JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Order 47, rule 1 (u) of the Code of civil Procedure, by the defendant against the order of remand, dated 18-7-1970, passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil appeal No. 27-A of 1969, arising out of the decree, dated 24-12-1968, passed by the Second Civil Judge, Class II, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 21-A of 1968. ( 2. ) THE respondent firm was assessed to sales-tax at Rs. 3,400/-for the period from 9-11-1961 to 28-10-1962, as per the order of assessment, dated 24-10-1963. The firm had paid the advance tax of Rs. 204. 32 paise and was directed to deposit the balance of Rs. 3,295 6 8 paise. The firm, after serving a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, filed the present suit for a declaration that the order passed by the Sales-tax Officer was null and void and the plaintiff also claimed an injunction restraining the Sales-tax authorities from recovering the balance of the amount. The suit was filed on 20-3-1968. At this stage it is relevant to note the plaint allegations with reference to the alleged illegality committed by the Sales-tax Officer. Para 3 of the plaint is as follows : "the Sales Tax Department has, however, jurisdiction to assess only such taxes and penalties as are provided under the M. P. General Sales Tax Act and the Rules framed thereunder after the specified officer having jurisdiction has served the assessee with a proper notice giving him at least 30 days to comply with the directions in the notice or to show cause against the proposed action against him, as entered in the notice, as contemplated by Rules 32/33 under the M. P. General Sales Tax Act. " Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the notice was not a proper notice as it did not give 30 days period to the assessee. In this connection it is pertinent to note that reference to rule 32 is inappropriate. It is in fact rule 33, which prior to its amendment on 10-12-1964, provided a period of 15 days for the assessee to appear and submit his return. It was with effect from 10-12-1964 that rule 33 was amended providing for a period of 30 days. It is in fact rule 33, which prior to its amendment on 10-12-1964, provided a period of 15 days for the assessee to appear and submit his return. It was with effect from 10-12-1964 that rule 33 was amended providing for a period of 30 days. Therefore, it was not the petitioners grievance that no notice had been issued to the firm at all as required by the unamended rule 33. But the allegation was that the notice was not proper as it did not give 30 days period to the assessee. This aspect will be relevant to decide the question of jurisdiction of the civil Court to interfere with the decision of a Special Tribunal. ( 3. ) THE appellants defence was that a notice had been given giving 15 days time to the assessee and that such a notice had been served on the firm on 10-6-1963 and the date of hearing fixed before the Assessing Authority was 27-6-1963. It appears that there were some intermediate hearings and on some hearings at least, the representative of the firm appeared before the Sales tax Officer and ultimately, the order of assessment was passed on 24-10-1963. ( 4. ) ON these pleadings the trial Judge framed the preliminary issue whether the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned Judge of the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the civil Court had no jurisdiction as section 37 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, was a bar to the ten ability of such a suit. ( 5. ) ON an appeal being filed by the plaintiff-firm, the learned appellate judge remanded the case to the trial Court with a direction that an inquiry should be held by recording evidence whether the requisite notice was given in order to ascertain that the defendant had not acted against the principles of natural justice or in violation of the statutory provisions. It is against this order of remand passed under Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code that the defendant has filed the present appeal. The learned appellate Judge purported to rely on the observations of Naik, J. in Manoharlal v. State (S. A. No. 572 of 1960, decided on the 10th Oct. It is against this order of remand passed under Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code that the defendant has filed the present appeal. The learned appellate Judge purported to rely on the observations of Naik, J. in Manoharlal v. State (S. A. No. 572 of 1960, decided on the 10th Oct. 1963, head-noted by the MPLJ Notes of Cases Note No. 32.) In that case Naik, J. had held that if the question of jurisdiction of the civil court was raised, the civil Court was bound to decide it and it could not abdicate its function to enquire whether the authority when passing the order in question was acting within the four corners of the Act, which gave him jurisdiction. ( 6. ) THE learned appellate Judge also purported to rely on the observations of Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Ramga Singh v. Gurubux Singh (AIR 1961 Punj. 166.) ( 7. ) IT was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of the present kind. He relied on several Supreme Court decisions, which I propose to advert to presently. He invited attention to the written -statement filed by the appellant. As against this, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the written statement could not be looked into and it is only the plaint