Order.- In all these five cases the question that arises for consideration is whether the Sub-Inspector of Police, Honavar, is competent to prosecute the petitioners for not having obtained the licence for running tea shops and a biscuit shop which is punishable under section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to, as the Act). 2. Narasimha Govind Kamath (Petitioner in Cr.R.P. No. 205 of 1971), Ganapathi Vithoba Shet (Petitioner in Cr.R.P. No. 206/1971), Ramakant Anant Shanbhag (Petitioner in Cr.R.P. No. 207 of 1971), Nilabai Vasudev Shet (Petitioner in Cr.R.P.No. 208 of 1971) and Subraya Nagappa Shet (Petitioner in Cr.R.P. No. 209 of 1971) were prosecuted on the allegation that except Ramakant (Petitioner in Cr.R.P. No. 207 of 1971) the others were running tea shops keeping food articles for sale in their respective shops without obtaining a licence for the year 1969-70 as required by section 7(iii) of the Act read with section 50(1) of the Act and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 16 (1) of the Act. Ramakant Anant Shanbhag (Petitioner in Cr. R.P. No. 207 of 1971) was prosecuted for a similar offence for running a shop in which he was selling biscuits and other foodstuffs, in the Court of the Additional Judical Magistrate, First Class at Honavar. 3. It was objected on behalf of the petitioners that a prosecution under section 20 of the Act could only be instituted by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Central Government or State Government or a local authority and could not be instituted by any other person. The learned Magistrate decided in favour of the petitioners and dismissed the complaints without hearing the evidence. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Karwar, in all these cases came to the conclusion that the Sub-Inspector of Police was competent to prosecute the petitioners and in that view he directed the learned Magistrate to dispose of the cases as if they had been filed by the competent authority and according to law. These revision petitions are filed by the petitioners against the decisions of the learned Sessions Judge at Karwar. 4. The offence is created by section 4 of the Act and section 20 points out how it is to be prosecuted. 5. These revision petitions are filed by the petitioners against the decisions of the learned Sessions Judge at Karwar. 4. The offence is created by section 4 of the Act and section 20 points out how it is to be prosecuted. 5. Section 20 of the Act provides: “20 (1). No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority: Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12 if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.” (Sub-section (2) is not necessary). 6. The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 20 as it now stands, provides that no prosecution for an offence under this Act could be instituted by any person other than the persons or authorities specified therein. The prosecution can be instituted...(1) by the Central Government or (2) by the State Government or (3) by a local authority, or (4) by a person with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or local authority, or (5) by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 20 however provides that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may also be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12 if he produced in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. Therefore, it is clear that a prosecution under this Act must be by one or the other person specified in section 20 of the Act. The authorities specified in section 20 or persons authorised by them are competent to prosecute under this Act. A person who has been authorised to prosecute under this Act must therefore necessarily be clothed with the valid sanction by one or the other authorities specified therein. Consequently, it follows that the sanction must be valid. If the sanction in favour of a person is invalid to prosecute a person under this Act. such prosecution becomes a nullity. A person who has been authorised to prosecute under this Act must therefore necessarily be clothed with the valid sanction by one or the other authorities specified therein. Consequently, it follows that the sanction must be valid. If the sanction in favour of a person is invalid to prosecute a person under this Act. such prosecution becomes a nullity. It is not necessary that section 20 of the Act under which prosecution is sanctioned should have been specified. The facts on which the prosecution is based should however be placed before the authority and the authority should apply its mind to them before granting sanction. In substance, it amounts that the competent authority that could prosecute a person as specified in section 20 could itself prosecute a person or authorise a person giving sanction after applying its mind to the facts of the case. If the sanction is valid and if it is in favour of a person, that person alone is competent to prosecute and no one else can prosecute. 7. It is true that section 20 provides that ‘no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority”; but there are no words prohibiting other persons from taking proceedings. This section 20 is one of the group of sections headed “Enforcement of Act.” It shows that section 20 provides specifically for prosecution of persons by persons specified therein. I am clearly of the opinion that in cases arising under the Act, persons specified therein only can enforce the provisions of the Act. Certain offences are created by the Act and the Act provides that as to who shall enforce its provisions. If any one can enforce the provisions of the Act, section 20 becomes useless. I do not think that negative words are required to exclude proceedings by persons other than the persons specified in the section. Certain offences are created by the Act and the Act provides that as to who shall enforce its provisions. If any one can enforce the provisions of the Act, section 20 becomes useless. I do not think that negative words are required to exclude proceedings by persons other than the persons specified in the section. For instance, if an Act provided that a particular person was to enforce a penalty and no one else could sue for it; it is obvious that if every one could sue for it, all that the view of the statutory clause enabling him to sue, would be unnecessary and useless. It is made abundantly clear by the proviso to section 20 wherein an exception is provided for. The exception is only in respect of a purchaser referred to in section 12 of the Act and under that section he could prosecute a person for any offences under this Act, provided he produces in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. That proviso abundantly makes it clear that the Legislature intended that persons specified or persons authorised by them alone, are competent to enforce the provisions of this Act and no one else. The provisions of section 20 are direct and clear. It seems to me therefore that the words are intelligible and they mean that prosecution could only be instituted by the proper authorities and if any one enforces the provisions of this Act, that would not be competent. It seems to me therefore, that the words of the statute are reasonable and intelligible and whereas if the other meaning is given to them, they would be used in a strange sense and would be superfluous. The only safeguard provided is, as I could understand, that nobody except the authorities mentioned and the persons employed by them alone can launch the prosecution. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in K.M. Kanavi v. State of Mysore1 wherein the facts of the case were that one K. M. Kanavi was the President of the Municipal Borough of Cadag Betgeri from 11th January, 1960 and 15th March, 1963. He was removed from the Presidentship on 15th March, 1963 by an order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity. He was removed from the Presidentship on 15th March, 1963 by an order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity. On the next day, i.e., on 16th March, 1963 the Government passed an order superseding the Borough. K.M. Kanavi filed two writ petitions challengng these two orders of his removal and supersession of the Borough. The order of supersession was quashed by this Court. Thereafter elections were held for the office of the President, because the appellant (K.M. Kanavi) had ceased to be the President under the order of removal. One other person was elected as the President of the Borough on 22nd April, 1963. On 25th April, 1963 the new President asked K.M. Kanavi to hand over all the papers, documents and property belonging to the Municipal Administration. On 2nd May, 1963 K.M. Kanavi sent three keys and two files of papers by registered parcel to the new President. The new President returned it on the ground that those articles had not been delivered to him in person by K.M. Kanavi. When sending the parcel, K.M. Kanavi had written to the new President stating that he was retaining certain papers as they were needed by him for his writ petition. Thereafter, the State Government made an order under sub-section (2) of section 23-A of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 directing K.M. Kanavi to hand over charge of all the papers and properties which were;n bis possession. He was also asked to hand over an iron cup-board with its keys and contents which were with him. K.M. Kanavi did not comply with this order. Therefore, the Government of Mysore sent an order to the Divisional Commissioner directing him to take necessary action under section 23-A of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act to prosecute K.M. Kanavi. The Divisional Commissioner in turn, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner requesting him to take immediate action to prosecute K.M. Kanavi. The Deputy Commissioner then passed as order authorising the newly elected President of the Borough to be the formal complainant in respect of this prosecution and to file a criminal complaint against K.M. Kanavi. Therefore the new President (filed a complaint against K.M. Kanavi for an offence punishable under section 23-A (3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act). On the basis of this complaint, K.M. Kanavi was convicted. Therefore the new President (filed a complaint against K.M. Kanavi for an offence punishable under section 23-A (3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act). On the basis of this complaint, K.M. Kanavi was convicted. One of the grounds urged was that the new President was incompetent to file a complaint as it was not filed in accordance with the procedure laid down and so the proceedings taken by the Magistrate were without jurisdiction. Dealing with this question, this is what the Supreme Court observed: “It is true that there is no specific provision in the Act laying down that cognisance of an offence under the Act is not to be taken except on a complaint filed in accordance with a direction made under section 200 (1) but the scheme of the Act and purpose of this provision in section 200 (1) makes it clear that the Legislature intended that such proceedings should only be instituted in the manner laid down in that sub-section. The word ‘may ‘was used only because the Legislature could not have enacted a mandatory provision requiring the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make a direction for institution of proceedings in all proceedings in all cases. This word was intended to give a discretion to the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make directions for taking proceedings only when they considered it appropriate that such a direction should be made and to avoid compelling the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make such directions in all cases. The use of this word ‘may’ cannot be interpreted as laying down that, if a proceeding for punishment of any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act is to be instituted, it can be instituted in any manner without complying with the requirements of section 200 (1) of the Act.” 8. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the complaint filed not by a Standing Committee but by the President was illegal. Earlier the Supreme Court in Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J.C. Ckakravarty1 had to interpret a similar provision, i.e., section 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. It laid down that the Commissioner may institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under that Act or under any rule or byelaw made thereunder. Earlier the Supreme Court in Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J.C. Ckakravarty1 had to interpret a similar provision, i.e., section 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. It laid down that the Commissioner may institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under that Act or under any rule or byelaw made thereunder. The Court held that though the word used was ‘may’ this provision must be read as requiring that the institution or withdrawal from legal proceedings under that Act must be by the Commissioners and no other authority. 9. It seems to me therefore, that the authorities mentioned in section 20 can only launch proceedings against persons charged with an offence under the Act. The principle laid down in the above cases clearly apples to the interpretation of section 20 of the Act with which I am concerned. On this view, it must be held that the complaint, in the present case, which was instituted by the Sub-Inspector of Police of Honavar, without any order or direction from the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority as the case may be or a person authorised in this behalf by a general or special order by the three agencies mentioned in that section, was not competent as it did not comply with the requirements of section 20 (1) of the Act. 10. It was contended by Shri Laxmeshwar, learned Counsel on behalf of the State that the offence being cognisable by the police, the Sub-Inspector of Police was competent to prosecute the petitioners in question on the complaint of the Food Inspector who had been authorised by the Municipal Authorities, to prosecute them. The person who had been authorised to prosecute the petitioners in this case was the Food Inspector and not the Sub-Inspector of Police. The question is not whether the offence committed under the Act is cognizable or not. The question is whether who could prosecute any person under the Act for violating any of the provisions therein. To prosecute is to set the law in motion and the law is only set in motion by an appeal to some person clothes with judical authority in regard to the matter in question. The Food Inspector was competent in this case to prosecute the petitioners as he had been authorised generally or specifically to prosecute the petitioners under the Act. The Food Inspector was competent in this case to prosecute the petitioners as he had been authorised generally or specifically to prosecute the petitioners under the Act. He has no authority to delegate his power in favour of another person to prosecute the petitioners. The Municipal Council in the instant case, having not authorised the Sub Inspector of Police of Honavar, to prosecute the petitioners, the Sub-Inspector of Police was not competent to prosecute them under the Act and in this view the complaint filed by him was liable to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate has taken the correct view of the law. 11. For the reasons stated above, disagreeing with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge, Kanwar, I set aside the judgment passed by him and confirm the order passed by the learned Magistrate, Honavar. S.V.S. ----- Petitions allowed order of the Magistrate confirmed.