JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - This special appeal has been filed against the decision of a learned Single Judge whereby he quashed an order of the State Government dated 20.6.1967 by which it allowed a revision under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) filed by the tenant, who has appealed before us. 2. Sita Ram Poddar who is dead, and is represented by his widow Shrimati Ginnia Devi Poddar and his son Chunni Lal Poddar, filed an application for permission under Section 3 of the Act. The permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 10.1.1966. The tenant-appellant filed a revision which was dismissed by the Commissioner by his order dated 30.3.1966. A revision was thereafter filed by the appellant before the State Government and the State Government by its order dated 20.6.1967 allowed the revision and dismissed the application of the landlord-respondent seeking permission to file a suit for ejectment. The learned Single Judge did not go into the merits of the controversy. He based his decision on two grounds; the first being that the Deputy Minister concerned did not apply his mind to the case, inasmuch as it appeared that he had only initiated the report given by the Officer on Special Duty and secondly that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi who is respondent No. 5 before us, and was the Officer who gave a report in the case, was related to the tenant Shankar Lal Chaturvedi, and that being so, it was possible that a misguided decision had been given upon a perusal of the "purposive note". We purpose to consider the second ground on which the petition has been allowed by the learned Single Judge. 3. In paragraph 16 of the petition, it was alleged that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi was related to the appellant and also that he had been brought up and educated by the appellant. We purpose to consider the second ground on which the petition has been allowed by the learned Single Judge. 3. In paragraph 16 of the petition, it was alleged that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi was related to the appellant and also that he had been brought up and educated by the appellant. In an application filed by the tenant before the State Government for the case being transferred to some other officer (Annexure "F" to the supplementary affidavit filed in the writ petition), it was settled that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi was closely related to Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi, and was recently present in the marriage party of Sri Shankar Lal Chaturvedi's relative on 11th, 12th and 13th May, 1967 at Kanpur and that both Sri B.N. Chaturvedi and Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi had very good and close relations. This fact was denied by Sri B.N. Chaturvedi in paragraph 3 of his counter-affidavit. In the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by him it was, however stated that the daughter of Sri Prem Nath, who was his brother, was married to the son of the deceased brother of Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi the appellant but that this fact had no bearing on the facts of the present case. In respect of the relationship of Sri Dinesh, it was stated that the daughter of his cousin Sri Madhuri Saran was married to Sri Dinesh, but he was not aware of as to whether Sri Dinesh was related to Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi, or that he was employed in the firm of Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi. Even if the relationship between Sri Dinesh and the daughter of Sri Madhuri Saran who happened to be the cousin of Sri B.N. Chaturvedi is not taken into account, it is clear from the contents of paragraph 3 of the supplementary counter affidavit, that the daughter of Sri Prem Nath, who is the brother of Sri B.N. Chaturvedi is married to the son of the deceased brother of Sri Shanker Lal Chaturvedi. Thus it is clear that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi, who was the officer on Special Duty and who submitted the report which was accepted by the Deputy Minister concerned, was related to Sri Shankar Lal Chaturvedi. The question arises as to whether the relationship that existed between Sri B.N. Chaturvedi and Sri Shankar Lal Chaturvedi would vitiate the order passed by the Deputy Minister. The question arises as to whether the relationship that existed between Sri B.N. Chaturvedi and Sri Shankar Lal Chaturvedi would vitiate the order passed by the Deputy Minister. No bias has been alleged against the Deputy Minister who passed the order and the question is as to whether the order passed by the State Government stand vitiated on the ground that Sri B.N. Chaturvedi who was related to the tenant Shankar Lal Chaturvedi assisted in the decision making process, by putting up a report before the Minister concerned. 4. The State Government while disposing of a decision under Section 7-F of the Act, exercises a quasi judicial function. See Prem Parkash Virmani v. State Government, 1970 A.L.J. 1196. That being, so the State Government has, while making a decision, to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice Maniklal's case AIR 1957 SC 425 . Natural justice is said to demand not only that those whose interests may be directly affected by an act or decision should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also that the Tribunal should be disinterested and impartial. In classical Roman law the Judge who made a suit his own was liable in quasi delict to the damaged party. In English law the Judge who violated the maxim memo judex in cause sua does not incur civil liability, but prohibition may issue to restrain him from acting and his adjudication may be impeached on appeal or by means of an application for certiorari to quash or for such other remedy as may be appropriate (See S.A. de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd Edition on page 231). The principles have the approval of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as is clear from the decision in Maneklal's case (Supra). 