taken by the Sessions Court in granting a copy of the judgment under rule 145 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, is excluded and in any event, the delay, if any, may be condoned as it was not wilful or wanton but due to unavoidable circumstances stated therein. Though a copy of the affidavit was served on the respondents as early as in January, 1971, no counter has so far been filed. 4. It is well-settled that where the delay in presenting an appeal was condoned ex parte without notice to the respondent, the respondent is competent to raise a preliminary objection at or before the hearing of the appeal and satisfy the Court that it (appeal) was barred by limitation and there was no sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. See Krishnaswami v. Ramaswami1, Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arthur Lee2, Dinabandhu v. Jadumoni3, Sattur Radhamma v. Kistamma4and The State of Mysore v. Laxman Sharanappa5. As the application to condone the delay of 12 days was ordered by a Division Bench of this Court ex parte and without notice to the respondents on 6th November, 1969, the preliminary objection now raised by the respondents must be entertained and examined on its merits. Hence, we shall now proceed to examine on merits whether the preliminary objection can be sustained or not. 5. Upon the contention raised by the parties, the following questions arise for decision: (1) Whether the State is entitled while presenting an appeal to the High Court against an order or judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court, to exclude the time taken by the Sessions Court in supplying a free copy under rule 145 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, in computing the period of 90 days limitation provided therefore? (2) If the question No. 1 is answered in the negative, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, there was sufficient cause to condone the delay? 6. We shall first take up the principal question. The answer to the question turns upon the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act. (2) If the question No. 1 is answered in the negative, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, there was sufficient cause to condone the delay? 6. We shall first take up the principal question. The answer to the question turns upon the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act. We may usefully refer to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. Under section 3 of the Act, any suit, appeal or application presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed in the Act or the Schedules appended thereto must be dismissed in limine. The period of limitation has to be computed, subject to the provisions contained in section 4 to 24. “Period of limitation” as defined under clause (j) of section 2 means “the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule.” The “prescribed period” is the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Article u4 of the schedule prescribes a period of 90 days limitation from the date of the order appealed from, for preferring an appeal by the State against an order of acquittal, under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It has to be computed subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. Sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Act, which is material for our purpose, in so far as it relates to appeals, reads as follows: “In computing the period of limitation for an appeal.............., the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from............shall be excluded.” The State, which is entitled to prefer an appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Court, Warangal within go days from the date of such judgment, can have the period taken by the Court of Session to grant a copy of the judgment, excluded in computing the period of limitation for preferring the appeal. 7. The pertinent question that falls for consideration is, what is meant by the expression the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from in sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act. Normally, the party seeking for a copy of the decree, sentence or order has to apply to the Court which passed it. Normally, the party seeking for a copy of the decree, sentence or order has to apply to the Court which passed it. If any payment is required to be made as per the rules, the party has to comply with the same and make a regular and proper application therefor. The word “requisite” used in sub-section (2) to section 12 is a strong term. It cannot be equated to “required” but it means something more than “required”. The party will be entitled to have a copy of the judgment on application and the same, on demand, has to be supplied by the Court as early as possible. The time that has to be taken for supplying the copy to the applicant has not been specified in sub-section (2) to section 12. It should not be construed that the Court has to take only the minimum time required for the supply of the copy to the party seeking for the same on a proper application. See Tirumala Reddi v. Anavema Reddi1. It is for the Court but not for the applicant to determine as to how early the copy applied for can be given. If the Court takes more time than necessary, the party seeking for the copy need not be blamed. He should not be penalised. Hence, he is entitled to have the entire period taken by the Court in supplying the requisite copy of the decree, order or judgment, as the case may be, excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, revision or review. The day on which the judgment was pronounced has to be excluded. 