ORDER : This revision petition arises out of a common order of the Subordinate Judge, Trichur, dismissing 3 interlocutory applications filed in O.S. No.22 of 1969 by the revision petitioner, one to set aside the ex-parte decree in the suit, the other to condone the delay in filing that petition and the third to implead the revision petitioner as the 2nd defendant in the suit. 2. The above interlocutory applications were filed under the following circumstances: The 2nd respondent was the owner of the suit property. He executed a simple mortgage over it on 18-4-1968 for Rs. 20,000/- in favour of the 1st respondent. On the basis of the mortgage, the 1st respondent filed the suit to recover the amount by sale of the property. The 2nd respondent made his appearance in the suit and contested it. White so, on 17-11-69, the 2nd respondent remained absent and he was, therefore, declared ex-parte. Accordingly, an ex-parte preliminary decree for sale was passed in the suit on the same day. On 28-1-1970, the 2nd respondent sold the equity of redemption over the suit property to the revision petitioner directing him to pay the mortgage amount on the representation that the suit for recovery of the amount was pending and that he would contest the suit. But, on 17-2-1970, the husband of the 1st respondent told the revision petitioner that the suit had already been decreed ex-parte. Therefore, the revision petitioner filed the above 3 petitions on 19-2-1970. 3. The first of these petitions was to implead the petitioner as a party to the suit, the other to set aside the ex-parte decree and the last to condone the delay from 17-11-1969 which was the date of the ex-parte decree to 19-2-1970 which was the date on which the petition was filed to set aside the ex-parte decree. These petitions were opposed by the 1st respondent and the lower court on a consideration of the respective contentions came to the conclusion that the revision petitioner has no right to be impleaded in the suit and that the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree was barred by limitation as the revision petitioner did not file the petition within 30 days from the date of the ex-parte decree. 4. There was only a preliminary decree for sale in the case and, therefore, it can be said that the suit is still pending. S.146 CPC. 4. There was only a preliminary decree for sale in the case and, therefore, it can be said that the suit is still pending. S.146 CPC. was introduced in the Code with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they come to be vested by devolution or assignment and that being a beneficent provision, it should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. The section reads as follows: "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." 5. In Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 , the application of S.146 CPC. was considered. That decision was in respect of an appeal, which was held to be a proceeding for the purpose of S.146 CPC. and it was held that the expression "claiming under" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in O.22 R.10 CPC. So, it can be said that whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under O.22 R.10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed thereunder, if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code. So far the decision applies to our case, it is stated at page 397 as follows: "We are not disposed to construe S.146 narrowly in the manner contended for by counsel for the first respondent. That section was introduced for the first time in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they come to be vested by devolution or assignment, and being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense." 6. This principle is equally applicable to the present case where there was only a preliminary decree for sale. The final decree for sale has not been passed yet. This principle is equally applicable to the present case where there was only a preliminary decree for sale. The final decree for sale has not been passed yet. The revision petitioner would, therefore, be entitled to come on record in his own right in the suit and it comes upon himself all the contentions which are available to the 2nd respondent. 7. It can be said that where a judgment debtor, against whom an ex-parte decree under O.34, R.3 CPC. has been passed, sells the property to a third party, he can still apply for setting aside the decree under O.IX R.13 CPC. because he is bound to make good the title of the vendee. There is no doubt that the assignee, even if he does not become a party, is bound by the decision against an assignor, who is already a party to the suit, but the option to become a party or to let the assignor to carry on the litigation vests with the assignee and the application to substitute in place of an assignor should not unreasonably be refused, especially where the assignee is the only person, who is really interested in the conduct of the suit. No period of limitation is prescribed under O.22 R.10 CPC. for filing an application. The right under O.22 R.10 accrues from day to day and it does not become barred by lapse of time. It follows, therefore, that the revision petitioner is entitled to be impleaded as the 2nd defendant in the suit. 8. As I have already pointed out that if the revision petitioner could apply to set aside an ex-parte decree under O.9 R.13 CPC., the only question is whether his application would be barred by limitation. On this question, the point appears to be clear. Evidently, Art.146 of Limitation Act, 1908 (Art.123 of the present Act) would apply to the case. In this regard, my attention has been drawn to a decision reported in Shaligram Bindalal v. Pundalik Baliram and others, AIR 1955 Nag. 238, which is a Division Bench decision. The relevant question was considered in that case. That decision shows that the word 'defendant' in column 1 of Art.164, Limitation Act includes a person claiming under him as contemplated in S.146, Civil PC. 238, which is a Division Bench decision. The relevant question was considered in that case. That decision shows that the word 'defendant' in column 1 of Art.164, Limitation Act includes a person claiming under him as contemplated in S.146, Civil PC. It is evident that the term 'applicant' in column 3 would mean not only the defendant but also the person claiming under him, as the case may be. Accordingly, if the person claiming under the defendant having purchased the equity of redemption pendente lite, has made the application under O.9, R.13 by way of a personal remedy he cannot be relegated to the position of the defendant himself. It, therefore, follows that if he was not a party to the suit and the summons was not served on him, he would be entitle to make the application within 30 days from the date of his knowledge of the decree. In any other view of the case, he would not be able to enforce his personal rights recognised by law. It would evidently be not proper to impute to the Legislature such an anomalous idea to hold that a third party would not be able to enforce his personal rights recognised by law. On this question, the observation in the above decision may be seen at page 240. It runs as follows: "Therefore, since the word 'defendant' in column 1 of Art.164, Limitation Act, also includes a person claiming under him as contemplated in S. 146 of the Code, it is evident that the term 'applicant' in column 3 would mean not only the defendant but also the person claiming under him, as the case may be. Accordingly, if the person claiming under the defendant has made the application by way of a personal remedy he cannot be relegated to the position of the defendant himself. It, therefore, follows that if he was not a party to the suit and the summons was not served on him, he would be entitled to make the application within 30 days from the date of his knowledge of the decree. In any other view of the case, he would not be able to enforce his personal rights recognised by law. It would evidently be not proper to impute to the Legislature such an anomalous intendment." 9. However, it is pointed out that in Venkatasubbaiyar v. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1915 Mad. In any other view of the case, he would not be able to enforce his personal rights recognised by law. It would evidently be not proper to impute to the Legislature such an anomalous intendment." 9. However, it is pointed out that in Venkatasubbaiyar v. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1915 Mad. 1204 a contrary view was taken. That was the case of an executor of the defendant, who died 7 days after the ex-parte decree was passed against him. The executor was held to be entitled to apply for setting aside the decree even though he was not brought on record at the time when the application was made. It was observed in that case that on the true construction of Art.164, Limitation Act read with S.146 CPC., the word 'defendant' in Art.146 was held to include the executor of the original defendant. That decision could be distinguished from the later decision of the Nagpur High Court referred to above. The Madras decision was the case of an executor, who had only a representative character and had no personal rights of his own. I am of the opinion that the Madras decision was rightly distinguished in the Nagpur decision. In view of the above circumstance, I am of the opinion that the petitioner's application to set aside the ex-parte decree was not barred by limitation. The petitioner alleged that he came to know of the ex-parte decree from the husband of the 1st respondent only on 17-2-1970. The petitioner had sworn to an affidavit to that effect That was not controverted. So, it could be held that the revision petitioner filed the application to set aside the ex-parte decree within 30 days of his knowledge of the ex-parte decree. There was, therefore, no delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree. In view of the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that all the 3 interlocutory applications filed by the revision petitioner have to be allowed. 10. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order of the court below is set aside and the revision petitioner is impleaded in the suit; the ex-parte decree is set aside condoning the delay. No costs. Allowed.