JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - This is an appeal against the order of a learned single judge of this Court, dated 16th of April, 1971 dismissing the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground that it was unduly belated and that the petitioners were guilty of laches. 2. The three petitioners and respondents Nos. 2 to 7 belong to U.P. Service of Engineers and were working as officiating Executive Engineers. Recruitment to this service was being made from the following sources: (1) Direct appointment from amongst engineer students who passed out of the Thomason Civil Engineering College, Roorkee and who concluded a course of training in building and road branch as engineer students. (2) By direct appointment after advertisement. (3) By appointment of officers in the temporary service of U.P., P.W.D. building and road branch. (4) By promotion of the Members of the U.P. Subordinate Engineering service or of upper subordinate in the Public Works Department, building and road branch who have shown exceptional merits. (5) By promotion of computers in Public Works Department building and road branch who have shown exceptional merit and who are technically qualified. 3. On 21st March, 1942 U.P. Government made an order directing that with effect from the year 1942-43 two vacancies in Provincial Service for Engineers shall ordinarily be reserved for two students of the Thomason College of Civil Engineering Roorkee, who pass out highest in order of merit in the final examination of Civil Engineering of that College. Thus the two topmost students, out of those who passed out of the Civil Engineering Class of Thomason College Roorkee, in 1941 were to be eligible for appointment in 1942-43 on completing their class of Practical training. This order concerned the appointment to the Provincial Civil Service of Engineers from source No. 1 mentioned above. Appointments to be so made were termed as guaranteed appointments or appointment to guaranteed posts. Both the petitioners and the respondents No. 2 to 7 have been recruited from the first source. Respondents Nos. 2-7, however, belong to the class which was meant to fill the guaranteed posts. 4. The three petitioners passed out of the Thomason College of Engineering in the year 1948 and were appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineers on various dates in the year 1949. Respondents Nos. Respondents Nos. 2-7, however, belong to the class which was meant to fill the guaranteed posts. 4. The three petitioners passed out of the Thomason College of Engineering in the year 1948 and were appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineers on various dates in the year 1949. Respondents Nos. 2-7, who were entitled for guaranteed appointments, passed out of Thomason College of Engineers in 1949, 1950 and 1952 (two of them in each of the years mentioned above) . Four of them viz. respondents Nos. 2-5 were appointed as Assistant Engineers in the year 1951 whereas respondent No. 6 was so appointed in the year 1953. Respondent No. 7 was appointed as Assistant Engineer provisionally in the year 1953. However, State Government made orders confirming respondents Nos. 2-7 as permanent Assistant Engineers in the existing vacancies with effect from Ist April, 1955 on various dates. These orders provided that seniority of these officers was to be determined later. Seniority of these officers was subsequently determined vide office memorandum dated July 20, 1956 annexure 14 to the writ petition. The three petitioners who had been appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineers in the year 1949 continued to work as such and they were confirmed only on 7th of November, 1956, 9th of April. 1957 and 14th May, 1958 respectively. However, they were all confirmed retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1956. Order by which these officers were confirmed, provided that their seniority would be determined later and it was subsequently determined by officer memorandum dated 29th of April, 1961, Annexure 7. 5. The three petitioners claimed that respondents Nos. 2-7 were appointed as Assistant Engineers without consulting the Public Service Commission and that they were wrongly confirmed as Assistant Engineers by order made on 11th October, 1955, Annexure 13, with effect from 1st April, 1955 before the petitioners orders, for those confirmation were made on 7-11-1956, 9-4-1957 and 14-5-1968. They claim that seniority list had accordingly been prepared ignoring their claim for earlier confirmation. Result of this was that although according to rules of service, the petitioners were senior to respondents still the respondents were promoted to officiate as Executive Engineers before any chance was given to the petitioners. They claim that seniority list had accordingly been prepared ignoring their claim for earlier confirmation. Result of this was that although according to rules of service, the petitioners were senior to respondents still the respondents were promoted to officiate as Executive Engineers before any chance was given to the petitioners. They contend that seniority of Assistant Engineers joining the service has to be determined from the date of their respective appointments to the service and in this respect persons appointed to guaranteed posts could not enjoy any special privilege. Petitioners case, stated in their own words, in paragraph 41 of the petition, is- "That appointment to the post of permanent Assistant Engineer, which in other words means confirmation of temporary, Assistant Engineers, is to be clone in the U.P. Service of Engineers Class II building and roads branch strictly in the order of seniority as Temporary Assistant Engineers, with the exception that if it is proposed not to confirm the senior most person available, consultation with the U.P. Public Service Commission in that behalf will be necessary as will be evidenced by....." 6. They also cited certain instances where the Government had recognised this position. 