JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution claiming relief for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Superintendent, Central Excise, Firozabad to return the liquid gold seized from the petitioner's business premises on 7th April, 1971 and to further prohibit the respondent from taking any further proceedings against the petitioner. 2. The facts which led to the filing of the present petition are necessary to be stated. Messrs Gyani Ram and Co., the petitioner is a partnership firm, which carries on business of sale of plain and decorated glass bangles at Firozabad in the district of Agra. Petitioner purchases plain bangles from the manufacturers of bangles and thereafter he undertakes the process of decoration of those bangles with the aid of liquid gold. On the completion of the process of decoration the bangles get golden colour which are sold by the petitioner to the dealers. On 7th April, 1971, Gold Inspector Firozabad received secret information that the petitioner was manufacturing liquid gold and he was also receiving illicitly manufactured liquid gold in his bangle store. The Gold Inspector forwarded the information to the Superintendent, Central Excise and Gold Control Officer, Firozabad, who issued a search warrant under Sec. 58 (2) of the Gold Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for the search of the petitioner's business premises. The Superintendent of the Central Excise himself headed the raiding party which searched the petitioner's premises on 7th April, 1971 at about 11 A.M. On search of the petitioner's business premises, the Superintendent, Central Excise found 12 bottles of liquid gold containing 13% gold having seal cover and paper labels of the Manufacturer affixed on them. The Superintendent, Central Excise further found 11 bottles of liquid gold having seal stoppears but without label or marking of the manufacturer, a big bottle containing gold having a label showing that the same was a bottle of eucalyptus oil containing liquid gold, a small bottle containing mixture of liquid gold and solvent oils and 21 phials containing mixture of liquid gold. The respondents seized all the bottles and phials containing liquid gold except the 12 bottles, which contained labels and marking of the manufacturer. The respondents seized all the bottles and phials containing liquid gold except the 12 bottles, which contained labels and marking of the manufacturer. A Kachchi Note-Book, recovered from the business premises of the petitioner, which contained accounts of receipt and disposal of the liquid gold for March, 1971 onwards was also seized by the Superintendent of Central Excise. Gyani Ram, a partner of the petitioner's firm, immediately after the search filed an application before the Superintendent, Central Excise, Firozabad, under his signatures, explaining the sources from which the material seized from his business premises were obtained by the petitioner. Gyani Ram denied to have any illicit gold with him or to have manufactured any liquid gold. Before any further proceeding could taken under the provisions of the Act, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of search of its premises and seizure of the liquid gold. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument only to the validity of seizure. No arguments were advanced before me assailing the legality of search of the petitioner's business premises. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the validity of the seizure of the petitioner's goods mainly on three grounds :- (i) The petitioner was only found in possession of liquid gold, which by itself did not contravence any provisions of the Act. (ii) There was no material on the basis of which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. (iii) The petitioner had not contravened any provisions of the Act in respect of the liquid gold which was seized from his business premises by the respondents, hence the seizure was illegal. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the petitioner had contravened provisions of Secs. 8 and 11 (d) of the Act, and there was ample material on the basis of which the Superintendent Central Excise had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold, although he had not obtained any licence for manufacturing the same, hence the liquid gold found on the petitioner's business premises was rightly seized under Sec. 66 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has further urged that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Departmental Authorities in adjudication proceeding, the petition according to him was premature. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has further urged that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Departmental Authorities in adjudication proceeding, the petition according to him was premature. 6. Before I discuss the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties I think it necessary to consider the nature, form and process of manufacture of liquid gold. Gold is a bright yellow metal which crystalises in the regular system, it has a high density and is a good conductor of heat and electricity. In the popular sense gold is generally used as a bullion for various purposes. Liquid gold is, however, not a bullion; it is a kind of chemical. Liquid gold is a dark, oily, viscuous substance containing resinlates of gold and of other suitable metals dissolved in essential oils, which is prepared either by interaction between the metal chloride and the sulphur turpentine compound, or by heating together the oxide of the metal with venetian turpentine at the bonding point of the latter. The sulphurs compound is a dark brown liquid prepared by heating flower of sulphur with a mixture of Venetian Turpentine and oil of turpentine. The gold bullion is melted in the shape of filigree