ORDER Shivdayal, J. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Excise authorities and the Collector, Gwalior, not to enforce the notice of demand (Annexure 2) issued by the Collector. In an auction of country liquor shops the Petitioner being the highest bidder, got a group of five shops situate at Gwalior for the period 1969-70 (from April 1, 1969 to March 31, 1970). One of the terms of the sale memo was that the contractor would have to lift a prescribed minimum quantity of liquor and pay duty or consolidated duty at the prevalent rate, otherwise he would have to pay duty on the quantity short of the minimum prescribed. In accordance with this condition the District Excise Officer, Gwalior, issued a notice of demand for Rs. 2,90,502.76 P. as arrears of land revenue and threatened to recover the amount as such. The Petitioner challenges this notice of demand and contends that the demand is not authorised by law. The Petitioner's contention is that the demand notice is ultra vires because duty on liquor not lifted by the contractor is not authorised by law. An excise licensee has to pay (i) the prescribed licence fee, which licence gives the licensee privilege of selling liquor in a shop; (ii) the price of liquor which he purchases from the State Government, and (iii) excise duty on the liquor so purchased by him. What has been demanded in this case under the impugned notice of demand is a fourth item, i. e. duty on liquor not lifted by the contractor who was bound to lift under the conditions prescribing minimum quantity. The question is whether the State Government is authorised to levy duty on liquor which the contractor did not lift. Sections 25 and 26 do not authorise levying of such duty. Under Section 26 duty may be levied on quantity of materials used but not on the quantity of materials not lifted. Nor Section 62 of the Excise Act, which confers rule making power, empowers the State Government to levy duty on liquor which a contractor does not lift. Therefore, it must be said that the levying of duty on liquor not lifted by a contractor is not authorised by law. Nor Section 62 of the Excise Act, which confers rule making power, empowers the State Government to levy duty on liquor which a contractor does not lift. Therefore, it must be said that the levying of duty on liquor not lifted by a contractor is not authorised by law. Any rule made by the State Government which authorises levying of such duty is also ultra vires as it is in transgression of the power conferred by the statute. This position of the law is settled in Bimal Chand Banerjee v. State of M. P. 1971 MPLJ 168 : 1970 JLJ 902 (SC) and Jagannath Prasad v. State of M. P. (Civil Appeal No. 308 of 1970 which appeals were decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by a common judgment dated August 19, 19701 on a consideration of Sections 25, 27, 62 (1) and 62 (2) (d) and (h) of the Excise Act. Their Lordships held:- Neither Section 25 or Section 27 or Section 62(1) or Clauses (d) and (h) of section 62 (2) empower the rule making authority viz. the State Government to levy tax on excisable articles which have not been either imported, exported, transported, manufactured, cultivated or collected under any licence granted under Section 13 or manufactured in any distillery established or any distillery or brewery licenced under the Act.......... The rule making authority has not been conferred with any power to levy duty on any articles which do not fall within the scope of Section 25........ Quite clearly the State Government purported to levy duty on liquor which the contractors failed to lift. In so doing it was attempting to exercise a power which it did not possess. No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule making authority. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. In that view of the matter the Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification as well as the demand notices. That rulling fully applies to the present case. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. In that view of the matter the Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification as well as the demand notices. That rulling fully applies to the present case. It is contended for the State Government that what has been demanded is not "duty" but 'compensation' for the Petitioner's non-performance of the conditions of the licence. A great deal of stress is laid on the Hindi word which was employed in the sale memorandum and licence but there is clear intrinsic evidence to show that this Hindi word was being used by the Excise authorities as equivalent of 'duty'. At many places the Excice authorities have consistently used the word "duty () " which unequivocally denotes that they translate the word 'duty' into. For instance, see Clause 29 (7) of the sale memo where the word has been put within brackets just after the word 'duty'. It leaves no doubt that the word has been used as equivalent of 'duty'. It is not possible to interpret the word as 'compensation' in these contexts. This is not all. In the tabular statement annexed to the sale-memo which shows the calculations of the duty fixed, again the word has been given within brackets to indicate that it is equivalent of 'duty' in the major heading of columns 11, 12 and 13 and also in the foot-note. This is further fortified by the fact that in the licence Clauses (2) (c) and (2) (d) the rate of which has been shown is exactly the same which is given in the tabular statement showing 'duty'. For instance, if the amount of duty for spiced liquor is divided by the quantity of liquor in column 6 the coefficient is the rate of duty and that very rate i. e. Rs. 9.40 P. per proof litre is entered in the licence. It is not possible to read the word in the said tabular statement or in clauses 2 (c) and 2 (d) of the Licence as to mean 'compensation'. We shall now refer to the nomenclature employed by the Excise authorities in these various demand notices. Order XIV, rule 2 before amendment Order XIV, rule 2 Older XIV, rule 2 before amendment Order XIV, rule 2 after amendment 2. We shall now refer to the nomenclature employed by the Excise authorities in these various demand notices. Order XIV, rule 2 before amendment Order XIV, rule 2 Older XIV, rule 2 before amendment Order XIV, rule 2 after amendment 2. Issues of law and of fact - Where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, find for that purpose may, if thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues 1. Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provision of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. 2. Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue related to a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. (i) Thus in the demand-notice in M. P. 10/69 what was demanded was 'duty' in terms and it was also specified that that duty was in respect of minimum guarantee. (ii) The demand-notice in Misc. Petition No. 111/69 is rather elaborate. It clearly speaks of the mind of the Excise authorities. There the contractor is told that in respect of his contract had been fixed. But he lifted liquor of less which resulted in deficit." Here deficit means loss of duty. The word is necessarily used here as equivalent of 'duty'. It is not possible to read it as meaning 'compensation' because otherwise the notice becomes absurd. (iii) In Misc. Petitions Nos. 109/69, 18/70 and 20/70 what was demanded was 'minimum guarantee'. (iv) In Misc. Petition No. 19/70 the expression used is simply 'arrears of land revenue'. The word is necessarily used here as equivalent of 'duty'. It is not possible to read it as meaning 'compensation' because otherwise the notice becomes absurd. (iii) In Misc. Petitions Nos. 109/69, 18/70 and 20/70 what was demanded was 'minimum guarantee'. (iv) In Misc. Petition No. 19/70 the expression used is simply 'arrears of land revenue'. Neither 'duty' nor 'compensation' nor 'minimum guarantee' has been used. The learned Government Advocate relied on the rules framed by the State Government which were published in the Madhya Pradesh Government Gazette (Extraordinary) dated January 6, 1965, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 62(2)(d) and (h). The relevant Rule 2-G may be reproduced here:- The minimum quantity for taking issues from the warehouse for sale is fixed at......P. litres spiced spirit, and......P. litres plain. On your failure to take, in any month, the monthly average of the total minimum quantity, you shall he liable to pay compensation to the State Government at the rate of Rs. ........per P. litre spiced spirit and Rs. ........per P. litre plain spirit falling short of such monthly minimum average and such compensation shall be paid by the 10th day of the month next following the month to which such short fall relates. In the Supreme Court ruling Bimal Chand v. State of M. P. (supra) the rule which was made by a notification published on January 7, 1970, is quoted. It corresponds to Rule 2-C of the Rules published on January 6, 1965, with the difference which is reproduced below:- In the Rules of 1970 the words: the deficit of monthly average of total minimum duty. (Italicised by us.) were used, while in the 1965 Rules the word 'compensation' which is specified in the licence, as payable if the minimum quantity of liquor was not lifted, is at the same rate of duty which was fixed for the respective liquor. In other words, the word 'compensation' referred to the "loss of duty" What the contractor had to compensate was the loss of such duty as the State Government would have got from him if he had lifted the liquor. Now if the levying of duty on liquor not lifted is not authorised by law, any compensation for loss of such duty as could not be levied must necessarily he held to be not authorised by law. Now if the levying of duty on liquor not lifted is not authorised by law, any compensation for loss of such duty as could not be levied must necessarily he held to be not authorised by law. Therefore, the demand of compensation for loss of such duty as is not authorised by law, must also be struck down on the authority of the Supreme Court ruling cited above. At this juncture it is urged by the learned Government Advocate that 'compensation' stipulated in the Sale-Memo, licence and the demand-notice is not for loss of duty but it is for other things. In our opinion this contention is clearly an after-thought and cannot be accepted. The Excise authorities equated the word 'compensation' with 'duty' and used them as synonymous. Moreover, it is not possible to read the word 'compensation' in its true connotation, and not as an equivalent of 'duty', in these documents because then they would be rendered absurd and without meaning. For instance, in the tabular statement the major heading of columns 11, 12 and 13 reads thus: The prescribed amount of duty compulsorily payable by the Contractor to Government for sale of liquor. . Below these words are written "duty" If the word is read as 'compensation', the whole thing becomes without meaning. The foot-note fortifies the above interpretation. It must be concluded from the above discussion that (i) Levy duty on liquor not lifted by the contractor is not authorised by law although there may be a guarantee to lift a prescribed minimum quantity; (ii) What was demanded was 'duty', not 'compensation'. The Excise authorities had been wrongly employing the Hindi word for 'duty'. It must be concluded from the above discussion that (i) Levy duty on liquor not lifted by the contractor is not authorised by law although there may be a guarantee to lift a prescribed minimum quantity; (ii) What was demanded was 'duty', not 'compensation'. The Excise authorities had been wrongly employing the Hindi word for 'duty'. The Respondents now want to take advantage of their erroneous translation; (iii) In essence the impugned demand-notice is in respect of that 'duty' which is shown in Annexure to the Sale-Memo, and which corresponds to the rate of 'duty' incorporated in the licence in Clause 2 (c) and 2 (d) as payable in case of minimum quantity prescribed was not lifted; (iv) Even assuming (but not holding) that the word was used for 'compensation', the compensation which has been demanded is for loss of such duty as would have been payable if the liquor bad been lifted; (v) As levying of duty on liquor not lifted by the contractor is not authorised by law, it necessarily follows that compensation for loss of such duty is also not authorised by law. What has been demanded from the Petitioner is not 'compensation' nor 'damages' for breach of contract. It is not necessary for us to enter into the question whether 'compensation' can be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Nor are we called upon to consider whether the State Government had legislative competence to make Rules for recovery of 'compensation' under the Excise Act as being beyond the purview of Entry 51 of Schedule II of the Constitution of India. Today we say nothing about the right, if any, of the Respondent State Government to demand and recover from the Petitioners 'compensation' as damages for breach of contract, but not for 'loss of duty' on the liquor not lifted by the contractor. The learned Government Advocate before concluding his address contended that the Petitioner is estopped from challenging the demand notice inasmuch as by virtue of the contract he ran the shops and he cannot now challenge the validity of the terms of conditions of the contract. This contention must be rejected as there can be no estoppel against statute. (See, Thakur Amur Singhji v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 504 . This petition is allowed. The impugned demand-notice is quashed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. This contention must be rejected as there can be no estoppel against statute. (See, Thakur Amur Singhji v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 504 . This petition is allowed. The impugned demand-notice is quashed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. The amount of security shall be refunded to the Petitioner. Petition allowed