JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Between August, 1947, and February, 1955, the Railway Administration at Allahabad imported large quantities of foodgrains and cereals which were liable to octroi duty payable to the Municipal Board of Allahabad. The Railway Administration imported these goods through contractors as well as itself directly. It also purchased these commodities from the Town Rationing Officer, Allahabad. The Municipality claimed that a sum of Rs. 62,944.81 was payable by the Railway Administration as octroi on goods imported through the contractors. Out of this Rs. 30,048.87 has been realised leaving a balance of Rs. 32,895.94. The Municipality claimed that a sum of Rs. 19,737/3/- was due from the Railway Administration on account of goods imported by it directly. The Railway Administration had paid a sum of Rs. 494/5/- leaving a balance of Rs. 19,242/14/-. The Municipality claimed that a sum of Rs. 51,728.65 was payable by the Railway Administration on account of goods purchased from the Town Rationing Officer. 2. The Railway Administration denied its liability to pay octroi for goods purchased from the Town Rationing Officer on the ground that the Town Rationing Officer had himself paid octroi when he imported the goods. It also denied liability to pay octroi for goods imported through contractors on the plea that the contractors alone were liable to pay it and they must have paid it. The Railway Administration however, admitted its liability to pay Rs. 19, 737/3/- on goods directly imported by it and also admitted that only a sum of Rs. 494/5/-had been paid on this account, leaving a balance of Rs. 19,242/14/-. The Railway Administration claimed that it had exported a large quantity of these goods for which it was entitled to a refund of Rs. 37, 140/3/- from the Municipal Board. The Municipality denied any liability to the amount claimed as refund on the ground that the Railway Administration had not complied with the requisite rules meant for claiming refund. 3. At first the Railway Administration and the Nagar Mahapalika entered into negotiations to settle these demands. Subsequently the State Government referred the matter to the Additional District Magistrate for settlement. The Municipality denied any liability to the amount claimed as refund on the ground that the Railway Administration had not complied with the requisite rules meant for claiming refund. 3. At first the Railway Administration and the Nagar Mahapalika entered into negotiations to settle these demands. Subsequently the State Government referred the matter to the Additional District Magistrate for settlement. While the matter was being heard by the Additional District Magistrate the parties on 24th January, 1963, executed an agreement whereunder these claims and counter claims were referred to the arbitration of the judicial Secretary to the Government of U.P. The arbitrator after hearing the parties pronounced his award on 30th July, 1964. He held that the claim of the Nagar Mahapalika on account of octroi duty due on goods imported through contractors has been paid and nothing is due now. The claim of the Railway Administration for refund was held barred by limitation as well by Section 326, U.P. Municipalities Act. The arbitrator found that the Railway Administration had admitted its liability to pay a sum of Rs. 19,242/14/- as octroi due on goods directly imported by it. He awarded this sum in favour, of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, with proportionate costs against the Railway Administration. 4. On the award being filed in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad, both parties instituted objections. The objection of the Nagar Mahapalika in relation to the specification of the actual amount of costs awarded was upheld. The rest of the objections were rejected. The Court also dismissed the objections filed by the Union of India. Aggrieved, the Union of India came to this Court in appeal. 5. One of the points urged by the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India (appellant) was that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute with regard to the recovery of octroi dues. Learned counsel urged that a Municipality's claim for recovery of octroi dues was not justiciable by the Civil Courts. Consequently, it could not be entertained or adjudicated upon by an arbitrator. In support of the first limb of the submission, reliance was placed upon Municipal Board, Bareilly v. Abdul Aziz Khan, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795 . The Bench which heard the appeal felt that this decision required reconsideration. It referred the following questions to a Full Bench : 1. Consequently, it could not be entertained or adjudicated upon by an arbitrator. In support of the first limb of the submission, reliance was placed upon Municipal Board, Bareilly v. Abdul Aziz Khan, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795 . The Bench which heard the appeal felt that this decision required reconsideration. It referred the following questions to a Full Bench : 1. Whether a claim by a Nagar Mahapalika or a Municipality for recovery of octroi duty is entertainable by a civil court ? 2. If not, is such a claim entertainable by an arbitrator ? That is how the matter has come before this Bench. 