JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This group of Special Appeals is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge, dismissing the appellant's writ petitions, whereby the challenged the validity of notices issued by the respondent Town Area Committee, requiring the appellants to pay the stated sum of money as weighing charges due from them. 2. It appears that the respondent Town Area Committee had promulgated a set of bye-laws for the establishment, Regulation and inspection of the market in the Town Area of Chirgaon. Under the 1st bye-law, sellers and purchasers of the commodities mentioned therein were required to pay weighing dues. The appellants were dealers in those commodities. In due course, they became liable to pay weighing dues to the Town Area Committee under this bye-law. They, however, did not pay, with the consequence that the Town Area Committee served upon them the impugned notices. The appellants challenged the validity of the notices on variety of grounds. 3. It was, in the first place, urged that the bye-laws were invalid, because they were not framed by the Town Area Committee. There sees no merit in this submission. Sec. 298 (2) F (d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act provided that the Town Area Committee may make bye-laws for the establishment, Regulation and inspection of the market and for proper and cleanly conduct of business therein. By a notification dated 3rd March, 1933, the State Government authorised the Town Area Committee of Chirgaon to frame bye-laws under this provision of the Municipalities Act. It appears that in 1934, the District Magistrate was functioning as the Town Area Committee. He framed this set of bye-laws. It then appears that after the District Magistrate had framed the bye-laws, the Town Area Committee was revived, and the bye-laws framed by the District Magistrate were placed before it for ratification and they were duly ratified on 9th January, 1935. Thus, in the eye of law, it will be deemed that these bye, laws were framed by the Town Area Committee. In any event, after the date of ratification, namely, 9-1-1935, no possible defect could remain in these bye-laws. 4. It was then urged that, though the Town Area Committee could frame bye-laws for the establishment, regulation, etc., of market, yet it could not, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 298 (2) F (d), impose any tax. In any event, after the date of ratification, namely, 9-1-1935, no possible defect could remain in these bye-laws. 4. It was then urged that, though the Town Area Committee could frame bye-laws for the establishment, regulation, etc., of market, yet it could not, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 298 (2) F (d), impose any tax. The weighing dues mentioned in bye-law No. 1 are in fact and in law, the levy of a tax, which was unauthorised. It is unnecessary to discuss this submission on its merits, because the defect, if any, was cured by the U.P. Town Areas (Amendment) Act, 1952. Sec. 12 of the amending Act added clause (g) to Sec. 14 (1) of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, in the following terms : "Any other tax being one of the taxes mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916." Thus, the Town Area Committee became empowered to levy all those taxes which the State Government could levy under sub sec. (1) of Sec. 128 aforesaid, Clause (xiv) of Sec. 128 (1) provides : "any other tax which the State Legislature has power to impose in the State under the Constitution;" Reading the two provisions together, the Town Area Committee could impose any tax, which the State Legislature could impose under the Constitution. List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution enumerates the various fields of legislation, upon which the State Legislature could make laws. Entry 52 of List II provided:- "Tax on the entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale therein." Entry 54 of List II provided:- "Tax on the sale or purchase of goods . . . . . . . . . . ." Thus, the Town Area Committee could impose tax on the entry of goods as well as on the sale or purchase of goods, in view of entries 52 and 54 mentioned above. Bye-law No. 1 provides:- "1.(a) Weighing dues shall be charged at the rate of 1/4/6 per cent (eight-/8/- annas per cent from the seller and twelve and a half annas per cent from the purchaser) on the following articles which come to the Town Area for sales:- Grains, oilseeds, oil cakes, cotton, vegetables for wholesale, Dhania for wholesale and Gur etc. (b) Weighing dues on Ghi shall be charged at the rate of 216 two and a half annas per maund half from the seller and half from the purchaser." It is thus clear that this imposition was upon the entry of the mentioned articles into the Town Area for sale. The levy is clearly covered by Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the constitution. It cannot be said that the Town Area Committee did not possess the requisite power to levy this tax. 5. It was, however, urged that the amending Act of 1952 conferred power upon the Town Area Committee from the date of its enforcement. The impugned bye-laws were promulgated in 1934, when the Committee had no such power. This submission is squarely met by Sec. 13 of the amending Act, which provided:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, (1) where any tax of the nature described in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14 of the Principal Act and by whatever name or description called has been imposed, levied or assessed by any Town Area Committee prior to the commencement of this Act, the same shall be and is hereby declared to be good and valid in law as if this Act had been in force on all material dates and the tax had been imposed, levied and assessed under and in accordance with the appropriate provision in that behalf; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." Thus, the imposition of this tax has been validated retrospectively, as if the amending Act had been in force even in 1924, when the bye-laws were framed. It cannot hence be held that the imposition of this tax was without the authority of law. 6. It was then urged that, in substance, the imposition of this tax was levying sales tax or purchase tax on the various commodities. We are not satisfied that there is any merit in this submission. But, assuming that is so, the Town Area Committee had, under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the requisite power to impose sales tax upon these commodities. 7. In the next place, Mr. We are not satisfied that there is any merit in this submission. But, assuming that is so, the Town Area Committee had, under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the requisite power to impose sales tax upon these commodities. 