JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal Singh, J. - This is an application under section 561-A Cr.P.C. praying that the order passed by SDM Mirzapur in case No. 25 of 1969 under section 145 Cr.P.C. be quashed. The applicant claimed that he was in clutivatory possession of the land in dispute since more than nine years prior to the institution of the present application. Despite it however the SDM Robertsganj executed pattas in regard to the same land in favour of some other persons. The applicant therefore filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Mirzapur and obtained the following order : "Issue adinterin injunction mean- while to opposite party not to interfere in plaintiff's possession till further orders." It appears that some time after this order had been passed the SDM received a report from SO Garhwal which indicated that there was apprehension of breach of peace. The learned SDM therefore drew up proceeding under section 145 and passed a preliminary order under that section. It is against that order that the present application is directed. 2. I have heard learned counsel on either side. 3. Mr. Keshav Sahai learned counsel for the applicant conceded that the SDO was not impleaded as a party to the civil suit. It was, however, argued on behalf of the applicant that the State was a party to the civil suit and the SDM being an employee of the State Govt. was bound by the injunction order. Now, every SDM has two capacities. In one capacity he works as an Administrative Officer and in the other he works as a Court. The injunction, if at all, could apply to the SDM in his administrative capacity. No injunction can be issued by one court to another court. See Har Bhagat Kaur v. Kripal Singh, A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 28, Faqira Mahadaji v. Ram Sokhi Bai, A.I.R. 1946 Nagpur 421 to p. 431, Badri Nath v. Jeewan Chand, A.I.R. 1935 Peshwar 182 and Gopi Chand Singh v. Habibgul, A.I.R. 1936 Peshwar 184. The injunction issued by the Munsif in the instant case, it should be presumed, was not intended to restrain the SDO from acting as a court and, indeed, it could not restrain from proceeding under section 145 Cr. P. C. in exercise of his statutory powers. 4. This application has therefore no force and is hereby rejected.