6. It will be seen that the Nagar Mahapalika was making a claim under three heads. The claims for goods imported through contractors and purchased through the Town Rationing Officer have been dismissed by the arbitrator. The Nagar Mahapalika has not come up in appeal against the dismissal of their objections in regard to these two matters. Consequently, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether the Municipality's claim of this nature was entertainable either by the Civil Court or by an arbitrator. 7. The third claim of the Nagar Mahapalika related to recovery of the admitted amount of octroi on goods direct imported by the Railway Administration. The Railway Administration was obviously not willing to pay this amount because it had made a counter-claim for refund which was far in excess of the amount due to the Nagar Mahapalika. In Kirpal Singh v. Municipal Board, Ghaziabad, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1416, the Supreme Court has held that a claim for refund of octroi was justiciable by the Civil Court and the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain such a claim was not barred by the provisions of the Municipalities Act. In view of this declaration of law, there can now be no controversy that a suit for recovery of the amount of Rs. 37,140/3/- as refundable claimed to the Union of India was entertainable by the Civil Court, and so on the arguments of the learned counsel, such a claim was also entertainable by an arbitrator. In my opinion, the Nagar Mahapalika Could validly have contested such a suit for refund on the ground that the refund was not due. 37,140/3/- as refundable claimed to the Union of India was entertainable by the Civil Court, and so on the arguments of the learned counsel, such a claim was also entertainable by an arbitrator. In my opinion, the Nagar Mahapalika Could validly have contested such a suit for refund on the ground that the refund was not due. It could also have taken a plea in the alternative that even if this amount was due, an award should be made for a lesser amount because a sum of Rs. 19,244/14/- was admittedly due payable by the Railway Administration to the Nagar Mahapalika on account of octroi. 8. It may be urged that even if the Nagar Mahapalika could before the arbitrator raise such a claim for a set off it could not make a counter claim for recovery of the octroi because it could not have filed an independent suit of its own for its recovery; and so the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make an award for Rs. 19,244/14/- in favour of the Nagar Mahapalika. In order to see whether a suit or an arbitration, in relation to a claim for recovery of an amount admitted to be due payable as octroi is barred in the Civil Court or before an arbitrator the scheme of Municipalities Act may be examined. 9. Sec. 128, U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, authorises the Municipality to impose the various kinds of taxes mentioned in it. Clause (viii) of Section 128 (1) provides for an octroi on goods or animals brought within the municipality for consumption, use or sale therein. Secs. 130 to 135 lay down the procedure for imposition of taxes. It is not disputed that the Municipality of Allahabad had validly imposed octroi. 10. Sec. 153, Municipalities Act, provides for various matters which shall be regulated and governed by rules except in so far as provision therefore is made by the Act. Such matters are assessment, collection or composition of taxes, the prevention of evasion of taxes, the system on which refund shall be allowed and paid, etc., etc. In Chapter X of the Municipal Account Code rules 131 to 231 provide for various matters like assessment, collection, refund of octroi, etc. The rules generally contemplate assessment and collection of octroi at the municipal barriers at the point of import. In Chapter X of the Municipal Account Code rules 131 to 231 provide for various matters like assessment, collection, refund of octroi, etc. The rules generally contemplate assessment and collection of octroi at the municipal barriers at the point of import. There is no specific rule to provide for a contingency where an importer may have escaped or evaded payment of octroi at the point of import. 11. Sec. 155, Municipalities Act, provides for penalty for evasion of octroi dues. A person evading payment of octroi is liable to be punished with fine which may extend to twenty time the value of such octroi or to five hundred rupees whichever is greater. Sec. 156 provides that a board may compound for a tax. 12. Sec. 155-A entitles the municipal authorities to search, enter and inspect places and books of account and to seize the books or the goods in respect of which octroi may have been evaded. Sec. 158 entitles a board or any assessing authority to call upon any person to furnish information or produce record or books of account, etc. in order to ascertain whether he is liable to pay tax and at what amount he should be assessed. Under Sub-sec. (2) thereof the assessing authority is entitled, after making such enquiry as it considers necessary to make an assessment of the tax to the best of its judgment. Sec. 160, Municipalities Act, provides for an appeal to the District Magistrate against an assessment to tax. Sec. 164 bars the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in regard to valuation or assessment or liability to be assessed or taxed. Such matters are not to be questioned in any other manner by any other authority than provided in the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 164 makes the order of the appellate authority in respect of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation final. 