5. In The King v. Sussex Justices, 1924 K.B.D. 256, a collision had taken place between a motor vehicle belonging to Mc Carthy and one belonging to Whitworth. A summons was taken out by the police against Mc Carthy for having driven his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public. At the hearing of the summons the acting clerk to the justices was a member of the firm or solicitor who were acting for Whitworth in a claim for damages against McCarthy for injuries received in the collision. At the hearing of the summons the acting clerk to the justices was a member of the firm or solicitor who were acting for Whitworth in a claim for damages against McCarthy for injuries received in the collision. At the conclusion of the evidence, the justices retired to consider their decision, the acting clerk retiring with them in case they should desire to be advised on any point of law. The justices convicted McCarthy, and it was stated on affidavit that they come to that conclusion without consulting the acting clerk, who in fact abstained from referring to the case. A writ of certiorari was filed for quashing the conviction, and the conviction was ultimately quashed. Lord Hewart, C.J., observed on page 259 as below :- "But while that is so, a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question, therefore, is not whether in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism which he might not properly have made or offered; the question is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspect as to be unfit to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. Speaking for myself, I accept the statement contained in the justices, affidavit, but they show very clearly that the deputy clerk was connected with the case in a capacity which made it right that he should scrupulously abstain from referring to the matter in any way, although he retired with the justices; in other words, his own position was such that he could not, if he had been required to do so, discharge the duties which his other position involved. His two fold position was a manifest contradiction. In those circumstances I am satisfied that this conviction must be quashed ........." Lush, J., on page 259 of the report observed :- "I agree. His two fold position was a manifest contradiction. In those circumstances I am satisfied that this conviction must be quashed ........." Lush, J., on page 259 of the report observed :- "I agree. It must be clearly understood that if justice allow their clerk to be present at their consultation when either he or his firm is professionally engaged in those proceedings or in other proceedings involving the same subject-matter, it is irrelevant to inquire whether the clerk did or not give advice and influence the justices. What is objectionable is his presence at the consultation, when he is in a position which necessarily makes it impossible for him to gave absolutely impartial advice. I have no doubt that these justices did not intend to do anything irregular or wrong. But they have placed themselves in an impossible position by allowing the clerk in those circumstances to retire with them into their consultation room.......". 6. In The King v. Essex Justices (Sizer and others) Ex parte Perking, 1927 K.B. 475, a solicitor was clerk to the justices, and left his business at a branch office almost entirely to his own clerk there. A lady consulted the solicitor's clerk at that office about the preparation of a deed of separation from her husband, and the clerk to the knowledge of her husband acted for her in the matter for a time, after which she ceased to consult him. No mention of the matter was made to the solicitor himself except one very causal one. At the hearing by the said justices of a summons for maintenance by the lady against her husband, the solicitor acted as their clerk and the husband appeared in person and eventually the justices made an order in favour of the lady. The husband obtained a rule nisi for a certiorari to remove the order of the justices. He stated in an affidavit that he was embarrassed before the justices by the feeling that their clerk was adverse to him, and that he was not aware at the time that he could make objection to his so acting. The solicitor stated in an affidavit that when acting as clerk to the justices on the occasion in question he had no knowledge that his firm had acted for the wife and that he was in no way adverse to the husband. The solicitor stated in an affidavit that when acting as clerk to the justices on the occasion in question he had no knowledge that his firm had acted for the wife and that he was in no way adverse to the husband. Avory, J., after referring to the case of Rex v. Sussex Justice Exparte McCarthy and expressing agreement to what was said there observed at page 488 of the Report as hereunder :- "The only difficulty here arises from the fact that the clerk to the justices has stated on affidavit that at the time when the summons was heard he did not in fact know that his firm had acted for the applicant's wife. If we had to consider whether or not he was in fact biased that statement would be most material. We have here to determine, however, whether or not there might appear to be a reasonable likelihood of his being biased. If there might, then justice would not seem to the applicant to be done, and he would have a right to object to the clerk acting as such. I must conclude that though the clerk to the justices and the justices did not know that his firm had acted for the applicant's wife, the necessary, or at least the reasonable, impression on the mind of the applicant would be that justice was not being done, seeing that the solicitor for his wife was acting with the justice and advising them on the hearing of the summons which she had taken out against him ......" 