Ramaswami, J.-Second defendant, the Highways Department of South Arcot, represented by the District Collector of South Arcot, Cuddalore, is the appellant. The first defendant is the Proprietor of a Service Bus bearing No. MDF 2015 and known as K. T. R. Bus Service. The third defendant is the New India Asiatic Insurance Company, with whom the said bus had been insured. The plaintiff had filed the suit against these defendants claiming damages in a sum of Rs. 25,000 on account of the death of their son Santhanagopalan in the accident that took place at or about 5-30 a.m. on 14th November, 1960 at 14/2 milestone in the Vridhachalam-Cuddalore Road due to the culvert giving way and the bus plunging into the channel. The learned Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore held that there was no negligence on the part of the first defendant or his driver and that, therefore, they were not liable for damages and in that view dismissed the suit as against the first and third defendants. But so far as the second defendant was concerned, he held that the very collapse of the bridge raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the second defendant and on the principle of res ipsa loquitur the second defendant was liable for damages. The learned Subordinate Judge ascertained and fixed the damages at Rs. 9,100 and decreed the suit for that amount against the second defendant alone. The second defendant has preferred this appeal. The plaintiffs have preferred Cross-objections in which they have claimed a further sum of Rs. 5,000 towards damages. No appeal has been preferred against that part of the decree which dismissed the suit as against defendants 1 and 3. 2. The culvert which collapsed was one vent of 15 feet wide with segmental brick arch. The thickness of the arch was 1 foot 6 inches. The height of the cushion near left and right parapet was 1 foot 2 inches and at the centre 1 foot 4 inches. The height of abutment from still level upto the spring of the arch was 5 feet 6 inches with square returns on all sides. In pursuance of the decisions taken during the Conference of Assistant Engineers and Section Officers at Cuddalore on 11th October, 1960, the Divisional Engineer issued instructions for inspection of culverts and bridges. The height of abutment from still level upto the spring of the arch was 5 feet 6 inches with square returns on all sides. In pursuance of the decisions taken during the Conference of Assistant Engineers and Section Officers at Cuddalore on 11th October, 1960, the Divisional Engineer issued instructions for inspection of culverts and bridges. The Section Officer, Highways, Kurinchipadi, D.W. 3, had inspected the culvert in question on 28th October, 1960 and sent his report, dated 28th October, 1960, Exhibits B-4 and B-5. He had then found the culvert in good condition and no scour was noted by him. The Road Inspector, D.W. 4, whose duty was to find out whether the culverts and bridges required repairs, inspected the culvert on 11th, 12th and 13th November, 1960 and found the culvert in good condition. The Assistant Engineer, Highways, Cuddalore, inspected the culvert on 16th October, 1960 and 11th November, 1960 and found it in a sound condition on both days. He did not notice even any cracks on either side of the abutment or in the arch. On the night of 13th November, 1960, the last bus to Cuddalore passed over the culvert safely at about 10-15 P.M. and lorries had also passed over the culvert till about midnight. Prior to 14th November, 1960 for about 2 weeks there were heavy and incessant rains. There were very heavy rains on the 13th November, 1960. There was one Eri by name T. Palayam Eri, one mile upstream. The full tank level of that Eri was 9 feet of water D.W. 6, the Karnam, inspected the Eri at 9 P.M. on 13th November, 1960 and found the tank full with 9 feet of water. Sometime after midnight on 13th November, 1960 and the early hours on 14th November, 1960, the Eri breached due to heavy rains and the flood water rushed through the culvert. The water level, as observed with reference to the flood mark, had reached 6 inches above the crown of the arch which is 10, feet above bed level. Due to the very high velocity of flood water through the vent-way, scour had taken place along the left abutment. The water level, as observed with reference to the flood mark, had reached 6 inches above the crown of the arch which is 10, feet above bed level. Due to the very high velocity of flood water through the vent-way, scour had taken place along the left abutment. D.W. 5, the Assistant Engineer, inspected the culvert on 14th November, 1960 morning at about 10 a.m. and submitted his report in which he had concluded that due to the heavy rains and the breach of the Eri the flood water might have entered into the culvert with terribly high velocity causing deep scour and when the K.T.R. Bus with full complement of passengers passed over the culvert at about 5-10 a.m., the culvert gave way and the bus plunged into the channel and that the damage to the culvert was only accidental due to the breach of the Eri on the upstream side and nobody could have foreseen the occurrence of such a damage on the previous day and that, therefore, no prior precautions could have been taken. 3. The above facts disclosed by the evidence of D.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 were accepted by the trial Court. But the trial Court, however, held that the 2nd defendant was liable on the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The presumption raised by the maxim res ipsa loquitur could be rebutted by evidence. The evidence let in on behalf of the defendants and the various reports filed by them unmistakably prove that there were heavy rains for about 15 days prior to the date of the occurrence and in particular on the previous day there were more than 6" of rain and the T. Palayam Eri which was full on the previous day got breached due to the rain. The reports of the Engineers and the flood level noticed on the crown of the culvert clearly establish that the water should have entered into the culvert with terrible velocity due to the breach of the Eri and the heavy rains causing scour in the arch of the culvert. The plaintiffs had not let in any positive evidence to show that the culvert had been defectively constructed or inefficiently maintained. The reports further disclose that the culvert was in a sound condition on the previous day and was adequate for all ordinary occasions. The plaintiffs had not let in any positive evidence to show that the culvert had been defectively constructed or inefficiently maintained. The reports further disclose that the culvert was in a sound condition on the previous day and was adequate for all ordinary occasions. In these circumstances, though the breach of the culvert may not amount to an act of God, still it could not be that it was due to any want of reasonable and proper care on the part of the 2nd