ORDER Dube, J. The Petitioner was appointed a lower division clerk on 11-3-1949 in the services of the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat in the Food Department and was posted at Tahsil Gohad. His appointment was temporary. While he was working as a Purchase Inspector in July 1952, it transpired that he had cheated the Government and had defalcated Government property. A criminal investigation was, therefore, started against him for offences under Sections 420, 467, 120-B and 467/108 of the Penal Code. He was placed under suspension in July 1952. The committing Magistrate found the investigation defective and incomplete, and therefore, the case was sent back for further investigation. In the trial that eventually took place, the Sessions Judge acquitted the Petitioner of all the charges framed by an order dated 5-12-1964. The State Government not being satisfied with the order of the Sessions Judge, preferred an appeal. The High Court, by order dated 26-12-1967, dismissed the State Appeal against the Petitioner. It seems, in about 1953, the Food controls were relaxed and the State Government decided not to maintain a separate Food Department, and so the departments of Food and Civil Supplies were amalgamated, with the result that a large number of the staff of the Food Department had to be retrenched. The Government, by an order dated 21-3-1953, retrenched most of the employees of the former Food Department in accordance with the Government's scheme, (vide Ann. R-2-B) and the retrenched employees were to be relieved on 31-3-1953, as their services stood terminated with effect from that date. Financial sanction for drawing of the salaries of such retrenched employees for the month of March was also given. The Petitioner was one of such retrenched employees. Telegraphic intimations were also sent by the Government to the Collector, Bhind, directing that notice be given to the Petitioner terminating his services. The Collector, acting on the aforesaid orders of the Government and also on the basis of the telegram received from Government, gave notice on 28-2-1953 that the services of the Petitioner stood terminated with effect from 31-3-1953. The server affixed the order of termination in the presence of two Panchas at the place of residence of the Petitioner as the Petitioner could not be found at his residence. This was done on 28-2-1953. The server affixed the order of termination in the presence of two Panchas at the place of residence of the Petitioner as the Petitioner could not be found at his residence. This was done on 28-2-1953. It was indicated in the notice that the termination was without prejudice to departmental enquiry, if any, pending against him. The Petitioner applied for his reinstatement after the appeal of the State Government against him was dismissed. He also demanded the salary for the entire period from 1952 onwards. He supplied to the Collector a copy of the High Court's judgment acquitting him. The Collector forwarded a copy of the letter of the Government, dated 24-9-1969, to the effect that he was entitled to full pay up to 31-3-1953 and that he would be considered on duty till that date. The letter reiterated that consequent on amalgamation of the departments of Food and Civil Supplies, the Petitioner was retrenched, vide order No. 1215-23 dated 21-3-1953 and the question of his reinstatement did not arise. The Petitioner was paid his entire salary up to 31-3-1953. The aforesaid letter also pointed out that the termination of his services was not as a result of any disciplinary action, and therefore, the question of his reinstatement did not arise. The Petitioner now claims that the contract of service remained in abeyance after his suspension, and therefore, after he was exonerated of the criminal charges he was bound to be restored to his service. He denied service of the order of termination of his services on him and claimed salary for all these years, and in any case, till the communication of the letter dated 24-9-1969 (Ann. R-3). The point to be considered is, whether the Petitioner remained in the service of the Government after 31-3-1953, and his service had not been terminated. It is well settled that a master has a right to place his servant under suspension as an interim measure when a departmental enquiry is pending against him. In the instant case, the servant was suspended from performing his duties of his office which he was ordinarily required to do under the contract of service. His services could be terminated while under suspension. The Petitioner was undoubtedly suspended because of the pending criminal enquiry on the charges of embezzlement against him. In the instant case, the servant was suspended from performing his duties of his office which he was ordinarily required to do under the contract of service. His services could be terminated while under suspension. The Petitioner was undoubtedly suspended because of the pending criminal enquiry on the charges of embezzlement against him. But in the meantime, the Government wanted to reorganise the Food Department by amalgamating it with the Civil Supplies. This necessitated a widespread retrenchment in the existing staff. The Petitioner who was holding a temporary post had no right to the post, and in any case, when no post was there, being abolished, no such right could be claimed. The Government, therefore, terminated the services of a number of employees amongst whom the Petitioner was also one, and all of them were to be relieved with effect from 31-3-1953. Financial sanction for drawing all salaries for the month of March of such retrenched staff was given in advance. The order of retrenchment was passed. The Petitioner was under suspension because of the criminal enquiry pending against him. The criminal prosecution by the police was independent of any departmental action. However, by the order of termination of his services, the suspension ceased to exist and there was no liability on the part of the Government to pay him after that date. Moreover, in the instant case, as the post itself was abolished, the contract of service could in no case be said be subsist. If any disciplinary action is sought to be taken against a Government servant, it must be done before he retires or before his services are terminated. In the instant case, no departmental action by holding any departmental enquiry was taken against the Petitioner. The criminal proceedings against him were with respect to the charges levelled against him for which the prosecuting authority was responsible. The criminal proceedings could continue even after the Petitioner was relieved from the service. The order of termination was tried to be served on the Petitioner through a messenger. One Pakhatilal, server, went to the residence of the Petitioner with the order, but as he was not to be found at the place of his house, the notice was affixed to his house before the two Panchas. The order of termination was tried to be served on the Petitioner through a messenger. One Pakhatilal, server, went to the residence of the Petitioner with the order, but as he was not to be found at the place of his house, the notice was affixed to his house before the two Panchas. The notice is dated 28-2-1953 and the service made by affixation of the notice on the house of the Petitioner was done on the same date. In Heavy Electricals (India) Limited, Bhopal v. Industrial Court Madhya Pradesh and others M.P. No. 573 of 1968, D/-7-7-1970., in a similar situation, this Court observed in para. 5 of its order, as under: We End it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the contention of the workman that the order of termination would be, if at all, effective only from 7th February 1967, the date of actual receipt by him. If that be the true meaning of 'communication', it would always be possible for a servant to effectively thwart an order of termination by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the due date has expired, even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. Such a meaning of the word 'communication' ought not to be given. In State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram AIR 1970 SC 214 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated as follows: It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. According to the principles stated, the crucial date is the date of despatch. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. According to the principles stated, the crucial date is the date of despatch. The order of termination must, therefore, be deemed to be communicated to the workman on 1st February 1967. In such circumstances, the order of retrenchment would be deemed to be communicated to the Petitioner on 28-2-1953. As the post was sought to be abolished from 31-3-1953, the Government did all in their powers to inform the Petitioner of their intention to terminate his service before that date. It is not disputed that the Petitioner had not received, his full pay up to 31-3-1953. His claim for subsequent period is misconceived and there could be no misconception as regards his not being in service after due termination of his service by the Government by the order dated 21-3-1953. There is no question of violation of Fundamental Rule 54 as the Petitioner was not reinstated. Fundamental Rule 54 clearly envisages reinstatement after a departmental enquiry. As already explained above, his service stood terminated during the period of his suspension and he became entitled to the salary only up to the time of termination of his service. The termination of his service could not be said to be penal as the posts were abolished for administrative exigencies. The termination of the Petitioner's service was not as a result of any departmental action, and therefore, there was no violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The order cannot be said to cast any stigma on him. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition has no force, and the same is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. The amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the Petitioner. Petition dismissed