Kondaiah, J.-The Original Suit, O.S. No. 75 of 1963 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Eluru, filed by one Gunnam Satyanarayana Murthy, on the foot of an agreement dated 5th March, 1963 against Karri Adi Reddy, the appellant herein, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 18,702 Was decreed only for a sum of Its. 14,973-21. Our learned brother, Parthasarathi, J., before whom A.S. No. 351 of 1966, preferred by the appellant against the judgment and decree of the trial Court came up for hearing, confirmed the decision of the trial Court. The learned Judge agreed with the finding of the trial Court that Exhibits B-1 and B-2, the documents filed and relied upon by the appellant herein, are false documents intended to be used in the case in support of his pleas. Certain account books sought to be tendered as additional evidence were also commented upon by the learned Judge. At the time of the pronouncement of the judgment in the case, the learned Judge indicated the expediency of directing prosecution of the appellant. Thereafter, the case was reposted for further hearing on this aspect. After hearing the representations of both the Counsel, and on a consideration of the entire material, the learned Judge was of the opinion that it was expedient and necessary in the interests of justice that an order should be made, in accordance with the provisions of section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the Deputy Registrar of the High Court to file a complaint on the basis of the findings expressed by him in the Judgment. In pursuance of the direction of the learned Judge, a complaint has been filed. Against the order passed by the learned Judge under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, this Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant. 2. Then the appeal came up before us for final hearing, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, at the outset, raised a preliminary objection that no Criminal Appeal lies against an order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, in the course of a civil appeal decided by him, but only a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench of this Court would lie. This claim of the Additional Public Prosecutor was strenuously resisted by Sri Krishna Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant contending inter alia that his client has a statutory right of preferring a Criminal Appeal under section 476-B, Criminal Procedure Code, and the present appeal has been validly filed and is maintainable. 3. On hearing the contentions of both the learned Counsel, the question that arises for decisions, whether on the facts and in the circumstances, it is a Criminal Appeal under section 476-B, Criminal Procedure Code, as contended by the appellant, or a Letters Patent, Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent that should be filed against an order of a single Judge of this Court directing the Deputy Registrar to prefer a Complaint under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, on the basis of the findings and opinion expressed by him in his Judgment in (Civil) A.S. No. 351 of 1966 and in the application for admission of additional evidence. 4. For a proper appreciation of the respective contentions, it is necessary to advert to the material provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Letters Patent of this Court. The answer to the question turns upon the scope and the interpretation of the provisions of sections 476, 476-A, 476-B and 195(3), Criminal Procedure Code, and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and their application to the present case. 5. The present sections 476, 476-A and 476-B, have been substituted for the original section 476, by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (XVIII of 1923). Section 476 empowers any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court to record a finding that, in its opinion, it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence specified in clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) to section 195, which. appears to have been committed, or in relation to a proceeding in hat Court, after due preliminary enquiry if it thinks necessary, and make a complaint thereof in writing and forward the same to a First Class Magistrate having jurisdiction in that regard. The Court is also competent to take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such. Magistrate and in non-bailable offences, it (Court) may send the accused in custody to the Magistrate. If the Court making the complaint is the High Court. The Court is also competent to take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such. Magistrate and in non-bailable offences, it (Court) may send the accused in custody to the Magistrate. If the Court making the complaint is the High Court. the complaint has to be signed by such officer of the Court, as the Court may appoint. Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, is wide enough to apply to any proceeding in a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court. The power vested in the Court, be it Civil, Revenue or Criminal under section 476(1) can be invoked either suo motu or on the application made to it, in that behalf. However, the Court must be satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into the offences specified in section 195(1), Clause (b) or (c) which appear to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court. A preliminary enquiry for the satisfaction of the Court may or may not be conducted. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the opinion that could be formed by it, on the basis of the material available before it. A finding to that effect must be recorded, and the complaint must be made in waiting by a Presiding Officer of the Court who shall forward the same to the First-Class Magistrate. Under section 476-A, any superior Court, in respect of any offence which appears to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, may prefer a complaint, where the Subordinate Court has failed or omitted to do so. A person aggrieved by an order passed by the Court under section 476 has been conferred under section 476-B with the substantive right of appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate, within the meaning of section 195(3). The superior appellate authority by virtue of the powers vested in it under section 476-B, may, after notice and opportunity to the parties concerned, either direct the withdrawal of the complaint or affirm the order or make the complaint itself, where the subordinate Court failed or has refused to do so under section 476, if it is satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. Under section 476-B, the appellate Court is competent either to confirm, reverse or set aside and remand the cases for further consideration to a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court in respect of whose proceeding or in whose Court, the offence appears to have been committed. The powers of the appellate Court under section 476-B, are wide enough to stay further proceedings, reconsider the entire matter on merits and arrive at an independent conclusion. This right is really a substantive one. The language of sections 476, 476-A and 476-B manifests that the proceeding in respect of which offence appears to have been committed may be a Civil, Revenue or Criminal. An appeal against an order passed by any Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, lies only to the Court which has jurisdiction to entertain appeals ordinarily against the orders of such Court. Where the order under section 476, is passed by a Revenue Divisional Officer and an appeal ordinarily lies to the District Collector, it is the District Collector that is empowered to pass an order under section 476-B. Similarly, where the order is passed by a Court of District Munsif under section 476, it is the District Court under section 476-B, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is competent to entertain an appeal. In the same way, where a District and Sessions Court passed an order under section 476, it is the High Court that is competent to exercise its appellate jurisdiction on the criminal side under section 476-B. We may usefully refer, in this context, to the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 195, provides for the prosecution of persons for contempt of lawful authority of public servants for certain offences and for offences against public justice and those relating to documents given in evidence. Section 195(1)(b) applies to an offence punishable under sections 193 to 196, and other offences specified therein alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court, (and so no Court shall take cognizance of such offence) except on a complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. Similarly, section 195(1)(c), applies to an offence punishable under sections 463, 471, 475 or 476, Indian Penal Code. Section 195(2) states that the term "Court" used in clauses (b) and (c) thereof includes Civil Revenue or Criminal. Similarly, section 195(1)(c), applies to an offence punishable under sections 463, 471, 475 or 476, Indian Penal Code. Section 195(2) states that the term "Court" used in clauses (b) and (c) thereof includes Civil Revenue or Criminal. Sub-section (3) of section 195 states that: "For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary civil jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate". Section 195(3), therefore, provides for an appeal being filed to a Court to which an appeal is provided ordinarily under the provisions of Civil or Criminal Procedure Code, as the case may be. 6. It is pertinent to notice that the forum of the appellate authority depends upon the nature of the proceedings as well as the Court, in respect of whose proceeding the offences under clauses (b) and (c) to sub-section (1) of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, appear to have been committed. Where the proceeding is a civil matter and the Court that had passed the order under section 476 is a civil Court, it is the superior civil Court, as provided under Civil Procedure Code, ordinarily entitled to entertain the appeals that has got jurisdiction to exercise the appellant powers under section 476-B. So is the case in a criminal proceeding. Therefore, there is no difficulty with regard to cases, where the Courts subordinate to High Court, passed the orders under section 476, although the forum of the appellate authority or the Court may depend upon the nature of the proceeding, i.e., Civil, Revenue or Criminal, as the case may be. 7. The aforesaid principle will also apply to cases where an order under section 476, has been passed by a Division Bench of the High Court. 7. The aforesaid principle will also apply to cases where an order under section 476, has been passed by a Division Bench of the High Court. In such a case, the Supreme Court being an ordinary Court of appeal against a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, it admits of no difficulty to hold that it is the Supreme Court that can entertain an appeal under section 476-B. However, the aforesaid principle cannot be said to be applicable to a case where a learned Single Judge of the High Court has passed the order under section 476. Where the order is passed by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a Full Bench of a High Court, such an order is nonetheless an order passed by the High Court. The use of the words, "the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3), and the superior Court.." in section 476-B, would make it abundantly clear that the Court that is competent to entertain the appeal against an order passed by a Court under section 476 must be a Court superior to the