8. We may refer in this context to a few leading cases where the scope of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 which was analogous to and similarly warded as the present one in the new Act. 9. In Pramatha Math Roy v. Willian Arthur Lee2, Lord Buckmaster, who spoke for the Judicial Committee, while considering the scope and meaning of “time requisite” used in sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, observed thus: “In their Lordships’ opinion no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain the order...... It certainly does not support the proposition that in determining what period is to be deducted in any case the time actually consumed in obtaining the decree is to be regarded.” The next case that requires a mention is that of the Privy Council on Jijibhoy N. Surity v. T.S. Chettiyar1, wherein it was stated as follows: “The word “requisite” is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word “required”. It means “properly required”, and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default.” We may now refer to the leading decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Tirumala Reddi v. Anavema Reddi2, wherein it was held that the words “time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree” mean the time beyond the party’s control occupied in obtaining the copy filed along with the memorandum of appeal and not an ideal lesser period which could have been taken if the application for the copy was filed at a different date. 10. The Supreme Court, in State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain3, has approved the dictum of the Madras High Court in Tirumala Reddi v. Anavema Reddi2. The learned Judge, Hedge, J., who spoke for the Court, ruled thus: “What is deductible under section 12 (2) is not the minimum time within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. It must be remembered that sub-section (2) of section 12 enlarges the period of limitation prescribed under Entry 157 of Schedule I. That section permits the appellant to deduct from the time taken for filing the appeal, the time required for obtaining the copy of the order appealed from and not any lessor period which might have been occupied if the application for copy had been filed at some other date. That section lays no obligation on the appellant to be prompt in his application for a copy of the order. A plain reading of section 12(2) shows that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment or order complained of was pronounced end the time taken by:he Court to make available the copy applied for, have to be excluded. A plain reading of section 12(2) shows that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment or order complained of was pronounced end the time taken by:he Court to make available the copy applied for, have to be excluded. There is no justification for restricting the scope of that provision.” The aforesaid decisions are authorities for the proposition that a party who, with due diligence and care and without negligence or laches on his part, has applied for a copy in time in proper form on payment of the requisite charges or stamps, as the case may be is entitled to have the entire time taken by the Court in supplying the copy excluded under section 12(2) of the Act in computing the period of limitation. 11. The moot point, as it has now arisen before us, is whether a party, who is entitled for supply of a free copy of the judgment or order from the Court or authority that has passed the same and which is complained of, can have the benefit of the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and exclude the time taken by the Court or authority in supplying the free copy to it, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeal. 12. The appellant in this criminal appeal is the State. As pointed out earlier Article 114 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act provides for a right of appeal against the order of acquittal within 90 days from its date. Admittedly, no application for the supply of a copy of the order complained of has been filed by the Superintendent of Police, Warangal or the Public Prosecutor representing the State. However, the appellant relies upon the provisions of clause (ii) of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of rule 145 of the Andhra Pradesh Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1966 (hereinafter called the Rules), as it stood on 21st July, 1969 when the appeal was presented, which are as follows: “145. However, the appellant relies upon the provisions of clause (ii) of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of rule 145 of the Andhra Pradesh Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1966 (hereinafter called the Rules), as it stood on 21st July, 1969 when the appeal was presented, which are as follows: “145. Distribution of copies of judgments: (1) Courts of Session shall within 8 days from the date of pronouncing judgment, distribute copies of all their judgments as follows, a sufficient number of copies being printed for the purpose of each case: (i) * * * (ii) Three copies in respect of capital charges and two copies in other cases to the Superintendent of Police/Commissioner of Police/Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. (iii) to (xi) * * * The copies referred to in sub-heads (1) to (ix) inclusive shall be supplied free of charge. Where printed copies can be spared, a copy may be supplied to a person not entitled by any law or order to receive a copy free of cost on payment of the prescribed charges. All such payments shall be in cash. (2) Courts of Session shall send with the least practicable delay advance typewritten copies of their judgments in all cases under section 302, Indian Penal Code, in which sentence of death has not been passed, to Collector and Superintendent of Police, or the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad or the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, as the case may be, without waiting for the printed copies to be made ready.” The Rules have been promulgated by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 554 of the Criminal Procedure Code and with the previous approval of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh. They are statutory rules having the force of law as held by the majority of the Full Bench of Andhra High Court in Ranganayakulu, In re.1. Hence, sub-rules 1(ii) and 2 of rule 145, which provide for supply of free copies of the judgment to the Superintendent of Police, are statutory rules having the force of law. By virtue of the provisions of rule 145, the Superintendent of Police is entitled to be supplied three printed copies of the judgment by the Sessions Court, Warangal. Hence, sub-rules 1(ii) and 2 of rule 145, which provide for supply of free copies of the judgment to the Superintendent of Police, are statutory rules having the force of law. By virtue of the provisions of rule 145, the Superintendent of Police is entitled to be supplied three printed copies of the judgment by the Sessions Court, Warangal. He is not expected to do anything for obtaining a copy of the judgment now appealed from. The rule itself makes it obligatory on the part of the Sessions Court to supply three copies of the judgment to the Superintendent of Police. The decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court referred to earlier, would apply only to cases where the parties are bound in law to apply for and obtain copies of the judgments. If there are laches or negligence on their part or on the part of their Counsel in applying for the same, they would not be entitled to have the period taken by the Sessions Court in supplying the copies excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Those cases, in our considered opinion, can have no application to the present case, where there is a specific rule under which without any application being filed by the Superintendent of Police, he is entitled for the supply of copies. It cannot be said that the Superintendent of Police could have got copies of the judgment from the Sessions Court, earlier than the time now taken pursuant to the statutory rule. In the circumstances, it can, under no stretch of reasoning, be said that the Superintendent of Police has committed any mistake or was not diligent in obtaining a copy of the Judgment. Nor any negligence or laches on his part can be alleged and much less established. In the usual course, he is expected to be supplied with the copies and therefore, he need not apply for the same. The High Court has made this rule for the facility of the concerned authorities and it cannot be said that it is unreasonable or arbitrary. In the usual course, he is expected to be supplied with the copies and therefore, he need not apply for the same. The High Court has made this rule for the facility of the concerned authorities and it cannot be said that it is unreasonable or arbitrary. Therefore, we have no hesitation, to hold that a party entitled either under a statute or a rule having the force of law for a free copy of the judgment, can have the time taken by the Court in supplying such free copy to that party, excluded by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation provided for an appeal, revision or review as the case may be. 13. There appears to be no direct decided case of any High Court on the question relating to the scope of rule 145(1) of the Rules with which we are concerned in the case on hand. However, this view of ours derives support from two decisions of the Calcutta High Court and two of the Patna High Court. Although, those cases arose under different statutes, the principle enunciated therein, is undoubtedly applicable to the pre;ent case. The earliest case is Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co.1 wherein, the judgment on a reference, under section 66 of the Indian income-tax Act, 1922, was pronounced by the High Court on 13th January, 1931. A free copy of the judgment required to be sent to the Commissioner of Income-tax under the seal of the Court as per the provisions of the Income-tax Act, was sent in due course and was received by him on 26th January, 1931. The application for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council under section 66-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was filed into the Court on 31st March, 1931. If the time taken by the Court in supplying a free copy to the Commissioner of Income-tax was excluded under sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act, the application was in time, otherwise not. When the application came up for hearing, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-assessee that the application itself had been brought out of time. When the application came up for hearing, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-assessee that the application itself had been brought out of time. On those facts, it was held that the application was presented in time as the Commissioner was entitled to exclude the time taken by the Court in furnishing a free copy under the seal of the Court as required under that Act. The learned Judge, Rankin, C.J., who spoke for the Court observed thus: “I also think that under section 12 a party in a case such as this is entitled to the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment. Nothing the Commissioner could have done would have given him a copy of the judgment sooner than he got it namely on 26th January, 1931. I am not of opinion therefore that the application is out of time.” The aforesaid view was followed by another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of P.N. Mookerjee and P.K. Sarkar, JJ, in General Electric Co. of India Ltd. v. Calcutta Corporation2. Therein the time taken by the Court in sending a copy of the Order by registered post to the applicant pursuant to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 182 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1851 was held to be excludable under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Repelling the contention of the respondents therein that the appellant did not make any application or effort to obtain a certified copy of the order complained of and therefore the company was not competent to seek the aid of section 12(2) of the Act, the learned Judges observed thus: “It is true that the company did not in the present case apply for any copy of the order but that was because there was a statutory duty imposed on the Corporation, to send a copy of the order within seven days of the date thereof and the Company was therefore entitled to wait until it received such a copy. We are not prepared to hold that the words “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” are inapplicable in those cases where the appellant is not required to obtain a copy at his own expense by applying for it but is entitled by statute to get a copy from the authority or authorities concerned within a certain time and in our opinion in a case of this type the time taken by the authorities concerned 10 supply the copy would legitimately be “time required for obtaining the copy” so far as the appellant is concerned and he will be entitled to its exclusion under section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act in the matter of computation of the period of limitation. That seems to be plain enough and no other view appears to us to be correct.” We do not think that the above view of the law need support from any decided case but, if reference be necessary we may just mention the decision of this Court in the matter of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co.1where a question arose as to whether an application by a Commissioner of Income-tax for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was within time." The aforesaid view of the Calcutta High Court has been followed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court consisting of V. Ramaswami. C.J. and R.K. Choudary, J., in M.N. Sharma v. State of Bihar2, wherein it was held that the time taken by the State Transport Authority in passing the order and communicating the same to the applicant was excludible under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act in computing the 30 days period of limitation prescribed for presenting a revision under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by Bihar Amendment Act (XXVII of 1950). The same view was reiterated by another Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Firm Pursottam Das v. Gulab Khan.3Therein the permit of the appellant-transport operator was suspended for a period of one year on account of certain irregularities found by the Regional Transport Authority. The order suspending the permit though dated 13th September, 1961. was communicated by a letter dated 3rd November, 1961 which actually reached the appellant only on 29th November, 1961. The order suspending the permit though dated 13th September, 1961. was communicated by a letter dated 3rd November, 1961 which actually reached the appellant only on 29th November, 1961. An appeal to the Appellate Board of the State Transport Authority was presented on 28th November, 1961 but it was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Sub-section (2) to section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires the transport authority that cancels or suspends a permit to give in writing its reason for the action taken by it, to the permit holder. As the appellant was served with a copy of the order suspending his permit only on 20th November, 1961 and on the application of the principle enunciated by that Court in M.N. Sharma v. State of Bihar2, the appeal was held to be will within time and not barred by limitation. The time taken by the Regional Transport Authority in furnishing the copy of the suspension order to the appellant was held to be excludable in computing the period of limitation by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 12 of the Limitation Act although the appellant did not file any application for a copy. 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions and for the reasons stated, we have no hesitation to reject the contention of Sri C. Krishna Reddy that it is only the time taker by the Sessions Court in granting a certified copy on the application filed by the State or the accused but not the time taken for supplying a free copy to the Superintendent of Police as per rule 145 of the Ruler that can be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation provided for preferring appeals to the High Court. We are not impressed with the submission of Mr. Krishna Reddy that rule 145 of the Rules is neither relevant nor has any application to the present controversy and the supply of a copy thereunder was not intended for the State preferring an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal. We are not impressed with the submission of Mr. Krishna Reddy that rule 145 of the Rules is neither relevant nor has any application to the present controversy and the supply of a copy thereunder was not intended for the State preferring an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal. We hold that the Superintendent of Police, Warangal, is entitled to exclude the time taken by the Sessions Court in supplying a copy of the judgment to him as per the provisions of rule 145 (1)(iii) in computing the period of Limitation under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. 