Judgment :- 1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. Against him the landlord filed RCP. 5/65 on the file of the Rent Controller, Trichur, for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and bonafide need for reconstruction. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority found against the landlord; but in revision before the District Judge, the petition was allowed and eviction was ordered on the ground that the building needed reconstruction. By the time the matter reached the revisional court, the arrears were all paid and so the only ground available for the landlord was that he bonafide needed the building for reconstruction. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, contended that the revisional court has gone in excess of its powers in allowing the petition. In support of the position the counsel relied on a Single Bench decision of this court in Doraiswami Chettiar v. Kunjiraman (1969 KLJ. 227.) The learned judge held in that case: "The difference consists in this, namely, that the revisional authority, while endowed no doubt with the power to examine the propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority, is not to treat the proceedings before it as in appeal and its jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact is limited to cases where such findings can be regarded as improper. It is not in every instance where the revisional authority is Inclined to arrive at a different conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence available on record that the finding recorded by the subordinate Tribunal can be said to be improper. In order that a finding can legitimately be characterised as improper it must be so wholly unreasonable or perverse that no reasonable tribunal or authority could have come to such a conclusion on the evidence on record or the subordinate tribunal should have recorded its finding without adverting to a single piece of evidence." I think on a review of the position that the revisional court is perfectly within its limits in having allowed the petition. The report of the commissioner would bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the building requires reconstruction. The report has not been properly considered by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority and the findings entered by them without a proper consideration of the commissioner's report can and must be characterised as improper. The report of the commissioner would bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the building requires reconstruction. The report has not been properly considered by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority and the findings entered by them without a proper consideration of the commissioner's report can and must be characterised as improper. I From the evidence, the commissioner was able to assess the age of the building at 60 years, the walls are made of mud and according to the commissioner net strong enough to support the roof. The plaster in some portions of the wall had fallen off, the eastern and western walls are damaged. The commissioner has also noted that some of the planks on the western and eastern side of the entrance door had crumbled and damaged by termites. Two planks near the corner of the south eastern portion were found broken and deteriorated. One of the steps of the ladder was found rickety and about to fall down. He noted also a small crack in the adjoining portion of the central Wall of the two bulidings. Other cracks were also noted. The commissioner is of the opinion that it is better to pull down the walls and reconstruct them with stones or make a strong basement since the present walls were found decayed due to old age. To use bis own words: "Considering the present nature and condition of the building it is better to pall down the two buildings for re-construction since the mud walls were not strong enough to support the ceiling and roofing as the walls were getting decayed and broken by cracks here and there and that in the absence of proper protection from exposure of the outer walls on the eastern and western side there was every likelihood of further deterioration and the wall will not remain as such for long." in these circumstances it would only be reasonable to order surrender of the building for reconstruction. The following observation of the Supreme Court in Panchamal Narayana Shenoy v. Venkatesha Shenoy (AIR. 1971 N. S. C. 46) is instructive in this connection. The observation is: "Whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bonafide has to be judged by I ' the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of (be building and other steps taken by him in that regard. 1971 N. S. C. 46) is instructive in this connection. The observation is: "Whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bonafide has to be judged by I ' the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of (be building and other steps taken by him in that regard. So also the desire of the landlord to put the property to a mare profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. In view of the specific provision in cl.(k) with regard to the condition of the building requiring immediate demolition cl.0) can have no reference to that condition." It would be unwise to wait in such circumstances for the building actually to fall down. The Act has provided ample safeguard against misuse of the right conferred on the landlord to reconstruct. The first proviso, for instance, to 'S. 11(4) (iv) says that if the building is not reconstructed within the time allowed, the landlord shall be liable to a fine of Rs. 500/-. the second proviso gives power to the court to put the tenant in possession if the reconstruction is not carried out. There is also the provision for giving first option to the tenant after the building is reconstructed. In the light of these facts, I do not think the view taken by the learned District Judge is in any way wrong or improper. 2. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner stated also that no proper notice to quit was served on him and as such the order is unsustainable. On this point it is worth remembering that no plea was raised by the tenant before the Rent Controller regarding want of notice. Ex P1 is the notice. It is dated 25th August, 1964; but it refers to a previous notice dated 15th February, 1964. The tenant has no case that such a notice was not received by him. In the counter-affidavit filed before the Rent Controller, no point at all was raised by him regarding notice. It was for the first time before the appellate authority that the objection regarding notice was raised. The tenant has no case that such a notice was not received by him. In the counter-affidavit filed before the Rent Controller, no point at all was raised by him regarding notice. It was for the first time before the appellate authority that the objection regarding notice was raised. The case is that Ext P1 does not satisfy the requirements of law regarding notice. Under S.106 of the T- P. Act, notice of a tenancy from month to month should be one terminating the tenancy and such notice should give 15 clear days terminable by the end of the month. But none of these points is of any serious consequence, since in the rent note Ex P5, the tenant has undertaken to quit the premises in terms of the notice issued by the landlord. In the earlier portion of the document the tenant had agreed to 30 days notice and from Ex P1 it is clear that 30 days notice had "already been given. In these circumstances it must be held that the tenant had contracted out of S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. "Where a contract of tenancy simply provides for a notice of a certain period which is different from the period of notice under this section there will be deemed to be a contract to the contrary within the meaning of this section not only with reference to the length of the notice required to determine the lease but also with reference to the time when the notice is to expire, although there is no specification in the contract as to such time. Hence in such a case the notice need not expire with a year or month of the tenancy." (vide The Transfer of Property Act by Chitaley, 4th Edn., V. 3, p. 1832). The tenant, therefore, cannot now insist on a notice strictly under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was also, argued on his behalf that the period of the tenancy having run out, he must be regarded as a statutory tenant holding over and in such a case he is entitled to 15 days notice as contemplated under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even if he is a tenant holding over such continuance of the tenancy must be presumed to be under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy, in the present instance evidenced by Ex-P5. Even if he is a tenant holding over such continuance of the tenancy must be presumed to be under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy, in the present instance evidenced by Ex-P5. The provision regarding notice in Ex-P5 is that he is entitled to 30 days notice and that having been complied with, in the present case, he has no cause for; any complaint. 3. The order of the learned District Judge is confirmed and this revision petition is dismissed.