JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - These four petitions under article 226 of the Constitution raise the question of the validity of notices of resumption of the lands of the various petitioners situate in the Meerut Cantonment, which are alleged to have been held by them under old grants or what is popularly known as Cantonment tenure. On the lands of the petitioners in three of the four petitions stand buildings. 2. Smt. Bhagwati Devi, Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 520 of 1969, is the sole heir of the original proprietors of the land in dispute in that petition and of the building thereon. She contends that her land is not held under any old grant and the land and the building thereon were the private property of her ancestors and the land cannot be resumed. The petitioners in the other three petitions admit that the-lands held by them were acquired by their predecessor-in-title under an old grant but dispute the power of the Government to resume them as sought to be done. 3. The impugned notices of resumption given by the Government to the Petitioners individually offer, it may be mentioned, compensation for the buildings standing thereon. 4. The contention of Smt. Bhagwati Devi that the land on which the building in her possession has been constructed was the private property of her ancestors may first be disposed of. In paragraph 2 of the petition she has stated : "2. That the premises were previously owned by Lala Kurey Mal and Rurey Mal, proprietor, Messrs Nand Ram and Sons, Sadar Bazar, Meerut. The bungalow was not subject to any lease and the property was occupied as under an old grant amounting to pernament licence. (Italicised is ours) In paragraph 16 it is so averred :- "16. That the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest have made permanent constructions over the disputed land which was given to them for the said purpose. The licence being for constructions had become irrevocable under Sec. 60 (b) of the Indian Easement Act." (Italicised is ours) In view of these statements in the petition, the argument advanced at the hearing of the petitions that the land also is private property and is not held under an old grant and hence is not subject to Contonment tenure is an afterthought and is without force. 5. 5. It may be mentioned that in Secretary of State for India v. Mulla, A.I.R. 1922 Allahabad 57, a Division Bench of this Court observed, after reviewing a number of earlier decisions of the Privy Council and other High Court, that "the Secretary of State is absolute owner of all Cantonment lands, unless it is proved satisfactorily that he has parted with ownership" (page 58) Although in K.A. Ghaswala v. Secretary of State, XXXVIII (IA) 204 for India in Council, a case relating to the Cantonment of Poona, the Privy Council has stated that probably all private land in the Cantonment is acquired, in Secretary, Cantonment Committee. v. Satish Chandra Sen, A.I.R. 1931 PC 1, it has been indicated that all lands in the Cantonment do not necessarily belong to the Government. It may be that the broad statement made by this Court in Mulla's case that the Government is the absolute owner of all lands in the Cantonments is open to doubt but in view of the aforesaid averment made by Bhagwati Devi in her petition, I have to treat her land as being held under an old grant. 6. All the four petitions have hence to be proceeded with on the basis that the lands sought to be resumed were obtained by the predecessors-in-title of the Petitioners under old grants and the only question that then remains to be considered is whether the lands can be resumed on the offer of compensation for the buildings constructed thereon. 7. The notices of resumption purport to have been given in exercise of the powers regulating the said grants under the Bengal Army Regulations, Governor-General Order No. 179, dated the 12th September, 1836, and subsequent orders. The Order of 1836 does not mention the legal sanction for its promulgation but it is not denied and cannot be denied that the Order has been made in exercise of the powers of the Governor-General in Council to make laws and regulations conferred by Sec. XLIII of the Government of India Act 1833 (3 and 4 Will. 4, c. 85). 4, c. 85). (It may be mentioned in this connection that in Hari Chand v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1939 PC 235 the Privy Council has stated that as a matter of history the Cantonments are regulated so far as grants to individuals, by an order of the Governor General in Council dated so far back as 1833 Sec. XLV of that Act further provides that all such laws and regulations shall be of the same force and effect within the territory to which they are applied as any Act of (British) Parliament and shall be taken notice of by all Courts of Justice in the same manner as a Public Act of (British) Parliament. 8. It will be relevant at the outset to analyse the provisions of the said Order of 1936. It purports to rescind some orders in force in the Presidency of Bengal in regard to the occupation of ground and the disposal of premises or buildings situated within the limits of military cantonments, and to substitute for them fresh regulations. The Order refers to its provisions as "regulations" and these regulations are made applicable to" different stations of the Bengal Army". Regulation 1 requires applications to be made for under unoccupied ground within the limits of military Cantonments for purposes of being enclosed, built upon or in any way appropriated to private purpose. Regulation 4 prescribes the form of the application. Regulation 6 sets out the conditions of occupancy and, in view of its impact on the present petitions deserves to be reproduced in toto. It reads :- "6. No ground will be granted except on the following conditions, which are to be subscribed by every grantee, as well as by those to whom his grant may subsequently be transferred :- 1st. The Government to retain the power of resumption at any time on giving one month's notice and paying the value of such buildings as may have been authorised to be erected. 2nd. The ground, being in every case the property of Government, cannot be sold by the grantee; but houses or other property thereon situated may be transferred by one military or medical officer to another without restriction, except on the case of reliefs, when if required the terms of sale or transfer are to be adjusted by a Committee of Arbitration. 3rd. 3rd. If the ground has been built upon, the buildings are not to be disposed of to any person, of whatever description, who does not belong to the army, until the consent of the officer commanding the station shall have been previously. obtained under his hand. 4th. When it is proposed, with the consent of the General Officer, to transfer possession to a native, should the value of the house, buildings or property to be so transferred, exceed Rs. 5000/-, the sale must not be effected, until the sanction of Government shall have been obtained through His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief." The other regulations are not relevant but Regulation 7 will be discussed later when the argument based on it is considered. 9. It will be observed from Regulation 6 that the first condition of occupancy is that the Government has the power to resume the land granted, at any time on giving one month's notice and paying the value of the building erected thereon authorisedly. It is in virtue of this power that the impugned notices have been given to the petitioners along with the offer of payment of value of the buildings thereon. 10. It was contended, to start with, that the Order of 1836 applies to the Presidency of Bengal only and since Meerut Cantonment has long ceased to be within the Presidency of Bengal, the Order cannot now be applied to lands within Meerut Cantonment. The argument has to be noticed only to be dismissed. Reference may usefully be made to the decision of this Court in Damodar Dass v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 1938 ALJ 1171 in which it has been observed that Meerut Cantonment was first occupied by the British between 1811 and 1813 when the General Order of the Governor-General-in-Council dated 28th September, 1807 was in force and that Order was replaced by the Order of 1836. It follows that the Order of 1836 governed occupation of lands in Meerut Cantonment by private parties. The fact that Meerut Cantonment was taken away from the territories of the Bengal Presidency does not result in the Order of 1836 ceasing to apply to Meerut Cantonment. It follows that the Order of 1836 governed occupation of lands in Meerut Cantonment by private parties. The fact that Meerut Cantonment was taken away from the territories of the Bengal Presidency does not result in the Order of 1836 ceasing to apply to Meerut Cantonment. It is a recognised principle of law that where a legal provision is applicable to any territory, that provision continues to apply to any part of the territory which is excluded later from the jurisdiction of that territory unless it is repealed by another provision of law in its application to that part of the territory. Sec. XLV of the Government of India Act, 1833, also states that every law and Regulation made under Sec. XLIII will continue in force in the territories to which they applied unless repealed. Thus even though Meerut Cantonment went out of the Presidency of Bengal sometime after 1836, the Order of 1836 remains in force in Meerut Cantonment since no subsequent law has excluded its operation from Meerut Cantonment. 11. It was next argued for the petitioners that with the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the Government of India Act, 1833, as well as the Order of 1836 ceased to have any force and effect. This argument has no force as under art. 372 (1) of the Constitution, all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution continue in force until repealed by a competent legislature or competent authority. In virtue of this provision, the Government of India Act, 1833, and also the Order of 1836 (which had the effect of a law of (British) Parliament under Sec. XLV of the Government of India Act, 1833 remained in force even after the commencement of the Constitution. The Government of India Act, 1833, was no doubt repealed later by the British Statutes (Application to India) Repeal Act, 1960, and it has ceased to be in force now; but the Order of 1836 has not been repealed and remains still in force. The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1833, would not have the effect of repealing the Order of 1836 as the Order of 1836, though made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Government of India Act, 1833, has independent existence as a law in view of Sec. XLV of the Government of India Act, 1833. The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1833, would not have the effect of repealing the Order of 1836 as the Order of 1836, though made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Government of India Act, 1833, has independent existence as a law in view of Sec. XLV of the Government of India Act, 1833. The Order of 1836 is thus in force even now. 12. Regulation 6 of the Order of 1836 sets out the conditions on which the grant of land has been made and also provides that these conditions have to be subscribed by every grantee. The grantee holds the land subject to these conditions subscribed by him and the Government can, therefore, resume the land under the power of resumption spelt out in these conditions which binds him. It may be relevant to mention in this connection that the conditions of the grant have not only the sanction of the Order of 1836 and the subscription made by the grantee, but also are confirmed by Sec. 3 of the Crown Grants Act, 1895, now known as the Government Grants Act, 1895. Even assuming that the Order of 1836 is not in force, the power of resumption which is a stipulated and accepted condition of the occupation of the land under the grant is exercisable by the Government. Accordingly, no objection can be taken to the notices of resumption of the lands served on the petitioners. These facts also answer the argument feebly advanced on behalf of the petitioners that they are being deprived of the lands in contravention of article 19(1) of the Constitution. 13. It was next contended that while Regulation 7 of the Order of 1836 provides for the valuation of the houses to be purchased by the Government by agreement or in the event of disagreement by a Committee of Arbitration, Regulation 6 makes no such provision for acquiring the buildings on the lands resumed and hence Regulation 6 is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Regulation 7 reads as follows : "7. All houses in a military cantonment, being the property not belonging to the army which may be deemed by the Commanding Officer of the Station suitable, from their locality, for the accommodation of officers, shall be claimable for purchase or for hire at the option of the owner; in the former cases at a valuation. All houses in a military cantonment, being the property not belonging to the army which may be deemed by the Commanding Officer of the Station suitable, from their locality, for the accommodation of officers, shall be claimable for purchase or for hire at the option of the owner; in the former cases at a valuation. And in the latter at a rent, to be fixed, in case of the parties disagreeing by a Committee of Arbitration constituted as follows." The concept of Regulation 7 is different from that of Regulation 6. While Regulation 7 contemplates purchase of private houses, Regulation 6 envisages acquisition of buildings on resumption of the land thereunder. The situations in the two regulations are not alike and do not attract the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution. 14. It was then urged that the compensation offered for compulsory acquisition of the buildings on the lands resumed is not commensurate with the actual value of the buildings and it was argued that the market value of the buildings should have been offered to the petitioners in the light of the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on Article 31 (1) in the Bank Nationalisation case. In my opinion, the . offer of compensation is merely by an offer to take over the buildings if the Petitioners are agreeable and does not involve a process of compulsory acquisition. In Secretary of State v. Sri Narain Khanna, A.I.R. 1942 PC 35 the Privy Council has observed : " . . . . . . . . . . . . . it necessarily follows that, as from the date of resumption, the respondent ceased to have any right to keep the buildings on the land." The Petitioners are, accordingly, free to demolish the buildings and remove the bricks and mortar leaving the lands in an open state to be taken possession of by the Government. There is no compulsion that the Petitioners must part with the buildings for the value offered. The Government has made an offer that the Petitioners may surrender the buildings in return for the compensation mentioned and it is for the petitioners either to accept the offer or to hand over the lands in a vacant state after pulling down the buildings. The Government has made an offer that the Petitioners may surrender the buildings in return for the compensation mentioned and it is for the petitioners either to accept the offer or to hand over the lands in a vacant state after pulling down the buildings. I am unable to agree with the argument that resumption of the lands is conditional upon the payment of the value of the buildings thereon or that the acquisition of the buildings is a necessary concomitant of the resumption of the land. 15. It may incidentally be mentioned in this connection that in the former days the Government was actually acquiring the buildings under the Land Acquisition Act. (See for example Secretary, Cantonment Committee v. Satish Chandra Sens, Secretary of State v. Sri Narain Khanna, Hari Chand v. Secretary of State, Sohan Singh v. Governor General-in-Council, A.I.R. 1947 PC 178. It seems that recently the Government has changed the policy and is making an offer to acquire the building by paying what it considers to be the fair price. If the price is not acceptable to the petitioners, they are at liberty to reject the offer and remove the buildings or negotiate for the price. 16. It would not be out of place to mention that the value of the buildings is said to have been assessed according to fixed principles formulated by Government. I can neither consider the reasonableness of these principles nor examine the adequacy of the compensation offered. Nevertheless, it would be useful to state that the Privy Council has approved of what is commonly known as the contractor's method. Their Lordships said in Hari Chand v. Secretary of State which was also a case of resumptions of land in a military cantonment : "The subject to be valued being a building apart from the site the principle of fixing value by ascertaining the costs of reproducing the building at the present time and then allowing for depreciation in consideration of the age of the building and for the cost of such repairs as might be required apart from depreciation, is quite a well known and recognised method of valuing buildings for the purpose of compensation," (page 237) The following observations of their Lordships would also provide sound advice to Government in such situations: "The notification (of resumption) also contained an offer of compensation. Apparently none of those to whom the notices were addressed was satisfied with the offer, and while the natural and ordinary course would have been to proceed to arbitration for the purpose of assessing the compensation, for some reason or the other that course does not seem to have been pursued or to have been acceptable to the parties, and the Government accordingly resorted to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 17. For the above reasons, I am of the view that the notices of resumption cannot be quashed. 18. It is alleged in the petitions that the Government has threatened to take forcible possession of the property but neither the notices nor the accompanying letters have delivered any such threat nor is there any cogent evidence to prove the threat. A date is no doubt fixed for taking possession of the property but that is obviously on the assumption that the Petitioners are willing to part with the buildings for the compensation offered. 19. The result is that the petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.