one which is ordinarily empowered to receive the appeals against such orders. It admits of no doubt that the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Rules of Practice do not provide for an appeal to a Division Bench against the Judgment or decision of a single Judge of the High Court in a Criminal Appeal, Revision or any proceeding. It is pertinent to notice that it is clause 15 of the Amended Letters Patent of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that provides for a right of appeal from the judgment of one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench, consisting of two or more Judges. Hence, an appeal against the orders of a single Judge of the High Court lies to a Division Bench of the same Court only under Clause 15 of the Letter Patent of this Court. The forum of an appeal to a Division Bench from the orders of the single Judge, is, therefore, governed and regulated by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but not by section 476-B. Although, section 476-B provides for a substantive right of appeal against an order passed under section 476, it does not however, specify the forum of appeal to a particular Court. Therefore, we are of the view that a single Judge is deemed to be subordinate by virtue of a fiction created by sub-section (3) to section 195 read with clause 15 of the Letters Patent, to a Division Bench of the High Court and hence we must hold that an appeal against an order passed by a learned Judge of this High Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, lies to a Division Bench only under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The substantive right to prefer an appeal in the instant case, being provided under section 476-B, the appellate Court, in our considered opinion, is empowered to exercise all the powers vested in it under section 476-B, read with clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 8. We may now turn to the decide d cases on this aspect. The earliest case is that of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Munisamy Mudaliar v. Rajaratnam1, 1. (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 928: 43 M.L.J. 375. wherein an appeal to a Division Bench on the Appellate Side of the High Court hearing appeals was held to be maintainable against an order passed by a learned single Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court trying a civil suit. Sanction for prosecution of the plaintiff therein for offences under sections 193, 465, 467, 474 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, was held to be not maintainable. The next leading case that requires consideration is that of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kumaravel v. Shanmugha1. Therein, it was held that where an application to a civil Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, is made, it does not cease to be a civil Court, and if for the purposes of that application or for exercising powers vested in it under section 476, it remains a civil Court, it must be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not by those of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That case is an authority for the proposition that where an order has been passed by a civil Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, providing for revision to the High Court has no application and it is only the revisional power vested under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, that is exercisable by High Court in such cases. The aforesaid decision amply supports our view that the nature of the proceeding which gave rise to the offence punishable under sections 193, 467, 463, 464 and 476, Indian Penal Code, and the nature of the Court that really matter in fixing the forum of the appeal provided under section 476-B, Criminal Procedure Code, the same view has been reiterated by Mockett, J., in Kuppuswamy Chettiar v. Subbaraya Chettiar2, The Calcutta High Court has also consistently taken the same view. We may add that the Calcutta High Court, commencing from its leading Full Bench decision of five Judges in Emperor v. Hariprasad3, took the same view expressed by the Madras High Court in Muniswamy Mudaliar v. Rajaratnam4, in Emperor v. Hari Prasad3, it was held that section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, has no application to a case where an order was passed by a Civil or Revenue Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. It was further held that the High Court by virtue of the powers vested in it under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 15 of the High Courts Act, can interfere with the orders passed by the Civil or Revenue Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. We may usefully notice the following findings of the Full Bench (at 502): “(iv) In the case of an order passed by a Civil or Revenue Court under section 476 the High Court can exercise the powers vested in it by section 115, of the Civil Procedure Code or section 15 of the High Courts Act. (v) When an order under section 476, made by a Civil or Revenue Court is sought to be revised by this Court, the Bench exercising criminal jurisdiction cannot, as such, deal with the matter, but the Judges composing that Bench may do so, if authorised by the Chief Justice, under section 14 of the High Courts Act”. (v) When an order under section 476, made by a Civil or Revenue Court is sought to be revised by this Court, the Bench exercising criminal jurisdiction cannot, as such, deal with the matter, but the Judges composing that Bench may do so, if authorised by the Chief Justice, under section 14 of the High Courts Act”. In Nasiruddin Khan v. Emperor5, the Additional District Munsif, Sadar, in the district of Mymensingh, at the instance of the plaintiff, filed a complaint before the Magistrate against Nasiruddin Khan and Madan Sheikh, for having committed certain offences punishable under sections 