B. J. DIVAN, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein is the original plaintiff and the opponent is the original defendant No. 1. The plaintiff had filed a suit in the Court of the learned Civil Judge J. D. Tharad in Banaskantha District to recover a sum of Rs. 830. 00 from the four defendants. It was the case of the plaintiff that defendants Nos. 2 3 and 4 who were the sons of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 1 himself constituted a joint and undivided Hindu family. Defendant No. 1 was the Karta and manager of that family. According to the plaintiff the first defendant purchased two sets of ivory bangles from the plaintiff on credit and the aggregate price of the two sets was Rs. 551. 00. This purchase took place on October 15 1964 Subsequently defendant No. 1 sent his son defendant No. 4 with a chit to get one of the two sets exchanged and then at the request of defendant No. 1 the set was exchanged and it was agreed that additional amount of Rs. 132. 00 should be paid by way of exchange price. The plaintiff duly debited this amount to the defendant No. 1 and inspite of repeated reminders and demands this amount was not paid. According to the plaintiff he had to incur some additional expenses by way of camel hire charges and the plaintiff also claimed interest and that is how the aggregate of Rs. 850. 00 was made out. Defendant No. 1 it appears paid an amount of Rs. 20. 00 and hence the plaintiff claimed Rs. 830. 00 from defendant No. 1. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Judge held that the plaintiff had not been able to prove that defendant No. 1 had purchased the two sets from the plaintiff. He however came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs version regarding the exchange had been established and he therefore passed a decree accordingly. Under these circumstances the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit only to the extent of Rs. 112. 00. He however came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs version regarding the exchange had been established and he therefore passed a decree accordingly. Under these circumstances the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit only to the extent of Rs. 112. 00. Against this judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge there was an appeal to the District Court and the learned District Judge Banaskantha at Palanpur came to the conclusion that the entire version given by the plaintiff in the plaint was false and that the trial Court was in error in passing the decree for Rs. 112. 00. The learned District Judge therefore dismissed the appeal. He set aside the judgment and decree of trial Court and dismissed the plaintiffs suit in toto. The present Civil Revision Application has been filed against this judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. it may be pointed out that against the judgment and decree to the extent of Rs. 112. 00. defendant No. 1 against whom the decree had been passed had he filed cross objections after the plaintiff filed appeal before the District Court. ( 3 ) MR. Majmudar for the petitioner the original plaintiff has contended that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to give relief to defendant No. 1 as regards the sum of Rs. 112. 00 for which the decree had been passed by the trial Court against defendant No. 1 when the first defendant had neither appealed nor cross objected to the trial Court decree in so far as it was against him. ( 4 ) THE learned District Judge nowhere refers to the provision of law under which he dismissed the plaintiffs suit in toto and thus deprived the plaintiff of the benefit of the trial Court decree to the extent of Rs. 112. 00. Mr. Majmudar rightly says that the only power which the lower appellate Court had and could possibly have to set aside the judgment and decree even to the extent of Rs. 112. 112. 00. Mr. Majmudar rightly says that the only power which the lower appellate Court had and could possibly have to set aside the judgment and decree even to the extent of Rs. 112. 00 can be under O. 41 R. 33 C. P. C. That rule is in these terms:-THE appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. Illustration to this rule is as under:-A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y and in a suit against both obtains a decree against X. X appeals and A and Y are respondents. The appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y. ( 5 ) THE scope of O. 41 R. 33 C. P. C. has been explained in some of the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Rameshgar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal. A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1901 Raghubir Dayal J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court observed :rule 33 really provides as to what the appellate Court can find the appellant entitled to. It empowers the appellate Court to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made in the proceedings before it and thus could have reference only to the nature of the decree or order in so far as it affects the rights of the appellant. It further empowers the Appellate Court to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. The Court is thus given wide discretion to pass such decrees and orders as the interests of justice demand. Such a power is to be exercised in exceptional cases when its non- exercise will lead to difficulties in the adjustment of rights of the various parties. The Court is thus given wide discretion to pass such decrees and orders as the interests of justice demand. Such a power is to be exercised in exceptional cases when its non- exercise will lead to difficulties in the adjustment of rights of the various parties. IN the light of the facts before it was further pointed out by the Supreme Court that the discretionary power given by O. 41 R. 33 C. P. C. cannot be exercised to nullify the effect of the abatement of the appeal in that particular case before the Supreme Court. In fact such an exercise of power will lead to the existence of two contradictory decrees between the heirs of the deceased and the respondents) one passed by the appellate Court and another to the contrary effect by the court below which has attained finality consequent on the abetment of the appeal. ( 6 ) MISS Shah relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1516; where Das Gupta J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court observed :even a bare reading of Order 41 Rule 33 is sufficient to convince any one that wide wording was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as the case may require. . . . . . . While the very words of the section make this position abundantly clear the illustration puts the position beyond argument. TO my mind the appropriate decision about the scope of O. 41 R. 33 is to be found is Nirmala Bala v. Balai Chand A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1874. . . . . . . While the very words of the section make this position abundantly clear the illustration puts the position beyond argument. TO my mind the appropriate decision about the scope of O. 41 R. 33 is to be found is Nirmala Bala v. Balai Chand A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1874. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Shah J. and in para 22 at page 1884 he has observed :the rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide but it has to be applied with discretion and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed the power conferred by Order 41 Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from. THESE observation of Shah J. make it abundantly clear that it is only when some relief is given to the appellant and at the time of giving relief to the appellant before it the appellate Court has to adjust the rights of the parties in order to see that no contradiction arises as between the appellate Court decree and the trial Court decree that it is open to the appellate Court in thus adjusting the rights of the appellant to modify or interfere with the lower Court decree even though that portion of the lower Court decree has not been appealed against but it is not open to the appellate Court to reopen the decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the trial Court. That being the correct legal position as regards the scope of O. 41 R. 33 C. P. C. in the instant case if the learned District Judge wanted to grant some relief to the appellant and if he found that while granting that much relief to the appellant it was necessary to adjust the rights of the parties by interfering with the trial Court decree even though that portion of the trial Court decree was not appealed against the learned District Judge could have done so. But here we find that the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal of the appellant and therefore there was no question of adjusting the rights of the parties or in the process of such adjustment interfering with the trial Court decree for the sum of Rs. 112. 00 though there was no appeal or cross objection against that judgment or decree. ( 7 ) IN Giasi Ram v. Ramjilal (1969) 1 S. C. C. 813 the scope of O. 41 R. 33 C. P. C. was again considered by the Supreme Court. In that particular case before the Supreme Court it was found that the case was one in which the power under O. 41 R. 33 ought to have been exercised and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Nirmala Balas case (supra) was not departed from. In my opinion in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nirmala Bala`s case (supra) it is clear that in the instant case the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to dismiss the plaintiffs suit in toto. All that he could have done was to dismiss the appeal. ( 8 ) I therefore allow this Civil Revision Application and set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court in so far as it dismissed the plaintiffs suit in toto. The judgment and decree of the trial Court would remain in entirety. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .