Judgment :- 1. These revision petitions arise out of an order refusing to extend time to deposit the costs in A. S. No. 34 of 1967, wherein the revision petitioners are the appellants. The appeal was against the decree and judgment of the Munsiff, Taliparamba. It was contended in the appeal that they are entitled to the benefits of S.76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and that they claimed fixity of tenure in respect of a land in their possession. Such a contention was not taken by them in the trial court. However, the appellate court permitted the appellants to raise the contention in the trial court and the suit was ordered to be remanded. But, the appellate court laid down a condition for remand. The condition was that the present petitioners shall pay the costs of the 1st respondent herein in the appeal within 2 weeks from 301 1969, which is the date of the remand order, in which case the petitioners would be permitted to establish their right on remand of the suit to the trial court. But, in default of payment of the costs of the 1st respondent within 2 weeks from the date of the order, it was specifically stated in the judgment of the appellate court that A. S. No. 34 of 1967 will stand dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent. 2. The petitioners did not deposit the amount of the costs. But, on 22 61969, the petitioners filed I. A. 865 of 1969 in the lower appellate court for extension of time to deposit the amount and I. A. 864 of 1969 to condone the delay in depositing the amount. The appellate court held that the order dated 3011969 worked itself out by 13 21969, which was the day when the 2 weeks' time allowed under the order expired and as such the revision petitioners were not entitled to get the time extended. Accordingly, both the petitions were dismissed. The revision petitions are against the order made in those petitions. 3. The remand order has specifically provided that the deposit of the costs shall be made within 2 weeks from 3011969 but, no deposit was made within the time allowed under the order. The petitions to extend time and condone delay were filed only on 22 61969, which was more than 4 months after the expiry of the stipulated time. 3. The remand order has specifically provided that the deposit of the costs shall be made within 2 weeks from 3011969 but, no deposit was made within the time allowed under the order. The petitions to extend time and condone delay were filed only on 22 61969, which was more than 4 months after the expiry of the stipulated time. The question is whether the court is competent to extend the time. 4. I may straightaway consider the Supreme Court decision relied upon by the learned counsel of the revision petitioners. It is reported in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das AIR. 1961 Supreme Court 882. In that case, on appeal to the High Court of Patna, the said court held that the valuation for the purpose of the suit was Rs. 12,178-4 annas and that ad valorem court-fee was payable on it. The said court thereafter gave a direction as follows: "If the amount is not paid within the time given, the appeal will stand dismissed. If (he court fee is paid within the time given, the appeal will be allowed with costs and the suit brought by the plaintiff will stand decreed." The time so given had expired on 8th July, 1954. But, the appellant was not able to find money and it appears that the appellant's Advocate in the High Court asked the case to be mentioned before the vacation judge on July 8th, 1954, so that a request for extension of time could be made. No Division Bench, however, was sitting on that day and the appellant filed an application on July 8th 1954, requesting that he may be allowed to pay Rs. 1,400/.-immediately and the balance within a month thereafter and this application was placed before a Division Bench of the said High Court which ordered that the application for extension of time could be dismissed as by virtue of the previous order of the Bench, the appeal had already stood dismissed as the amount was not paid within the time given. The appellant moved an application under S.151 which was rejected. Another application for review under 0.47 R.1 of the Civil Procedure Code was also not allowed. It was held by the learned judges that those sections apply only to those cases which were not, finally disposed of and the time would then be expired only before the final order was actually made. Another application for review under 0.47 R.1 of the Civil Procedure Code was also not allowed. It was held by the learned judges that those sections apply only to those cases which were not, finally disposed of and the time would then be expired only before the final order was actually made. The appeal against the order was then filed before the Supreme Court on obtaining a certificate from the Patna High Court. The Supreme Court held that in such a case the High Court had jurisdiction to extend time on the application which had been filed before the time fixed by the High Court for payment of deficit court-fee and also in the exercise of the inherent power of the court under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The above case could be distinguished from the facts of the Instant case, The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Para.5 of the above judgment may be seen: "The case is an unfortunate and unusual one. The application for extension of time was made before the time fixed by the High Court for payment of deficit court-fee has actually run out." This statement is sufficient to distinguish the Supreme Court case from the case on hand. In this particular case, the court which passed the order had ceased to have any seisin in the matter after 13-2-1969 when the time for deposit had expired. The petitions to condone delay and to extend time were filed only 4 months after the expiry, of the time stipulated for the deposit. There had been no previous application for extension of time. It could not, therefore, be said that the revision petitioners moved the court which passed the order to extend time before the expiry of the time allowed under the order. The effect of a conditional order is that as soon as the time fixed under the order is expired and no payment or deposit was made, the application, appeal or suit, as the case may be, would stand dismissed and the court ceases to have any jurisdiction to extend the time as the action was dead. Therefore, there could be no question of any enlargement of time as contemplated under S.148 C.P.C. 6. Therefore, there could be no question of any enlargement of time as contemplated under S.148 C.P.C. 6. The view in another case reported in Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, A. I. R.1965 Calcutta 308 on a consideration of the entire case-law on the point is as follows: "Where a decree is passed on condition that if a certain sura of money be put in within a specified time, the suit would stand decreed and in default thereof the suit would stand dismissed. In such a case, after the expiry of the time limited by the decree, the court loses seisin over the matter and cannot extend the time." 7. The same was the view expressed in Tarapada Sarker v. Nepal Gazi and others, A. I. R.1965 Calcutta 354, where it was an application under Order IX, R.13 to set aside the ex parte decree, which was sought to be allowed on condition of payment of costs to the opposite party on or before a particular date and with the direction that the application for restoration was to stand dismissed in case of default and the payment was not made before the expiry of the fixed time. It was held that the court had no jurisdiction under S.148 C.P. C. to condone the delay and to enlarge the time. 8. So, it is clear that when a court passed a conditional order or decree in proceeding directing a party to deposit costs or other sum of money within a stipulated time with the direction that if the deposit or payment was made certain consequences will follow and on failure to deposit the proceeding will stand dismissed, the court which passed the decree or order will have no jurisdiction to extend the time as the order worked itself out. Such an order cannot be restored on compassionate ground unless within the stipulated time the petition is not filed to get the time extended. In the absence of any such petition the courts would not be justified in extending the time. My attention has been drawn to an unreported decision in C.R.P. No. 1287 of 1969 of this court. That is not an authority on the question involved in the case. In the absence of any such petition the courts would not be justified in extending the time. My attention has been drawn to an unreported decision in C.R.P. No. 1287 of 1969 of this court. That is not an authority on the question involved in the case. The learned judge who disposed of that petition, allowed the order of the lower court to stand on the ground that under S.151 C. P. C. the court has always the right to extend the time. The facts of the case are not set-forth in that decision and if the decision is to be relied upon on a circumstance like the one on hand,1 am not prepared to agree that S.151 could be made use of in extending the time if the order stipulating the time to deposit the costs or the amount, as the case may be, had worked itself out. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the present revision petitioners have no right to get the time extended as the order had worked itself out as against the revision petitioners. 9. In the result, the revision petitions are dismissed with one set of costs.