15. It was next argued by Mr. Krishna Reddy that the appellant is not entitled to have more than 8 days time as prescribed in rule 145(1). True, the rule, as it stood in the year 1969 prescribed a period of 8 days for supply of the copies to the concerned authorities specified therein. Though the word "shall" is used in that rule it cannot be said that the requirements to supply the free copy within 8 days specified therein is mandatory. We are of the view that it is only recommendatory or directory; bat however, it is mandatory in so far as the supply of the free copy or copies of the judgment specified therein is concerned. In other words, the copy or copies of the judgments specified in that rule must be supplied by the Court of Session as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 8 days. Any other interpretation would be unreasonable and unworkable and would lead to anomalies and injustice. It is not practicable in every case for the Sessions Court to positively supply printed copies of the judgment within 8 days or any other period specified in that rule. The very intendment and object of the rules appears to be only to see that they are supplied to the concerned authorities specified therein as early as possible. This view gains support from a reading of the sub-rule (2) to rule 145 which says that the Courts of Session have to supply with the least practicable delay advance typewritten copies of their judgments in all cases under section 302, Indian Penal Code, where no death sentence was passed to the Collector and Superintendent of police or Commissioner of Police as the case may be without waiting for the printed copies to be made ready. Therefore it cannot be said that the time of 8 days specified in this rule should be given strict compliance in this regard. However we may add that this rule has in fact been amended in the year 1970 with effect from 7th May, 1970 extending the period of 8 days to 15 days as it was found to be very difficult and impracticable. That a part the present copy which is now filed into the Court is typewritten copy sent to the Superintendent of Police. This copy might have been sent under sub-rule (2) to rule 145 where no specific time has been mentioned. The copy contemplated under rule 145 must be construed to be an official or authenticated copy of the judgment of the Sessions Court under its seal. Mere plain, unofficial or unauthorised copy of the judgment was not the one that is contemplated to be supplied to the concerned authorities under the statutory rule 145 of the Rules. Hence the true copy of the judgment supplied by the Court of Sessions under its seal to the Superintendent of Police under rule 145 of the Rules is an authenticated and certified copy which could be filed along with the memorandum of the appeal in the High Court as per the procedure prescribed therefor. Judged from any angle we are satisfied that there is nothing which the Superintendent of Police, Warangal in the instant case had to do or failed to do in obtaining the copies of the judgment. Hence we do not find any substance in this submission of M. Krishna Reddy. 16. It was argued by M. Krishna Reddy that the copy filed must be a certified copy and the one now filed by the appellant is not a certified one. In State of U.P. v. C. Tobit1it was held by the Supreme Court that the word “copy” used in section 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means ‘certified copy’. Therein it was ruled that the question whether a copy in a particular section means a plain copy or a certified copy must depend upon the subject or context in which the word “copy” is used in such section. We may also notice what the certified copy means. Therein it was ruled that the question whether a copy in a particular section means a plain copy or a certified copy must depend upon the subject or context in which the word “copy” is used in such section. We may also notice what the certified copy means. S.R. Das, C.J. who spoke for the Court observed thus: “A copy may be a plain copy i.e., an unofficial copy or a certified copy i.e. as official copy. If a certified copy of the judgment is annexed to the petition of appeal nobody can say that the requirements of section 419 have not been complied with for a certified copy is nonetheless a ‘copy’.” The copy now filed by the State is admittedly a certified copy in the sense that it is an official and authenticated copy giver by the Sessions Court with its seal and an endorsement by the Superintendent of the District and Sessions Court, Warangal as true copy and signed on 22nd April 1969. We may also add that each page of the judgment has been stamped with the seal of the Sessions Court, Warangal. Therefore, the copy now filed into the Court by the appellant is a certified true copy which is official copy given by the Sessions Court to the Superintendent of police as per rule 145. Therefore, this objection of the respondent must fail. 17. For all the reasons stated, our answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative and in favour of the State. 18. In view of our answer to question No. 1 in the affirmative, the second question does not arise. In any event, even assuming that there is delay, we are satisfied on the particulars furnished in the affidavits that this is a fit case where the delay should be condoned as the delay was caused due to the circumstances stated in the affidavit. The delay is not wilful nor due to the negligence of the concerned authorities. Some time had been taken by the Public Prosecutor, Warangal, in offering his opinion and the Superintendent of Police also had to send the copy of the judgment to the Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., for his report as the case was also investigated by the C.I.D. branch. Therefore, we are satisfied that there is no negligence or wilful default even if there is any delay. The delay is, therefore, condoned. 19. Therefore, we are satisfied that there is no negligence or wilful default even if there is any delay. The delay is, therefore, condoned. 19. For all the reasons stated, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents is overruled and the appeal is directed to be posted on 12th July, 1971, for final hearing on merits. A.B.K. ----- Preliminary objection as to bar of time overruled.