JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This and the connected special appeals are directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellants. 2. The Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, notified proposals under Sec. 203 (3) of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam for the levy of Theatre Tax. It was proposed to levy the tax on cinemas, carnivals and fetes and other amusements and entertainments. Cinemas were divided into two classes, defined by reference to the annual value of the cinema building, Class I comprised of cinemas where the annual value of the building for the purposes of property tax was Rs. 10,000, in that case the theatre tax was to be Rs. 5/- per show Class II comprised of cinemas where the annual value for property tax was Rs. 10,000 or less, in that case the theatre tax proposed was Rs. 3/- per show. An objection was filed by Shri Naresh Bhargava, President of the Allahabad Cinema Exhibitors Association (hereinafter called the Association). It purported to be an objection under Sec. 200 (1) of the Adhiniyam. It attempted to show that having regard to the conditions prevailing in the cinema industry the proposed tax would be burdensome and unreasonable. The Mahapalika, however, finalised the proposals and imposed the tax with the sanction of the State Government. The validity of the impost was challenged by the writ petitions. They have been dismissed by Beg., J. 3. A number of contentions have been raised before us. 4. The first contention is that the Nagar Mahapalika did not follow the procedure set out in the Adhiniyam while finalising the proposals and submitting them to the State Government. We find upon a perusal of the writ petitions that nothing has been indicated to show what were the lapses allegedly committed by the Mahapalika in this regard. Beyond a general averment that the procedure was not followed the appellants have said nothing more. On that ground alone we would be justified in not, considering that contention. In any event, there is no substance in it. It is pointed out first that the objection submitted by the Association was not considered by the Mahapalika. The counter-affidavit of Shri M. L. Bhargava clearly shows that the objection was considered and was rejected by a special resolution dated June 29, 1964 of the Mahapalika. In any event, there is no substance in it. It is pointed out first that the objection submitted by the Association was not considered by the Mahapalika. The counter-affidavit of Shri M. L. Bhargava clearly shows that the objection was considered and was rejected by a special resolution dated June 29, 1964 of the Mahapalika. The appellants say that the matter had already been considered by the Mahapalika on November 22, 1962, and rejected by a general resolution and therefore it was not open to the Mahapalika to consider the matter again on June 29, 1964; and inasmuch as there was no authority in the Mahapalika to dispose of the matter through a general resolution the entire procedure leading to the levy of the impost was invalid. It seems to us that if, as appears here, the proposals and the objection thereto can be disposed of by a special resolution only, the general resolution was beyond the powers of the Mahapalika. And it is well settled that what is beyond the powers of a statutory authority must be treated as a nullity. In that event the proposals and the objection thereto must be treated as remaining pending on November 23, 1962 and when the Mahapalika proceeded to dispose them of in its meeting of June 29, 1964, it acted entirely within its powers. 5. The next submission of the appellants is that when their objection was considered by the Mahapalika no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. Now, it is apparent from the provisions of Secs. 199 to 203 of the Adhiniyam that what is contemplated by the Legislature when framing and finalising proposals thereunder is the legislative process involved in imposing a tax. It is a process in which the historical cry of "no taxation without representation" has been widened to include filing of a personal objection by interests likely to be affected. They are given an opportunity to file objections to the proposed levy. Beyond this, the Legislature has not considered it necessary to provide for an oral hearing to the objectors. It is a process in which the historical cry of "no taxation without representation" has been widened to include filing of a personal objection by interests likely to be affected. They are given an opportunity to file objections to the proposed levy. Beyond this, the Legislature has not considered it necessary to provide for an oral hearing to the objectors. The appellants rely on The Kind v. Housing Appeal Tribunal, L.R. 1920 (3) K.B. 334, where it was held that a company which had been refused permission by the local authority to construct a building was entitled on appeal to a hearing during the appeal so that the company would be in a position to controvert the statements made by the local authority in opposition to the appeal. Even here the learned judges did not hold that the company was entitled to an oral hearing. All that they held was that the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to controvert what was stated in the reply of the local authority. The proceeding before the learned Judges was not a proceeding of the nature contemplated by Sec. 200 of the Adhiniyam. It was a proceeding in which the question was whether permission should be granted to construct a building. The party denied was given by statute a right of appeal to the Tribunal. The nature of the proceeding was essentially administrative and the procedure contemplated was admittedly quasi-judicial. As we have pointed out, the nature of the proceedings under Sec. 200 of the Adhiniyam is legislative in character. In Narinder Chand v. Lt. Governor, Himachal Pradesh, (1971) 2 (SC) Cases 747, the Supreme Court pointed out that the power to impose a tax was undoubtedly a legislative power. 6. The appellants also rely upon Board of Revenue v. Sardarni Vidyawati, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1217. In that case, the proceeding involved lay under Sec. 56 (2) of the Stamp Act. The Board of Revenue was concerned with the proper amount of stamp duty payable on an instrument. It seems to us beyond doubt that the proceeding being essentially of a quasi-judicial nature cannot be contemplated with that contemplated under Sec. 200 of the Adhiniyam. 7. We have also been referred to the observations of Hidayatullah, J. in Raza Buland Sugar Co. It seems to us beyond doubt that the proceeding being essentially of a quasi-judicial nature cannot be contemplated with that contemplated under Sec. 200 of the Adhiniyam. 7. We have also been referred to the observations of Hidayatullah, J. in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal Board, Rampur, A.I.R. 1965 SC 895, where that learned Judge observed : "The Act lays down conditions some of which are devised for the protection of the tax payers and some others for ministerial operations connected with the method or system of imposing the tax or for promoting the dispatch, efficiency and publicity, etc. All conditions of the first kind must, of course, be regarded as mandatory because they lie at the very root of the exercise of the power. Thus preparation of assessment rolls, hearing of objections, framing of assessment rules are all mandatory." It is urged that the learned Judge specifically ruled that the hearing of the objections was mandatory. We are unable to agree that the observation could be applied to extend to an oral hearing during the consideration of objection; under Sec. 200 (1) of the Adhiniyam. Reference was intended by the learned Judge to objections filed to the assessment rolls. They were made with reference to the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Sec. 143 (3) of the said Act expressly provides an opportunity to the objector of being heard in person or by an agent. No such provision is contained in Sec. 200 (1) of the Adhiniyam. It cannot be said that merely because Sec. 200 (1) contemplates the filing of an objection that alone entitles the objector to an opportunity of being orally heard in the matter. Whether or not an opportunity of hearing should be given depends upon the essential nature of the proceeding and that, as we have pointed out, is not implied when the proceeding is legislative in character. 8. The appellants also place reliance upon Vasudeo Chaube v. V.N. Kishore, 1968 ALJ 1021. This Court held that in a proceeding under Sec. 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the applicant was entitled to a copy of the report sent by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to controvert the allegations contained therein and inasmuch as that opportunity was not provided the action taken by the State Government under Sec. 7-F is quasi-judicial in nature. That is now well settled. See Prem Prakash Virmani v. State Government, 1970 ALJ 1197 (FB) and Haji Manzoor Ahmed v. State of U.P., 1968 ALJ 809 (FB) 9. The appellants also say that while the Mahapalika was bound under Sec. 200(4) of the Adhiniyam to forward the objections along with the proposals to the State Government, the objections filed on behalf of the appellants were in fact not forwarded to the State Government. We have before us a clear statement in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Mahapalika that the objection preferred by the Association was also sent to the Government. There is nothing to show why the averment should not be accepted. We have been referred to annexure `D' to the counter-affidavit, but that is merely a copy of the comments sent by the Mahapalika. The averment is dear that along with the comments the objection was also sent. 10. Another contention on behalf of the appellants is that a copy of the comments should have been made available to the appellants so that they could meet the allegations contained therein. This contention would have had substance if the appellants had been able to show that the allegations in the comments relied upon facts not considered by them in their objection. They have not shown that. Moreover, that is a ground pertinent to a quasi-judicial proceeding. As in our opinion, we are concerned with a proceeding essentially legislative in character the question does not arise. In New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Surwarna Transport Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1957 SC 232, the Supreme Court pointed out that if a statutory body had done all that was required by law to be done, it could not be said to have failed in the discharge of its statutory duty. Inasmuch as, in our opinion, there is nothing in Sec. 200 (1) requiring the Mahapalika to hear the objector on the objection filed by him it cannot be said that the special resolution passed by the Mahapalika is invalid on that ground. 11. Besides, there is no material before us to show that the appellants at any stage demanded from the Mahapalika a right to be heard on their objection. No such demand was made either before the State Government at the time when the proposals were being considered. 11. Besides, there is no material before us to show that the appellants at any stage demanded from the Mahapalika a right to be heard on their objection. No such demand was made either before the State Government at the time when the proposals were being considered. In the absence of any such demand it is not open to the appellants to complain now of the want of opportunity of being heard. In State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipality, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1398 the Supreme Court laid down that no fault could be found with the decision of the State Government to supersede the Board under Sec. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act if the explanation of the Board of considered but no oral hearing was granted to the Board in the absence of any request therefore. Reference may also be made to Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, A.I.R. 1969 SC 198. 12. The appellants, in our opinion, have failed to show that the procedure adopted by the Mahapalika in respect of the proposals relating to the impugned tax has violated the law. In any event, nothing has been shown to indicate that substantial compliance was not effected with the statutory procedure. Admittedly, the imposition of the tax has been notified in the Official Gazette. and by virtue of Sec. 203 (3) that notification is conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyam. 13. The next contention of the appellants is that the terms of the notification levying the tax contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution. It is pointed out that the classification of cinemas into Class I and Class II proceeds upon the annual value of the cinema building determined for the purpose of property tax, and it is urged that them is no reasonable relation. ship between the annual value and the object of the tax. `Annual value' has been defined by Sec. 174 of the Adhiniyam, and it is apparent from the terms of the definition that in one case the cost of erecting the building is taken into consideration and, in the other, the gross annual rent for which that building is actually let or expected to be let from year to year. `Annual value' has been defined by Sec. 174 of the Adhiniyam, and it is apparent from the terms of the definition that in one case the cost of erecting the building is taken into consideration and, in the other, the gross annual rent for which that building is actually let or expected to be let from year to year. Both the cost of the construction and the rental value indicate the extent of the accommodation, its quality, the locality in which it is situated and other factors which relate to the enjoyment of the building. Now, the theatre tax is levied as a tax on amusement and entertainments. The amusement in a building are affected by all those factors which go into the composition of the "annual value" of the building Several factors which affect the one constitute considerations influencing the other. 14. In Western Theatres v. Cantonment Board, A.I.R. 1959 SC 582 it was observed that it would not be unreasonable or improper if a higher tax is imposed on the shows given by a cinema house which contained a large seating accommodation and which was situated in a fashionable or busy locality where the number of visitors was more numerous and in more affluent circumstances than the tax that was imposed on the shows given in a smaller cinema house containing less accommodation, and situated in a locality where the visitors were less numerous and financially in less affluent circumstances and it could not be said that the two cinema houses in those circumstances were similarly situated so as to attract the pro-visions of the Article 14 of the Constitution. 15. We have been referred by the appellant to K.T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1961 SC 552, where the Supreme Court laid down that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws must be extended even to taxing statutes and if the property of the same character had to be taxed the taxation must be effected by the same standard, so that the burden of taxation could equally fall on all persons holding that kind and extent of property. But, we may point out, it was also observed that if the Legislature had classified persons or properties into different categories, which were subject to different rates of taxation with reference to income or property, such a classification would not be open to the attack of inequality on the ground that the total burden resulting from such a classification was unequal. Different kinds of property could be subjected to different rates taxation, and so long as there was a notional basis for the classification, Article 14 would not stand in the way of such a classification resulting in unequal burdens on different classes of properties. 16. Reference was also made by the appellants to the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Rajja Reddy, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1458, but we find that in applying Article 14 of the Constitution the Supreme Court merely laid down the law already enunciated by it in earlier cases including K. T. Moopil Nair. 17. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the considerations forming the basis of the levy of property tax cannot reasonably constitute the basis of defining a classification for the purposes of theatre tax. 18. Besides, the opinion to which we have come that the classification between cinemas of class I and class II proceed upon a rational basis, there is also the circumstance that there is a complete absence of any allegations in the writ petitions on which any contention such as the one before us can possibly be founded. It is now settled law that when invoking Article 14 of the Constitution a petitioner must lay the foundation of facts in the petition itself when invoking that provision. 19. Upon these considerations, we reject the contention that Article 14 has been contravened by the classification attempted by the impugned notification. 