Judgment :- Messrs. Arvind Emporium No. 81/3, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Pondicherry, imported a consignment of nine cases containing "Mahle" pistons below 5 "under the cover of the Bill of Entry No. 130/242 dated 27-4-1964/26-6-1964 ex. s.s. Meliakerk. The goods were described as Ex. Army surplus material in the invoice and declared as disposal goods in the Bill of Entry. The value was declared as Rs. 1, 022. The goods were consignment from Holland and the country of origin shown in the Bill of Entry as well as in the invoice was U.S.A. The Customs officials examined the goods and came to the conclusion that the goods were brand new goods; that there was an under-valuation to the extent of Rs. 28, 629 which would have resulted in loss of revenue to the extent of Rs. 14, 827 and that the importers had also failed to produce a valid import licence for the amount of Rs. 28, 631 with the result that the import of goods valued at Rs. 28, 631 should be treated as unauthorized importation. A show cause notice dated 11-11-1964 was issued to the firm. After considering the explanation, the goods were confiscated subject to redemption fine of Rs. 55, 000 for home consumption and a personal penalty of Rs. 12, 000 was also imposed on the firm by the Collector of Customs, Bombay, by order dated 11-1-1965 under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The firm filed an appeal to the Central Board; but the same was rejected on 7-4-1967. The revision filed against that order was rejected by the Government of India by order dated 30-8-1968. The firm sent a petition to the President of India. The same was also turned down by order dated 18-3-1969. As the personal penalty of Rs. 12, 000 remained unpaid, action was initiated for recovery of the same as provided in Section 142 of the Act. The Revenue Officer, Pondicherry who was requested to effect recovery under Section 142 was able to recover only Rs. 4000 leaving the balance, namely Rs. 8, 000. This writ petition is filed impugning the validity of these proceedings and praying for an order of prohibition to restrain the Union of India, the first respondent and the Tahsildar, Pondicherry, the second respondent from collecting the penalty. 2.Messrs. 4000 leaving the balance, namely Rs. 8, 000. This writ petition is filed impugning the validity of these proceedings and praying for an order of prohibition to restrain the Union of India, the first respondent and the Tahsildar, Pondicherry, the second respondent from collecting the penalty. 2.Messrs. Arvind Emporium was a registered firm consisting of three partners (1) Shanmugha Mudaliar, the third respondent (2) Somasundaram Chettiar, late husband of the second petitioner and father of petitioners 3 to 7 and (3) Sinnaraju Chettiar, the first petitioner. Under the terms of the partnership deed, the business of the firm was conducted by the third respondent and the late Somasundaram Chettiar, all the partners having contributed equally. The firm stood dissolved as per notice of dissolution dated 28-6-1969. The contention raised by the petitioners is that the action taken by the Customs Official under the Act resulting in the imposition of penalty is a penal action for which individual notices should have been issued to partners, that the first petitioner and late Somasundaram Chettiar were not aware of the proceedings resulting in the imposition of the fine, that they had no opportunity of putting forward their contentions and that inasmuch as the fine imposed on firm is sought to be recovered from them, the proceeding is vitiated. It is contented that though there is no statutory provision requiring notice to be given to the partners of a firm still principles of natural justice would require that such a notice should be given and that inasmuch as that requirement was not complied with, the petitioners are not liable to answer the claim. It is, therefore, submitted that the respondents 1 and 2 should be restrained from taking any action to recover the balance from them. 3.On behalf of the respondents it is contended that the importer being the firm, the requisite notice was issued to the firm and was acknowledged by the managing partner, the third respondent; that the third respondent exhausted all the remedies available under the Act by way of appeal and revision in addition to submitting a petition to the President of India; that the Customs officials are not aware as to who are the partners of the firm so as to require them to issue individual notices to the partners and that, therefore, the proceedings are in no way vitiated. 4.In these circumstances, the only question is whether the Customs authorities should have issued notices to their individual partners before taking action for the importation, that the importation involved infringement of the provisions of the Act is not disputed. That it was the firm that imported, is also not disputed. That the importation was made in the regular course of business of the firm is also not disputed. Action was taken under Section 112 of the Act, which reads:" * 112 Penalty for improper importation of goods etc. Any person : (a)who in relation to any goods, does or omits to do any act which act or omission would render such goods liable to confiscation under Section 111, or abets the doing or omission of such an act, or (b) who acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing, or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under Section 111, shall be liable (i) in the case of goods in respect of which any prohibition is in force under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, to a penalty not exceeding five times the value of the goods or one thousand rupees, whichever is the greater (ii) in the case of dutiable goods, other than prohibited goods, to a penalty not exceeding five times the duty sought to be evaded on such goods or one thousand rupees, whichever is the greater "Section 124 deals with issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods etc. It reads:" * 124 Issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods etc. It reads:" * 124 Issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods etc. - No order confiscating any goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made under this Chapter unless the owner of the goods or such person -(a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty; (b)is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter ; Provided that the notice referred to in clause (a) and the representation referred to in clause (b) may, at the request of the person concerned be oral "The simple question is whether, in addition to giving notice to the firm, which was the importer, the authorities should have given notices to the individual partners. Mr. Venkatachari, counsel appearing for the petitioner, conceded that he cannot lay his fingers on any provision of law requiring such a notice to be given to the individual partners. But his contention was that the action resulting in imposition of penalty is quasi criminal in nature and that, therefore, before such an action was taken, individual notices should have been issued to the partners. In support of this argument, he