ORDER R.B. Misra, J. - These three connected petitions Under Article 226 of the Constitution arise out of consolidation proceedings. 2. The dispute between the parties relates to plots Nos. 521 and 332, which were recorded in the basic year as Ban jar and Kallar in the name of the Gaon Sabha. Five sets of persons had obtained leases from the Land Management Committee in respect of five Bigha area each. They applied for mutation of their names by expunging the name of the Gaon Sabha inr respect of the area leased out to them. Their applications were resisted by the contesting Respondent, Nos. 3 to 14 or the ground that the lease executed in favour of the objectors were in utter violation of the relevant rules and therefore these leases did not create any right in favour of the lessees. 3. The Consolidation Officer as well as the Settlement it Officer (Consolidation) allowed the five applications filed by the lessees al and directed the expunction of the name of the Gaon Sabha from" the record in respect of the plots in dispute. The contesting Respondents went up in revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 25th September, 1969. He set aside the orders of the subordinate authorities and held that the leases created the Land Management Committee in favour of the objectors were In utter Violation of the mandatory rules. 4. It appears that two setoff he lessees have submitted to the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, while the remaining three objectors have come to this Court to challenge the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 25th September 1969. Writ No. 31 of 1969 has been filed by Major Rameshwar Sahai; Writ No. 4690 of 1969 has, been filed by Lt. Col. Joginder Singh and Writ No. 4691 of 1969 has been filed by Lt. Col M.M.L. Whig against Respondents Nos. 1 to 14 who are common in all the three writ petitions. 5. Sri Banarsi Das, appearing for the Petitioners in all the three petitions, strenuously contended that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are based on no evidence and are arbitrary. 6. The Deputy Director has referred to certain facts in his order. 1 to 14 who are common in all the three writ petitions. 5. Sri Banarsi Das, appearing for the Petitioners in all the three petitions, strenuously contended that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are based on no evidence and are arbitrary. 6. The Deputy Director has referred to certain facts in his order. He has observed that the Consolidation Office and the Assistant Settlement Officer did not take into consideration the various factors pointed out to them. He observed that there was definite evidence on record to show that there was no dearth of landless labourers in the village as also of such persons as had small holdings who qualified for allotment of surplus land at the hands of the Land Management Committee. He has held, that no publicity was made and that the entire land still remained Banjar only in respect of a small area some attempt was made to bring it under, plough. These findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are bused on the evidence on the record. But the contention is that the findings are not based on any evidence. I have gone through the entire petition but I find no such allegation in it. It is true that the grounds taken do mention that there no document or oral evidence to justify the findings but there is ho foundation for such a ground. Unless it was allege in the petition that the findings record by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Were based on no evidence, it will not be possible for this Court to accept it. 7. In paragraph 26 (b), 32 (b) (xi) of the rejoinder affidavits, it has no doubt been averred that "even the finding of facts, given by the Opposite Party No. 1 are perverse and contrary to, the evidence on record." Even if this allegation is accepted to be correct, it cannot amount to saying that there is no evidence on the record. All it can amount to is that the finding recorded by the Deputy Director is not justified by evidence. This Court cannot make a fresh appraisal of evidence and come to a conclusion different from the one recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. All it can amount to is that the finding recorded by the Deputy Director is not justified by evidence. This Court cannot make a fresh appraisal of evidence and come to a conclusion different from the one recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In the absence of any allegation to that effect in the petition itself and in the absence of any specific allegation even in the rejoinder affidavit, it is not possible for this Court to accept the contention of the Petitioner that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are based on no evidence. 8. It was next contended on behalf of the Petitioners that unless the leases executed by the Land Management Committee in favour of the Petitioners were cancelled, the Deputy Director committed a manifest error in refusing to mutate the names of the Petitioners and because the cancellation of the leases could be done only u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act, for which the Sub-Divisional Officer had the exclusive jurisdiction, it was not open to the consolidation authorities to cancel the leases. 9. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Rasala v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1970 AWR 112 , which was a case for mutation on the basis of a lease granted by the Land Management Committee. It was held that till the allotment was cancelled, the right, title and interest remains with the allottee and had to be recognised. It was further held that the jurisdiction to cancel the allotment had been conferred on the Assistant Collector. The same jurisdiction could not be exercised by the Consolidation Officer. 10. But that case, in my opinion, is distinguishable on facts. In the present case it is true that the Petitioners had applied for mutation of their names but the contesting Respondents bad filed an objection u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground that the leases created in favour of the Petitioners were in contravention of the requirements of Section 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act. In so far as is material for our purpose, Section 198 provides: In admitting any person, as Sirdar or Asami Under Sections 195 or 197, the Land Management Committee shall, subject to the rules framed or order made by Court u/s 178, observe the following order of preference: (1-a) the recognised educational institution for a purpose, connected with instructions in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry ; (a) a landless agricultural labourer or an asami residing in the cirole, who does not hold any land whether as Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Adhivasi; (b) a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Adhivasi who is holding land less than 6 1/4 acres in area in the circle; Once an objection was filed by the contesting Respondents that the basic year entry should be allowed to continue and the claims of the Petitioners should be dismissed as they were not valid allottees, the leases created in their favour being in contravention of the provisions of Section 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act, it became obligatory for the consolidation authorities to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties irrespective of the fact that the Petitioners had applied only for mutation. Further, in view of the Supreme Court decision in Ramadhar Singh v. Ram Roop Singh 1968 AWR 14 and the Division Bench case of this Court reported in Jagannath Shukla v. Sita Ram Pandey 1969 AWR 435 , it is not possible to hold now that the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to cancel the lease for which the S.D.O. alone had exclusive jurisdiction u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act. When suits u/s 209 or u/s 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act could be decided only by the Revenue Court, yet the title in respect of such property could, after the commencement of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, be decided only by the consolidation authorities, there seems to be no difficulty why an application for cancellation of a lease u/s 198, UP ZA and LR Act could not be decided by the consolidation authorities. 11. It was next contended that the contesting Respondents were not 'interested persons' within the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P.C.H. Act and so the objection filed by them could not be taken to be an objection u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 11. It was next contended that the contesting Respondents were not 'interested persons' within the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P.C.H. Act and so the objection filed by them could not be taken to be an objection u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In my opinion the phrase 'interested person' is wide enough to include the contesting Respondents as the property in dispute being the property of the Gaon Sabha, every adult member in the village was entitled to raise objection in respect of the Gaon Sabha' property, especially When the contesting Respondents came with the allegation that the Gaon Sabha had colluded with the Petitioners in the allotment of land or the creation of the leases in their favour. 12. It was further contended that the Petitioners had acquired subsequently Bhumidhari right by depositing ten times rental and therefore, the cancellation of their lease would be prejudicial to their interest and the right that had accrued to them consequent upon the deposit of the ten times rental could not be taken away from them. 13. I am afraid this argument too cannot be accepted. The mere deposit of the ten-times rental will not and could not clothe the Petitioners with a right if no right and interest was created under the leases themselves. 14. For, the masons given above I find no force in either of the contentions raised on behalf of toe Petitioners in these three petitions. The three writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.