JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - This revision by the General Manager, North Eastern Railway (hereinafter referred to as employer) and others arises out of the proceedings taken by Abdul Qayum Khan, the opposite party, under the Payment of Wages Act claiming his salary and emoluments from 20-2-1952 to 4-10-1955 on the ground that the same was wrongly withheld. It is the admitted case of the parties that Abdul Qayum Khan was employed as a Travelling Ticket Examiner. On 20-2-1952 he was removed from service. The employee under his service rules filed departmental appeals, made some representations but to no avail. Ultimately on 6-10-1958 the employee instituted a suit in civil court for a declaration that the order of removal from service was null and void, he be deemed in continuous service entitled to all the salary and allowances. He claimed a decree for the arrears of his salary and allowances. Ultimately on 1-4-1965 the High Court decreed the suit in second appeal, for declaration and for recovery of arrears of salary and allowances for a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the suit. On 20-11-1965 the employer reinstated the employee in his post but simultaneously passed an order suspending him with retrospective effect from 20-2-1952 pending enquiry into certain charges against him. I am given to understand that the enquiry is now over and the employee has been removed from service. However, much before his removal from service a second time the employee on 30-4-1966 filed an application under Sec. 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act claiming wages for the period 20.2-1952 to 4-10-1958. One of the pleas on which the employer contested the claim of the employee was that the employee having been suspended with effect from 20-2-1952, he was not entitled to full salary and allowances under the rules and he having been paid his subsistence allowance as allowed by the rules, his claim was liable to be rejected. In effect the plea was based on the provisions of clause (h) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act. 2. It appears that neither the Payment of Wages Authority nor the appellate court give any clear finding on the plea so raised. In fact there is no discussion in their judgments on such a plea. In effect the plea was based on the provisions of clause (h) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 of the Payment of Wages Act. 2. It appears that neither the Payment of Wages Authority nor the appellate court give any clear finding on the plea so raised. In fact there is no discussion in their judgments on such a plea. The learned counsel for the employee submitted that the case of the employee was never argued on the basis of any such plea. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the employer submitted that the plea having been raised, it ought to have been noticed by the Payment of Wages Authority and in fact the employer raised a ground in appeal in support thereof and the counsel argued the point before the lower appellate court. An application with an affidavit was filed on behalf of the employer before this Court averring that the point was raised and argued before the appellate court. In the counter-affidavit of the employee this assertion of the employer has been refuted. Be that as it may, I have allowed the point to be raised by the learned counsel for the applicant employer as it does not involve any fresh enquiry into facts and because it was pleaded as a defence in the written statement filed by the employer before the Payment of Wages Authority. 3. I have heard Sri Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the applicant. Learned counsel submitted that the employer had the power in law to pass an order of suspension with retrospective effect and the order having been passed by the appropriate authority. It would be a good defence against the claim of the payment of full salary and allowances made by the employee. Learned counsel submitted that the employer had the power in law to pass an order of suspension with retrospective effect and the order having been passed by the appropriate authority. It would be a good defence against the claim of the payment of full salary and allowances made by the employee. Sri K. C. Saksena learned counsel for the employee opposite party, concede; that the employer under the rules had the power to pass a suspension order with retrospective effect but he contended that on the facts established in the instant case, no such power could be exercised as the decree of the High Court passed in second appeal was binding on the employer who bound to pay under the decree the full salary and allowances to the employee for the period 6-10-1955 to 5-10-1958 and the suspension order if given effect to would contravene the decree binding on the parties inasmuch as while the effect of the suspension order would be that right up from 20-2-1952 to the date of the removal of the employee from service or withdrawal of the suspension order, he would be entitled to only a subsistence allowance, his decree passed by the Court required the payment of full salary and allowances for the period 6-10-1955 to 5-10-1958, a period covered by the suspension order. The further submission was that once the suspension order is held to be operative then its effect cannot be arrested in between the period 6-10-1955 to 5-10-1958. Therefore, the whole order would remain ineffective though the civil court had not granted a decree to the employee for recovery of full salary and allowances between 20-2-1952 to 4-10-1955, as such a claim was barred by the law of limitation. 4. Sri Lalji Sinha for the applicant urged that there being no decree of the civil court directing payment of full salary and allowances for the period commencing from 20-2-1952 to 4-10-1955, there will be no contravention of the decree of the civil court if for that period the employees were paid only subsistence allowances under the suspension order. Reliance was placed on the case of Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 SC 687. Reliance was placed on the case of Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 SC 687. In the case before the Supreme Court there was no decree of the civil court or of the Supreme Court, for payment of any salary or allowance in favour of the employee; only a declaration had been given that the employee continued to be in service. In that context the Supreme Court considered whether a suspension order passed after the decree by the President of India giving it a retrospective effect contravened the decree of the Supreme Court. The answer given by the Supreme Court was that it did not. The learned judges, however, have made an observation in paragraph 15 of the reported judgment at page 690 as follows : "If the decree of this Court had directed payment of arrears of appellant's salary and allowances and the effect of the Rule made by the President was to deprive him of that right there might perhaps have been scope for an argument that the Rule contravened the provisions of Article 144 (of the "Constitution)." 