7. In paragraph 60 of the petition it was stated that the legality of the action of opposite party No. 1 in confirming opposite parties Nos. 2-7 from a date prior to the date of confirmation of the petitioners, and in giving seniority to opposite parties Nos. 2-7 over them was being challenged on the two grounds mentioned therein. 8. These averments go to show that by filing this writ petition, what the petitioner really intended to challenge was the order of the State Government confirming the respondents as Assistant Engineers before confirming the petitioners. In other words, the petitioners want to question the legality of the order made as far back as 11th October, 1955, Annexure 13, by means of a petition filed in the year 1970. 9. Apart from the general reliefs, the two reliefs claimed by the petitioners are (1) to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite party No. I not to act on the basis of dates of confirmation vide Annexure 6 and 13, dated 29th of May 1971 and 11th of October 1955 respectively and seniority of the petitioner and the opposite parties Nos. 2-7 as determined in Annexures 7 and 14 dated 29th May 1961 and 20th July 1956 and (2) to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite party No. 1 to redetermine the respective dates of confirmation of the petitioners vis-a-vis opposite parties Nos. 2-7 and accordingly re-assess the inter se Nos. 2-7 in case seniority between the petitioners and opposite parties Nos. 2-7 in accordance with law and in the light of decision in the writ petition. 10. The reliefs claimed by the petitioners also indicate that the writ petition is in fact directed against the order by which the respondents were confirmed before the petitioners and consequential determination of their seniority on that basis. In the circumstances, a question that naturally arose for consideration before the learned single judge, was whether while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution he should consider the propriety of an order made in the year 1955 i.e. about 15 years before the filing of the writ petition. 11. Learned single judge rejected the explanation offered by the petitioner and held that the petition was highly belated and barred by laches. In the result he dismissed the writ petition. 12. In this appeal, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the delay in filing the writ petition had been properly explained and considering the nature of controversy involved in the case learned single judge was not justified in rejecting the petition on this ground. 13. Explanation offered by the petitioner for this inordinate delay is that during the year 1941 a large number of persons were appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineers both against guaranteed and non-guaranteed posts. After these engineers were made permanent, the State Government by an order dated 19th of April 1950 determined their seniority in such a way that persons appointed to the guaranteed posts every year were given seniority over other persons appointed in that year only. A person appointed to a guaranteed post in a particular year was made junior to all those who were appointed as Assistant Engineer in earlier years, irrespective of whether they were appointed to guaranteed or to non-guaranteed posts. A person appointed to a guaranteed post in a particular year was made junior to all those who were appointed as Assistant Engineer in earlier years, irrespective of whether they were appointed to guaranteed or to non-guaranteed posts. In this manner, one Sri D.K. Laroia who was appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineer to one of the guaranteed posts in 1945 and confirmed in the year 1949 was placed at serial No. 50 Sri Laroia then made a representation dated April 15, 1955 claiming seniority over every Assistant Engineer appointed to non-guaranteed post, irrespective of the year of appointment. This representation was pending when order for confirming the respondents was made on 11th of October, 1953 with retrospective effect from 1st of April 1954, and also when the petitioners were confirmed vide orders dated 7th of November, 1956, 9th of April, 1957 and 14th of May, 1958 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1956. As it was expected that the Government would adopt a uniform policy after deciding Sri Laroia's representation it was not considered desirable to rush up to this Court by way of writ petition. The petitioners further alleged that they also made representations dated 19th of August 1959, 29th July 1959 and 5th of August 1959 followed by reminders dated 27th May 1960, 23rd July 1960 and 2nd August 1963 claiming that their seniority had been wrongly fixed vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 2-7, but no orders on these representations and reminders have been passed so far. It appears that various representations were forwarded to the Public Service Commission and by a letter dated 9th of December, 1964 the Public Service Commission told the Government that real grievance of Sri Laroia was that he had been placed at the head of his batch only, whereas guaranteed Assistant Engineers who were confirmed subsequently in the year 1956 were placed above non-gazetted Assistant Engineers of even earlier batches. The Commission had advised the Government to rectify this mistake as would appear from its letter dated 27th July, 1964. Once that rectification was made all the guaranteed appointments would secure the top position in their batch only and not over others of earlier batches and the sting in Laroia's representation would be taken out and he will get reconciled to the position already assigned to him in the seniority list of Assistant Engineers. Once that rectification was made all the guaranteed appointments would secure the top position in their batch only and not over others of earlier batches and the sting in Laroia's representation would be taken out and he will get reconciled to the position already assigned to him in the seniority list of Assistant Engineers. The Commission, therefore, requested that decision of the Government on the recommendation made by it be expedited and the commission be informed accordingly. The petitioners contended that the Government has not taken any decision on the recommendation made by the Public Service Commission and as such the question that the present petition is belated does not arise. 14. It was also contended on their behalf that one Sri K.C. Aggarwal filed a writ petition No. 12 of 1966 on 4th of April 1966 in which similar questions were raised and which was still pending when the present writ petition was filed in the year 1970 and therefore the petition should not be considered to be belated. They were fully justified in waiting for the decision of the State Government on the representations made by Sri Laroia in the light of the advice given by the Public Service Commission till after December 1964. It is rather curious that the Government has not so far given effect to the advice given by the Public Service Commission. 15. We find that Sri Laroia made a representation to the State Government in respect of his seniority on 16th of April 1955, long before the orders confirming the respondents were passed on 11th October, 1955 and those confirming the petitioners were passed in the years 1956, 1957 and 1958. In spite of the fact that Sri Laroia's representation was pending, the Government made order determining respective seniority of the petitioners and the respondents. In the circumstances, pending of Laroia's representation cannot provide an excuse for inaction on the part of the petitioners. Moreover, success of the representation made by Sri Laroia could not have been in the interest of the petitioners. The petitioners, therefore, were not at all justified in waiting for a decision on the representation made by Sri Laroia. 16. The first representation said to have been made by the petitioners was made on 28th July 1959 i.e. after about 3 years of the order fixing petitioner's seniority. The petitioners, therefore, were not at all justified in waiting for a decision on the representation made by Sri Laroia. 16. The first representation said to have been made by the petitioners was made on 28th July 1959 i.e. after about 3 years of the order fixing petitioner's seniority. Apart from the pendency of the representation made by Sri Laroia no other explanation has been offered by the petitioners for their inaction up to the year 1959 and even after 1963 when they sent their last reminder to the Government. 17. It was then contended that in the year 1966 one Sri K.C. Agrawal filed a writ petition in this Court raising similar pleas, and that writ petition was still pending when the petitioners, filed their petition. It was heard and decided on the same date on which the petition giving rise to the present appeal was heard and decided. It was claimed that in these circumstances no question of the petition being belated arises. We are unable to accept this contention. Mere filing of a writ petition by another person cannot justify inaction on the part of the petitioners. Thus we find that the explanation for the delay in filing the writ petition as put forward by the petitioner is not adequate and was rightly rejected by the learned single judge. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that even if the delay in filing the writ petition has not been properly explained, that by itself should not be a ground for rejecting the petition. He relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Singhani v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427. In that case, amongst others, a plea was raised that during the period 1951-56, recruitment to Income-tax Class I grade II service was made, violating the Quota fixed for direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion. In the result, there was excessive recruitment of 71 promotes more than the figure permitted by quota rule. In that case, amongst others, a plea was raised that during the period 1951-56, recruitment to Income-tax Class I grade II service was made, violating the Quota fixed for direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion. In the result, there was excessive recruitment of 71 promotes more than the figure permitted by quota rule. In a petition filed long after 1956, the Supreme Court upheld this contention and issued mandamus commanding the respondents to adjust seniority of the petitioner's and other officers similarly placed and to prepare a fresh seniority list in accordance with law after adjusting the recruitment for the period 1951-56 and onwards in accordance with quota rules prescribed in the letter of Government of India dated 18th October, 1951. Their Lordships, made it clear that the order was not to affect such Class II Officers who had been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. Their order, however, was to apply to all other officers including those who