which is then dissolved in acqua regia and thereafter the product is treated in essential oils. The liquid gold generally contains twelve per cent gold and 88 per cent of the oils and other chemicals. The gold contained in this product is in a colloidal state. The liquid gold is used in the decoration of glassware and ceramic Wares. The decorative design produced with its oil is air dried and the decorated article fired in a suitably muffled furnace at gradually rising temperatures up to 650.0 to 700.C. During firing the organic matter burns off leaving a bright film of metallic gold. If necessary precautions are taken a film having a proper degree of lustre and adhesion is obtained. The liquid gold is not a metallic gold and in the popular sense of the term it is not known as gold instead, it is known as a chemical. See Indian Ceramic House Agra v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow, 26 Sales Tax Cases 413. 7. Grounds nos. 1 and 3 raised by the petitioner can be dealt with together conveniently. See Indian Ceramic House Agra v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow, 26 Sales Tax Cases 413. 7. Grounds nos. 1 and 3 raised by the petitioner can be dealt with together conveniently. Under Sec. 66 of the Act the Gold Control Officer is invested with power to seize any gold in respect of which any provision of the Act is contravened. If liquid gold is not gold within the meaning of the Act, it cannot be seized under Sec. 66 of the Act. Gold is defined by Sec. 2 (j) of the Act. According to the definition given in the Act unless the text otherwise requires gold means gold including its alloy, (whether virgin, melted or remoulted, wrought or inwrought) in any shape or form, of a purity of not less than 9 carats and includes primary gold articles and ornament. It is admitted that liquid gold recovered from the petitioner's premises did not contain gold in any shape or form of a purity of nine carats or above. A purity of nine carats would amount to 37 per cent, while it is admitted that the contents of gold in the liquid gold seized from the petitioner's premises was not more than fifteen per cent. The contents of gold was much less than nine carats, and therefore, it was not gold within the meaning of Sec. 2 (j). As already discussed, liquid gold is not in metallic form and it cannot, therefore, be an ornament. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that liquid gold is an "article" as defined in section 2 (b) of the Act and thus it is gold within the meaning of the Act. According to the definition as set out in Sec. 2 (b) of the Act `Article' means anything (other than ornament) in a finished form, made or manufactured from or containing gold and includes any gold coin, broken pieces of article, but does not include primary gold. The definition does not include a chemical like liquid gold. Even if the definition of article is assumed to include liquid gold, its contents must not be less than nine carats before it can be treated to be gold as defined in Sec. 2 (j) of the Act. It is thus clear that liquid gold is neither gold nor article within the meaning of the Act. 9. Even if the definition of article is assumed to include liquid gold, its contents must not be less than nine carats before it can be treated to be gold as defined in Sec. 2 (j) of the Act. It is thus clear that liquid gold is neither gold nor article within the meaning of the Act. 9. It is admitted that the petitioner's liquid gold has been seized in exercise of powers under Sec. 66 of the Act. Provisions of Sec. 66 are set out as under : "66. Power to seize-(1) If any Gold Control Officer has reason to believe that in respect of any gold any provision of this Act has been, or is being or is attempted to be contravened them, he may seize- (a) such gold along with the package, covering or receptacle, if any (and the contents thereof), in which the gold is found; (b) any other goods in which any quantity of such gold has been mixed. (2) Any Gold Control Officer may seize- (a) any document or other thing which, in his opinion will be useful for, or relevant to, any inquiry or proceeding for the contravention of any provision of this Act of any a rule or order made thereunder; (b) any conveyance or animal which has been, or is being, or is attempted to be, used for the transport of any gold in relation to which any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder has been, or is being, or attempted to be contravened. (3) Any document or other thing seized under Sub-sec. (2) shall not be retained by the Gold Control Officer for a period exceeding six months from the date of the seizure unless the reasons for retaining the same are recorded by him in writing and the approval of the Administrator for such retention is obtained: Provided that the Administrator shall not authorise the retention of the document or other thing for a period exceeding thirty days after all proceedings, for which the document or other thing is useful or relevant are completed. (4) The person from whose custody any document or other thing is seized under Sub-sec. (4) The person from whose custody any document or other thing is seized under Sub-sec. (2) may make copies thereof or take extracts therefrom in the presence of the Gold Control Officer or any other person empowered by him in this behalf, at such place and at such time as the Gold Control Officer may appoint in this behalf. (5) If a person legally entitled to the document or other thing seized under Sub-sec. (2) objects for any reason to the approval being given by the Administrator under Sub-sec. (3), he may make an application to the Central Government stating therein the reasons for such objection and requesting for the return of document or other thing- (6) On receipt of the application under Sub-sec. (5) the Central Government may, after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it may fit. The section confers powers on a Gold Control Officer to seize gold, put that power cannot be exercised unless the two conditions which are conditions precedent to the exercise of that power, are fulfilled; firstly, the Gold Control Officer must have reason to believe that in respect of any gold any provisions of the Act has been or is being or is attempted to be contravened, only then he is employed to seize that gold in respect of which contravention is attempted or committed. The article, however, which is liable to be seized must be gold as defined under the Act. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Sec. 76 of the Act in support of his contention, that liquid gold is gold even though its contents are less than 9 carats. Sec. 76 lays down that any reference to gold in Chapters 12 to 16 shall unless the context otherwise requires be construed as including reference to any article or thing made of or containing gold of any purity, whether such purity exceeds nine carats or not. It was urged that for purposes of Chapters 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 any article or thing which contains gold of any purity even if it is less than 9 carats, shall be deemed to be gold. Sec. 66 is contained in Chapter 12 of the Act. It was urged that for purposes of Chapters 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 any article or thing which contains gold of any purity even if it is less than 9 carats, shall be deemed to be gold. Sec. 66 is contained in Chapter 12 of the Act. It was thus urged that liquid gold even if it contained less than 9 carats of gold, was gold for the purposes of Sec. 66 of the Act. The argument has no force. Even if liquid gold is deemed to be gold for purposes of Sec. 66 of the Act, it cannot be seized, unless the possession of liquid gold containing less than 9 carats gold is shown to have contravened some provisions of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that possession of liquid gold was restricted under the Act. Hence the petitioner contravened Sec. 8 (3) and Sec. 11 (d) of the Act in acquiring and possessing the liquid gold in question. I have carefully considered this submission, but I do not find any merit in it. Sec. 8 prescribed restrictions regarding acquisition, possession and disposal of gold. It lays down own, or have in his possession, custody or control any primary gold, any ornament or any article. As already discussed the definition of gold includes article and ornament. Sec. 8 is included in Chap. 3 and the deeming provisions contained in S. 76 do not apply to S. 8 before S. 8 can be said to have been contravened, gold or article must contain 9 carats of gold. On the admitted case of the parties the petitioner's liquid gold is not covered by Sec. 8. Therefore, the possession or acquisition of liquid gold is not prohibited or restricted under Sec. 8 of the Act. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has then urged that the petitioner contravened Sec. 11 (d) of the Act. Hence, the Gold Control Officer acted within jurisdiction to seize the liquid gold from the petitioner's premises. Sec. 11 of the Act imposes prohibition regarding manufacture etc. of primary gold articles and ornaments etc. Sec. 11 is set out as under : 11. Hence, the Gold Control Officer acted within jurisdiction to seize the liquid gold from the petitioner's premises. Sec. 11 of the Act imposes prohibition regarding manufacture etc. of primary gold articles and ornaments etc. Sec. 11 is set out as under : 11. Prohibition regarding making articles, ornaments etc.- (1) Save as other wise provided in this Act, no person shall- (a) make, manufacture, prepare or process, any primary gold, or (b) make, manufacture, prepare, repair, polish or process, any ornament, or (c) make, manufacture, prepare, repair, polish or process any article, or (d) make, manufacture or prepare, anything containing gold of any purity, whether such purity exceeds nine carats or not, or subject such gold to any other process unless he is authorised so to do by the Administrator. Explanation - Nothing contained in this Sub-sec. shall apply to the polishing by any person, in his dwelling house, of any article, or ornament, or both, belonging to himself or to any other member of his family. (2) Every authorisation made Sub-sec. (1) shall be subject to such conditions (including conditions as to the payment of any fee or charges of supervision) and restrictions as may be specified therein." 12. According to clause (d) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 no person is authorised to make, manufacture or prepare anything containing gold of any purity, whether such purity exceeds nine carats or not, unless he is authorised to do so by the Administrator. The prohibition contained in Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act, therefore is directed against the manufacture or preparation of any article or thing containing gold, its provisions are not directed against possession of any article or thing containing gold of any purity. If the petitioner was manufacturing liquid gold without being authorised so to do by the Administrator, he would certainly be contravening Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act. But before Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act can be pressed into service, it has to be determined whether the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the averments contained in the counter affidavit and the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent, Central Excise, to show that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. It is admitted that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the averments contained in the counter affidavit and the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent, Central