JUDGMENT K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiff appellants, arising out of the following facts: The plaintiffs brought a suit with the allegations that the disputed land belonged to one Raghubans Rao, who was succeeded by his mother Rani Mahalakshmi. The Rani entered into a family settlement with the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 to 7. The plaintiffs and these defendants asserted that they were collaterals of Raghubans Rao. By this family settlement the disputed land and certain other properties were given to the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 to 7. According to the plaintiffs, they were in possession of the land in dispute, and as the defendant No. 1 started construction on the disputed land without any right or title, therefore, they brought the suit for declaration and injunction. 2. The defendant No. 1 contested the suit and alleged that his father Beni Prasad succeeded to the property on the death of Shanker Lal, to whom it belonged, as his daughter's son, and after the death of his father, the property had been in his possession. According to this defendant, Shanker Lal was the father of Ganpat Gopal, the father of Raghubans Rao. It was alleged that the Rani had no right, title or interest in the disputed property so as to entitle him to enter into any family settlement. 3. The learned Munsif held that the family settlement was valid, and that the Rani was in possession of the disputed property as a widow, and she rightly entered into the family settlement with the plaintiffs. On these findings, the suit was decreed. The defendant No. 1 filed an appeal. The lower appellate court held that there was a family settlement, but the plaintiffs were not the members of the family of Raghubans Rao and, therefore, the family settlement was not binding on the defendant No. 1. It was also held that the defendant No. 1 was the rightful owner of the properties and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree on the basis of their possessory title. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court were set aside, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs. 4. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiffs have filed the present Second Appeal in this Court. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court were set aside, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs. 4. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiffs have filed the present Second Appeal in this Court. It was vehemently argued on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants that firstly the plaintiff-appellants were members of the family of Raghubans Rao and secondly even if they were not so, the family settlement entered into by the Rani with the plaintiff was valid because there could be a family settlement even when one of the parties to the settlement was a stranger. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the possessory title of the plaintiffs was good enough to give them the reliefs of declaration and injunction prayed for, and the lower appellate court was wrong in holding against the plaintiffs on this issue as well. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act the Rani became the absolute owner of the properties and, therefore, the family settlement was binding and valid so far as the disputed property was concerned because the right which the Rani acquired subsequently was sufficient enough to give a title to the plaintiffs in the disputed property. So far as the question of the plaintiffs being the members of the family of Raghubans Rao is concerned, there is a finding of fact by the lower appellate court that the plaintiffs were not the members of the family. This finding was challenged by the learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that there was evidence on the record that the plaintiffs were the members of the family. In this connection, the statement of Jugal Kishore (PW 1) was relied upon. In his cross-examination, Jugal Kishore made a statement that Raghubans and Debi Sewak and the sister of the plaintiffs were not real brothers and sister, but they were of the same family. This statement cannot be read to the advantage of the plaintiffs because it does not come within the four corners of S. 32(5) and S. 50 of the Evidence Act. There is nothing on the record to show that this Jugal Kishore was in any way connected with the family or that he had any personal knowledge about this fact. This statement cannot be read to the advantage of the plaintiffs because it does not come within the four corners of S. 32(5) and S. 50 of the Evidence Act. There is nothing on the record to show that this Jugal Kishore was in any way connected with the family or that he had any personal knowledge about this fact. He has not given any pedigree connecting Debi Sewak with Raghubans Rao and, therefore, his general statement in the cross-examination to the above effect should not be received as an evidence in support of the fact that the plaintiffs were the members of the family of Raghubans Rao. 5. Thus, there is a clear finding by the lower appellate court based on the evidence on record that the plaintiffs were strangers to the family of Raghubans Rao. This finding of the lower appellate court being based on evidence cannot be said to be perverse. Therefore, in a second appeal, this finding of fact has to be accepted. 6. The plaintiffs having been held to be strangers to the family, it has to be seen as to whether there could be a settlement between the Rani and the plaintiffs. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the Oudh High Court in Uma Datt v. Ram Jiwan 1941 AWR (CC) 29). In this case, the family settlement was between the members of the family. They were related to the last male holder of the property. One of them, namely, Ganga Din was remotely connected with the family. Therefore, in this case none of the parties to the family settlement was an absolute stranger to the family as in the instant case. There are certain observations in this case which can be read with advantage in holding that the law does not contemplate a family arrangement where one of the parties is a total stranger to the family. In this case it was observed as below:-- The case in AIR 1926 Allahabad 7 is clearly distinguishable on facts. There the widow had adopted a relation of her own and made him a member of her husband's family. Upto the time of his adoption he was not a member of that family but belonged to the family of his adoptive mother. There the widow had adopted a relation of her own and made him a member of her husband's family. Upto the time of his adoption he was not a member of that family but belonged to the family of his adoptive mother. It was held in these circumstances that any arrangement arrived at between him (adopted son) and her before the adoption took place or at that very time cannot be said to have been an arrangement between the members of the same family. Further on, it was observed as below: The last case which remains to be noticed in this connection is a decision of the Officiating Judicial Commissioner of Nagpur in 76 IC 218. In this case the defendant supported his possession to the property under a family arrangement. It appeared however that the defendant was an utter stranger and was not a member of the family of the deceased owner of the property which was in his possession. In these circumstances it was held that the defendant being a perfect stranger to the family cannot be in possession of the property under a family arrangement which presupposes a claim by some members of the family to part of the family property, which is settled by an arrangement between the members of the family recognising the claimant's real or supposed rights. 8. The above observations in Uma Datt's case leave no room for doubt all the law required was that all the parties to the family arrangement must be the members of the family either closely related as heirs or remotely related. The law, therefore, does not contemplate a family arrangement where one of the parties is an utter stranger to the family. In this view of the matter, the Oudh case is distinguishable from the instant case. 9. The other case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is a decision of the Bombay High Court in Shivamurteppa Gurappa Ganiger v. Fakirappa Basangauda Channappagaudar A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 430). In this case also the parties to the family arrangement were all members of the family and, therefore, it was said that it was not necessary that a member of the family should be so closely related to the heir but it was only necessary that he should be a member of the family howsoever remotely connected. This case is also therefore, distinguishable from the present case. 10. This case is also therefore, distinguishable from the present case. 10. The third case cited on behalf of the appellants was a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi A.I.R. 1966 SC 323). In this case also the members to the family arrangement were of the same family. The following observation in this case also supports the view which I have taken: Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future dispute regarding property amongst members of a family. The word 'family' in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. From the above observation of the Supreme Court it is evident that it is not necessary that the parties to the family settlement be necessarily an heir or a person having the right to succession. 11. In interpreting a family settlement, the word 'family' has to be interpreted liberally which would mean that the word 'family' is not limited to heirs or near relations, but also to persons who are distantly or remotely connected with the family. The meaning of the word 'family' cannot be enlarged so as to include a stranger to the family, otherwise the very notion of a family settlement would be lost. A family settlement, if other legal conditions are satisfied, is given a special sanctity in law because it is a settlement of a family dispute howsoever colourable. This is based on the principle that by the settlement the family is saved of a ruinous litigation which might end in the loss of the property to the family itself. 12. I do not think that an agreement between a widow and a stranger can be said to be a family arrangement. If this view is taken, any agreement or demise which a widow may make in favour of a stranger would come under a family settlement which, I think, the law does not permit. In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs being strangers, they are not legally entitled to claim that the transaction which the Rani entered into with them was a family arrangement. 13. In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs being strangers, they are not legally entitled to claim that the transaction which the Rani entered into with them was a family arrangement. 13. There is a finding of fact that the Rani had no right to enter into the family settlement and as this document is also based on legal and good evidence, it cannot be upset in a second appeal. 14. So far as the other argument about the possessory title of the plaintiffs is concerned, it was rightly repelled by the lower appellate court. The possessory title is good against every body except the rightful owner or a person having better claim than the person in possession. In the instant case, there is a clear finding of fact that the defendant No. 1 was the owner of the property in dispute. The possessory title of the plaintiffs, therefore, can be of no avail against the defendant No. 1, the real owner of the property. Therefore, this argument also has no force in it. 15. So far as the argument regarding S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is concerned, this too has no force in it. The deed was executed on 1-3-1955. The Rani died on 21-6-1957, whereas the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17-6-1956. The Rani was not in possession of the property on the date on which the Hindu Succession Act came into force, and, therefore, this argument also fails. 16. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the appellants should be permitted to withdraw the suit with the liberty to bring a fresh suit. This argument too cannot be accepted. There was no formal defect in this case going to the root of the case. On the other hand, if the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were members of the family of Raghubans Rao, they cannot be given another chance to prove this fact because that would only mean encouraging introduction of frivolous litigation. Therefore, the suit cannot be permitted to be withdrawn with a liberty to bring a fresh suit on the ground of weakness of the plaintiffs' evidence. This argument, therefore, has no force in it. 17. In the result, the appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed. Costs of this appeal shall be easy.