ORDER K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal by the unsuccessful Plaintiff arising out of the following facts: The property in dispute belonged to one Karimullah who sold the same to his son Noor Mohammad by a registered deed dated 27-10-1933. Noor Mohammad is said to have gifted these houses along with another house to his nephews Mohammad Saeed, Mohammad Hanif and Mohammad Amin on 15-1-1947. According to the Plaintiff, actual delivery of possession was not necessary in this case because the donees resided in the same house with the donor. The donees are said to have sold the houses to the Plaintiff on 3-2-1956. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants are alleged to have purchased there houses from Noor Mohammad on 6-11-1954 and as Noor Mohammad had no right, title and interest in these houses after having executed the gift deed, the Defendants did not acquire any right, title and interest in these houses by the sale deed dated 6-11-1954. 2. The suit was contested by the Defendants who alleged that the gift was incomplete in so far as no delivery of possession was given to the donees of the houses and that the donees never resided with the donor at the time of the execution of the gilt. According to the Defendants, the house remained in the possession of Noor Mohammad who was the owner of the same and he had the right to transfer these houses to the Defendants. 3. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit. Being dissatisfied, the Plaintiff filed an appeal. The appeal was also dismissed by the lower appellate court. The Plaintiff has now filed this second appeal. 4. The first point which was contended in this appeal was that the donees were residing in the houses with the donor and therefore, there was no need to deliver possession to the donees after the gift. In support of this argument, reliance was placed on the observation of the lower appellate court that for some time the donees stayed in these houses. This observation by the lower appellate court does not go to mean that the donees i.e. the vendors of the Plaintiff were residing in these houses at the time when the gift deed was executed.
This observation by the lower appellate court does not go to mean that the donees i.e. the vendors of the Plaintiff were residing in these houses at the time when the gift deed was executed. On the other hand, there is evidence of Noor Mohammad who was a witness for the Plaintiff that the donees were not residing in the houses which are said to have been gifted to them by Noor Mohammad. This witness further admitted in the cross examination that he did not know as to in which house the donees were residing with the donor at the time of the execution of the gift. Further on, he admitted that the donees resided in Bombay for more than 40 years doing the business of vegetable sellers. In view of this evidence, the learned lower appellate court rightly held that the donees were not residing in these houses along with the donor at the time of the gift. 5. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that there was a mention in the gift deed that the delivery of possession was handed over to the donor and this itself discharged the burden which lay on the Plaintiff and in view of this admission, the burden was on the Defendant to prove that the donees were not in possession of the houses. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on a Single Judge decision of the Madras High Court-S.V.S. Mohammad Yusuf Rowther v. Muhammad Yusuf Rowther AIR 1958 Mad 527 . In this case, an observation was made that in a case where an admission was made by the donor that delivery of possession was given to the donees, the burden lay on the other side to prove that no possession was given. It was further observed that in a second appeal, when the burden was wrongly placed, the finding can be set aside. In the Madras case, the donor gifted some property to his sons who were residing with him in the same house. Because of the fact that the donees in the Madras case were residing in the same house, there was no need to deliver possession. On the finding that the donees resided in the-same house with the donor and that they were sons of the donor, the above observation was made.
Because of the fact that the donees in the Madras case were residing in the same house, there was no need to deliver possession. On the finding that the donees resided in the-same house with the donor and that they were sons of the donor, the above observation was made. Therefore, the facts of the Madras case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In my opinion, the mere admission in the gift deed that the delivery of possession had been given to the donees is in itself not enough to dispense with the burden of proving the delivery of possession of the gifted property to the donees. 6. The Privy Council in Mohammad Sadiq Ali Khan v. Fakr Jahan Begum 1932 ALI 663 held that an admission in the gift was a circumstance to prove that delivery of possession was given to the donee. In this Privy Council case, the property was transferred to the wife who on occasions resided with the husband. There was also evidence that the deed of gift was handed over by the husband to the wife and in the light of these established facts, it was held that an admission in the deed by the donor has also to be taken into consideration. I don't think that without any other evidence, simply the admission in the gift deed can be accepted in support of the fact of delivery of possession. Generally in almost all the cases, there is a mention that delivery of possession has been given to the donee. If such an admission in itself without any other evidence is taken to be an evidence of delivery of possession, then that will make the provisions of the Mohammedan law altogether ineffective and nugatory. Under the Mohammedan law, the delivery of possession to the donee is absolutely necessary. Even if a donor has not actually given possession and has mentioned that delivery of possession has been given to the donee can undo the above ingredient of a valid gift. 7. The other case cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is a Single Judge decision of this Court-Humera Bibi v. Najmunnisa Bibi 1905 AWN 222.