7. In the next place, Mr. Verma, appearing for the appellants, urged that, in truth and in law, the imposition is not a tax, but a fee. We had some difficulty in following this argument. The entire burden of the writ petitions was that the Town Area Committee is realising about Rs. 62,000/- annually in the form of the weighing dues, but it spends nothing to render any service to the traders from whom it is realised. According to the appellants, the Town Area Committee renders no special service to the trade or the traders. If this were so, the imposition could not, in law be deemed to be a fee. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Gwamiar of Sri Shripur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 SC 282, it was held that the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayers consent and the payment is enforced by law. It is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. There is no element of quid pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority. But, a fee is payment for service rendered or to be rendered. There seems to be an element of quid pro quo in the levy of a fee. On the facts alleged by the appellants, the impugned levy could not be a fee, because, admittedly, there is no quid pro quo. 8. It was then urged that the levy is neither a fee, nor a tax, but something like an illegal exaction. The Town Area Committee has the power to impose fee (see Sec. 294 of the U.P.) Municipalities Act) . It has the power to impose tax in view of clause (g) of Sec. 14 (1) of the Town Areas Act. Learned counsel was not able to specify what exactly this levy is to be called or known, if it is neither a fee nor a tax; and we are unable to discern any difference between this imposition and a tax properly so called. Learned counsel was not able to specify what exactly this levy is to be called or known, if it is neither a fee nor a tax; and we are unable to discern any difference between this imposition and a tax properly so called. This is a levy made by the authority without the consent of the payer. We find that no special service or benefit is rendered to the persons from whom the charge is realised. As alleged by the appellants themselves, the Town Area Committee does no service to the trade or traders. In this situation, the levy is a tax as known to the Constitution. 9. It was then urged that clause (d) of bye-law No. 1 violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Under this sub-paragraph, certain commodities were exempt from weighing dues. The point does not really arise for adjudication. Assuming that the argument is right, if this clause is struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. the appellants will not gain anything. Only the exemption will go. The imposition of the tax will not be affected. The appellants are praying for the quashing of the notices demanding payment of the tax from them. That prayer cannot be granted. It is settled that if a particular submission does not advance the case of the appellant and does not entitle him to the relief claimed by him, he is not entitled to raise such a plea. Further, in paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the commodities mentioned in clause (d) are not locally produced, but are imported from distant places. Therefore, their cost is already increased due to transportation charges. At the time the bye-laws were framed it was, thought that these articles should not be taxed. The weighing tax was levied only on the local produce which came from the neighbouring places. The facts mentioned in this paragraph give a reasonable basis for classification of these commodities for exemption. Learned counsel urged that paragraph 16 was sworn in the affidavit on the basis of record. It was rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that if this technical objection had been taken at the appropriate time, the affidavit would have been rectified or a supplementary affidavit would have been filed. No such defect was pointed out even in the grounds of appeal. It was rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that if this technical objection had been taken at the appropriate time, the affidavit would have been rectified or a supplementary affidavit would have been filed. No such defect was pointed out even in the grounds of appeal. In our opinion, there is no merit in this technical objection. It is apparent that the District Magistrate, who framed the bye-laws, was aware of the local conditions and he made the exemption in the public interest, having regard to the local condition of things. We are not satisfied that clause (d) violates Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. In the end, it was urged that bye law No. 2 violates Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. This bye-law provides that articles coming for sale mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of bye-law No. 1 shall be put to auction in public and shall be sold to the highest bidder, and if he refuses to buy, then the matter shall be referred to the Bazar Committee whose decision shall be binding on the purchaser and the seller. If the article is found to be inferior to the sample, it shall again be put to auction. It is evident that this bye-law has nothing to do with the levy of the tax. It provides for the Regulation and conduct of business of purchase and sale in the market. As seen above, Sec. 298 (2) F (d) confers power to frame bye-laws for the Regulation of the conduct of business, such regulatory bye-laws have never been held to violate the fundamental right to carry on business. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad, A.I.R. 1952 SC 115. There, the Town Area Committee had been authorised by Sec. 293 (1) and 293 (j) (d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act to make bye-laws authorising it to charge any fee for the use and occupation of any property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee. The bye-laws framed by the Town Area Committee of Jalalabad imposed a fee on any and every body who used a public street for auctioning goods. It was held that these bye-laws were ultra vires the powers conferred upon the Town Area Committee, and were invalid. The bye-laws framed by the Town Area Committee of Jalalabad imposed a fee on any and every body who used a public street for auctioning goods. It was held that these bye-laws were ultra vires the powers conferred upon the Town Area Committee, and were invalid. In this context, it was urged that the restrictions upon the right of business guaranteed by Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution could be imposed only by the authority of law. Such not being the case there, the imposition was held violative of that Article and struck off. This case will apply only if it is held that the bye-laws impugned in the present case were, for any reason, invalid. But, that is not the case. 11. Reliance was placed upon Sri Ram v. Notified Area Committees, A.I.R. 1952 SC 118. There also, the bye-laws were held to be invalid, because they did not in fact or law, levy a fee as known to law which alone they were authorised to levy. This case is also distinguishable, because, in our case, the bye-laws cannot be held invalid on any such ground. 12. No other point was pressed. The appeals have no substance, and are accordingly dismissed with costs.