allegations which have to be looked into for the purposes of deciding the preliminary questions relating to limitation or jurisdiction. For that proposition the learned counsel relied on the pronouncement in Fatechand v. Wasudeo (AIR 1961 Punj. 166.)and Fazlehussein v. Yusufally Adamji (AIR 1955 Bom. 55.) ( 8. ) IT is true that ordinarily when such questions are raised, the Court should always look into the plaint allegations to ascertain whether the suit is within limitation or whether the Court has jurisdiction. But, I may observe that where there are some obvious facts, the Court cannot shut its eyes and blindly act on the plaint allegation, which may or may not be correct. Prima facie, of course, the plaint allegations have to be taken as correct. In some types of cases even evidence on preliminary questions of law may have to be recorded. The Court cannot shut its eyes to such evidence which would undoubtedly be adduced by both the parties. Prima facie, of course, the plaint allegations have to be taken as correct. In some types of cases even evidence on preliminary questions of law may have to be recorded. The Court cannot shut its eyes to such evidence which would undoubtedly be adduced by both the parties. Moreover, issues are framed after the opposite party files its written statement and preliminary issues of law under Order 14, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code are tried after the pleadings of the parties are complete, In the present case the parties also filed some documents on record. Therefore, the facts as might be disclosed from the written statement or from such documents, cannot altogether be ignored, although for the purpose of jurisdiction, the plaint allegations might prima facie be assumed to be correct. But, where evidence is led by both the parties on the preliminary question of jurisdiction, it will be too much to contend that the Court should shut its eyes to all that evidence which may be led by both the parties. After all, plaint allegations are not to be treated as final or conclusive. Even a part from that, the plaint allegations in the present case did not make out a case that no notice at all was issued to the assessee. The allegation is that no proper notice giving the assessee a period of 30 days was issued. Evidently that allegation was made with reference to the amended rule 33, which became operative on 10-12-1964. As the notice had been given under the unamended rule 33, giving the assessee time of 15 days was sufficient. This is the crux of the plaint allegations in the present case and the question of jurisdiction has to be decided with reference to these plaint allegations. ( 9. ) THE general proposition as adduced from the pronouncement of their lordships of the Supreme Court in a series of cases approving of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. (AIR 1940 PC 105.) and Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor-General in council (AIR 1947 PC 78 ). is that ordinarily civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all disputes of civil nature vide section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (AIR 1940 PC 105.) and Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor-General in council (AIR 1947 PC 78 ). is that ordinarily civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all disputes of civil nature vide section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the jurisdiction of the civil Court may be taken away by a specific statutory provision or by the necessary implication or intendment. Say, where the special statute provides a complete machinery for decision of the disputes with right of appeal or revision. It is only that forum which will be available to a party and it will not be open to the party concerned to approach the civil Court except when the Special Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the statutory powers conferred on the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal has flouted all principles of natural justice so that the conclusion arrived at might be unconscionable to a judicial mind. But the action without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction should be so flagrant and should be patent on the face of the record. In that event only, the civil Court can interfere with the decision of the Special Tribunal. Otherwise, the remedy provided by the special statute alone can be resorted to. For instance, I may refer to the Division bench case of Ramsingh Gangaram v. State of M P. ( 1965 MPLJ 716 .), where the revenue authorities adopted the procedure outside the scope of the Dhar State Land revenue and Tenancy Act, 1940-41 and purported to set aside a sale even though the sale had earlier been confirmed and the auction purchaser had been put in possession. The Division Bench held that the procedure adopted by the revenue authorities was unknown to the Dhar State Land Revenue and tenancy Act, 1940-41 and in that view, it was laid down that the civil Court would have jurisdiction to treat the order of the revenue authorities as null and void and the civil Court would be able to afford the plaintiff the requisite relief. ( 10. ) IN M/s K. S. Venkataraman and Co. ( 10. ) IN M/s K. S. Venkataraman and Co. (P)Ltd. v. The State of Madras ( AIR 1966 SC 1089 .)their Lordships laid down that if a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law or fact arising in regard to that liability, it may, by necessary implication, bar