D. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THIS judgment in F. A. O. No. 75 of 1968 will also dispose of the two connected appeals, F. A. O. Nos. 76 and 77 of 1968. ( 2 ) THE appellant in this case is M/s. Hemla Embroidery Mills (P) Ltd. , whereas the respondent is Hindustan Embroidery Mills (P) Ltd. , The respondent in this case has filed three applications for the registration of three trade marks each of which employs the words HEMLA in different forms, before the Registrar of Trade Marks. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to give the exact descriptions of the Trade Marks involved. The appellant opposed the registration under Section 31 (1) of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act ). Counter statements were thereafter filed by the respondent under Section 21 (2 ). The procedure prescribed by the Act requires that at this stage evidence has to be filed by the appellant. However, before this could be done the present appellant moved stnay applicatns in this said three cases before the Registrar which have been rejected and three appeals have been brought against the three orders passed by the Registrar to this Court. All three orders are in practically identical terms. ( 3 ) THERE were two applications in each of the cases. One application was a request for extention of time in Form No. T. M. 56 and the other was a petition for stay. The ground of which stay was sought was that certain disputes between the parties had been REFERRED TO to arbitration as a result of a consent order passed in the Bombay High Court by Kantawala J. The said reference to arbitration was to two well known selecitors of Bombay and included disputes concerning the ownership of the trade marks involved in the applications for registration. It was submitted that the Award of the Arbitrators which would be given as a result of the agreed reference ordered by the Bombay High Court would be binding on both the parties and conclusively decide the disputes concerning the ownership of the trade marks in question. It was further submitted that there would be great prejudice if the proceedings continued to go on before the Registrar. It was further submitted that there would be great prejudice if the proceedings continued to go on before the Registrar. The application for extention of time on form TM 56 was in the form of a prayer for time being extended till after the hearing and final disposal of F. A. O. No. 223 and F. A. O. No. 224 of 1967, pending in this court. ( 4 ) AT the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Anoop Singh who appears on behalf of the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent because of Section 109 (2) of the Act. The said sub-section relates to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain an appeal against the orders of the Registrar of Trade Marks and is in the following terms :- "109 (2 ). Save as otherwise expressly provided in sub-section (1) or in any other provision of this Act, an appeal shall lie to the High Court within the prescribed period from any order or decision of the Registrar under this Act or the rules made there-under". The provisions of this sub-section are to be commonly found in numerous other statutes and there appear to be two restrictions on the right of appeal. Firstly, the appeal must be directed against an order or decision of the Registrar and secondly, that order or decision must be under the Act or rules made under the Act. ( 5 ) THE question as to what is "an order or decision" has been the subject matter of several authoritative decisions given under various similar statutes. 1 have been REFERRED TO to Shankarlal Aggarwala and others, v. Shankarlal Poddar and Others. 1 The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Golak Chand,2 and The Central Bank of India v. Golak Chand3. The test which has been approved in these cases, which are either under the Companies Act or the Delhi Rent Control Act, is that the order against which an appeal is sought should be (i) which affects the rights of the parties and (ii) should not be merely procedural in nature. In other words, the test appears to be exactly similar to the one relating to appeals against judgment under the Letters Patent. In other words, the test appears to be exactly similar to the one relating to appeals against judgment under the Letters Patent. The question I have, therefore, to see for the purposes to this test is as to whether the order under appeal in this case relates to and thereby affects the right of the parties before me. If it does, then the decision or order will be appealable, if no rights are affected then no appeal will lie. ( 6 ) ON this part of the case I am satisfied that the decision is an order or decision within the meaning of section 109 (2) of the Act and I briefly state my reasons for coming to this conclusion. The dispute which is pending before the Registrar is as to whether a particular trade mark should or should not be registered in favour of the respondent. I have also been told that the appellant had also moved similar applications for registration of the same trade mark, but, they are not the subject matter of this appeal. The question which has been REFERRED TO to arbitration by the Bombay High Court also relates to the ownership of these trade marks. Assuming that a decision is given in that arbitration that one or other of the parties before me are the owners of the trade marks in dispute, it would have a considerable bearing on any eventual decision the Registrar might make regarding the registration of trade marks for which the respondent has applied. If the matter is staved in some manner then the Registrar would have to await the decision of the Arbitrators, but, if the matter is not stayed, then there would be two parallel enquiries leading 10 perhaps two contrary decisions. In such a case, conceiveably in the absence of stay, regsitration might be made in favour of one of the parties and the Arbitrators might decide that the other is the owner, or, conversely theregistration may be refused whereas the ownership might be found to vest in the party whose registration has been refused. Normally, if this matter was a matter in Court, it would certainly be a good case for staying at least the final order or decision till the disputes had been settled in arbitration I think, the same test might apply so far as registration is concerned. Normally, if this matter was a matter in Court, it would certainly be a good case for staying at least the final order or decision till the disputes had been settled in arbitration I think, the same test might apply so far as registration is concerned. It is very difficult in cases of this sort to draw a line between a merely procedural order which is not appeaable and a substantive order which is appealable. I think that in the present case the order is substantive" on the special facts of the case. However, there is one aspect of the case which needs consideration. The Registrar has not finally turned down the request for stay. He has merely said that the evidence should be filed and he will entertain an application for stay later