defendant. The decision in Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Sobhagwanti1, relied on by the trial Court in support of its view that the principle of res ipsa loquitur will be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case is clearly distinguishable. In that case, which went to the Supreme Court and reported in A.I.R.1966 S.C. 1750, it was found that having regard to the kind of mortar used, the normal life of the structure of the top storey of the building could be only 40 or 45 years but at the time when the building collapsed it was 80 years old and the collapse was due to the thrust of the arches on the top portion and the mortar was deteriorated to such an extent that it was reduced to powder without any cementing properties. In the present case, the culvert was found to be in a sound condition on the previous day and there is no evidence of any defective construction or inefficiency in the maintenance. We, therefore, hold that the accident was not due to the negligence of the 2nd defendant in maintaining the culvert. 4. Even if the principle of res ipsa loquitur is to be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, in law the 2nd defendant could not be held to be liable in tort for highway accidents. Article 300 of the Constitution provides that, subject to any provisions which may be made by any Act of the Legislature of a State, the Government of a State may sue and be sued in the name of the State in relation to its affairs in the like cases as the corresponding provinces might have sued or been sued if the Constitution had not been enacted. Like section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858, or section 32 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 or section 176 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, Article 300 of the Constitution also makes provision for suits against the Government in cases where such suits could have been filed against the East India Company had the case arisen prior to 1858, subject to any Act of the Legislature of the State. 5. It may be mentioned that there is no statute governing the liability to maintain and repair a highway though there are certain statutory provisions in respect of the roads vested in the panchayats, panchayat unions, municipalities, corporations and the national highway. It is not necessary for us to deal elaborately with all the cases which deal with the liability of the Government in tort where the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions or Governmental or commercial functions are noticed. The latest decision of the Supreme Court on the general principle of State’s liability in tort is found in M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, wherein it was held: “ It is not difficult to realise the significance and importance of making such a distinction particularly at the present time when, in pursuit of their welfare ideal, the Government of the States as well as the Government of India naturally and legitimately enter into many commercial and other undertakings and activities which have no relation with the traditional concept of Governmental activities in which the exercise of sovereign power is involved. It is necessary to limit the area of these affairs of the State in relation to the exercise of sovereign power, so that if acts are committed by Government employees in relation to other activities which may be conveniently described as non-Governmental or non-sovereign citizens who have a cause of action for damages should not be precluded from making their claim against the State. That is the basis on which the area of the State immunity against such claims must be limited.” It follows, therefore, in respect of exercise of sovereign power, the State is not liable in tort. 6. That is the basis on which the area of the State immunity against such claims must be limited.” It follows, therefore, in respect of exercise of sovereign power, the State is not liable in tort. 6. In the Secretary of State V. Gockcraft3, the plaintiff sued the Secretary of State for India in Council for damages in respect of injuries sustained by him in a carriage accident which was alleged to have been due to the negligent stacking of gravel on a road which was stated in the plaint to be a military road maintained by the Public Works Department of the Government. It was held in that case that the provision and maintenance of roads specially a military road is one of the functions of the Government carried on in the exercise of its sovereign powers and is not an undertaking which might have been carried on by private persons and that, therefore, the State was not liable in tort. This decision was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Krishnamurthy v. State of Andhra1. In this case the plaintiff was struck down by a road-roller as a result of which his hand was crushed. At the time of the accident the road-roller was being used for the maintenance of the highway and was returning from its duty to the place where it should be kept. It was held by a Division Bench that the making and maintenance of highways is a public purpose and the duty of the Government and not a commercial undertaking and that, therefore, no question of liability for the wrong done would attach to the Government. The decision in the Secretary of State v. Cockcraft2, was sought to be distinguished on the ground that the road in question in that case was a military road and not a highway. The learned Judges observed that they failed to see how maintenance of highways which is the exclusive duty of the Government can in any manner be treated different in its nature from the maintenance of the military road; it was the nature of the duty in the discharge of which the act was committed that was material. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondents, relying on the decisions in the Secretary of State for India V. Hari Bhanji3, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondents, relying on the decisions in the Secretary of State for India V. Hari Bhanji3, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati4and some other decisions, wanted to contend that in the instant case the suit was maintainable for damages in tort. All these decisions were discussed in the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh5and, as already stated the Supreme Court has held that no action will lie against the State in respect of acts, done by them in exercise of their sovereign function. It follows, therefore, that the suit by the plaintiffs claiming damages against the 2nd defendant was not maintainable in law. 8. In view of the above findings, we allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-objections, set aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and dismiss the suit. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs both in the appeal and in the cross-objections. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.