20. The next contention is that the theatre tax levied by the Nagar Mahapalika is a colourable piece of legislation. It is pointed out that the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 is already in operation and the new impost of theatre tax merely endeavours to achieve what is already covered by that Act. It is difficult for us to appreciate this contention. The two taxes are essentially different in their incidence. The U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act levies a tax on all payments for admission to any entertainment. It is difficult for us to appreciate this contention. The two taxes are essentially different in their incidence. The U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act levies a tax on all payments for admission to any entertainment. It is a tax imposed on and paid by those who seek admission to an entertainment. On the contrary, the theatre tax levied by the Mahapalika is a tax imposed on those who carry on the business of entertainment. The incidence is visited on a different class of persons, and that identifies the tax as one different from the entertainment tax. We are unable to hold that any colourable piece of legislation was attempted by the imposition of theatre tax. We may also dispose of at this stage the further contention that in view of the Entertainment Tax already levied, the theatre tax constitutes double taxation. It is apparent from what we have said that no question of double taxation can arise, the incidence of the two taxes being visited on two different classes of persons. We may also take note of the further contention that the theatre tax amounts to double taxation because it is of the same nature as property tax. This contention has not been taken in the writ petition at all. Besides, the nature of the imposition is wholly different in the two cases. The mere circumstance that the notification classifies the cinemas on the basis of the property tax imposed on the cinema buildings does not affect the nature of the theatre tax. It will be clear from a perusal of the notification that reference to property tax levied on the cinema buildings has been made merely for the purpose of classifying the cinemas for the purpose of applying different rates. It is the quantification of the tax that is under consideration here and not its quality or nature. Reliance was placed upon Ujjam Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1921, but we find nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court there which can be of assistance to the appellants. 21. The next contention is that theatre tax is not cinema tax and, therefore, it cannot be levied in respect of cinemas. It seems to us that the expression "theatre tax" must be construed by reference to the meaning given to it in the Adhiniyam. 21. The next contention is that theatre tax is not cinema tax and, therefore, it cannot be levied in respect of cinemas. It seems to us that the expression "theatre tax" must be construed by reference to the meaning given to it in the Adhiniyam. When Sec. 172 (2) (i) and the other provisions of the Adhiniyam speak of theatre tax, they refer to the tax defined by Sec. 2 (77) as a tax "on amusement or entertainments". Wherever, therefore, reference has been made in the Adhiniyam to the theatre tax it must be understood as a tax on amusement and entertainments. There can be no dispute that cinemas are intended to provide entertainment. We have been referred by the appellants to Entry 33 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, where "theatres" have been referred to as distinct from "cinemas". No doubt Entry 33 makes a distinction between theatres and cinemas. But, as we have pointed out, we are concerned essentially with the definition of "theatre tax" as formulated by the Adhiniyam itself. We are of opinion that the theatre tax, despite the nomenclature used, can be levied in respect of cinemas. 22. The last contention is that theatre tax cannot exceed Rs. 250/- per annum because in its nature it is a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments and must conform, therefore, to the terms of Article 276 of the Constitution. That contention is shortly disposed of. List II of the Seventh Schedule contemplates a tax on profession, trades, callings and employments as different in nature from a tax on entertainment and amusements. It contains two separate entries in that behalf, namely entry 60 and entry 62 respectively. Whether legislation falls under one entry or the other will depend upon the essential content of the legislation and the question in every case will be whether it can be properly said to fall under one entry or the other. In the case before us, we are concerned with a tax on entertainment and amusements. While it may incidentally affect the trade or calling of the person on when the tax is visited, that will not alter the essential content of the legislation. It is a tax which falls under entry 62 and not under entry 60 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While it may incidentally affect the trade or calling of the person on when the tax is visited, that will not alter the essential content of the legislation. It is a tax which falls under entry 62 and not under entry 60 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. In this connection, reference may be made to Western India Theatres (supra) and Y.V. Sri. Nivasamurthy v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1959 SC 894 where the same view has been taken. 23. In our judgment, the contentions raised before us cannot succeed and must, therefore, be rejected. 24. In Special Appeal No. 1024 of 1969, the theatre tax was imposed consequent to Sec. 128 (1) (iii) (a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The appellant in that case states that the questions raised there fall to be decided upon the same considerations as those governing the other case. Indeed, learned counsel has merely adopted the arguments which have been raised in the other cases. 25. In the result, we affirm the judgment and order of the learned single Judge and dismiss these appeals with costs.