Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a learned single judge in a writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing an order passed by the Kerala State Electricity Board reducing him in rank as a Grade I Overseer. 2. The facts of the case may be stated as follows: The appellant was a Junior Engineer (Electrical), Chavara. A sum of Rs. 3186.81 collected by the Cashier, Sri Ramakrishna Pillai, on 191 1966 was entrusted with the peon Sri Divakaran on 20-1-1966 for remittance to the Treasury. A further sum of Rs. 5,611.66 received on 5-2-1966 was also entrusted with the same peon on 7 21966 for remittance to the treasury. These amounts were misappropriated by the peon. C C. No. 88 of 1966 on the file of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karunagappally, was filed against the peon Divakaran and the Cashier Ramakrishna Pillai as 1st and 2nd accused respectively. The magistrate while acquitting the Cashier convicted the peon. The appellant was examined as Pw.l in the case and his conduct in not making effective supervision was adversely commented upon by the magistrate in the judgment. The appellant's case was that he came to know about the transaction of receipt of the two amounts and their non-remittance into the treasury only on 29-4-1966 after he got intimation from the Deputy Chief Accountant. The magistrate did not believe the case of the appellant. He referred to the statement of the 2nd accused that he had brought the matter on several occasions to the notice of the appellant that the 1st accused had not produced the chalan receipts for the amounts, but that the appellant on these occasions told him that there was no need for worry as the peon was honest and trustworthy. The 2nd accused also stated that the appellant had finally addressed the Sub Treasury Officer, Karunagappally, for a certificate of remittance on 26 21966 and that the said correspondence was in file No. R. C. 4/63 dated 26-2-1966. The appellant was summoned to produce the file in R.C. 4/63 before the Magistrate's Court and, on production, it was found that sheet No 35 on which reliance was placed, was missing and that in its place sheet No. 35 of R. C. 8/65 was substituted. In the light of the evidence of the witnesses examined in the case, especially of pw. In the light of the evidence of the witnesses examined in the case, especially of pw. 3 who deposed to having seen file R.C. 4/63 before its production in court and sheet No. 35 as the carbon copy of a letter dated 26 61965 by the appellant to the Sub Treasury Officer, the magistrate concluded that the appellant purposely and dishonestly removed sheet No. 35 from R.C. 4/63 and substituted sheet No.35 of R.C. 8/65 in order to fit in with his prior assertion that he came to know of the transactions only on 29-4-1965. 3. On the basis of these circumstances two charges were laid against the appellant, namely, dereliction of duty and misconduct. Ext, P1 dated 29-3-1967 is a copy of the charges and along with that a statement of allegations was also served on the appellant and he was called upon to state whether he desired to be heard in person. He was also permitted to peruse the relevant records mentioned in the statement of allegations and to take down extracts from the relevant records to prepare his written statement. The statement of allegations referred to the judgment in C. C. 88/1966, and in particular, to the relevant paragraphs therein dealing with the conduct of the appellant. The appellant filed Ext. P-2 written statement of defence. Thereafter Ext. P-3 show-cause notice was issued by the Board proposing to impose the punishment of reduction in rank and calling upon the appellant to submit his explanations against the proposed punishment. Ext. P-3 (a) and P-3 (b) are copies of the enquiry reports of the Chief Engineer (Electricity) enclosed along with Ext. P-3. The explanation submitted by the appellant is Ext. P-4. After considering the explanation the Board passed Ext. P-5 order reducing the appellant to the lower grade of Grade I Overseer for a period of one year. 4. The main contention of the appellant before the learned judge was, there was no enquiry as contemplated by R.15 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, for short, the Rules. The Rules have been adopted by the Board and there was no dispute that the proceedings against the appellant were governed by the Rules. R.15 of the Rules provides as follows: "(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act. The Rules have been adopted by the Board and there was no dispute that the proceedings against the appellant were governed by the Rules. R.15 of the Rules provides as follows: "(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act. 185) (Central Act XXXVII of 1850), and the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1122 (Act XI/1122) no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in items (V) to (ix) of R.11 (1) shall be passed except after an enquiry held as far as may be in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) (a): Whenever a complaint is received, or on consideration of the report of an investigation, or for other reasons, the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority or any other authority empowered by Government in this behalf is satisfied that there is a prima facie case for taking action against a Government servant, such authority shall frame definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the Government servant together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. The accused Government servant shall be required to submit within a reasonable time to be specified in that behalf a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. The Government servant may on bis request be permitted to peruse or take extracts from the records pertaining to the case for the purpose of preparing his written statement; provided that the disciplinary or other authority referred to above may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse him such access, if in its opinion such records are not strictly relevant to the case or it is not desirable in the public interest to allow such access. After the written statement is received within the time allowed, the authority referred to above may, if it is satisfied that a formal enquiry shall be held into the conductor the Government servant, forward the record of the case to the authority or officer referred to in clause (b) and order that a formal enquiry may be conducted." Sub-rule (5) empowers the enquiring authority to enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted. Sub-rule (6) enables the disciplinary authority to nominate a person to present the case in support of the charges, and enables the Government servant to present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant, and under certain circumstances, with the aid of a legal practitioner. Sub-clause (7) of R.15 says that the enquiring authority shall in the course of the enquiry consider such documentary evidence and take, such oral evidence as may be relevant or material in regard to the charges and that the Government shall be entitled to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and give evidence is person and to have such witnesses as may be produced examined in his defence. It further provides that the person presenting the case in support of the charges shall be entitled to cross-examine the Government servant and the witnesses examined in his defence. There is a note to the rule which provides that if the enquiring authority proposes to rely on the oral evidence of any witness the authority should examine such witness and give an opportunity to the Government servant to cross-examine the witness. 5. The learned judge was of the view that it was not obligatory for the enquiring authority to have conducted an enquiry in this case with notice to the delinquent officer and in his presence. According to the learned judge the scheme of the Rules is that so long as the documents and the records proposed to be examined by the enquiring authority are indicated to the delinquent officer and the officer afforded an opportunity to counter them or rebut the inference to be drawn from them, the proceedings cannot be regarded as vitiated, for the reason that the records were not examined in the presence of the delinquent officer. The learned judge came to this conclusion mainly for the reason that the language of the R.15 (1) ordains only an enquiry to be held 'as far as may be' in the manner provided by R.15 and that while sub-rule (7) which provides for examination of witnesses and affording opportunity for cross-examination would indicate that this should be done in the presence of the delinquent, there is nothing in the rule to show that the records and documents can be examined only in his presence. The learned judge also said that the petitioner was told by Ext. The learned judge also said that the petitioner was told by Ext. P1 memo to state whether he desires to be heard in person and since he did not say one way or the other in the written statement it was quite unnecessary that an enquiry should be conducted. The learned judge was of opinion that the judgment in C. C. No. 88 of 1966 provided ample materials to show that the delinquent officer was guilty of the charge of misconduct and that since Exts. P3(a) and P3 (b) copies of the reports of the enquiring officer were furnished to the appellant and these showed the document and records which had been relied on by the enquiring authority there was no failure of natural justice in the case. 6. We are of the view that R.15 made it obligatory that the enquiring officer should have conducted an enquiry, which means an enquiry after notice to the delinquent and in his presence. For imposing a minor penalty R.16 provides that the delinquent need only be informed of the charge and be given an opportunity of explaining it. No formal enquiry need be conducted. But for imposing a major penalty R.15 makes it clear that after the delinquent is informed of the charge and his written statement filed, there must be a formal enquiry unless of course the delinquent admits the charge; and that is quite proper because the delinquent must have a reasonable opportunity of defending himself. The rules were framed under the proviso to Art.309 and R.15 in essence embodies the content of the reasonable opportunity to be provided to a person holding a civil post under the Government in a disciplinary proceeding for imposing the penalties specified in Art.311. In interpreting R.15, this has to be borne in mind. The rule is not susceptible of a different interpretation when it is sought to be applied to a person not holding a civil post under the Government. The rules no doubt, have no statutory force so far as the Board is concerned. But when once the Board has adopted them, and purported to conduct the proceedings according to them, they must follow them scrupulously. As Frankfurter J. said in Viterelli v. Seaton (359 US 535): "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged. But when once the Board has adopted them, and purported to conduct the proceedings according to them, they must follow them scrupulously. As Frankfurter J. said in Viterelli v. Seaton (359 US 535): "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even if generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicial rule of administrative law is now firmly established, and if I may add, rightly so. He 'that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword'." We think that the enquiry visualised by the rule is an enquiry in the presence of the delinquent. It is said that the enquiring authority relied on no oral evidence but only perused the records to find out whether appellant was guilty of the charges, and the nature of the records perused was intimated to the appellant in the statement of allegations; and so it was quite unnecessary that the appellant should have been present when the records were perused by the enquiring officer. An opportunity for the delinquent to present his case means an opportunity to explain away the inference of guilt to be drawn from the records. The material on the basis of which the appellant was found guilty must be introduced into the records of the case in the presence of the delinquent, and there must be an opportunity to rebut the inference sought to be drawn from them by examining himself or other persons. What the enquiring officer purported to do in this case was that after receiving the written statement Ext. P2, he looked into the records including the judgment of the criminal court referred to and came to a conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the charges. It is very doubtful whether for proceeding the charge of misconduct the