ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of an order passed by the Industrial Court whereby a revision filed by the Petitioner under Section 66 of the M. P. Indus-trial Relations Act, 1960, was dismissed as barred by time. The Petitioner's revision under Section 66 of the Act before the Industrial Court was from an order dated December 6, 1968, passed by the Labour Court. The revision was filed on April 5, 1969. The period of limitation for such a revision is 30 days. Sub-section (2) of Section 66 reads thus:- No application under Sub-section (1) shall lie to the Industrial Court unless it is made within thirty days of the date on which the case has been finally decided by the Labour Court: Provided that in computing the period of thirty days the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded. A copy of the order of the Labour Court, being aggrieved by which the revision was filed, was admittedly supplied to the Petitioner on April 4, 1969, under the second proviso to Rule 58 (1) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Rules, 1961. The Petitioner's contention before the revisional Court was that the period from December 6, 1968 to April 4, 1969, should be excluded. This contention was rejected by the Industrial Court. The relevant portion of the said Rule 58 (1) runs thus:- 58 (1): An arbitrator, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court or a Board shall furnish a copy of an award, order or any document filed in any proceeding before it on payment of the charges at the following rates:- * * * Provided further that the Labour Officer, the Registrar, the Commissioner of Labour, and the parties to the dispute, shall be supplied with one copy of an award, or order, free of charge. The question before us is whether the period which intervenes between the date of the order and the supply of a copy under the second proviso to the above rule is also to be deemed as "period requisite for obtaining a copy" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 66(2) of the Act. The question before us is whether the period which intervenes between the date of the order and the supply of a copy under the second proviso to the above rule is also to be deemed as "period requisite for obtaining a copy" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 66(2) of the Act. It is clear from the second proviso to Rule 58 (1) that it is imperative for the Labour Court to supply a copy of the award or order to the parties to the dispute. A party, therefore, can legitimately wait for such a copy to be supplied to him and then he may go to the higher authorities if he is aggrieved by the order or the award. For a copy to be supplied under the second proviso to Rule 58 (1), no application is necessary. It is the duty of the Labour Court itself to supply such a copy. Learned Counsel for the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 contends that the period to be excluded under the proviso to Section 66(2) of the Act is only that period which is requisite for obtaining a copy when an application is made for obtaining a copy but not otherwise and on that argument it is urged that where a copy is supplied under the second proviso to Rule 58 (1), then there is no question of exclusion of any period under the proviso to Section 66(2). We are, clearly, of the opinion that having regard to the plain language of the second proviso to Rule 58 (1) when it is imperative that a copy shall be supplied to the parties, the parties can wait for a copy to be supplied to them and then prefer a revision under Section 66. It will, therefore, be a reasonable interpretation of the second proviso to Rule 58 (1) that the period which intervenes between the date of the order and the date on which such a copy is supplied should be excluded under the proviso to Section 66(2) of the Act. Here, it may be mentioned that it is not in dispute that such copies are supplied even without an application. In paragraph 1 of the return fi1ed by Respondents Nos. Here, it may be mentioned that it is not in dispute that such copies are supplied even without an application. In paragraph 1 of the return fi1ed by Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 it is admitted that the copy which the Petitioner filed with his revision was granted to him under Rule 58, that is to say it was granted without an application made by the party. Since the revision was filed on the very next day that the copy was given to the Petitioner, on excluding the period from December 6, 1968 to December 4, 1969 the revision must be treated as within limitation. This petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 25th November 1969 of the Industrial Court is quashed. The Industrial Court shall now decide the revision on merits. Parties shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the Petitioner. Petition allowed