and then eventually decide whether he is going to grant stay or not. He seems to have said this in order to prevent the matter being needlessly delayed. The Registrar has stated that the application for stay is premature at this stage. Even then, I feel that an order staying the proceedings to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings. So, as regards this part of the case 1 think the order appealed against is an order or decision within the meaning or Section 109. (2) of the Act. The next question is. . . . . is it an order or decision passed under the Act or rules ? On this question I am unable to find any provision in the Act or the rules which entitle the Registrar to stay proceedings. The only section which applies for such a purpose is Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. However, the conditions required for the satisfaction of Section 34 do not exist. No application for stay has been moved before the filing of a written statement or taking any steps in the matter. Possibly, if an application had been moved under Section 34 before the opposition had been filed, the provisions of Sections 34 might have been involved. This is a merely the oretical view, because no application was is fact moved under Section 34 either earlier or later. There is no other provision of law which entitles the Registrar to stay proceedings. The Registrar being an authority under the Act has no general inherent powers to pass any order in the interests of justice. This is a merely the oretical view, because no application was is fact moved under Section 34 either earlier or later. There is no other provision of law which entitles the Registrar to stay proceedings. The Registrar being an authority under the Act has no general inherent powers to pass any order in the interests of justice. He is a creature of the statute and has only the powers the statute gives him. He is the only authority entitled to register or not to register a trade mark and he has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the disputes which are so sought to be stayed, because no arbitration can decide whether a trade mark should or should not be registered. In fact, even if the Arbitrators were to give a decision that either of the present parties before me are the owners of the trade mark, the Registrar might still refuse to register the trade mark In the absence of any statutory provision dealing with the question of stay to be found within the four corners of the Act, I come to the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to order the stay which has been applied for, and therefore, the order passed by him on the application for stay is not an order passed under the Act. In this view of the matter, I come to the conclusion that the order regarding stay which has been passed by the Registrar is not appealable. ( 7 ) THERE are other provisions of the Act which need to be REFERRED TO to for the purpose of deciding whether the Registrar has power under the Act to stay his hands in some other way. In this connection, 1 refer to sections 97 and 101 of the Act. Under Section 97, the Registrar has the powers of the Civil Court for certain matters, such as, receiving evidence, administering of oaths etc. though there is no special power relating to adjournments. 1 think such a power must be implied because no Registrar can possibly decide the applications for registration without adjourning the case at some stage. He could, therefore, in exercise of the power to adjourn, adjourn the cases till after the decision of the arbitration. though there is no special power relating to adjournments. 1 think such a power must be implied because no Registrar can possibly decide the applications for registration without adjourning the case at some stage. He could, therefore, in exercise of the power to adjourn, adjourn the cases till after the decision of the arbitration. Similarly under Section 101 the Registrar has got jurisdiction to extend time, he might, therefore, without staying the decision of the dispute before him for the purpose of awaiting the decision in the Arbitration, extend the time for the filing of the evidence by the present appellant till after the disposal of the Arbitration proceedings in Bombay. But, in that case, it would be a mere procedural order. That would not be the same as a substantive decision under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act in which case there would be a sine die adjournment to await a particular decision by a different Tribunal. I, therefore, conclude that if the Registrar refuses an adjournment under Section 97 or refuses to extend time under Section 101, it would be a merely procedural matter which is not subject to appeal in this Court. Even though, the Registrar would have the power under Act, it would in the light of this view, not be an order or decision appealable to this Court. In the circumstances, on both lines of reasoning, I come to the conclusion that this appeal is not competent. ( 8 ) AS regards the order refusing to extend time there is provision in Section 101 (2) which is in the following terms :- "101 (2 ). Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to require the Registrar to hear the parties before disposing of anapplication for extension of time, and no appeal shall lie from any order of the Registrar under this Section". Therefore, even if we consider the refusal of the Registrar to extend time to be substantive order, within the meaning of Section 109 (2) of the Act, the appeal is barred by reason of section 101 (2 ). In the circumstances the refusal of the request to extend time is not appealable to this Court and, even if the application for stay is considered for the purpose of this appeal to be an application for extension of time within the meaning of Section 101, it also is not appealable. In the circumstances the refusal of the request to extend time is not appealable to this Court and, even if the application for stay is considered for the purpose of this appeal to be an application for extension of time within the meaning of Section 101, it also is not appealable. ( 9 ) IN the circumstances, the preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal is held to be incompetent. Even otherwise, if I were to deal with the merits of the case, I would come to the conclusion that an order merely differring the consideration of the question of stay till a latter stage is not an incorrect order. As I have already indicated the Registrar is the only person competent to Register or not to register a trade mark. And, therefore, is fully justified in his discretion to insist on the parties filing the evidence so that there may be no delay in his proceedings by reason of the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. Such an order causes no injustice to either of the parties, as it is open to the appellant or Respondent to ask for stay at a later stage. I do not think that this can be said to be an unjust or incorrect order. ( 10 ) IN this view of the matter, I come to the conclusion that this appeal must fail and I dismiss the same. The Respondent is entitled to costs in this appeal.