cited the following passage in Lindley on Partnership (11th edition) at page 355 :" * One partner is not the agent of his co-partner except as to partnership matters ; and if one partner issued in respect of some private affair of his own, he must be proceeded against, like any other individual, and service of writs etc., must be made accordingly, and they must not be left at the place of business of the firm, to be served on the other partners. And even in proceedings relating to partnership matters, although service on one partner is some-times, held equivalent to service on all, this is not case where the service is relied on the foundation of process of contempt, or of any proceedings of a penal nature ".Section 124 of the Act requires notice to be given to the owner of the goods or such person meaning thereby the person contemplated in Section 112. In the case of a firm, the firm is the owner of the goods. The firm is a legal entity and is also a person within the meaning of Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The question is whether a notice to a firm represented by the managing partner is sufficient compliance of the requirement of notice under section 124. Before adverting to the provisions made in the Act dealing with offences and prosecutions, I shall refer to the position of law as regards the effect of notice to a partner as to obtaining under the law of partnership as contained in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, Section 24 reads :" * 24. Notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of the firm of any matter relating to the affairs of the firm operated as notice to the firm, except in the case of a fraud on the firm committed by or with the consent of that partner. "Section 25 dealing with the liability of a partner for acts of the firm reads :" * Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner ". Section 26 dealing with the liability of the firm for wrongful acts of a partner, reads:" * Where by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm, or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefore of the same extent as the partner". 5. The general rule as to a person's liability as a partner laid down in Section 25 of the Partnership Act confines that liability to all acts of the firm done while he is a partner. This is on the principle of agency. The various grounds on which a person may incur liability as a partner are :(i) A partner may become liable for an act done by another partner or an agent on behalf of the firm but not binding on it if the act has subsequently been ratified by all the partners; (ii) A partner is liable for all the acts of the firm done while he is a partner. This would include liability arising from contracts as well as torts; (iii) A partner would be liable for the acts of his co-partners purporting to be done on behalf of the firm. Section 25 lays down the general rule that every partner is liable for all the acts of the firm done while he is a partner and that the liability is both joint and several. The expression 'act of a firm' means any act or omission by all the partners, or by any partner or agent of the firm which gives rise to a right enforceable by or against the firm. The general rule as to a partner's liability for acts of the firm, based as it is on the principle of agency properly confines that liability only to acts of the firm done while he is a partner. What is required to bring a case under this section is that the act of the firm in respect of which liability is sought to be enforced against a party must have been done while he was a partner. If an act is binding on the firm, every partner will be liable for it. This is irrespective of the fact that a partner was not known as a dormant or a secret partner. The true principle of partnership liability being the existence of an implied agency, it follows that every partner should be liable for all acts of the firm. 6. Section 26 provides for the liability of the firm for wrongful acts of a partner in general. The general rule is that a firm is liable for any loss or injury caused to a third party by the wrongful acts or omissions of a partner if they were done by him while acting (a) in the ordinary course of the partners and (b) with the authority of the partners. To bring a case within the purview of Section 26, it is necessary to show either that the act of the partner was authorized by his co-partners or that in doing it he was acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm. It is not incumbent on the party seeking to charge the firm for the wrongful act of a partner to show that the particular act is within the usual course of dealing or practice of others carrying on a similar business. It is not incumbent on the party seeking to charge the firm for the wrongful act of a partner to show that the particular act is within the usual course of dealing or practice of others carrying on a similar business. What is essential is that the act must be shown to have been done by a partner in the ordinary course of the business of the particular firm. 7.As already pointed out, it is not in dispute in this case that the consignment in question was obtained for the benefit of the firm. It is also not in dispute that the order for importation was made by the third respondent for and on behalf of the firm in the usual course of the business of the firm. Emphasis may also be laid upon the fact that it is not the case of the petitioner, that with regard to the transaction in question, the third respondent was either guilty of fraud or malpractice. In substance, the transaction was one concluded for and on behalf of the firm and is binding on the firm. In these circumstances, the simple question is whether the customs authorities should have issued individual notices to the partners before holding the firm liable. Mr. Venkatachari, appearing for the petitioner, contended that under the Import Trade Control Policy which was in force for the relevant period namely, April 63 to March 1964 that the form of the application required particulars to be given about the partners of the applicant firm and that the authorities concerned were put on notice as to who all were partners. No doubt, Annexure I to Appendix V dealing with the form of certificate of income-tax assessment to be produced by an applicant for import and export licence, inter alia requires a list of partners with addresses of the concern in a firm. It may be presumed that in making the application for the import in question, this requirement was complied with. The question is whether the authorities were bound in law to issue notices to individual partners before holding the firm liable. It should not be forgotten in this connection that the applicant was the firm, a legal entity entitled to make the application. In other words, the importer was the firm. The question is whether the authorities were bound in law to issue notices to individual partners before holding the firm liable. It should not be forgotten in this connection that the applicant was the firm, a legal entity entitled to make the application. In other words, the importer was the firm. He who as an importer was liable for