the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituting the said machinery to decide finally a jurisdictional fact thereby excluding by necessary implication the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in that regard. But an authority created by a statute cannot question the vires of that statute or any of the provisions thereof where under it functions. It must act under the Act and not outside it. If it acts on the basis of a provision of the statute, which is ultra vires, to that extent it would be acting outside the Act. In that event, a suit to question the validity of such an order made outside the Act would certainly lie in a Civil Court. In that view, their Lordships held that the sales-tax recovered under a void provision of law, which had been held to be unconstitutional, was liable to be refunded to the assessee. ( 11. ) IN Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur ( AIR 1968 SC 271 .), their Lordships affirmed their above pronouncement by reiterating the same propositions. ( 12. ) FURTHER on in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1969 SC 78 .), their Lordships of the Supreme Court enunciated the following seven principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts :- "1.- Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do, what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 2.- Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. 3.- Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. 4.-When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation act, but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. 5.- Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. 6.-Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. 7.- An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. 7.- An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. " In my opinion, the seven principles laid down by their Lordships of the supreme Court in the said case would cover all possible cases arising in connection with the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to interfere with decision of special Tribunals. Those principles have been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadharao Panthulu Bahadur v. The State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1971 SC 71 .) ( 13. ) A Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to apply the said principles as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Af/5. Kalekhan Mohammad Hanif (Firm) v. Union of India ( 1971 MPLJ 144 .), wherein the question was whether the duty paid on tobacco under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, was liable to be refunded to the assessee in view of the fact that the goods had been destroyed by fire The Division Bench on facts held that as the Special tribunal had acted within jurisdiction and according to the statutory powers conferred on it, the matter could not be agitated in a Civil Court. ( 14. ) APPLYING these tests to the present case, it is not the respondents allegation in the plaint that the Assessing Authority acted without any initial jurisdiction or it acted in excess of the statutory power. The only grievance of the respondent, as made in the plaint, is that no proper notice, as required by rule 33 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, was given, thereby implying that the notice giving 15 days time was improper and that at least 30 days time should have been given to the assessee. Such a question evidently cannot be agitated in a Civil Court. It will not imply that the Special Tribunal acted in excess of the statutory powers. Moreover, on merits that contention was based on the amended rule 33, which was not in force at the date the notice was served on the firm. According to the unamended rule, 15 days notice was sufficient and in that view, the notice served could not be said to be improper. Moreover, on merits that contention was based on the amended rule 33, which was not in force at the date the notice was served on the firm. According to the unamended rule, 15 days notice was sufficient and in that view, the notice served could not be said to be improper. There might have been need for an inquiry if the respondents allegation had been that no notice at all had been served on the assessee. In this view, the order of remand passed by learned appellate Judge was clearly erroneous and illegal. Even on the plaint allegations, the Court was bound to hold that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of a Special Tribunal when prima facie it was not alleged that the Special tribunal acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the statutory powers. On the other hand, the allegation was about an irregularity, such as insufficient or inadequate notice of 15 days instead of 30 days. Looked at from this point of view, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the suit on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, in view of section 37 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. ( 15. ) AS a result of the discussion aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The order of remand passed by the first appellate Court is set aside, while the order of the trial Judge deciding the preliminary issue of jurisdiction is restored, with the result that the suit of the respondent would stand dismissed. The appellant shall be entitled to its costs throughout. Counsels fee in this Court shall be Rs. 50/-, if certified. Leave for filing Letters patent appeal is refused. Appeal allowed.