Judgment :- 1. These appeals are from the decisions of a learned single judge of this court in three second appeals. 2. O. S.531/1955 from which A.S. 342/1966 arises was a suit instituted for declaration of the plaintiff's title and possession of S. No, 154/7B and for injunction to restrain the execution of the decree in O.S. 101/1102 of the Kottayam District Court. O.S. 361/1953 from which A.S. 341/1966 arises was a suit for mesne profits filed by defendants 1 and 4 in O.S. 531/1955 for, unlawful taking possession of the plaint property in O.S. 531/1955 in execution of the decree in O.S. 661/1093 of the Thiruvalla Munsif's Court. O.S. 392/1956 from which A.S. 343/66 arises was a suit for similar relief of a subsequent "period. Counsel on both sides are agreed that a decision in A.S. 342/1966 would dispose of the other two appeals. The plaintiff's case in O.S. 531/1955 was as follows: S. No. 154/7B belong, ed to the plaintiff's illom. It was leased under Ext. J to the Ist defendant's Koikkal on 7-2-1025 M. E. and was subsequently mortgaged to it under Ext. K on 7-7-1038 M.E. The Koikkal in turn sub-mortgaged the property on" on 5-11-1089 to Padinjare Matom. The plaintiff's illom subsequently got itself divided into two branches under Ext. H, a compromise decree passed in O.S. 214/1084. By the compromise S. No. 154/7B was allotted to the branch of plaintiff's grandfather. He instituted O. S.661/1093 in the Thiruvalla Munsif's Court, on behalf of the illom, to redeem Exts. J and K. By Ext. C judgment demtion was allowed and under Ext. E the property was taken delivery of. Thereafter the plaintiff's grandfather leased the property under Ext. G to the 2nd defendant's father on 7-11-1097. A member of the 1st defendant Koikkal instituted, O.S. 101/1102 in the District Court, Kottayam, for setting aside the sub-mortgage in favour of Padinjare Matom. That suit was later on amended in 1106 by adding a prayer to set aside the decree and execution proceedings in. P.S. .661 of 1093 after impleading the plaintiff's grandfather. When the plaintiff's grandfather died in 1109 the plaintiff's father, the 3rd defendant here, was impleaded in that suit as the 12th defendant. Both of them remained ex parte and; the suit was decreed on 13 111111 (vide Ext.D). The Koikkal became divided by the compromise decree evidenced by Ext. P.S. .661 of 1093 after impleading the plaintiff's grandfather. When the plaintiff's grandfather died in 1109 the plaintiff's father, the 3rd defendant here, was impleaded in that suit as the 12th defendant. Both of them remained ex parte and; the suit was decreed on 13 111111 (vide Ext.D). The Koikkal became divided by the compromise decree evidenced by Ext. IV dated 14 111116 under which the 1st defendant obtained the suit property. He got himself impleaded as the additional decree holder in O. S.101/1102 and sought to execute that decree. While the execution proceedings were pending he assigned the suit property to defendants 4 and 5 by Ext. XI dated 18101954.In the partition in the plaintiff's illom under Ext. F, 5. No. 154/78 was allotted to the plaintiff and S. No, 154/7 A to his father. The plaintiff, alleging that the illom was not bound by the decree in O. S.101/1102, as it was not obtained in conformity with the provisions of S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act, Act 3 of 1106, instituted O. S.531/i955 to restrain the execution of the decree in O. S.101/1102 by a permanent injunction. 3. Defendants 1, 4 and contended that the suit property never belonged to the plaintiff's illom, that the illom has been properly represented in O. -S. 101/1102, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. The Munsif's Court found that the decree in O. S.101/1102 was not bind ing on the plaintiff's illom, as it was: not obtained in conformity with S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act, Act 3 of 1106; and therefore, decreed the suit. This decree was confirmed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge. The second appeal filed by defendantsl, 4 and 5 was dismissed by the learned single judge. 4. The first question for consideration in the appeals is whether the decree in O. S.101/1102 in so far as it set aside the decree in O. S.661/1093 was binding on the plaintiff. S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act which came into force on 8 61106 reads as follows: "No decree shall bind an illom unless it is obtained against the karnavan as such and the senior Anandravans of his branch and of every collateral branch, if any." It is clear that to the decree in O. S.101/1102 the 3rd respondent, i. e; the plaintiff's father alone was a party. Ext. Ext. F a deed of partition in the plaintiff's illom dated 3-81124 shows clearly that on the date of the decree in O. S.101/1102 (here was at least a major member in the illom other than the plaintiff's father i.e., the plaintiff's mother. Since the decree was obtained only against the karanavan, the decree cannot bind the illom. See the decision in Govinda Pillai v. Chellamma 1957 KLJ.1006. Therefore the finding of the courts below to the effect that there was no binding decree as against the illom has to be confirmed. 