13. Chapter VI of the Act comprising of Secs. 166 to 177 lays down the procedure for recovery of municipal claims. It does not apply to octroi or toll which are expressed to be taxes payable upon immediate demand. For other kinds of taxes this Chapter broadly provides for the issuance of a bill and thereafter a notice of demand and if the tax is not paid, the authority can issue a warrant of distress and sale to recover the tax. It does not apply to octroi or toll which are expressed to be taxes payable upon immediate demand. For other kinds of taxes this Chapter broadly provides for the issuance of a bill and thereafter a notice of demand and if the tax is not paid, the authority can issue a warrant of distress and sale to recover the tax. Under Sec. 173-A any sum due on account of a tax other than octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand can be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Sec. 176 provides that instead of proceeding by distress and sale, or in case of failure to realise thereby the whole or any part of the demand, the board may sue the person liable to pay in any court of competent jurisdiction. 14. Under Section 153 the board has been authorised to make rules for the purposes of assessment, collection or refund of taxes including octroi. Rules 178 to 197 of the Municipal Account Code provide for refund of octroi. In Kirpal Singh's, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1416 it was held that under the orders issued by the Government under Section 157 (3) of the Municipalities Act the amount of toll paid by the appellant became refundable to him. The appellant was, therefore, entitled to claim against the Municipality that the amount be repaid. The right to enforce that claim was a right of a civil nature and could be enforced in a civil suit unless the suit was barred by some provision. It was held that a suit for refund of tax is not barred by any express enactment or by necessary implication arising out of the provisions of Section 153 (c) , 160 or 164 of the Act. Sec. 153 (c) merely provides for the framing of the rules regulating the system on which refunds shall be allowed and paid. Sec. 160 makes provision for appeals relating to taxation and the authorities to which the right to appeal may be exercised. Sec. 164 bars the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of valuation or assessment or about the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed. The Supreme Court then held : "But the dispute in this case does not relate to valuation or assessment, or liability to be taxed or assessed." 15. Sec. 164 bars the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of valuation or assessment or about the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed. The Supreme Court then held : "But the dispute in this case does not relate to valuation or assessment, or liability to be taxed or assessed." 15. In regard to the rules framed under Section 153 (c) the Court held : "The rules framed by the Government merely set up the procedure to be followed in preferring an application to the Municipality for obtaining refund of the tax paid. The Municipality is under a statutory obligation, once the procedure followed is fulfilled to grant refund of the toll. The application for refund of the toll must be made within fifteen days from the date of the issue of the certificate and within six months from the date of payment of the toll. It has to be accompanied by the original receipts. If these procedural requirements are not fulfilled, the Municipality may decline to refund the toll and relegate the claimant to a suit. It would then be open to the party claiming a refund to seek the assistance of the Court, and to prove by evidence which is in law admissible that the goods transported by him fell within the order issued under Section 157 (3) of the Act. The rules framed by the Government relating to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemption on April 15, 1939, do not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the procedure is not followed. In our judgment, the Civil Judge and the High Court exalted what were merely matters of procedure, which the Municipality was entitled to require compliance with in granting refund, into conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Civil Court." It will thus be seen that Section 153 and the rules framed thereunder lay down the procedure to be followed while making a demand for refund, or for the Municipality in collecting the octroi or toll. These rules do not constitute conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court, much less a bar to its jurisdiction. These rules, therefore, cannot be held to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits in relation to matters covered by them. These rules do not constitute conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court, much less a bar to its jurisdiction. These rules, therefore, cannot be held to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits in relation to matters covered by them. So, absence of any express provision in the rules to entitle the Municipal Board to collect or recover octroi of which the payment has been evaded at the time of import, cannot bar a suit for recovery of such an amount in the civil Court. Sec. 164, Municipalities Act, only bars a suit against valuation or assessment of a tax or about the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed. A claim for recovery of an admitted amount of octroi does not involve any of these things. We are here not concerned with a suit for recovery of octroi where either the assessment thereof or the liability to be assessed or taxed is disputed. The decision of a Bench of this Court in Municipal Board, Bareilly, v. Abdul Aziz Khan, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795, in so far as it construes Section 153 and the rules framed thereunder as creating a condition precedent or bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil Court must be deemed overruled by the Supreme Court in Kirpal Singh's case, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1416. 16. Another principle which prevailed upon the Division Bench deciding Abdul Aziz, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795 was Sec. 155. It was held that Section 155 which entitled the Municipality to impose the punishment of fine up to twenty times the octroi dues was a special remedy provided to the Board for recovery of octroi dues. It was emphasised that under Section 114 the fines realised on conviction were liable to be appropriated by the Municipal Board to its own funds. This line of reasoning is no longer applicable because (b) of Section 114, Municipalities Act, which entitled such appropriation, has been repealed by the Adaptation Order of 1937. The Municipal Board is no longer entitled to appropriate the fines imposed on evaders of octroi. 17. The Bench considered Section 176, Municipalities Act, as excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for recovery of octroi. I am unable to agree with this view point. Chapter VI of the Municipalities Act lays down the procedure for recovery of municipal claims. 17. The Bench considered Section 176, Municipalities Act, as excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for recovery of octroi. I am unable to agree with this view point. Chapter VI of the Municipalities Act lays down the procedure for recovery of municipal claims. It does not apply to recovery of octroi or toll because these are taxes "payable upon immediate demand." It seems that Chapter VI provides a detailed procedure for recovery of taxes which were not payable on immediate demand. That is why a provision was made under Section 166 for the presentation of a bill and thereafter service of notice and of demand and, if the person liable does not pay the sum or show cause warrant of distress and also could be issued. In this context, Sec. 176 provided an alternative to the Municipal Board to site the person liable to pay the tax in the courts, instead of proceeding by way of distress and sale. The Legislature may have thought that the Municipal Board may not find it worthwhile to proceed by way of distress and sale without the intervention of the Court. That is why an alternative to approach the regular courts was provided for. An implication that Section 176 did not authorise the Board to adopt the alternative of filing a suit for recovery of octroi or toll could have been possible if Chapter VI was applicable to recovery of octroi or toll. When the procedure given in the Chapter is not applicable to the recovery of octroi or toll, no further negative implication could, in my opinion, be construed from Section 176, because the alternative of a suit was not provided elsewhere. 18. Further, the question of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78 : 1969 M.P.W.R. 200. The Court discussed in detail a large number of decisions of the Privy Council as well as of itself and laid down seven principles of law relevant to the question. One of the principles enunciated was : "Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit." 19. One of the principles enunciated was : "Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit." 19. Sec. 164 gives finality to the appellate orders regarding valuation or assessment. Such matters may be deemed excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil court because the Municipalities Act makes adequate provision for valuation or assessment. 20. Sec. 158 (2) , Municipalities Act, entitles the Board to assess tax to the best of its judgment in cases where a person has evaded or escaped assessment thereof. There is no specific provision anywhere in the Act or the rules for recovery or collection of octroi so assessed. In view of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for recovery of including octroi, will not be barred. 21. In the present case, the goods imported by the Railway directly, escaped assessment of tax at the point of import. because the Railway Administration after importing by rail transferred them to its canteens for sale to its employees. They did not pass through the octroi barrier situated outside the railway premises. This was clearly a case of escapement of octroi. The Board could have assessed octroi on such imports to the best of its judgment. It is admitted that long drawn out negotiations and correspondence went on between the Nagar Mahapalika and the Railway Administration in order to assess the amount of octroi payable. The ultimate determination that a sum of Rs. 19,244/14/- was due payable for direct imports having been arrived at after enquiries in association with the Railway Administration should be deemed to be assessed to the best of the assessing authority's judgment. The Railway Administration admitted its liability to pay this amount of octroi. It did not actually pay because it was making a counter claim for refund of a larger amount. In this situation the claim for recovery of the amount of octroi assessed to the best of its judgment and the liability whereof was admitted by the Railway Administration was, in my opinion, maintainable in the civil court. So, on the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the matter could also be entertained by an arbitrator. 22. In this situation the claim for recovery of the amount of octroi assessed to the best of its judgment and the liability whereof was admitted by the Railway Administration was, in my opinion, maintainable in the civil court. So, on the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the matter could also be entertained by an arbitrator. 22. In view of the conclusion that the claim was entertainable by the civil Court, it is unnecessary to discuss the other question whether such a claim was entertainable by an arbitrator, in case a suit therefor was not competent in the civil Court. 23. I would, therefore, answer the two questions by saying that the claim of the Nagar Mahapalika for the admitted amount of octroi for which the arbitrator made his award, was entertainable by a civil Court and was also entertainable by the arbitrator. 24. A.K. Kirty, J.- I have carefully persued the judgment prepared by my brother Satish Chandra, J. If the two questions referred to this Bench were to be answered with reference merely to the facts of the instant appeal, I would probably have agreed with my brother's opinion in toto. But I find that the questions, framed as they are in the referring order to which I myself was a party, cannot be so answered. I will, therefore, examine and answer them generally. The two questions are-: (1) Whether a claim by Nagar Mahapalika or a Municipality for the recovery of octroi duty is entertainable by a Civil Court ? (2) If not, is such a claim entertainable by an arbitrator ? 25. In my view, the second question does not present much difficulty. If the Civil Court is not competent to try or decree a suit for such a claim, it cannot be the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration nor of a valid award, unless there is some special provision either in the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 or in the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, (hereinafter to be called the Adhiniyam). This is clear from the definition of `Court' in Section 2 (c) of the Arbitration Act. An award does not operate by its own course. It has under Section 31 (1) of that Act to be filed in a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. 26. This is clear from the definition of `Court' in Section 2 (c) of the Arbitration Act. An award does not operate by its own course. It has under Section 31 (1) of that Act to be filed in a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. 26. Lets now see whether by virtue of another special provision either in the U.P. Municipalities Act or in the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, such claim can become the subject-matter of an arbitration. 27. Sec. 472 (1) of the Adhiniyam, inter alia, provides that subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any annual value or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the judge. Sub-sec. (2) thereof provides that no such appeal shall be heard unless the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (e) are fulfilled. Clause (a) provides that an appeal shall not be heard unless it is brought within 15 days after the accrual of the cause of complaint. Under Clause (e) , the appeal cannot be heard in the case of an appeal against the tax unless the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari. Under Section 473, cause of complaint for the purposes of Section 472 shall be deemed to have accrued, inter alia, on the day when the payment of tax in question is demanded. Sec. 474 provides as follows :- "Where any appeal against the annual value or tax fixed or charged under this Act is pending and all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before a decision is given in such appeal, apply in writing to the Judge for an order of reference on such matter and on such application being made the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, relating to arbitration in suits shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to such application and the proceedings to follow thereon, as if the said Judge were a Court within the meaning of the Act and the application were an application made in a suit." 28. Section 474 of the Adhiniyam, therefore, contains a special provision by virtue of which a reference to arbitration can be made even in regard to any dispute or difference relating to the annual value or tax fixed or charged under the Adhiniyam. The condition precedent to such arbitration, however, apart from other requisite conditions, is the pendency of an appeal validly filed and entertained under Section 472 thereof. It seems to me that only to the extent provided for in Section 474, there can be an arbitration even in regard to a claim for a tax assessed, levied or charged under the provisions of the Adhiniyam. The question, however, still remains as to whether the claim for octroi duty by a Nagar Mahapalika can become the subject-matter of an appeal under Sec. 472. In my opinion, it can be reasonably inferred from Section 472 (1) read with clause (a) of sub-sec. 2 thereof and clause (d) of Section 473 that such an appeal would be competent. I may, however, point out that such an appeal or for that matter any appeal under Section 472, can only be filed by the tax-payer and not by the Nagar Mahapalika. Therefore, even though there may be arbitration under Section 474 in respect of a demand for octroi duty under circumstances specified thereunder, there can be no arbitration in respect of such a claim under the provisions of the Arbitration Act itself. 29. In so far as Municipalities Act is concerned, I have not been able to find therein any provision corresponding the Section 474 of the Adhiniyam. Therefore, in respect of a claim of a municipality for octroi duty, there can be no arbitration under that Act. 30. The position that emerges out from the above discussion is that if for any claim for recovery of an octroi duty a suit cannot be filed in the Civil Court, there can be no arbitration in regard to such claim under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. There can be arbitration in respect of such a claim only under the special provision contained in Section 474 of the Adhiniyam. My answer to question No. 2 of framed, therefore, would be in the negative. 31. Question No. 1 atonce attracts Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the material part of which reads :- "The Courts shall .......... My answer to question No. 2 of framed, therefore, would be in the negative. 31. Question No. 1 atonce attracts Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the material part of which reads :- "The Courts shall .......... have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." This in its turn poses three questions: (1) Whether a suit by a Nagar Mahapalika or a Municipality for recovery of octroi duty is a suit of a civil nature ? (2) Whether the cognizance of such a suit, even though of a civil nature, is expressly barred ? (3) Whether the cognizance of such a suit, though not expressly barred is impliedly barred ? If the answer to query No. 1 above be in the negative, the other two queries would become inconsequential. I would, therefore, consider the legal position with reference to the first query. 32. That octroi duty is a tax admits of no doubt. Article 265 of the constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The whole gamut of taxation comprises three stages : imposition of tax by law, i.e. the making of a law providing for chargeability to tax with reference to specified taxing event and the amount or rate of tax; assessment and quantification, i.e. determination, according to law and procedure, by officers appointed or authorised in that behalf, of the person or persons, who generally or in a given case, has or have incurred the liability to pay a fixed or an ascertained amount as tax; and collection of such amount of tax from the person or persons concerned, i.e. procuring the amount by seeking voluntary payment by the taxpayer or otherwise realising the same according to law. We are not concerned here with the first two stages. The precise question arising for consideration in this connection is whether a right to realise a quantified amount of tax by a Nagar Mahapalika or a Municipality is a right of a civil nature. It was not contended before us that such a right is not a right of a civil nature. Even so, I will briefly examine the matter. 33. It was not contended before us that such a right is not a right of a civil nature. Even so, I will briefly examine the matter. 33. The imposition of a tax creates jural relationship between the taxpayer on whom fiscal obligation is cast and the State or the body on which the right to receive and appropriate the tax is conferred. Such obligations or rights though of statutory origin cannot but be considered as being civil in nature. They are not ascriable to any thing which is criminal, military, religious, social or political in nature. Nothing is germane to them which is `non-civil'. In Nilmoni v. Taranath, 9 I.A. 174, it was held that Revenue Courts are Civil Courts and are governed by the Civil Procedure Code except in regard to matters excluded by any special or local law. Sec. 5 of the Code also leads to the same conclusion. In fact sub-sec. (2) of Section 5 clearly indicates that suits or proceedings relating to revenue are of a civil nature triable by a Civil Court. Revenue referred to therein is land revenue which indisputably is a tax. 34. It now remains to be seen whether a suit for recovery of octroi duty is expressly or impliedly barred either under the provisions of the Adhiniyam or those of the Municipalities Act. Sec. 226 of the Adhiniyam reads :- "No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or before any other authority than is provided in the Act." The Municipalities Act contains a similar provision. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 164 of that Act is identical to Section 226 of the Adhiniyam quoted above. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 164 further provides that the order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final. In view of the specific provisions referred to above it has got to be held that in so far as valuation or assessment or the liability of a person to be assessed or taxes is concerned no suit will lie in the Civil Court. In view of the specific provisions referred to above it has got to be held that in so far as valuation or assessment or the liability of a person to be assessed or taxes is concerned no suit will lie in the Civil Court. I may here refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court- (1) Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78 : 1969 M.P.W.R. 200, and (2) State of West Bengal v. The Indian Iron and Steel Co., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1298. In these cases it has been laid down that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. It has been further laid down that the questions of correctness of the assessment apart from their constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities, and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared final or there is an express prohibition under the particular Act. 35. Though from what has been stated above it follows that no civil suit would lie in regard to matters of valuation, assessment or the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed there is nothing either in Section 226 of the Adhiniyam or under Section 164 of the Municipalities Act expressly barring any suit for recovery of a tax after the amount payable as tax has been determined by the authority empowered in that behalf or according to the relevant provisions contained in those Act. To my mind, once the quantum of tax payable by a person or persons is determined, the person or persons liable to pay the same are in the position of debtors vis-a-vis the Mahapalika or the Municipality entitled to receive and appropriate the amount in question. This being so, in the absence of any express or implied bar contained in the Adhiniyam or the Municipalities Act a right to recover the amount of the unpaid tax by a civil suit cannot be held to be unavailable to the Mahapalika or the Municipality concerned. This being so, in the absence of any express or implied bar contained in the Adhiniyam or the Municipalities Act a right to recover the amount of the unpaid tax by a civil suit cannot be held to be unavailable to the Mahapalika or the Municipality concerned. I will now proceed to examine whether the two Acts in question contain any express or implied bar to the institution of a suit in a Civil Court for the recovery of the amount of tax. 36. Chapter XXI of the Adhiniyam deals with "recovery of taxes and other Mahapalika dues." Sec. 503 runs thus :- "503. Manner of recovering Mahapalika taxes-A Mahapalika Tax may be recovered by the following processes in the manner prescribed by rules: (1) by presenting a bill, (2) by serving a written notice of demand, (3) by distraint and sale of a defaulter's movable property, (4) by the attachment and sale of a defaulter's immovable property. (5) in the case of octroi and toll, by the seizure and sale of goods and vehicles, (6) in the case of property tax by the attachment of rent due in respect of the property, and (7) by a suit." Sec. 503 above, therefore, clearly provides for recovery of a Mahapalika tax, which will certainly include octroi dues, by a suit. Sec. 504 to 516 pertain to clauses (1) to (6) of Sec. 503. Sec. 517 is as follows :- "517. Defaulters may be sued for arrears, if necessary-Instead of proceeding against a defaulter by distress, attachment and sale as hereinbefore provided, or after a defaulter shall be so proceeded against unsuccessfully or with only partial success, any sum due or the balance of any sum due, as the case may be, by such defaulter, on account of tax may be recovered from him by a suit in any Court of competent jurisdiction." 37. Thus, in so far as the Adhiniyam is concerned, far from containing any provision expressly or impliedly barring the institution of a civil suit to recover octroi dues, it contains express provision authorising the institution of such suits. 38. In so far as the Municipalities Act is concerned, Sec. 153 thereof provides as follows :- "153. Rules as to assessment, collection and other matters.-The following matters shall be regulated and governed by rules except in so far as provision therefor is made by this Act, namely. 38. In so far as the Municipalities Act is concerned, Sec. 153 thereof provides as follows :- "153. Rules as to assessment, collection and other matters.-The following matters shall be regulated and governed by rules except in so far as provision therefor is made by this Act, namely. (a) the assessment, collection or composition of taxes, and in the case of octroi, or toll, the determination of octroi or toll limits; (b) the prevention of evasion of taxes; (c) ........................................: (d) ....................................... (e) ........................................; (f) any other matter relating to taxes in respect of which this Act makes no provision or insufficient provision and provision is, in the opinion of the State Government, necessary." Sec. 155 provides for imposition of penalty for evasion of octroi dues. Sec. 155-A confers powers of search, entry and inspection in connection with evasion of octroi. Chapter VI relates to "Recovery of certain Municipal claims." Sec. 166 requires the Municipal Board to cause a bill to be presented to the person liable for payment of any sum on a account of a tax, other than octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand. Sec. 167 relates to the contents of the bill. Sec. 168 provides for service of notice of demand if the bill remains unpaid. Secs. 169, 170, 171, and 172 relate to coercive measures which may be enforced against a defaulter on whom a notice of demand has been served. Sec. 173-A provides for recovery of Municipal taxes, other than octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand, as arrears of land revenue. Sec. 176 reads as follows :- "176. Alternative power of bringing suit.-Instead of proceeding by distress and sale, or in case of failure to realise thereby the whole or any part of the demand, the board may site the person liable to pay the same in any court of competent jurisdiction." 39. It will thus be seen that the Act contains specific provisions relating to recovery of taxes, other than octroi, toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand, by various modes provided for in Secs. 166 to 176. Sec. 176 which provides for an alternative mode of recovery by suit, in terms, does not apply to octroi, toll and other similar taxes payable upon immediate demand. 166 to 176. Sec. 176 which provides for an alternative mode of recovery by suit, in terms, does not apply to octroi, toll and other similar taxes payable upon immediate demand. So it is clear, at any rate, that the Act does not contain any express provision for recovery of octroi duty by a suit nor does it contain any express provision barring the institution of such a suit. The question then is whether the Act impliedly bars the institution of such a suit. An implied bar is not to be readily inferred, because it is well settled that curtailment of the powers of the Civil Court is not to be assumed or inferred unless a particular law necessarily implies that the Civil court's power has been curtailed or taken away in respect of a particular kind of suit under a particular statute. I have already mentioned that to my mind, when an amount has become due on account of a tax be it an octroi duty or any other tax the person or persons liable to pay the same stand indebted to the Municipality or the Mahapalika. Therefore in all those cases there is an obligation to pay a determined amount which has acquired the character of a debit and corresponding right to recover the same by the authority entitled to receive and appropriate the amount. I may here mention further that although Secs. 166 to173-A have not been made applicable to octroi, toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand, yet in respect of octroi duty an immediate demand, can and has to be made, and if in spite of such demand the amount in question is not paid the person or persons for whom payment was demanded become indebted to the Board in respect of the unpaid demand. Unlike Section 503 of the Adhiniyam, the Municipalities Act does not appear to contain any express provision empowering the Board to recover octroi dues by the seizure and sale of the goods and vehicle concerned. I am not aware whether acting under Section 153 of the Act the State Government has made any provision for recovery of octroi duty by seizure and sale of goods and animals. If it has, the Board may exercise the powers of recovery given to it under the relevant order of the State Government. I am not aware whether acting under Section 153 of the Act the State Government has made any provision for recovery of octroi duty by seizure and sale of goods and animals. If it has, the Board may exercise the powers of recovery given to it under the relevant order of the State Government. I am, however, of opinion that an order made by the State Government under Section 153 of the Act cannot legally exclude the right to recover any amount on account of unpaid octroi duty by a civil suit. To my knowledge, however, neither the Municipal Account Code nor any other order of the State Government under Section 153 either expressly or by necessary implication bars the institution of such a suit. 40. My learned brother Satish Chandra has already pointed out in his judgment the reasons why the Division Bench decision in Municipal Board v. Abdul Aziz Khan, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795, must be deemed to be over-ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Kripal Singh v. Municipal Board Ghaziabad, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1416. I also fully agree that the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Municipal Board Bareilly v. Abdul Aziz Khan, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 795, assuming that it was correct when pronounced, is no longer legally tenable. If that view were to be consider as still good and bindding it might lead to extraordinary results in certain cases. A person liable to pay octroi duty may, on whom immediate demand has been made for payment of the duty, manage to escape and evade payment of tax. He may be penalised under Section 155 of the Act, but the Municipal Board would be left with no remedy to recover the amount due to it on account of octroi from such person or persons. This could never have been the intention of the legislature. In my opinion there is nothing in the Municipalities Act, by virtue of which it can be held that a suit for recovery of a specific sum as octroi duty is impliedly barred. 41. My answer to question No. 1., therefore, is in the affirmative. My answer to question No. 2, as already mentioned, is in the negative. K. N. Srivastava, J. - I agree with the opinion of brother Kirty. 42. 41. My answer to question No. 1., therefore, is in the affirmative. My answer to question No. 2, as already mentioned, is in the negative. K. N. Srivastava, J. - I agree with the opinion of brother Kirty. 42. BY THE COURT - Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second question, in the negative.