Excise, to show that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. It is admitted that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. It is admitted that the petitioner was not found manufacturing liquid gold, nor any instrument or apparatus necessary for purposes of manufacturing liquid gold was found at the petitioner's premises. The petitioner was, however, found in possession of liquid gold which, as already discussed, does not contravene any provisions of the Act. Mere possession of liquid gold does not show that the petitioner was a manufacturer. The respondent has, however, asserted that the Superintendent, Central Excise, Firozabad respondent no. 1 had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold without any licence. Thereby he contravened Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act. Hence, seizure of petitioner's liquid gold under Sec. 66 of the Act was justified. 13. Sec. 66 of the Gold Control Act, 1968 runs as under : 66. Power to seize.- (1) If any Gold Control Officer has reason to believe that in respect of any gold any provision of this Act has been, or is being or is attempted to be contravened then, he may seize. (a) such gold along with the package, covering or receptacle, if any (and the contents there of), in which the gold is found; (d) any other goods in which any quantity of such gold has been mixed. (2) Any Gold Control Officer may seize- (a) any document or other thing which, in his opinion will be useful for, or relevant to, any inquiry or proceeding for the contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b) any conveyance or animal which has been, or is being, or is attempted to be, used for the transport of any gold in relation to which any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder has been, or is being, or is attempted to be, contravened. (3) Any document or other thing seized under Sub-sec. (2) shall not be retained by the Gold. (3) Any document or other thing seized under Sub-sec. (2) shall not be retained by the Gold. Control Officer for a period exceeding six months from the date of the seizure unless the reasons for retaining the same are recorded by him in writing and the approval of the Administrator for such retention is obtained : Provided that the Administrator shall not authorise the retention of the document or other thing for a period exceeding thirty days after all proceedings, for which the document or other thing is useful or relevant, are completed. (4) The person from whose custody any document or other thing is seized under Sub-sec. (2) may make copies thereof or take extracts therefrom in the presence of the Gold Control Officer or any other person empowered by him in this behalf, at such place and at such time as the Gold Control Officer may appoint in this behalf. (5) If a person legally entitled to the document or other thing seized under Sub-sec. (2) objects for any reason to the approval being given by the Administrator under Sub-sec. (3), he may make an application to the Central Government stating therein the reasons for such objection and requesting for the return of document or other thing. (6) On receipt of the application under Sub-sec. (5) the Central Government may, after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it may think fit. 14. The Legislature has prescribed two conditions precedent which must be fulfilled before any Gold Control Officer is entitled to exercise power of seizure. In the first place, the Gold Control Officer should have "reasons to believe" that "in respect of any gold any provision of the Act has been or is being or is attempted to be contravened"; only then he is authorised to seize such gold along with the package covering or receptacle if any, in which the gold is found. Only that gold can legally be seized in respect of which the Gold Control. Officer has reasons to believe that any provision of the Act has been or is attempted to be contravened. If no provision of the Act is contravened or is at-tempted to be contravened in respect of any particular gold, then the Gold Control Officer will have no jurisdiction to seize that gold. Officer has reasons to believe that any provision of the Act has been or is attempted to be contravened. If no provision of the Act is contravened or is at-tempted to be contravened in respect of any particular gold, then the Gold Control Officer will have no jurisdiction to seize that gold. I have already discussed that possession of liquid gold is not prohibited by the Act as such the petitioner did not contravene any provisions of the Act in respect of the liquid gold which was recovered from him. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has then urged that the petitioner was manufacturing liquid gold without obtaining a licence for that purpose from the Administrator, therefore, he was contravening the provisions of the Act, and in any case, the Superintendent, Central Excise, has reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold without having any licence in his favour for that purpose from the Administrator, as such, the respondent acted within his power and jurisdiction in seizing the liquid gold from the petitioner's premises. Learned counsel has referred to certain directions issued by the Administrator to regulate the manufacture of liquid gold in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (2) of rule 126-B, rule 125-T and 126-TT of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. (annexure I to the counter-affidavit). Under the Defence of India Rules the Administrator was empowered to issue directions to regulate the manufacture of liquid gold. The direction in question were issued and published under a notification of Government of India, Ministry of Finance, dated 29th June, 1964. Under these directions no person is authorised to