193, 465, 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code in a civil proceeding. An appeal preferred to the District Judge was dismissed, as the pleader for the appellants was absent and as the matter was delayed for more than a year. An application for the restoration of the appeal was dismissed, after hearing the parties. A revision petition to the High Court was filed. The question that arose for decision was whether it was the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Civil Procedure, that was applicable in that case. In those circumstances, the learned Judges held that it was the Code of Civil Procedure, that would apply, as the proceedings which gave rise to the criminal offences were of civil nature and hence the Code of Criminal Procedure 1. I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 762: (1940) 1 M.L.J. 719 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 465. 2. (1941) 1 M.L.J. 611 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 574. 3. (1913) I.L.R. 40 Cal. 477. 4. (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 928: 43 M.L.J. 375. 5. A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 98. had no application. We may notice the following observations of the learned Judge (at page 100). “...No doubt the appeal in this case is one which is given by section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, but the very words used in section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, indicate with sufficient clearness that the Court to which the appeal lies is one to which the Court making or filing the complaint is subordinate; in other words, if it is a civil Court which has made an order under section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the appeal against such an order must lie to and be heard by the authority or tribunal to which such civil Court is subordinate. It follows, therefore, that the original order, having been made by a Munsif in a civil suit, the appeal against an order by the Munsif under section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, lay to the District Judge to whom the Munsif is subordinate. Therefore, it would follow that, although the appeal itself is one which is allowed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appeal must be heard by the District Judge to whom the Munsif is subordinate, i.e., by an appellate Court exercising civil appellate jurisdiction. It follows therefore, that the procedure governing an appeal of this description is one which is to be sought for within the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure. It follows also that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being applicable to an appeal of this nature, the District Judge was in our opinion fully competent in making the orders which he did on the two dates referred to above. ..Under these circumstances, we do not see that the District Judge has been guilty of any illegality or of any material irregularity within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor does it seem to us that there has been anything done by the District Judge to which exception can be taken, and in respect of which our powers of superintendence under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act can be invoked”. 8-A It is unnecessary to add any other cases where the same view has been taken; but suffice it to say that the High Courts of Allahabad, Rangoon and Mysore in Jarbandhan v. Emperor1, Dan San Khin v. Kohpar2, and Sharada Bai v. Lakshminarayana Rao3, respectively have taken the same view. We may also point out that contrary view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Dhanpat Rai v. Balak Ram4. We may add that the view of the Full tench of the Lahore High Court has been expressly dissented to by the Madras High Court in Kumarvel v. Shanmugha5. The Punjab and Patna High Courts in Hakim Rai v. State6, Dhup Narain Singh v. State7, respectively have also taken the contrary view. We may add that the view of the Full tench of the Lahore High Court has been expressly dissented to by the Madras High Court in Kumarvel v. Shanmugha5. The Punjab and Patna High Courts in Hakim Rai v. State6, Dhup Narain Singh v. State7, respectively have also taken the contrary view. We may with great respect to the learned Judges express our dissent to the view taken by them and agree with the view expressed by the Madras, Calcutta, Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts in the cases referred to earlier. We may add that the decision of Kumarayya J., (as he then was) in Mruthyunjayudu v. Venkata Krishnamraju8, supports the view-taken by us though there is no discussion about this aspect of the case. The fact that a Civil Revision Petition under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, was preferred and disposed of instead of Criminal Revision Case under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, is a factor which in substance supports the view taken by us. If the contention of Mr. Krishna Reddy is accepted to be correct, then it should be Criminal Revision Case, but not a Civil Revision Petition, under section 115 Civil Procedure Code, that should have been filed in the aforesaid case. 9. We shall now advert to the two decisions of the Supreme Court in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras9 and Narain Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another10, on which strong reliance has been placed by Sri Krishna Ruddy. The former case is an authority for the 1. A.I.R. 1946 All. 245. 2. A.I.R. 1941 Rang. 163. 3. A.I.R. 1955 Mys. 59. 4. A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 761. 5. (1940) 1 M.L.J. 719 : A.I.R. 940 Mad. 465. 6. A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 154. 7. A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 76. 8. (1957) 2 An.W.R. 239. 9. 1954 S.C.J. 458: 1954 S.C.R. 1144: (1954) 1 M.L.J. 699: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 397. 10. (1961) 1 S.C.J. 375: (1961) M.L.J. (Crl.) 223: (1961) 1 S.C.R. 670: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 181. proposition that an appeal under section 476-B lies to the Supreme Court against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court under section 476. 9. 1954 S.C.J. 458: 1954 S.C.R. 1144: (1954) 1 M.L.J. 699: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 397. 10. (1961) 1 S.C.J. 375: (1961) M.L.J. (Crl.) 223: (1961) 1 S.C.R. 670: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 181. proposition that an appeal under section 476-B lies to the Supreme Court against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court under section 476. A Division Bench of the High Court is certainly a Court subordinate to the Supreme Court within the meaning of section 195(3) and therefore, an appeal shall lie only to the Supreme Court front an order of the Division Bench of the High Court under section 476. The case on hand is different from the case of M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras1. In the present case, the order has been passed by a single Judge of this Court. In the aforesaid case it has been held that the expression “subordinate” used in section 195(3) does not bear its ordinary meaning, but is used as a term of art. It is ruled that a fiction has been imposed by the word “deemed”. There remains the other decision of the Supreme Court, i.e., Narain Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another2, Therein, the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court who heard a civil writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution refused to make a complaint under section 193, Indian Penal Code, against one Phanish Tripathi who was alleged to have made a false statement in his affidavit. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge refusing to sanction prosecution under section 476, the appellant therein preferred an appeal directly to the Supreme Court under section 476-B. Hence, the question that fell for consideration was whether an appeal against an order of a single Judge refusing to file a complaint under section 476 lies under section 476-B to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that no appeal under section 476-B against an order of the single Judge under section 476 lies. It was further held that an appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the High Court against an order of the single Judge. The Supreme Court held that no appeal under section 476-B against an order of the single Judge under section 476 lies. It was further held that an appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the High Court against an order of the single Judge. We may usefully read the following passage from the judgment delivered by Raghubar Dayal, J., on behalf of the Bench (at page 182): “....A right of appeal against that order is given by the provisions of section 476-B. The forum of appeal is also determined by the provisions of section 476-B read with section 195(3), and the only relevant consideration to determine the proper forum for an appeal against such an order of the single Judge is as to which Court the appeals against appealable decrees of the single Judge ordinarily lie. Such appeals lie to the High Court under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court and therefore, this appeal lies to the High Court.” The decision of the Supreme Court in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras1, referred to earlier was distinguished by the learned Judge who observed that as no appeal lies to the High Court against the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court, in appeal under section 476-B from an order of this Division Bench of the High Court must lie to the Supreme Court. In our judgment, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is not only not in favour of the appellant but is against the plea raised by him. 10. The aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: Where a proceeding which gave rise to an offence punishable under sections 193, 474, 467, Indian Penal Code, in a civil Court is of a civil nature, it is the Code of Civil Procedure, but not the Code of Criminal Procedure that will apply in preferring an appeal against an order passed by such Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. If the Court that passed the order under section 476 is a criminal Court, while disposing of the criminal proceeding, undoubtedly, an appeal is provided for under the Code of Criminal Procedure to a superior criminal Court. If the Court that passed the order under section 476 is a criminal Court, while disposing of the criminal proceeding, undoubtedly, an appeal is provided for under the Code of Criminal Procedure to a superior criminal Court. Where the order is passed by a single Judge of the High Court under section 476, it is only under clause 15 of the Letters Patent that an appeal ordinarily lies to a Division Bench of this Court. No appeal under section 476-B lies to a Division Bench on the Criminal Appellate Side, as there is no provision thereof, against an order passed by a learned single Judge, in a civil case. The heart of the matter is that the nature of the proceeding, whether Revenue, Civil or 1. 1954 S.C.J. 458: (1954) 1 M.L.J. 699: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 397. 2. (1961) 1 S.C.J. 325: (1961) M.L.J. (Crl.) 223: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 181. Criminal and the Court that passes the order under section 476 or refuses to pass an order under section 476 that really govern and determine the forum of appeal, although a substantive right to prefer an appeal against an order under section 476 is provided by the provisions of section 476-B, Criminal Procedure Code. 11. For all these reasons, we must hold that there is no merit in the contentions raised by Sri Krishna Reddy. 