Judgment Kanhaiyaji, J. 1. Messrs Ganga Motor Service has filed this application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the order dated the 4/5.01.1969 (Annexure 1) passed by the Chota Nagpur Regional Transport Authority, hereinafter- called the R. T. A., the order of the Appeal Board dated the 4th April, 1969 (Annexure 2) and the order of the State Government dated the 9th August, 1969 (Annexure, 4) and for direction to the Transport authorities to consider only the case of the petitioner for granting permit for stage carriage. 2. The R. T. A. (respondent No. 2) advertised one vacancy for the route Chatra Hatia via Chandva and Ranchi (96 miles) and invited applications for the grant of a stage carriage permit. The petitioner along with 23 other persons applied for the grant of the permit The applications were duly published, and objections and representations, if any, were invited. The R. T. A., before hearing the applications, for grant of a stage carriage permit on the aforesaid route, considered the desirability of granting a stage carriage permit and came to the conclusion that there were adequate services on the route which fully catered to the existing need. It also held that routes should be created on some set principle keeping always in view the interest of the travelling public. It laid down certain principles as guide-line for creation of service. In the light of the above decision, the hearing of the applications for the said route was dropped. The extract of the proceeding of the meeting of R. T. A. is Annexure 1 to the application. Against the aforesaid order of the R. T. A., the petitioner filed an appeal under S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 , hereinafter called "the Act". The State Transport Appellate Authority (respondent No. 3), hereinafter called "the Appeal Board", heard the appeal. It was represented on behalf of the appellant before the Appeal Board that having advertised the vacancy the R. T. A. could not cancel the vacancy advertised. It was pointed out that the applications should have been considered on their merits. The State Transport Appellate Authority (respondent No. 3), hereinafter called "the Appeal Board", heard the appeal. It was represented on behalf of the appellant before the Appeal Board that having advertised the vacancy the R. T. A. could not cancel the vacancy advertised. It was pointed out that the applications should have been considered on their merits. The Appeal Board held that the R. T. A. was certainly justified in initiating principles to be followed as far as future guidance is concerned; but it should not refuse to consider any application received in respect to an advertisement issued by the R. T. A. The Appeal Board, therefore, ordered that the R. T. A. must consider all the applications for the notified route and give permit accordingly. The appeal was allowed on the 4th April, 1969, and the case was remanded for action in the light of the observations recorded by the Appeal Board. A copy of the order is Annexure "2" to the application. The petitioner was not satisfied with the order passed by the Appeal Board. Therefore, the petitioner filed an application under Sec. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 hereinafter called the Bihar Amendment Act". The application was filed mainly on the ground that since the other applicants did not file any appeal against the order of the R. T. A., therefore, the Appeal Board acted without jurisdiction in remanding their cases. The petitioner being the sole appellant before the Appeal Board claimed that the permit should have been granted to the petitioner, for the entire route in question. A copy of the application filed by the petitioner is Annexure 3 to the application. It is stated in the Writ application that the petitioner was not given any notice and personal hearing in respect of the application filed by him under Sec. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act; but was only informed by Memo No. A4-1017/69-7185 dated the 9th August 1969, signed by the Under Secy, to Government that his representation under Sec. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act had been reiected by the State Government. A copy of the letter is Annexure "4" to the Writ application. 3. It may be mentioned that at the time of the hearing of this application. Mr. A copy of the letter is Annexure "4" to the Writ application. 3. It may be mentioned that at the time of the hearing of this application. Mr. Basudev Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner, did not challenge the validity of the order passed bv the R. T. A. (Annexure "I1). The main argument put forward by learned Counsel is that the order of the Appeal Board directing the R. T. A. to consider all the applications for the grant of permit for the said notified route was ultra vires. It was urged by him that the Appeal Board should itself have decided and taken a decision on the point and granted permit to the petitioner as it had only filed the appeal before it against the order of the R. T. A. dropping the proceeding. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was therefore, that the Appeal Board was competent in the circumstances to only consider the case of the petitioner and order for grant of permit. 4. I am unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner as correct. It is true that the appeal of the petitioner was being dealt with by the Appeal Board, but I see no warrant for the submission that the Appeal Board had no power to remand the case as a whole to the R. T. A. after setting aside the order dropping the proceeding. It cannot be doubted that the power of the Appeal Board under Sec. 64 of the Act must comprise within its ambit the power to dispose of the appeal in any manner known to law. The Appeal Board has no doubt a right to set aside the order of the R. T. A. under appeal and substitute its own order. It may, on the other hand, merely quash the order appealed against and require the R. T. A. to restore the original proceeding and decide it afresh. It is equally clear that in disposing of an appeal under Section 64 of the Act, the Appeal Board has power to remand the case because the power of remand is ancillary to the power of disposal of the appeal. This view is supported by a Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmi Narain Sahu V/s. State Transport Appellate Authority, AIR 1963 Pat 81 . This view is supported by a Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmi Narain Sahu V/s. State Transport Appellate Authority, AIR 1963 Pat 81 . It is not a case in which the R. T. A. failed to determine the claim of the applicants or has determined the claim of one applicant as against the other applicants. In the instant case, the R. T. A. had dropped the hearing of the applications filed by the petitioner and 23 other persons for grant of the permit. The Appeal Board was thus within its rights while setting aside the said order to direct the R. T. A. to consider all applications for the notified route and grant permit according to law. Had the Appeal Board granted permit to the petitioner for the said notified route, it would have been without hearing the applications which were pending before the R. T. A. Admittedly, the R. T. A. had not considered the several applications filed for permit of the notified route on merit. Different considerations may arise if the R. T. A. had considered the applications on merit and decided in favour of one after rejecting the applications of others; but the situation is entirely different in this case. In such a situation, the Appeal Board was fully justified in remanding the case to the R. T. A. for a fresh decision after determining the rival claims of the applicants. 5. In support of his contention, learned Counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Cumbum Roadways (P) Ltd. Madurai V/s. Somu Transport (P) Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1366 , in which the Regional Transport Authority granted a stage carriage permit on a certain route to A, one of the several applicants for permit. Several appeals were filed by the applicants who were aggrieved by the order. These appeals were heard together by the Appellate Tribunal which set aside the order granting permit to A and instead ordered grant of permit to B. A thereupon filed a writ application challenging the grant of permit to -B. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal and directed it to dispose of the appeal afresh or remit the matter to the Transport Authority for fresh disposal. The matter was taken to the Letters Patent Bench which remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for reconsideration after hearing all the parties, namely, not only the parties which had come to the High Court by way of writ proceedings but also the other appellants who had filed appeals before the Tribunal. On appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court decided that on principle it was not right that the High Court should set aside orders in appeal passed by the Appellate Tribunal when the parties to those appeal did not bring up the matters before the High Court, simply because as a matter of convenience the Appellate Tribunal dealt with all the appeals relating to one route by a consolidated order. Therefore, the remand should only be confined to those parties which came to the High Court and not extend to others, as the High Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal either in favour of or against the parties which had not come to it. The principle laid down in the above case has no bearing on the facts of the instant case. When a court of appeal dismisses an appeal it becomes final; and if the matter is not brought before a superior authority or the High Court by way of writ proceedings against a successful party, it is not open to the High Court to interfere in favour of that person who had not thought fit to challenge the order of the Appellate Tribunal. In the instant case, no such order had been passed either by the R. T. A. or the Appeal Board. I would, therefore, hold that the order passed by the Appeal Board in the instant case is not only within its jurisdiction but also just and proper. 6. The other grievance of the petitioner is that the application filed by the petitioner under Sec. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act has not been dealt with by the Minister. Alternatively, it was argued that even if the application had been dealt with by the Minister, the petitioner was not given notice of hearing before summarily rejecting his application. It may be mentioned that at the time of hearing of the writ application, it was not urged that the Minister could not reject the application without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. It may be mentioned that at the time of hearing of the writ application, it was not urged that the Minister could not reject the application without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. There is no provision for the Minister to issue a notice to the petitioner in a revision application in order to enable him to make an oral submission. However, it was strenuously urged that the Minister had not looked into the revision petition which he was bound to consider on merits before summarily dismissing it. In order to satisfy ourselves on the points raised on behalf of the petitioner, we wanted to have a look on the order of the Minister, and, learned Standing Counsel No. II though he was not appearing in the case undertook to produce the same before us. and, he later on produced the entire file of the revision case for our perusal. On perusing the same, I do not find that the Adviser who was in charge of the department at that time had passed the order summarily rejecting the application without considering the matter. Therefore, there is no truth in the submission that the Minister, in this case the Adviser, had passed the order rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Sec. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act without considering it on merits. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner next argued that the order passed by the Government is illegal and it should be quashed. The grievance of the petitioner is that the grounds for rejecting the application are not mentioned in the order. This aspect of the case was considered by a Bench of this Court in Bikramajit Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1965 BLJR 394 = ( AIR 1966 Pat 96 ) and in a recent decision of this Bench in Sarju Bala Kushiary V/s. The tinder Secretary to Government of Bihar, Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No, 1095 of 1969, (reported in AIR 1972 Pat. 62 ) disposed of on the 19th February, 1971. It was held that there was no provision for the Minister to issue a notice to the petitioner in a revision application to enable him to make an oral submission. 62 ) disposed of on the 19th February, 1971. It was held that there was no provision for the Minister to issue a notice to the petitioner in a revision application to enable him to make an oral submission. A different consideration may arise when the Minister is going to reverse an order of the subordinate authority and thus pass an adverse order against a person in whose favour the subordinate authority had passed an order. It is not necessary for a Minister to give elaborate grounds for rejecting a revision application summarily and thus affirming the order of the subordinate authority. In cases where the superior authority merely affirms the order of the inferior authority and where the order of the inferior authority does not set out its reasons, the superior authority is required to disclose its reasons in its order. However, where the order of the inferior authority sets out the reasons and the superior authority finds the reasons of the inferior authority acceptable to it, it need not specify the reasons in its order but may merely refer to the reasons given by the inferior authority or give an outline of the process of reasoning by which it finds itself in agreement with the inferior authority. Further, if the superior authority does not find the reasons of the inferior authority acceptable to it, the superior authority must set out its own reasons in its order. In the instant case, the Adviser apparently agreed with the reasons given by the Appeal Board and therefore in agreement with the order passed by the inferior authority dismissed the application summarily. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in the contention and this has also to be rejected. 8. The result, therefore, is that the application fails and is dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs. S.N.P.Singh, J. 9 I agree.