enquiring officer was right in having relied upon the observations made by the learned Magistrate in that judgment. The delinquent officer was not a party in that case. He was only a witness there and any adverse observations made by the learned Magistrate as regards the conduct of the appellant cannot be taken to have proved the charge of misconduct against him. The delinquent officer was not a party in that case. He was only a witness there and any adverse observations made by the learned Magistrate as regards the conduct of the appellant cannot be taken to have proved the charge of misconduct against him. The observations of the magistrate in the judgment had no evidentiary value and they cannot be taken without anything more as proof of misconduct in the proceeding in question. The charge of misconduct must be proved on the basis of the materials introduced in the proceedings as evidence the observations of the magistrate do not by themselves prove the charges. The enquiring officer has assumed in Ext. P3(a) report and that assumption was concurred in by the disciplinary authority that the second charge has been proved by the observations of the magistrate in the judgment. The magistrate relied upon the evidence of pw. 2 and pw. 3 in the case for making the observations upon the conduct of the appellant, in his written statement the appellant challenged the impartiality of pw. 2 and the veracity of pw. 3. He has given a detailed statement as to why the inference of the magistrate that he has removed the sheet No 35 from file R. C. 4/1963 and substituted sheet No. 35 of file R. C. 8 to fit in with his assertion that he came to know of the defalcations only on 29 91966 is incorrect. The appellant was entitled to an opportunity to prove that he has not removed sheet No. 35 from file R. C. 4 and substituted sheet No. 35 of file R.C. 8. The appellant not being a party to the criminal case was unable to cross-examine pw. 2 and pw. 3 in that case. The observations were made by the magistrate on the basis of the testimony of these two witnesses whom the appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine. What value can be attached to those observations so far as the appellant was concerned? Without giving the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses in the enquiry, how can a finding of guilt on that charge be arrived at against the appellant? We cannot speculate whether if the appellant bad been given an opportunity of cross-examining those witnesses in the enquiry, their evidence would have been believed by the enquiring officer. Without giving the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses in the enquiry, how can a finding of guilt on that charge be arrived at against the appellant? We cannot speculate whether if the appellant bad been given an opportunity of cross-examining those witnesses in the enquiry, their evidence would have been believed by the enquiring officer. We cannot also speculate as to what evidence or explanation the appellant would have given if there had been an enquiry. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in thinking that a finding of misconduct was not based on any relevant and admissible materials. 7. The fact that the delinquent officer did not in bis written statement claim an opportunity for personal hearing would not dispense with the necessity for an enquiry which is enjoined by Rule 15. In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Madhya Bharat (AIR. 1961 SC. 1070) the Supreme Court said: "The departmental enquiry is not an empty formality; it is a serious proceeding intended to give the officer concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. In the absence of any such enquiry it would not be fair to strain facts against the appellant and to hold that in view of the admissions made by him the enquiry would have served no useful purpose." That was a case where the High Court thought that the delinquent officer has practically admitted the charges. The Supreme Court said that unless the admission is unambiguous and unconditional, an enquiry cannot be dispensed with. As the delinquent officer here did not plead guilty to the charges it was absolutely essential that there must have been a formal enquiry in the presence of the 'delinquent. We find it difficult to subscribe to the opinion of the learned judge that the words -as far as may be' in R.15 (1) do not make it obligatory upon a disciplinary authority to conduct an enquiry when it is proposed to impose a major penalty where no oral evidence is attempted to be aduced on behalf of the disciplinary authority. Those words only indicate that minor or immaterial deviations from the provisions of the rule might not affect the validity of the proceedings. Those words only indicate that minor or immaterial deviations from the provisions of the rule might not affect the validity of the proceedings. Those words do not mean that an enquiring authority can totally dispense with an enquiry when the charge is denied, even if the charge is sought to be made out on the basis of records and documents. As already stated the records and documents must be introduced in the evidence in the enquiry in the presence of the delinquent. The object of appointing a presenting officer is to present the case with the materials to prove it. The delinquent officer is entitled to have his case presented with the assistance of any other government servant or under certain circumstances with the assistance of a legal practitioner. In this case the disciplinary authority had directed the Chief Engineer to conduct an enquiry. We think that even if no oral evidence was necessary to prove the charges, the delinquent officer was entitled to have an opportunity to explain his case to the enquiring officer with reference to the records with the assistance of another government servant and if necessary to adduce either oral or documentary evidence in rebuttal. We have also no hesitation to find that the appellant was prejudiced by the absence of an enquiry. 8. We therefore set aside the judgment of the learned single judge and allow the appeal by quashing Ext. P5, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. But we make it clear that this would not preclude the disciplinary authority from conducting an enquiry on the basis of the charges already framed and proceeding with the case in accordance with law. A.N.K. Allowed.