had been appointed as Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax provisionally pursuant to the order of the High Court. Learned counsel contended that in Jai Singhani's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 the Supreme Court interfered with the recruitment made after a period of about 11 years. He contended that in Jai Singhania's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 the Supreme Court recognised that in respect of service matter, writ petition is not to be considered to be belated or barred by laches merely because the same has been filed after considerable lapse of time, subject of course, to this that if vested rights have accrued in favour of some Government servant that right may not be disturbed after a length of time. According to the learned counsel, in the case before us, both the petitioners and the respondents Nos. 2-7 are merely officiating Executive Engineers and therefore, if the petitioners are right in contending that their seniority has been wrongly fixed and relief is granted to them, the respondents will not be prejudiced merely because the petition has been filed late and therefore the petition could not be dismissed on that ground. 19. 2-7 are merely officiating Executive Engineers and therefore, if the petitioners are right in contending that their seniority has been wrongly fixed and relief is granted to them, the respondents will not be prejudiced merely because the petition has been filed late and therefore the petition could not be dismissed on that ground. 19. He also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mahar, President Industrial Court Bombay, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1450, In this case the Supreme Court considered the question as to the circumstance in which jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution may not be misused and observed :- "It is true that the issue of the writ of Certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent though not identical with similar to exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery." Their Lordships further pointed out the principle on which the discretion is exercised by a court of Chancery, was stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindley Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 5 P.C. 221 at p. 239, as follows :- "Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to waiver of it, or whereby his conduct or neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other so far as it relates to the remedy." 20. Learned counsel argued that in the case before us, any negligence or omission on the part of the appellant in not asserting their rights in not such which taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causes any prejudice to the other party. He contends that if at all the other side gained some advantage by getting confirmed earlier and they would not be prejudiced if fresh orders confirming them are passed with effect from the correct date and they are given seniority which is due to them under the law. It cannot be said that the petitioner's conduct has been such that it may be regarded as waiving his rights. The respondents it is urged, have not been placed in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place them if the remedy was afterwards to be asserted. Further, it is pointed only, there is no statute which bars seeking of the remedy claimed in the writ petition. In the circumstances it is submitted, the learned single judge was not justified in refusing him relief on the ground of delay. 21. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhai Lal Bhai, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1006, the Supreme Court observed :- "It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Again where even if there is any such delay the Government or the Statutory Authority against whom consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such remedy on the ground like limitation the court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of Mandamus for such payment. Again where even if there is any such delay the Government or the Statutory Authority against whom consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such remedy on the ground like limitation the court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of Mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound discretion to leave the party to seek the remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution." 22. In the case of Naresh Chandra Saha v. Union Territory of Tripura, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 364, a question that arose for consideration was whether the petitioner should be allowed to question the propriety of an order reverting him passed seven years before filing the writ petition. The Supreme Court observed as follows :- "In any event the Judicial Commissioner was justified in refusing to entertain any contention as to the validity of the order of reversion made nearly seven years before the date on which petition was filed." It appears that in this case, the judicial Commissioner had refused to entertain any contention as to the reliability of an order of reversion only on the ground that it was being raised seven years after and on no other ground, and the Supreme Court approved this action. 23. The Supreme Court again had an occasion to consider the effect of delay in filing a writ petition, in respect of service matters, in the case of Ravindra Nath v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 470. While dealing with this question it made the following observation at page 477. "But in so far as the attack is based on 1962 seniority rules, it must fail on another ground, the ground being that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been brought about 15 years after 1952. Rules were promulgated and effect was given to them in the seniority list prepared on August 1, 1953." In this case an argument was raised that under Article 32 of the Constitution, Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to refuse to exercise its discretion on the ground of delay. This argument was repelled by the Court. Rules were promulgated and effect was given to them in the seniority list prepared on August 1, 1953." In this case an argument was raised that under Article 32 of the Constitution, Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to refuse to exercise its discretion on the ground of delay. This argument was repelled by the Court. If it is open to the Supreme Court not to exercise its jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution, on the ground of delay, it would equally be open to the High Court to decline to interfere on that ground while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Again after considering the argument raised in the case and the authorities cited before them learned judges made the following observation :- "But after carefully considering the matter, as are of the view that no relief should be given to the petitioner, who without any reasonable explanation approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay.......... It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, so it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay." Their Lordships then made significant observations to the following effect :- "It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion affected a long time ago would not be set aside after a lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court in Jai Singhani's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II Officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioner:- 24. In the case before us, the order confirming the respondents as Assistant Engineers, which is sought to be challenged by this writ petition was made as far back as 11th October, 1955. In the case before us, the order confirming the respondents as Assistant Engineers, which is sought to be challenged by this writ petition was made as far back as 11th October, 1955. When their appointment was not challenged by the petitioners for quite some time, as per observations of the Supreme Court in Ravindra Nath's A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 470 they were then entitled to sit back and consider that the appointment made some time back will not be set aside and that it would be unjust to deprive them of the rights which have accrued to them. Jai Singhani's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 was examined and explained by the Supreme Court in that case and on the same reasoning even the observations made in Moon's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1450 will not help the appellant. 25. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the learned single judge was fully justified in not permitting the petitioner to raise a challenge, to the orders made as far back as the year 1955, and 1956. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that even if the petitioners cannot be permitted to question the propriety of confirmation orders dated 11th October 1955 and 9th May, 1956, they are still entitled to claim seniority over the respondents as per rules regulating the seniority of engineers. They claim that the petitioners were appointed as Assistant Engineers even though temporarily, they became members of the service. Since they became members of the service before the respondents they were entitled to claim seniority over the respondents. According to him orders of confirmation did not have the effect of altering their seniority in the service. It is admitted by respondent No. I that representations made by the petitioners as far back as the year 1959 in this respect are still pending and therefore no, question of its becoming barred by delay arises. 27. As stated earlier, basic ambit and scope of the present writ petition filed before this Court was a challenge raised to the confirmation orders dated 11th October, 1955 and 29th May, 1961 and consequential determination of seniority by acting upon those confirmation orders. Since the petitioners cannot be allowed to agitate and question the propriety of confirmation order passed long time back, it would not be desirable to go into the question of consequential determination of seniority either. Since the petitioners cannot be allowed to agitate and question the propriety of confirmation order passed long time back, it would not be desirable to go into the question of consequential determination of seniority either. Moreover representations made by the petitioners, as admitted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, are still pending. The State Government has taken up the stand that these representations have not been decided as writ petitions had been filed by Sri K.C. Agrawal and the petitioners before this Court and the matter became subjudice. We have no reason to think that after disposal of the petitions the State Government will not decide the representations fairly and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to examine the correctness of this submission made by the petitioners in this petition. 28. We are accordingly of opinion that in the circumstances the learned single judge was fully justified in holding that the appellants were not entitled to claim a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.