7. In this case, therefore, although no moral blame attaches to the justices or their clerk, we ought, in my opinion, to hold that this rule nisi for a certiorari should be made absolute". Swift, J., also with the decision of Avory, J. and quoting the dictim of Lord Hewart, C.J., in Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex Parte Mc Carthy, observed on page 490 :- "Might a reasonable man suppose that there had been such an interference with the course of justice ? I agree that he might, and I therefore think that this rule nisi should be made absolute for a certiorari to remove the order of the justices into this Court with a view to its being quashed". 8. In Regina v. East Kerrier Justices Ex Parte Mundey, 1952(2) Q.B. 864. I agree that he might, and I therefore think that this rule nisi should be made absolute for a certiorari to remove the order of the justices into this Court with a view to its being quashed". 8. In Regina v. East Kerrier Justices Ex Parte Mundey, 1952(2) Q.B. 864. Devlin, J., on page 724 of the Report observed as below :- "We are not concerned with a case of actual justice : if we were, that would be the end of the matter, and clearly the conviction would be quashed. We are concerned with an infringement of the rule that justice must only be done but must also manifestly appear to be done, and, accordingly we are concerned with matters of form. Courts have held in the past that it is important not only that justice should be done, but also that it should be seen to be done, so that a person who is guilty should know that there has been no injustice. It is better that he should go free than that the rule that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done should be infringed. In a case of this kind, where the question is whether the Court should quash a conviction or exercise its discretion in upholding a conviction, the important matter is what appears to have been done in the course of the proceedings......" These cases clearly establish the proposition that a decision given by justices is vitiated of bias can be attributed to a person who acts as their clerk, and the more fact that the clerk has not participated in the decision of the justices would not save the decision. These cases apart, the matter seems to be concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1969 Services Law Reporter 400 : AIR 1970 Supreme Court 150. In this case, a selection had to be made by a Board, one of the members of which was a candidate for selection. The member had not taken part in the deliberation of the Board but had taken part while making the selection of his other rival candidates. Thereafter, the Selection Board prepared its recommendations. These recommendations had to be considered first by the Home Ministry and then by the Public Service Commission. The member had not taken part in the deliberation of the Board but had taken part while making the selection of his other rival candidates. Thereafter, the Selection Board prepared its recommendations. These recommendations had to be considered first by the Home Ministry and then by the Public Service Commission. It was argued that inasmuch as it could not be said that the recommendations made by the Public Service Commission were inaffected with bias, the selection could not be quashed. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court and their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while rejecting this contention observed on page 157 of the report A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (supra), as below : "21. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that after all the Selection Board was only a recommendatory body. Its recommendations had first to be considered by the Home Ministry made by the U.P.S.C. The final recommendations were made by the U.P.S.C. Hence grievance of the petitioners have no real basis. According to him, while considering the validity of administrative action taken, all that we have to see is whether the ultimate decision is just or not. We are unable to agree with the learned Attorney-General that the recommendations made by the selection board were of little consequence. Looking at the composition of the Board and the nature of the duties entrusted to it we have no doubt that its recommendations should have carried considerable weight with the U.P.S.C. If the decision of the selection board is held to have been vitiated, it is clear to our mind that the final recommendations made by the Commission must also be held to have been vitiated. The recommendations made by the Union Public Service Commission cannot be disassociated from the selections made by the selection Board which is the foundation for the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision in Reg v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 1967-2 Q.B. 864. 9. In the present case too, it cannot be said that the report made by Sri B.N. Chaturvedi did not carry weight with the Minister or that it can be disassociated from the ultimate order. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision in Reg v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 1967-2 Q.B. 864. 9. In the present case too, it cannot be said that the report made by Sri B.N. Chaturvedi did not carry weight with the Minister or that it can be disassociated from the ultimate order. Sri B.N. Chaturvedi being related to Sri Shankar Lal Chaturvedi the tenant who had filed the revision application, was disqualified from giving any assistance in the proceedings, for family relationship acts as a disqualification. See Rex v. Band, 1866 L.R. 1 Q.B. 230; Rex v. Armagh County, JJ (1915)49 I.L.T. 56 and Cf. Auten v. Rayner, 1958(1) W.L.R. 1300 . There was a real likelihood of bias and Sri B.N. Chaturvedi was disqualified from taking up the matter. Thus, we are in agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order passed by the State Government is vitiated on account of the relationship that existed between Sri B.N. Chaturvedi and the tenant Shanker Lal Chaturvedi. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether the order is vitiated on account of the fact that the Minister concerned did not apply his mind to the facts of the case before passing the order. 10. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.