the unlawful importation is not either one or the other of the partners, but the firm as a whole. It cannot be informed from the mere requirement of particulars of the names of the partners to be given in the application that a duty is cast upon the authorities concerned to issue notices to the individual partners before holding the firm liable. After the application for import is made, the partners may change without reconstitution of the firm. No legal duty can be cast upon the customs authorities to find out who were the actual partners at the time of illegal importation and to issue notices to them. 8.Sections 111 and 112 dealing with confiscation of goods and imposition with confiscation of goods and conveyances and imposition of penalties. Section 124 dealing with the show cause notice before confiscating the goods also occurs in the same chapter. It has already been pointed that that section contemplates only notice to be given to the owner of the goods or such person as the one referred to in Section 112, Chapter XVI deals with offences and prosecutions. Section 140, which deals with offences by companies lays down as to who shall be deemed to be guilty of the offences if the person committing the offence is a 'company'. It says that every person who, at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It says that every person who, at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Sub-section (2) of that section provides inter alia that where an offence under that chapter has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any negligence on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence. The explanation to that section says that for the purpose of this section (a) "company" means a body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals and (b) "director" in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. Thus, the Legislature has made a specific provision regarding the persons to be dealt with in the case of offences by companies which include firms also. But that is restricted to the persons committing the offence in Chapter XVI which enumerates several offences. It is important to remember that while making provisions for imposition of penalty in Chapter XVI, no such restriction is placed as to the persons who all should be held liable for the penalty. Mr. Venkatachari contended that the principle embodied in Section 140 may be extended even to imposition of penalty under Chapter XVI. I am unable to accept this argument. When the Legislature has made specific provision with regard to a particular matter and restricting its applicability to that matter, it should necessarily be taken that it was not the intention of the Legislature that similar provision should be applied to any other matter. If the intention was to apply similar consideration to more than than one matter, there was no difficulty for the Legislature to make suitable provision for applying that principle to all matters. The firm being the importer it has been held liable for the penalty, though the partners, by virtue of their relationship, are also liable for the penalty imposed on the firm. The firm being the importer it has been held liable for the penalty, though the partners, by virtue of their relationship, are also liable for the penalty imposed on the firm. It is not as if the partners are sought to be made liable apart from the liability of the firm. If that were the case, the petitioners should be justified in their contention that they cannot be held liable for the act of another partner without notice to them. But what has been done in the instant case is that the firm as such has been held liable, and for recovery of the penalty imposed on the firm, action is being taken against the partners. It is not the case of the petitioners that the third respondent as the Managing partner did not put forward available defences. Nor is it their case that he did not pursue available remedies or that he acted deterrently to their interests. I do not find any ground to accept the contention that before imposing penalty on the firm, notice should have been given to the individual partners also. 9.Mr. Venkatachari cited some authorities in support of his contention that notice to individual partners was necessary before the firm was dealt with. None of the authorities is in point. In Syed Cassim v. Collector of Central Excise - 1962 II M.L.J. 499 the principle laid down is that the penal provision in the Sea Customs Act should be construed strictly and that the authorities issuing a show cause notice should comply strictly not only with the letter of the law but also with the spirit of it. In that case, the notice merely mentioned the statutory provision without mentioning the facts on the basis of which certain contravention was sought to be made out. It was held that the person was entitled to be told that he should show cause against the imposition of such penalty. In Devichand v. Collector, Central Excise 1965 11 A.W.R. 102 the principle laid down is that before passing the order of confiscation of the goods or imposition of penalty, a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person concerned should be given. There is no controversy about this principle in the instant case, because all the prescribed notices were given to the firm and were acknowledged by the managing partner and were also replied to. There is no controversy about this principle in the instant case, because all the prescribed notices were given to the firm and were acknowledged by the managing partner and were also replied to. The decision in Collector of Customs v. Sitaram, was concerned with the meaning of the expression "in any way concerned in or in any manner dealing with any goods" occurring in Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. That is not relevant for the purpose of this case. 10.It is not as though the other partners were not aware of the imposition of penalty on the firm. The first petitioner while he addressed the Deputy Tahsildar of Pondicherry on 28-1-1970 who took action for recovery of the penalty, admitted that the third respondent had told him that penalty had been imposed, though he qualified that statement by saying that the information was conveyed to him in a vague manner without particulars about the amount payable and the circumstances under which the levy was made. His explanation was that he did not attach any importance to that reference, because, according to him, the third respondent was frequently asking financial calls with a view to exploit him. This explanation is not believable. On the admission of the first petitioner it is clear that the third respondent, as the managing partner, also brought to the notice of the other partners that the firm had been dealt with for the importation in question and that penalty had been levied. The other partners took no action to absolve themselves from liability until they were proceeded against to recover the balance of the penalty.11.For all the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the demand of the penalty from the partners of the firm is in no way vitiated and that the petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.