K.S.HEGDE, J. (1) THESE are appeals by certificate. They are by the same appellant and they raise common questions of law. Hence they are considered together. (2) TWO questions of law were urged on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeals. The first contention urged was that S. 3-D(1) of theU.P.SalesTax Act, 1948 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) is ultra vires the Constitution, firstly because that under that S. excessive legislative power had been delegated to the State government and secondly on the ground that it discriminates between the registered dealers who made their purchases through licensed dealers and the registered dealers who made their purchases through dealers who are not licensed. The second contention taken was that notification No. ST-7122/X- 900(16)-64, dated 1/10/1964 issued under S. 3-D (1) of the Act imposing purchase tax on oil seeds is invalid as it contravenes S. 3-AA of the Act. (3) WE have considered the first ground of attack in Civil Nos. 362 and 1692 of 1969 (Mfs. Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal etc. v. State of U. P)( (1972) 2 SCR 141 : (1972) 4 SCC 485 : 1974 SCC (Tax) 294.)in which we have delivered judgment just now. For the reasons mentioned therein, the contention that S. 3-D(1) is ultra vires the Constitution fails. (4) THE only surviving question is whether the notification referred to earlier is violative of S. 3-AA of the Act. (5) BEFORE examining that contention, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts. (6) THE appellant is a partnership firm. It carries on business as dealers in groundnuts, oil seeds and Arhar. For the assessment years 1965-66, 1966-67, the Sales-tax Officer Rampur assessed the appellant to sales-tax on the turnover of the groundnuts oil manufactured by the appellant and to purchase tax on the turnover of the oil seeds and foodgrains. The appellant unsuccessfully appealed against the assessment orders. Thereafter it took up the matter in revision before the revising authority. There again it substantially failed. Aggrieved by that decision, he moved the High court of Allahabad for a writ of certiorari quashing the levy of purchase tax imposed on him in respect of his purchases of oil seeds. The High court rejected those petitions. Hence these appeals. (7) WE shall now extract the impugned notification to the extent it is material for the purpose of this appeal. The High court rejected those petitions. Hence these appeals. (7) WE shall now extract the impugned notification to the extent it is material for the purpose of this appeal. It reads thus: "Noti. No. ST-7122/X-99(16)-64 dated 1/10/1964. In exercise of the powers under Ss. (1) of S. 3-D of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948), the governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to notify that with effect from 1/10/1964, the turnover of first purchases in respect of goods mentioned below shall be liable to tax under S. 3-D of the said Act. Sl. No. Name of goods Rate of tax 1. Foodgrains including cereals and pulses 1. 5 paisa per rupee 2. Gur 3. paisa per rupee 3. Oil seeds 2. " " " X X X" xä As per this notification a purchase tax of 2 paise per rupee on the turnover of the first purchases of oil seeds is leviable. It is contended that this notification violates S. 3-AA of the Act. S. 3-AA says : "Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 3 or 3A, the turnover in respect of the following goods shall not be liable to tax except at the point of sale by a dealer to the consumer, and the rate of tax shall be such, not exceeding the maximum rate for the time being specified in S. 15 of the central Sales Tax-, Act, 1956, as may be declared by the State government by notification in the Official Gazette- (i).................. (ii) .................. (iii) .................. (iv) .................. (v) .................. (vi) oil seeds, that is to say, seeds yielding non-volatile oils used for human consumption, or in industry, or in the manufacture of varnishes, soap and the like, or in lubrication, and voladle oils used chiefly in medicines, perfumes, cosmetics and the like. 2. Unless the dealer proves otherwise, every sale by a dealer shall, for the purposes of Ss. (1) be presumed to be to a consumer. EXPLANATION.--A sale of any of the goods specified in Ss. (1) to a registered dealer who does not purchase them for resale in the same condition in which, he has purchased them, or to an unregistered dealer shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to be a sale to the consumer." (8) THIS S. was incorporated into the Act on 1/04/1956. (1) to a registered dealer who does not purchase them for resale in the same condition in which, he has purchased them, or to an unregistered dealer shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to be a sale to the consumer." (8) THIS S. was incorporated into the Act on 1/04/1956. Under this section, on the goods specified therein, sales tax not exceeding the maximum rate for the time being specified in S. 15 of the central Sales Tax Act, 1956 can be levied by tlie State government on the turnover in respect of sales by dealers to the consumers. From an analysis of this provision, we get tlie following 1. that tax to be levied is a sales-tax ; 2. levy in question is a single point levy ; 3. the point of levy is the sale by the dealer to the consumer and 4. the rate to be fixed by the State government is not