Even if a donor has not actually given possession and has mentioned that delivery of possession has been given to the donee can undo the above ingredient of a valid gift. 7. The other case cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is a Single Judge decision of this Court-Humera Bibi v. Najmunnisa Bibi 1905 AWN 222. In this case, the donee was residing with the donor in the same house and as such, it was not necessary for the donor to have delivered actual and physical possession over the house to the donor. It was in this connection that it was observed that it was not necessary for the donor to have gone out of the house with bag and baggages and the intention of the donor had to be looked into as to whether delivery of possession had been given to the donor. This case also does not apply to the facts of the present case. 8. The other case cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant was Jamilunnisa v. Mohammad Zia 1937 AWR 430. In this case, the land which was gifted was a joint land of the person to whom it was gifted. It was, therefore, observed that: There was really nothing more which could have been done and it is therefore, unreasonable to expect that the donor would have done any thing more. We think that the admission made by the donor that possession had been delivered is binding on him and even if it does not amount to estoppel it certainly throws a heavy burden on the donor to show that the statement was untrue and was false. 9. As against this, the learned Counsel for the Respondent relied on two decisions of this Court in support of his contention that it was absolutely necessary that the gift was followed by actual delivery of possession. The first case is Mt. Hajra v. Dost Mohammad AIR 1947 All. 180. The other case is Mst. Noor Jahan Begum Vs. Muftkhar Dad Khan and Others, AIR 1970 All 170 . 10. In this case, a Division Bench held that: A recital in the gift deed that possession has been delivered to the donee of the property gifted gives rise to a presumption only of such delivery and the presumption may be rebutted by those challenging the gift.
Muftkhar Dad Khan and Others, AIR 1970 All 170 . 10. In this case, a Division Bench held that: A recital in the gift deed that possession has been delivered to the donee of the property gifted gives rise to a presumption only of such delivery and the presumption may be rebutted by those challenging the gift. The presumption may be rebutted by establishing that the subsequent conduct of the donor is inconsistent with the making of the gift or by demonstrating the patent improbability of what is stated by the recital. The subsequent conduct of the donor has been considered by the courts in India as of great relevance in determining whether possession had been delivered and a valid gift completed. 11. In the instant case, therefore, it has to be seen as to whether actual delivery of possession was given to the donees and whether the presumption raised on the basis of the admission in the gift deed had or had not been rebutted As I have already observed that from the evidence on record it was fully proved that no delivery of possession was given to the donees and that the donees were not residing with the donor in the houses which were the subject matter of the gift. In the absence of any evidence, the presumption in the gift deed about the delivery of possession would be a very weak presumption and it has been rebutted by the evidence on the record. The gift deed was executed in 1947. Due to the Hindu Muslim riots in 1947 Mohammedans had become panicky and were migrating to Pakistan in large number. The donees were residing in Bombay. It was possible that Noor Mohammad, in order to keep his property intact, might have executed this deed as a sham transaction. 12. There is evidence on the record that the Plaintiff had taken these houses on lease from Noor Mohammad. Even after the alleged execution of the gift deed, he had been paying rent to Noor Mohammad. According to the Plaintiff, subsequently, he met his vendors and then he came to know that Noor Mohammad had executed a gift in favour of his nephews and it was then that he got these sale deeds executed from them. There is no evidence that the vendors of the Plaintiff who were donees had been ever in possession of the houses.
There is no evidence that the vendors of the Plaintiff who were donees had been ever in possession of the houses. No such document has been filed. These houses were situated in Meerut city. Had the vendors of the Plaintiff been in possession of the bonuses, they must have paid the Municipal tax, but the absence of any such evidence coupled with the fact that the Plaintiff took these houses on lease from Noor Mohammad and paid rent to him completely rebutted the presumption raised by the above admission in the gift deed. The lower appellate court, therefore, rightly held that this gift deed was not completed as it was not followed by delivery of possession as was necessary under the Mohammedan law. 13. In view of this, the appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs.