JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from the house in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The trial court decreed the suit and the first appellate court dismissed the defendant's appeal. The premises were such to which the provisions of the U. P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act applied. The suit had been filed on the basis of a permission from the District Magistrate under section 3 of the Act. 2. In the appeal learned counsel has pressed two points. The first is that the court below has erred in not considering itself the needs of the parties. According to him, if the needs of the parties had been properly considered the permission could not have been granted to the landlord for filing the present suit. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the notice to terminate the tenancy was given before the permission was obtained. On both the points the lower appellate court has held against the appellant. 3. In support of the first contention learned counsel has relied an the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ismail v. Nanney Lal, 1969 R.C.J. 453 and also on the decision of this Court reported in Asa Singh v. B. D. Sanwal and others, A.I.R. 1969 Allahabad 474, and in Dwarka Prasad and others v. Additional Commissionerm 1966 A.L.J. 850. The following observation in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ismail (supra) has been stressed :- "The court trying the suit for eviction has to find out whether a propel notice to quit was given and whether the tenancy was properly determined. It must also examine the grounds on the basis of which the landlord seeks to evict the tenant and decide for itself whether such grounds exist. Neither the District Magistrate nor the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reasons which may influence the said authorities in coming to their decision and the court is not called upon to 'examine whether the conclusion of any of the said authorities was properly arrived at." On the basis of this observation learned counsel has contended that the court can go behind the order of the District Magistrate and see if the order was properly passed. No such inference in any opinion can be drawn from the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court. When it is said that the court should examine the grounds for eviction, it refers to the grounds mentioned in section 3 of the Act, and as has already been held by this court in a number of decisions that one of those grounds is the permission of tee District Magistrate. The civil court is thus only to see if in fact a permission under section 3 for filing the suit exists. 4. In the case of Asa Singh (supra) this Court had pointed out that the needs of the landlord and tenant have to be compared before permission is to be granted. This Full Bench decision, however, does not lay down that the civil court can go behind the order and itself compare the needs of the landlord and tenant. The case of Dwarka Prasad (supra) is also no authority for the proposition contended by the learned counsel. Section 16 of the Act runs as follows : "Orders under the Act not to be questioned in any court. No order made under this Act by the State Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any court : The order of the District Magistrate under section 3 of the Act is subject to the order of the Commissioner passed in revision and the order of the Commissioner is finally subject to the order of the State Government in revision Section 16 puts a bar on the right of the Civil Court to question the correctness of the order. In this connection learned counsel referred to the observation in Mohammad Ismail's case (supra) to the effect that the order of the State Government could not be treated as beyond the pale of scrutiny by a court of law. This, however, does not mean that the civil court while deciding the suit can look into the propriety of the order. This is clear from the observation in the same case to the effect that "neither the District Magistrate nor the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reason which may influence the authorities in coming to the decision and the court is not called upon to examine whether the conclusion was properly arrived at. 5. This is clear from the observation in the same case to the effect that "neither the District Magistrate nor the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reason which may influence the authorities in coming to the decision and the court is not called upon to examine whether the conclusion was properly arrived at. 5. Moreover, in the present case the District Magistrate had granted the permission and the order passed by the Commissioner in revision which was produced by the learned counsel shows that he did arrive at the finding that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant The finding of the lower appellate court that the permission granted for instituting the suit under section 3 of the Act was valid cannot thus he held to be erroneous or contrary to law. 6. There is also no force in the contention that the notice to terminate the tenancy could not be given prior to the grant of permission by the District Magistrate for the institution of the suit. 7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P C.