JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by one of the partners of the erstwhile New Janta Goods Transports Company, challenging the proceedings for recovery of Provident Fund dues under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . 2. The petitioner is one of the partners of the firm which carried on the business of transport. It is alleged that the firm was constituted on 1st December, 1965 and was dissolved on the 31st October, 1968. It appears that the provident fund dues were not being paid by the firm and accordingly, a notice dated 17th October, 1969 was issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, U.P., calling upon the employers to appear on the 6th November, 1969 in connection with an enquiry for determining the provident fund payable. The dues in respect of which the notice was given was for, a period from June, 1968 to July, 1969. This notice was sent by post and was returned with the report of the postman that the firm had come to an end as such the notice was being returned. No further notice was sent or sought to be served upon the firm or any of its partners, and subsequently an order was passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner under Sec. 7-A of the Act imposing an amount of Rs. 1755.25 P. only as dues payable under the Act. Subsequently, a letter dated 5th December, 1969 was sent by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner U.P., to the Collector Agra for recovery of a total amount of Rs. 18,121.20 from Messrs Janta Transport Company as arrears of land revenue. 3. The petitioner filed an objection before the Additional Collector, Agra, against the recovery but it appears that the objection was not disposed of and the Additional Collector only kept on granting time to the petitioner to bring a stay order from the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. According to the petitioner, he also made a representation to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner on the 15th January, 1970 (Annexure "F' to the petition) challenging the imposition. This representation according to the case set up by the respondents was not received. No orders having been passed on that representation, the petitioner thereafter moved this court by way of the present petition challenging the impugned imposition and demand of Provident Fund. 4. This representation according to the case set up by the respondents was not received. No orders having been passed on that representation, the petitioner thereafter moved this court by way of the present petition challenging the impugned imposition and demand of Provident Fund. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions : (1) The partnership having been dissolved, there is no liability on the petitioner who was merely one of the partners to pay the dues; (2) The firm was an establishment which had been newly set up and as such entitled to exemption under Sec. 16 of the Act ; (3) No enquiry as contemplated by Sec. 7 (c) of that Act having been found to have been received by the establishment before passing the order under Sec. 7 (a) of the Act, the order is void. (4) No notice having been given or served on the petitioner before the impugned order was passed, the order is opposed to the principles of natural justice and in contravention of Sec. 7 (a) (iii) of the Act. 5. There is no substance in the first three contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. It is, not denied that the firm was doing transport business. In law a firm is not a legal entity. See Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1956 SC 354. The business as such was owned by the partners of the firm who had ultimate control and authority. Under Sec. 6 of the Act, the liability to pay the provident fund contribution is upon the employer. The word "employer" has been defined in Sec. 2 (e) of he Act, and means " . . . . . . . a person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment." It cannot be denied that the firm was an establishment as contemplated by the Act, and inasmuch as the partners had the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, all the partners in the present case were employers in relation to the persons employed in the business of the firm. As such the petitioner was liable for the contributions which had to be made under the Act, and the mere fact that the partnership stood dissolved would not absolve him of a liability which had already accrued at the when the partnership was in existence. As such the petitioner was liable for the contributions which had to be made under the Act, and the mere fact that the partnership stood dissolved would not absolve him of a liability which had already accrued at the when the partnership was in existence. The dissolution of the partnership was a matter inter se between the partners, and it cannot affect the statutory liability of the employers which had accrued under the Act. No provision in the Act has been pointed out which would absolve an employer of his liability to pay the provident fund which has already been fallen due on account of the mere fact that the firm which owns a particular establishment has been dissolved. 6. The contention that the firm was entitled to exemption under Sec. 16 of the Act may now be considered. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the petition, it has been stated that the firm was constituted on the 1st of December, 1965 and was dissolved on the 31st October, 1968. This fact has been denied in paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit and it has been stated that Messrs New Tanta Transport Company was established in the year 1959 and its business had started as from that time and that the partners in order to avoid the statutory liability had been changing partners. The question as to when a particular establishment has been set up involves an enquiry into facts, and this fact having been disputed in the counter-affidavit, it is not possible to decide this controversy. As such this argument of the petitioner must also fail. 7. In connection with the third contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of the Orissa High Court in Balasore Motor Association v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Orissa, A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 199 and Ramanujan Press v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras, A.I.R. 1970 Madras 224. None of these cases are apposite to the present controversy. In the present case, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner issued a notice to the petitioner and thereafter when no one appeared on behalf of the employers accepted the report made by the Regional Provident Fund Inspector. In these circumstances it cannot be said that no enquiry as contemplated by Sec. 7 (a) of the Act was held. The facts in the two cases cited were entirely different. 8. The last contention, however, has considerable force. In these circumstances it cannot be said that no enquiry as contemplated by Sec. 7 (a) of the Act was held. The facts in the two cases cited were entirely different. 8. The last contention, however, has considerable force. Under Sec. 7 (a) (iii) of the Act, before an order determining the liability of an employer for payment of provident fund can be passed, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. This postulates that he must have notice of the proceedings. It is not denied that the notice sent was returned by the postman with the remark that the firm had been dissolved, and there does not appear to have been any effort to serve the petitioner or other partners subsequently. In this situation, it cannot be said that a reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Sec. 7 (a) (iii) of the Act was afforded to the petitioner. 9. Counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that the petitioner had knowledge, of the proceedings and wilfully abstained from appearing before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. In support of this contention, he has drawn my attention to paragraphs 5 and 7 of the counter-affidavit, wherein it has been stated that the employers managed to return the notice and avoided attending the proceedings. These paragraphs have been sworn on a perusal of the record. The fact as to whether the employers managed to return the notice unserved or that they avoided attending the proceedings are such facts as can be properly asserted only on personal knowledge. The averments in the counter-affidavit fall short of establishing that the petitioner purposely avoided the service of the notice, or wilfully abstained from putting in appearance. In view of the above, it is not possible to uphold the contention on behalf of the respondents. 10. It would thus appear that the petitioner was denied an opportunity of representing his case. The petitioner has alleged that he had sent a representation to the Provident Fund Commissioner which is Annexure "F" to the petition. In view of what has been held above, it will now be necessary for the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to decide the representation. Such of the points raised in the objection as have already been dealt with in the present case need not be decided by him. 11. The petition is accordingly allowed. In view of what has been held above, it will now be necessary for the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to decide the representation. Such of the points raised in the objection as have already been dealt with in the present case need not be decided by him. 11. The petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner dated 5th December. 1969 (Annexure "B" to the petition) and the requisition sent to the Collector, Agra, for recovery of the amount (Annexure "C" to the petition) are quashed. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner shall now decide the objection of the petitioner as contained in Annexure "F" to the petition, except such as have already been dealt with in this petition. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.