5. Thus in the case cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, the Supreme Court had no occasion to lay down the law as to the effect of a decree passed by a civil court binding between the employer and the employee for payment of salary and allowances to the employee on an order of suspension passed by the employer giving it retrospective effect covering wholly or partially the period for which the salary or allowances were decreed by the civil court. On the other hand the learned Judges of the Supreme Court, as appears from the observations quoted above, did admit the scope for argument that a suspension order or a Rule authorising such suspension contravenes a decree of a civil court for payment of full salary and allowances for any period covered by the suspension order. The ruling of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the applicant does not assist him. 6. The suspension order passed by the Chief Commercial Superintendent on 29-7-1966, a copy of which is on record, shows that the employee under Rule 1706 (R) (I) will be deemed to have been placed under suspension on and from 20-2-1952 and shall continue under suspension till further orders. 6. The suspension order passed by the Chief Commercial Superintendent on 29-7-1966, a copy of which is on record, shows that the employee under Rule 1706 (R) (I) will be deemed to have been placed under suspension on and from 20-2-1952 and shall continue under suspension till further orders. The order in its terms that the employee shall continue under suspension till further orders. It is difficult for me then to agree with the submission of Sri Lalji Sinha for the applicant that the decree of the civil court will not be contravened as for the period covered by the decree the full salary and allowance would be payable by virtue of that decree and the suspension order will be fully effective for the period for which there is no decree. If I understand the implication of the submission correctly, then what the learned counsel meant was that either I should read the suspension order as if it was a suspension order from 20-2-1952 to 5-10-1955 and then again from 6-10-1958 upto the date when further orders were passed or that for the whole period the suspension continued and by the force of the decree of the civil court for the period between 6-10-1955 to 5-10-1958 the employer to meet the decree would pay over and above the subsistence allowance the balance of the decretal amount. It is not possible to accept either construction of the suspension order canvassed by the learned counsel for the applicant. Considering the rule under which the power of suspension is exercised and the terms in which the order has been passed, it cannot be bifurcated or divided into periods. Once the power of suspension had been exercised the suspension would be continuous and the effect of the rule would be that the suspended employee will not be entitled to the full salary and allowance for any period covered by the suspension order. Since there is a decree of a civil court binding on the employer to pay full salary and allowances to the employee for a part of the period covered by the suspension order, there arises a clear repugnance between the suspension order and the decree of the civil court. Since there is a decree of a civil court binding on the employer to pay full salary and allowances to the employee for a part of the period covered by the suspension order, there arises a clear repugnance between the suspension order and the decree of the civil court. Since the law will not permit the employer to contravene the decree of the civil court and the suspension order cannot be severed into different periods as to its effect, the whole suspension order will have to be ignored. In other words, because of the decree of the civil court binding on the employer, the power of the employer to suspend the employee from any date prior to the period covered under the decree cannot legally be exercised. 7. For the reasons given above, I hold that the employer's plea based on Sec. 7(2)(h) of Payment of Wages Act, on the facts of the instant case, is untenable. 8. Sri Lalji Sinha, then contended that claim of the employee was barred by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the C.P. Code. In this connection learned counsel relied upon a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of P.J. Lartius v. Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1965 ALJ 292. The ratio of the decision of the case cited again does not help the employer applicant. The provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 2 are attracted where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim. In the instant case the employee as a plaintiff in the civil suit did not omit to put a claim of arrears of salary and allowances for the period from 20-2-1952 to 6-10-1955. He had claimed the salary for that period also. The civil court decided that he was not entitled to it as the claim was barred by limitation. The decision of the civil court will not amount to a relinquishment of the claim. He had claimed the salary for that period also. The civil court decided that he was not entitled to it as the claim was barred by limitation. The decision of the civil court will not amount to a relinquishment of the claim. Moreover, in the case of P.J. Lartius v. Superintendent Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1965 ALJ 292 the attention of the learned Single Judge does not seem to have been drawn to the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act which invests the authority under the Payment of Wages Act with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure only for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents. Thus the Payment of Wages Authority has no power to reject a claim under Order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. Code as the exercise of such a power is not covered by any of the three purposes mentioned. Moreover, in the case of H.C.D. Mathur v. E.I. Rly. Administration, A.I.R. 1950 Allahabad 80 a Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 15 of the reported judgment on page 82 observed as follows : "Clearly, therefore, the Legislature in-tended that the authority constituted under Sec. 15, Payment of Wages Act should be a Court." 9. Since I have held above on the facts of the instant case that no part of the claim had been omitted or relinquished by the employee in the previous litigation between the parties and sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 2 in its terms will not apply, I need not refer this case to a Division Bench for consideration of the correctness of the learned Judge's decision in Lartius v. Superintendent, Printing and Stationery (supra). 10. As a result of the discussion above, I find no merits in this revision and dismissed it with costs.