manufacture liquid gold unless he is authored to do so by the Administrator. The directions contained detailed instructions and procedure for obtaining authorisation in the form of licence. The directions contained detailed provision for manufacture of liquid gold and the period during which the gold should be utilised and also for the maintenance of accounts of stocks and for sub mission of returns. The Defence of India Rules have admittedly ceased to be in force. but in view of the provisions contained in Sub-sec. The directions contained detailed provision for manufacture of liquid gold and the period during which the gold should be utilised and also for the maintenance of accounts of stocks and for sub mission of returns. The Defence of India Rules have admittedly ceased to be in force. but in view of the provisions contained in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 116 of the Act, the notification and direction issued by the Administrator under paragraph 12-A of the Defence of India Rules 1962 continue to be in force insofar as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. There is no provision in the Gold Control Act, 1968 for regulating the manufacture of liquid gold and, as such, the directions issued by the Administrator under the Defence of India Rules, cannot be held to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The directions issued by the Administrator in 1964 therefore continue to remain in force. 16. The directions issued by the Administrator no doubt regulate manufacture of liquid gold, but those directions do not prohibit possession of liquid gold. No licence or permission is required for possessing liquid gold. One of the conditions prescribed by the Administrator is that every phial containing liquid gold shall contain the label of the manufacturer, but a consumer found in possession of manufactured liquid gold, cannot be held to have contravened any provisions of the said directions. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged that in view of the provisions contained in the directions issued by the Administrator and the provisions of Sec. 11 (d) of the Act, the petitioner contravened provisions of the Act inasmuch as he was manufacturing liquid gold without obtaining a licence for the same from the Administrator. It is admitted that the petitioner has no licence from any competent authority for manufacturing liquid gold. The petitioner categorically denied to have ever manufactured liquid gold. According to him he obtains liquid gold from manufacturers and utilises the same in decorating glass bangles. The Superintendent, Central Excise has stated in his supplementary counter-affidavit that he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold without any licence, and therefore he was contravening provisions of the Act. 18. According to him he obtains liquid gold from manufacturers and utilises the same in decorating glass bangles. The Superintendent, Central Excise has stated in his supplementary counter-affidavit that he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold without any licence, and therefore he was contravening provisions of the Act. 18. Before I proceed to consider the material on record on the question as to whether the respondent had any reasons to believe that the petitioners was a manufacturer of liquid gold I think it necessary to consider the scope of the expression "reasons to believe". The existence of the belief by the Gold Control Officer is a condition precedent necessary for the exercise of power of seizure under Sec. 66 of the Act. In proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, High Court can investigate the existence of the conditions precedent i.e. whether the Superintendent, Central Excise had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold which resulted into contravention of the Act. If the existence of that condition is not found to be established, the action of the respondent would be rendered without jurisdiction. The belief is not subjective; it must be based on objective materials relevant for the purpose for which power is to be exercised. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has strenuously urged that since the Superintendent, Central Excise who was the Gold Control Officer, has stated on oath before this Court that he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold, this Court cannot enquire into the adequacy of the grounds on which he formed that opinion. According to the learned counsel once the respondent had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold, this Court cannot investigate into the matter. In Interpreting Sec. 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 the Supreme Court considered the expression "reason to believe" and laid down the scope of power of court to investigate into the matter. In S. Narayanappa v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, A.I.R. 1967 SC 523 the Supreme Court observed thus : "The first condition is that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income, profits, or gains chargeable to income tax had been underassessed. In S. Narayanappa v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, A.I.R. 1967 SC 523 the Supreme Court observed thus : "The first condition is that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income, profits, or gains chargeable to income tax had been underassessed. The second condition is that he must have reason to believe that such "underassessment" had occurred by reason of either (1) omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under Sec. 22, or (ii) omission or Hilure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for an assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income Tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to issue a notice under the second, but the legal position is that if there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income Tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact which could have a material bearing on the question of underassessment, that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to issue the notice under Sec. 34". After making the aforesaid observations in respect of the scope of Sec. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act their lordships further proceeded to lay clown the extent to which the Court can investigate into the existence of the reasons of belief. The Supreme Court further observed as under : "Whether these grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the court to investigate. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income Tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to `contend that the Income Tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words the existence of belief can be challenged by the assessee, but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. Again. the expression "reasons to believe" in Sec. 34 does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income Tax Officer. the belief must be held in good faith : it cannot be merely a pretence. Again. the expression "reasons to believe" in Sec. 34 does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income Tax Officer. the belief must be held in good faith : it cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently, it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief had a reasonable ground or a relevant bearing to the formation to the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the Sec. To this limited extent, the action of the Income Tax Officer in starting proceedings under Sec. 34 is open to challenge in a court of law." 20. In M/s. Kantanam Venkata Narayana and sons v. The Additional Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1967 SC 587 the Supreme Court held that if the High Court was of the opinion that the conditions which invest the Income Tax Officer with power to reopen the assessment, existed, it could not investigate into the sufficiency or adequacy of those conditions. In that case the observations referred to above made in the case of S. Narayanappa were also considered. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1970 SC 1011. It is true that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted cases, if the Superintendent, Central Excise had reasons to believe, that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 could not investigate into the adequacy of the grounds on which that belief was formed by him. It is, however, imperative that the belief must be held in good faith, and in considering that question it is open to this Court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous and irrelevant to the purposes of Sec. 66 of the Act. In the case of Shiv Nath v. Appellant-Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 82 ITR 147 the Supreme Court again emphasised this aspect of the question in the following words : "There can be no manner of doubt that the words reason to believe suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person passed upon reasonable ground and that the Income Tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence, but not on mere suspicion, gossip"' or rumour. The Income Tax Officer would be acting without jurisdiction if the reason for his belief that the conditions are satisfied does not exist or is not material or relevant to the belief required by the Sec. The court can always examine this aspect, though the declaration of sufficiency of the reason for the belief cannot be investigated by the Court." 21. In view of the law laid down by this Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Narayanappe it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited. The sufficiency of the grounds for entertaining the belief cannot be investigated by this Court, but the court is empowered to consider the question whether the authority concerned was satisfied on some material relevant to the existence of satisfaction and also to the relevancy of the material considered by the authority concerned in forming that belief. If the formation of the respondent's belief was based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, then the court has jurisdiction to interfere. If the respondent honestly entertained a belief that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold and if that belief was formed on certain materials which had reasonable nexus with the formation of belief, then the action of seizure cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. The Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the Gold Control Officer; what has to be considered is that whether on the material disclosed by the respondent, a reasonable person could reasonably form that opinion. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the formation of belief cannot fall merely on the ground that the material on the basis of which belief was formed was not sufficient to warrant formation of such belief. 22. In the present case, the respondent has filed a detailed affidavit stating therein that he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. 