5. Then the further question which remains for consideration is whether the present suit was barred by resjudicata by reason of the decision in execution of the decree in O. S.101/1102 on the objection of the 3rd defendant here, the 12th defendant in O. S.101/1102. The 3rd defendant objected to the delivery of the property on 22 91954 in execution of the decree in O. S.101/1102 on the ground that the decree was not executable as against the illom for the reason that it was not obtained in conformity with S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act. That objection was overruled by the execution court and that was affirmed in appeal by the Travancore-Cochin High Court by Ext.11 judgment. Ext. L is the 1st defendant's reply to the 3rd defendant's objection. That shows clearly that the plaintiff's father had been impleaded in O. S.101 of 1102 not as karanavan of the plaintiff's illom but only in his individual capacity. Exts. J, K and the judgment Ext. C are clear that the plaintiff's illom was the real proprietor of the suit property and not the plaintiff's father in his individual capacity. The learned single judge held on that basis that the decree in O. S.101/1102, not having been obtained in conformity with S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act, was void, and cannot operate as res judicata. But it is contended on behalf of the appellants that even if the decree was null and void, and would not be res judicata, the decision in Ext. II overruling the objection of the 3rd defendant that the decree was void, would constitute res judicata and bar the present suit. But it is contended on behalf of the appellants that even if the decree was null and void, and would not be res judicata, the decision in Ext. II overruling the objection of the 3rd defendant that the decree was void, would constitute res judicata and bar the present suit. That a decree is null and void is an objection that can be raised in execution, but whether such an objection is one relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code is not beyond controversy. In Mahabir v. Narain AIR. 1931 Allahabad 490 Sulaiman, Ag. C. J., speaking for a Full Bench of the Court said that a plea that a decree is a nullity does not relate to the execution of the decree as it aims at its destruction, and that a dispute as to the execution of a decree contemplates the existence of a valid decree. He further said that a court would have power to refuse to execute a decree of this kind when it is a nullity or has been passed without jurisdiction. But the complaint of the aggrieved party would not be an objection within the meaning of S.47, Civil P. C., so as to bar a separate suit by him. But in R. M. Bhatt v. Mamlal Luxmichand AIR. 1959 Bombay 221 Shah J., speaking for the court said that an objection that a decree is a nullity is one relating to execution of the decree within the purview of S.47 and that if the objection is not raised in execution and the court orders execution on the basis that there is an executable decree, a fresh suit for a declaration that there is no executable decree would be barred. In Lakshmi v. Bharathi and Others 1968 KLT. 447 one of us had occasion to consider the question and it was observed that if a decree is a nullity, and an objection is raised in execution that it is a nullity and the objection is overruled and execution ordered, it will operate as res judicata for a fresh suit. The decision of the Supreme Court in V. D. Modi v. R. A. Rehman AIR. The decision of the Supreme Court in V. D. Modi v. R. A. Rehman AIR. 1970 S.C.1475 shows that an objection that a decree is null and void on its face can be raised and decided by the executing court; but the court did not decide whether the objection related to execution of the decree within the meaning of S.47 or that a decision on the objection would be a bar to a fresh suit. Be that as it may, the decision in Ext. II was not binding on the illom as the 3rd defendant was incompetent by himself to represent the illom. In other words, the 3rd defendant who raised the objection had no jural capacity to represent the illom and the decision of the executing court that the decree was executable would not bind the illom. As the illom was not bound by the decision the plaintiff was also not bound by it. If the decision was a decision under S.47 of the CPC., it would be a decree and the decree can bind the illom only if it was passed in accordance with S.12 of the Malayala Brahmins Act. 6. Alternatively it was contended that the decree in O. S.101/1102 was only voidable on the basis of the decision in Mathew v. Ayyappankutty,1962 KLT. 61 and the execution court having decided that the property could be delivered in execution of the decree in O. S.101/1102 the present suit was barred by res judicata. If the decree in O. S, 101/1102 was only voidable, the execution court was not competent to entertain the objection, as the objection related to the validity of the decree and any decision arrived at by the court would not relate to execution, discharged satisfaction of the decree, and would fall outside S.47 of the CPC. The objection that a court has no, jurisdiction to pass a decree, and therefore, the decree is "a nullity may properly be raise! in the execution court. Whether the objection is an objection coming within S.47 of the CPC. or not it has to be entertained 'by the execution court, as the existence of a decree is a condition precedent to the execution court obtaining jurisdiction to execute the decree. in the execution court. Whether the objection is an objection coming within S.47 of the CPC. or not it has to be entertained 'by the execution court, as the existence of a decree is a condition precedent to the execution court obtaining jurisdiction to execute the decree. But an objection that a decree is only voidable is a matter which does not relate to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree, and therefore, cannot be raised under S.47. See the decision in Ajay Kumar v. Puspabala AIR. 1952 Assam 54 Therefore, in any view it has to be held that the decision in Ext. II has no binding force, and it cannot bar the present suit. Besides, the plaintiff's illom became divided on 3 81124 (16-3-1949) and the suit property was allotted to the plaintiff. The 3rd defendant's objection which culminated in Ext. II decision was 6Ied on 22-9-1954. On that date the 3rd defendant had no interest in the property and the decision in Ext, II can have no force so far as the plaintiff was concerned. There can be no question of the partition in the plaintiff's illom being affected by the doctrine of lis pendens as there was no transfer of the property or other dealing with it by a party to the suit, within the meaning of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The illom was not a party to the suit as the persons competent to represent the illom were not impleaded in the suit. Therefore, these appeals fail, and they are dismissed with costs. Dismissed.