to exceed the maximum rate for the time being specified in S. 15 of the central Sales Tax Act, 1956. (9) IF we hold that provisions contained in S. 3-AA continue to be in force in respect of dealing in oil seeds then tlie appellants contention that the impugned levy is an invalid levy succeeds. But the question is whether that contention is correct. (10) THIS takes us to S. 3-D. That section reads : " 1. Except as provided in Ss. (2), there shall be levied and paid, for each assessment year or part thereof, a tax on the turnover, to be determined in such manner as may be prescribebed, of first purchases made by a dealer or through a dealer, acting as a purchasing agent in respect of such goods or class of goods, and at such rates, not exceeding two paisa per rupee in the case offoodgrains, including cereals and pulses, and five paisa per rupee in the case of other goods and with effect from such date, as may, from time to time, be notified by the State government in this behalf. EXPLANATION.-IN the case of a purchase made by a registered dealer through the agency of a licensed dealer, the registered dealer shall be deemed to be the first purchaser, and in every other case of a first purchase, made through the agency of a dealer, the dealer who is the agent shall be deemed to be the first purchaser. 2. X X "X 3. x x x 4 On the issue of a notification under this S. no tax shall be levied under any other S. in respect of the goods so notified. 5. The provisions of the second and third proviso to S. 3 and of S. 18, shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to the tax payable under this Section. 6. X X X 7. Unless the dealar proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the assessing authority, every purchase by or through a dealer shall, for the purposes of Ss. (1), be presumed to be the first purchase by such dealer and every sale through a dealer shall, for the purposes of Ss. (2), be presumed to be sale to a first purchaser." (11) FOR our present purpose, it is not necessary to refer to the second and third provisos to S. 3 and S. 18. It may be noted that S. 3-D was incorporated into the Act on 1/08/1958. (12) THE contention on behalf of the appellant was that S. 3-AA is a special provision regarding certain specified class of goods including oil teeds whereas S. 3-D is a general provision. Hence dealings in respect of oil seeds must be held to be governed exclusively by S. 3-AA. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant called into aid the rule of construction that a special provision excludes the application of a general provision. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that power was conferred on the State government to levy purchase tax in place of sales-tax in respect of any goods that may be notified under S. 3-D(1) subject only to the conditions mentioned therein. According to Dr. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that power was conferred on the State government to levy purchase tax in place of sales-tax in respect of any goods that may be notified under S. 3-D(1) subject only to the conditions mentioned therein. According to Dr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the Revenue, the legislature left the questions whether in respect of a class of goods, the appropriate levy is sales tax or purchase tax as well as what is the appropriate point of levy, to the State Governmen,t because a decision on that question has to be taken on an assessment of various factors, some of which are not constant. According to him in view of the language employed in Ss. (4) of S. 3-D, it is not possible to apply the rule of construction that special legislation in respect of any particular topic should exclude the application of general legislation. (13) IT may be noted that S. 3-D was incorporated into the Act much later than S. 3-AA. As seen earlier S. 3-AA was incorporated into the Act on 1/04/1956 whereas S. 3-D was added on 1/08/1958. At the time the Legislature incorporated into the Act S. 3-D, it must have been aware of the existence of S. 3-AA but yet in Ss. (4) of S. 3-D, it declared that on the issue of a notification under that section, no tax shall be .evied under any other S. in respect of the goods so notified. The ambit of this provision is very wide and it clearly takes in goods mentioned in S. 3-AA. (14) NOW turning to S. 3-AA, it is important to note that it begins by saying "notwithstanding anything contained in S. 3 or 3-A". The nonobstante clause does not take in S. 3-D. If the Legislature intended to exclude the operation of S. 3-D, in respect of matters covered by S. 3-AA, nothing would have been easier than to say so. It could have said "notwithstanding anything contained in S. 3, 3-A and S. 3-D". But it did not choose to do that. Therefore there are no grounds to cut down the amplitude of the power conferred on the State government under Ss. It could have said "notwithstanding anything contained in S. 3, 3-A and S. 3-D". But it did not choose to do that. Therefore there are no grounds to cut down the amplitude of the power conferred on the State government under Ss. (4) of S. 3-D. (15) THE High court of Allahabad has consistently taken the view that it is open to the State government to levy purchase tax in exercise of its powers under S. 3-D even in respect of goods covered by S. 3-AA. We are in agreement with that view. (16) IN the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs One set.