22. In the present case, the respondent has filed a detailed affidavit stating therein that he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. In the counter affidavit material which was taken into account by the Superintendent; Central Excise in forming his belief has also been disclosed. In view of the observations made earlier it is clear that this Court cannot enquire into the sufficiency of the material for forming the belief by the Superintendent, Central Excise. But the question arises whether the material on the basis of which the respondent claims to have formed a reasonable belief had any rational nexus and was relevant for the purposes of forming that belief as contemplated by Sec. 66 of the Act. In the counter affidavit and the supplementary counter affidavit, the Superintendent, Central Excise has asserted that several bottles containing liquid gold were found which had no labels and since the petitioner could not correctly account for the sources from which he received the said liquid gold, he had reasons to believe that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold. It has further been asserted that the vouchers produced by the petitioner were on enquiry not found genuine. The account book which was seized from the petitioner's premises also did not contain any details of account for the disposal of the liquid gold. The account book did not disclose the sources from which the liquid gold was obtained by the petitioner. In fact on enquiry M/s. Mor Mukat Goel and brothers and M/s. G. B. Karia and Company, from whom the petitioner claimed to have obtained the manufactured liquid gold, denied to have sold any liquid gold to the petitioner. It has further been asserted that a bottle bearing the label of eucalyptus oil, which is one of the essential ingredients of liquid gold was found in the business premises of the petitioner. In his written statement made to the Superintendent, Central Excise the petitioner stated that at the time when his premises were raised, the petitioner had opened the phials for making liquid gold. In his written statement made to the Superintendent, Central Excise the petitioner stated that at the time when his premises were raised, the petitioner had opened the phials for making liquid gold. The exact words used by him and referred by the respondent are "Khol Kar banane ko rakhi thi." After the account book was seized from the petitioner's premises, he made a request for permission to copy out the accountant and, necessary permission was granted to him by the Superintendent, Central Excise. During the process of copying. the petitioner, is alleged to have torn out one leaf, of the account book recovered from his premises. The torn page was recovered from a nearby drain in a mutilated condition. The Superintendent, Central Excise has stated on oath that Gyani Ram a partner of the petitioner's firm admitted before him that he had torn out one leaf to shield one Hari Shanker who had threatened him with death if his name appeared in any inquiry. The torn page it is alleged, contained transaction of 428k phials of liquid gold received from Hari Shanker Gupta, which appeared to be a fictitious transaction. The Superintendent, Central Excise has stated on oath before this Court that all the aforesaid circumstances, led him to entertain a reasonable belief that the petitioner was either manufacturing illegally liquid gold or abetting the manufacture of the same without obtaining a licence. The petitioner has no doubt denied the averments contained in the affidavit of the Superintendent. Central Excise, but the recovery of the bottles of liquid gold without any labels, the seizure of the account books and the making of the statement by one of the partners, Gyani Ram, and the unexplained sources from which liquid gold was said to have been obtained are the important circumstances on which the respondent entertained his belief against the petitioner. The material which had been taken into account by the respondent, cannot be said to be irrelevant for forming the belief required under the Act. The conduct of the petitioner and the material found at his premises bad reasonable nexus with the manufacture of liquid gold. 23. The material which had been taken into account by the respondent, cannot be said to be irrelevant for forming the belief required under the Act. The conduct of the petitioner and the material found at his premises bad reasonable nexus with the manufacture of liquid gold. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that since no apparatus or machinery required for the manufacture of liquid gold was found on the business premises of the petitioner, the respondent's belief that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold was not an honest one and that material on the basis of which that belief is said to have been entertained was not sufficient. As already observed, the adequacy of the material or the grounds for forming the belief cannot be investigated by this Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Superintendent of Central Excise has placed material before this Court which were relevant material to the formation of the belief. This Court cannot enquire into the sufficiency of that material. There is nothing to show on record that the Superintendent, Central Excise did not form his opinion honestly. Once an honest opinion is formed, on the basis of the material which is relevant for the purposes of the section, the petitioner cannot question the adequacy or inadequacy of the material or the reasons there for. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the condition precedent required for exercising the power of seizure under Sec. 66 of the Act was non-existent. On the other hand, on the material on record, it is clear that the Superintendent, Central Excise had material before him on the basis of which he honestly entertained a belief that the petitioner was a manufacturer of liquid gold, whereby he was contravening the provisions of Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act. The respondent was legally entitled to seize the liquid gold from the petitioner. The seizure was not without jurisdiction as the necessary condition for the exercise of power of seizure under Sec. 66 of the Act was fulfilled. The petitioner's contention, therefore, must fail. 24. No other point was pressed before me by the petitioner. 25. In the result, the writ petition fails and accordingly dismissed with costs.