12. It was next argued by Sri Krishna Reddy that rule 171 of the Criminal Rules of Practice made in the year 1966 gives the right of criminal appeal and that all the decisions cited by the learned Public Prosecutor did not override this Rule. True, the Andhra Pradesh Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1966, hereinafter called, the Rules have been framed by the High Court in exercise of its powers conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 554 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and with the approval of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh. These Rules and Orders have been made for the guidance of the Criminal Courts in the State. It is pertinent to notice the heading of the Rules which reads thus: “Rules under or in matters relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure”. Hence, these Rules govern only matters relating to the Criminal Courts and the proceedings relating thereto. With this background, we shall examine Rule 171. It is pertinent to notice the heading of the Rules which reads thus: “Rules under or in matters relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure”. Hence, these Rules govern only matters relating to the Criminal Courts and the proceedings relating thereto. With this background, we shall examine Rule 171. These Rules numbering about 336 have been divided into XIV Chapters. Suffice it to mention that Chapter VI comprises of Rules 118 to 146 which deal with matters and proceedings relating to the Courts of Session, Chapter VII comprising of Rules 147 to 172 also refers to the proceedings relating to the Court of Session, Appeal, Reference and Revision. Rule 171 is under a heading, miscellaneous which reads thus: “Rule 171: Appeals under sections 476, 476-A and B and 485 of the Code-Appeals filed against an order made under sections 476, 476-A, 476-B and 485 of the Code shall be registered as Criminal Appeals. This Rule applies to revision petitions also.” 13. The word “Order” used in Rule 171 must be construed only as an order made by a Criminal Court dealing with criminal matters. Proceedings during or in respect of which an order contemplated under Rule 171 has ultimately been passed under section 176 must invariably be interpreted as those of criminal nature regulated by 1 he several provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. This view of ours is amply borne out by the language of the Rule 171 when read with the intendment, purpose and object of the very Rules. In our considered opinion, Rule 171 is not susceptible of any interpretation other than the one given by us. As pointed out earlier, the very Rules govern only the proceedings and cases in the criminal Courts. In a case where an order was passed in a criminal proceeding under section 476, any appeal preferred against such an order shall be registered as a Criminal Appeal. But the word “order” used in Rule 171 cannot be construed as an order passed under section 476 in a Civil or Revenue proceeding, as these Rules have no application at all to Civil or Revenue proceedings or Civil or Revenue Courts. That apart, our view is further strengthened by the fact that this Rule 171 is in the Chapter dealing with the matters and proceedings relating to Courts of Session, be they, an appeal, reference or revision. That apart, our view is further strengthened by the fact that this Rule 171 is in the Chapter dealing with the matters and proceedings relating to Courts of Session, be they, an appeal, reference or revision. Chapter VIII deals with the proceedings relating to the High Court. In our case, the order under section 476 has been passed by a single Judge of this Court, while disposing of a Civil Appeal. Therefore, in regard to the order passed under section 476 by the learned single Judge of the High Court, we must hold that Rule 171 has no application. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the word “order” used therein is wide enough to take in an order passed not only in Criminal but also Civil and Revenue proceedings, the very fact that this rule is not in Chapter VIII applicable to the proceedings in the High Court, would not in anyway assist the contention of the appellant herein. In ether words, the appellant cannot rely upon a rule, i.e., Rule 171 which is not applicable to a proceeding or order passed by the High Court as the same has to the confined to the one passed by the District or Sessions Court or any other Court subordinate to the High Court. 14. For all these reasons, we must sustain the preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this case that this appeal cannot be registered as a Criminal Appeal, but that it would be only numbered as a Letters Patent Appeal. However, we may add that by any observation made in our judgment it should not be construed that we have finally decided the scope and ambit of the Letters Patent Appeal in the instant case. That has been left open. In this view, the appeal cannot be heard by us and the office is directed to return the papers in this appeal to the appellant who is at liberty to file the same as a Letters Patent Appeal with an application to condone the delay as he had pursued the remedy in a wrong forum on the bona fide belief that that was the procedure. As and when the delay is condoned, the appeal may be numbered and disposed of according to law in the usual course as a Letters Patent Appeal. As and when the delay is condoned, the appeal may be numbered and disposed of according to law in the usual course as a Letters Patent Appeal. This being a matter arising under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, it is not only desirable but also necessary and appropriate to give notice only to the Public Prosecutor but not to the Government Pleader to represent the State and appear in the Letters Patent Appeal. K.N.R. ----- Preliminary objection sustained.